U.S.-China Scientific Exchange:
A Case Study of State-Sponsored Scientific
Internationalism during the Cold War and Beyond
Historical Studies in the
Physical and Biological Sciences,
Fall 1999 v. 30, part 1, pp. 249-277
Full Text: COPYRIGHT 1999 University of California Press
IN FEBRUARY 1972 President Richard Nixon of
the United States embarked
on his historic journey to Beijing.
The dramatic trip not only opened a new era in U.S.-China relations, but also
began an exciting process of mutual discovery between the two peoples. If it is
true that, as the China
scholar A. Doak Barnett wrote, "never in the modern period have two major
societies been so isolated from each other for so long in peacetime," the
end of the schism also brought forth unprecedented exchanges in many walks of
life, especially in academia.  The geopolitical move by the two countries to
counter Soviet aggression paved the way for interactions in science and other
fields. The contacts flourished through the 1970s and expanded even further
after the establishment of diplomatic relations and the launching of China's
economic reforms by the end of the 1970s. This intellectual open door proved to
have profound social and political, as well as scientific, impact, especially
which had just begun to emerge from the devastating Cultural Revolution of
Despite its considerable significance,
scientific exchange has often been treated as a sideline in U.S.-China
relations. Several excellent studies examine U.S.-China academic and
educational exchanges, but they barely touch on the scientific components, thus
obscuring the part that science and technology played in the developing
relationship. Most of these studies focus on the impact of academic exchanges
in the U.S.
and leave the political, social, and cultural impact of such exchanges on
Chinese society unexamined. 
This paper examines the U.S.-China scientific
reopening as a case study of scientific nationalism and internationalism. Here
we are concerned not so much with specific exchange projects as with the
political context and implications of the exchange as a whole. What, for
example, did the exchange mean to Chinese science and Chinese scientists, many
of whom had suffered, along with other intellectuals, horrible persecution at
the hands of Mao Zedong's radical Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution?
How did American scientists respond to the new opportunities? Above all, what
does this story of scientific exchange tell us about scientific nationalism and
internationalism during the Cold War?
In considering these questions, we will look
not only at the two national scientific communities involved but at also the
special subnational group of Chinese American scientists who were crucial in
the forging of this new international scientific network. They, along with
Chinese scientists who were trained in the U.S. in the 1930s and 1940s, helped
to stimulate and sustain the exchange program. In turn, the U.S.-China
reopening did much to give them a political voice and helped them form a
distinct scientific community. The narrative covers mainly the period from
1971, when the first moves in the reopening took place, up to 1989, when the
Chinese government's crackdown on the pro-democracy demonstration at Tiananmen Square produced a hiatus in the exchange and
introduced new dynamics in U.S.-China relations. But we will also take a brief
look at the 1990s, when this community of Chinese American scientists evolved
into a transnational scientific network of the Chinese diaspora and when some
of these scient ists were accused by the U.S.
government of spying for China
in the areas of nuclear and defense technologies. The present study thus
examines interactions of scientific communities at three levels, the
subnational, the national, and the international, during the Cold War and
State-sponsored scientific internationalism
The U.S.-China scientific exchange provides a
case of what might be termed state-sponsored scientific internationalism during
the Cold War, when nation-states, often for geopolitical reasons, established
the framework for communication and collaboration among scientists across national
boundaries. This was in contrast to the more traditional, private form of
scientific internationalism that relied on personal scientific communication
before World War II. Prominent examples of the latter included the travel of
scientists to enemy territories in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to
conduct scientific research.  The state was mostly absent or passive.
Nationalism did surge during and immediately following World War I, as Entente
scientists launched a boycott against their German colleagues. Max Planck
lamented the division as an "unnatural mixture of science and
politics."  Yet, it was often the national scientific communities, in Germany and
elsewhere, rather than the governments, that most activel y promoted or
manipulated the ideology of scientific nationalism.  In the interwar years,
"private" internationalism soon revived as physicists from around the
world, often financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, traveled to Germany, Denmark,
to study the new quantum mechanics and nuclear physics. Chinese scientists also
benefited from and joined in this movement of people and ideas. Most pioneering
Chinese physicists in the modern era, for example, received their graduate
training in the U.S. or Europe in the early twentieth century. Chinese biologists
exchanged specimens with colleagues in the West. 
World War II, especially the Manhattan
Project, started state internationalism in science in earnest, although
traditional, personal networks among scientists continued to play an important
role. To make the atomic bomb, the U.S.,
Britain, and Canada pooled
resources and scientists under formal governmental agreements. During the
ensuing Cold War, state internationalism flourished when the world was divided
into two hostile camps in the late 1940s and 1950s, and persisted even when
realignment and detente in the 1960s and 1970s changed the early pattern of
bipolar conflict. Both the NATO and Warsaw-pact alliances sponsored fraternal
scientific cooperation. The U.S.
exchanged information, albeit limited, on nuclear weapons. Scientists from the
Eastern bloc worked with each other at the Dubna nuclear research center in the
Soviet Union.  Using Dubna's 10-GeV
accelerator, Chinese physicists led by Wang Ganchang discovered an elementary
particle, the anti-sigma negative hyperon, in the late 1950s, widely regarded
as the only major achievement in the history of that machine.  Until the
Sino-Soviet split became public in the early 1960s, thousands of Soviet
scientists and engineers also went to work in China as advisors. China sent students, scientists, and engineers
to study and visit the Soviet Union. 
Indeed, state-sponsored scientific internationalism was used both to heighten
and mediate tensions in the Cold War.  Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union
implemented cooperative projects in science, technology, and education--for
example, an agreement on cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy was signed in
1959--but such exchanges were often marred by suspicion and heavy political
control on both sides. 
U.S.-China scientific contacts
U.S.-China scientific contacts during the
Cold War followed the same pattern of state domination, as the governments
determined the nature and degree of exchanges, if any, on the basis of
international and domestic politics. When the Chinese Communists took over the
mainland in 1949, American scientists lost touch with their many former
students and colleagues in China.
The situation improved somewhat after the end of the Korean War in the mid
1950s, but the poor relationship between the U.S.
resumed and caused great difficulties in several international scientific
projects in this period, such as the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58.
China withdrew from the IGY
when the U.S.-led organizing committee allowed Taiwan,
regarded as a renegade province, to join.  The few contacts that did take
place between American and Chinese scientists in this period produced only
misunderstandings and frustrations on both sides, often in highly politicized
circumstances. At the Pugwash confe rence in Moscow in 1960, for example, Jerome Wiesner,
then a professor of electrical engineering at MIT and soon to be appointed
science advisor to President-elect John Kennedy, shook hands with Zhou Peiyuan,
a U.S.-trained physicist and chairman of the Chinese delegation. Wiesner told
Zhou that he was a close friend of Kennedy's and was interested in contacts
Before the Chinese could make a positive response to this overture, however,
they found in Wiesner's paper distributed at the conference statements on the
need for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to work together to contain a militant
China. Belligerency became self-perpetuating at the very forum that was
designed to prevent. 
Wiesner's conflicting signals reflected
Kennedy's ambivalence. On the one hand, Kennedy believed that China was a more unpredictable and dangerous
threat to world peace than the Soviet Union.
Thus, he hoped that the Limited Test Ban Treaty among the U.S., Britain, and the Soviets in 1963
would help curb Chinese nuclear ambitions. This proved an unrealistic goal,
given the little leverage either the U.S.
or the Soviet Union had on China.
 On the other hand, Kennedy believed that scientific exchange across the
Iron Curtain, especially with Eastern Europeans, would help relax the Cold War
tension. His liberal policy encouraged American scientists to knock on China's door.
In 1962, Luis Alvarez, a Berkeley physicist
whose mother was born in China
to missionary parents, contacted John Tizo Wilson, a Canadian geophysicist who
had recently visited China,
in the hope that Wilson and his connections
would help him secure an invitation to visit the Chinese Academy
of Sciences. To Wilson's skepticism about
officials would approve the trip, Alvarez responded that "the State
Department has been under new management for the past year" and that he
was confident that his government would "consider such a trip in a
favorable light." 
Months earlier, Walt Whitman, science advisor
to the Secretary of State, had advised Harrison Brown, a geochemist at the
California Institute of Technology who wanted to invite Chinese scientists for
a conference, that the State Department saw no objection, provided that Brown
would "select those for invitation whose primary interests are scientific
rather than political." Whitman could not, however, guarantee that
"anyone invited will be admitted to the U.S."  Little success came
to these private initiatives by American scientists. Under President Lyndon
Johnson, the Vietnam War, which was ostensibly fought to contain Chinese
expansion, coupled with the Chinese Cultural Revolution made scientific
communication between the two sides all the more difficult. 
The door for scientific and cultural exchange
opened finally with Nixon's trip in 1972.  In the famous Shanghai
Communique signed by Premier Zhou Enlai and Nixon during the visit, science and
technology figured prominently in the new bilateral relationship: 
The two sides agreed that it is desirable to
broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed
specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports, and
journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually
beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such
contacts and exchange.
Both the U.S.
saw scientific exchange as a neutral, non-ideological route to mutual
understanding after so many years of isolation.  The U.S. recognized the military implications of
technological exchange, but decided to take a calculated risk in the hope that a
modernized China would help
in the balance against the Soviet Union and thus work in the U.S. national
interest. In 1973, for example, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a
secret proposal to Premier Zhou Enlai that the U.S.
was willing to provide China
with early warning intelligence information for satellite images on Soviet
missile launchings through a hotline. "We could also give you the
technology for certain kinds of radars," Kissinger told Zhou, "but
you would have to build them yourselves." Probably due to domestic
politics, the Chinese government did not follow up on the offer. 
The exchange carried great significance for
Chinese leaders concerned with rapid economic development, especially Premier
Zhou and his protege Deng Xiaoping, who would become supreme leader of China in 1978
after Mao and Zhou died in 1976. These modernizers had always viewed science
and technology as the key to Chinese modernization and sought ways to import
foreign technology.  For this purpose, they had turned to the Soviets in
the 1950s and the Europeans in the 1960s. In early 1966, Zhou had urged in a
talk with Chinese diplomats that they should learn enough science and
technology to be able to coordinate the process of absorbing scientific and
technological information from the countries where they were stationed. 
During the latter phase of the Cultural Revolution, Zhou and Deng again
attempted to revitalize Chinese science and technology. Shortly after the Nixon
trip in 1972 Zhou Enlai presented to the country an ambitious plan of
modernizing Chinese science and technology, agriculture, indust ry, and
In many ways, Zhou became the gatekeeper in
scientific exchange with the U.S.
in the early 1970s. He personally negotiated the first formal academic exchange
agreement with the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's
Republic of China (CSCPRC) in 1973, a semi-official group formed in the U.S. in
1966 by the National Academy of Sciences, the American Council of Learned Societies,
and the Social Sciences Research Council to promote contacts with Chinese
scientists. During a session with the CSCPRC delegation on May 27, 1973, in Beijing, Zhou gave his
blessing to nine scientific areas of cooperation that ranged from earthquake
predictions to acupuncture to anthropology. But he excluded three social
science projects (China
studies, urban studies, and science and technology in China's
development) as requiring further preparation. 
Zhou viewed scientific exchange with the U.S. with great
personal interest and sought to ensure that the framework of exchange would
survive personnel changes at the top of both governments, especially in view of
Nixon's domestic political troubles. Glenn T. Seaborg, Nobel laureate and
professor of chemistry at UC Berkeley, who was a member of the CSCPRC
delegation, recorded a telling anecdote.
When the CSCPRC meeting in the Great Hall
ended, Seaborg wrote in his diary, Zhou shook hands with delegation members and
commented to Emil L. Smith, biochemist at UCLA and CSCPRC chairman, that he
understood that the committee was formed in the mid-1960s but was only
effective after Nixon's contacts with the Chinese leaders. "Doesn't this
mean that President Nixon has done something good?" Zhou asked. Emil Smith
agreed. Then the premier threw up his hands and said, "But oh,
Watergate!" When Smith reassured Zhou that he did not think that the
political turmoil in the U.S.
would affect U.S.-China relations or scientific exchanges, "the premier
took Smith's hand in both of his hands and gripped it." 
Reactions of American scientists
Following this meeting with Zhou Enlai, the
CSCPRC, operating within the National Academy of Sciences and with funds from
the U.S. government and
private foundations, became the de facto liaison in the U.S. for academic exchanges with China. It
sponsored American delegations in almost all major scientific fields to visit China, usually
for several weeks. Upon their return, these groups published detailed reports
about the status of Chinese science, technology, and education and made
suggestions for future exchanges.  The committee also arranged for the
visits of Chinese delegations to the U.S.  Although these early, brief
exchanges were sometimes criticized as "scientific tourism" by
American scientists who wanted to expand the depth and length of contacts, they
proved to be enormously useful to Chinese scientists who needed information
about the state of the art in various fields of science, information which
could only come from personal contacts. More substantial collaboration became
possible foll owing the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979.
The U.S.-China exchange also gave American
scientists, especially former government advisers such as the alumni of the President's
Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), a chance to pursue arms control through an
outside channel. For many of them, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
now became their institutional platform of choice, and the FAS happily met with
a favorable reception by the Chinese government as a progressive scientific
group. American scientists seized the opportunity to show a skeptical U.S. government
that traditional scientific internationalism could still play a positive role
in international Cold War politics. Thus, Wiesner, now president of MIT, and
IBM's Richard Garwin, a former member of PSAC, both active in the FAS, sought
and received opportunities to engage Chinese physicists in arms-control
discussions, even in the early 1970s. Despite their earlier conflict at the
Moscow Pugwash meeting in 1960, Zhou Peiyuan hosted a visit by Wiesner to China and
arranged his meeting with ot her scientists interested in arms control.  In
contrast to the high visibility and formality of U.S.-Soviet conferences on
arms control throughout the Cold War, contacts in arms control by Chinese and
American scientists have been kept low-key, even to the present day. They are
believed by the participants to be useful in helping educate the Chinese
government and scientists about the dynamics of the arms race and the need for
Impact on Chinese scientists
Despite, or perhaps because of, the
geopolitical designs of the Chinese government, Chinese scientists stood to
reap the greatest benefit from the U.S.-China reopening and scientific
exchange. During the Cultural Revolution, thousands of Chinese scientists,
especially those senior scientists trained in the U.S.
and Europe, were accused of being reactionary
bourgeois academic authorities and American or Western agents and spies.
Hundreds were killed or committed suicide and many more suffered persecution.
 Chinese scientific and educational institutions stopped functioning from
the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 to about 1970. Universities
admitted no new students for those years; laboratories and libraries were
abandoned; professors and students, like much of the rest of the society, were
engaged in political campaigns, either as victims or victimizers. International
exchange stopped completely.  By the early 1970s, the Cultural Revolution
was past its most violent phase, but the nation al economy neared collapse. Mao
decided to reestablish order and revive the institutional structure of Chinese
society, including scientific research and higher education.  The downfall
in this period of Chen Boda, a party ideologue in charge of science, and the
death of Lin Biao, chief of the People's Liberation Army and Mao's heir
apparent, in a plane crash while fleeing to the Soviet Union after a failed
coup against Mao, marked a major turning point in Chinese politics and helped
improve the situation of scientists.  Some scientists regained limited work
possibilities, although ideological control was far from being relaxed. The
powerful Gang of Four, led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, and often acting with his
consent, continued to impose a reign of radical terror. They often targeted and
attacked Zhou as a major obstacle on their route to leadership of China after
The stunning reversal of U.S.-China relations
and images of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai shaking hands with Richard Nixon in the
midst of the political turmoil brought political relief to many scientists.
When visiting American scientists asked to see Chinese scientists whom they
knew from the past, the attention often helped to improve the personal and
professional conditions of these scientists.  About fifty Chinese
scientists and science administrators, for example, participated in Zhou's
meeting in 1973 with the CSCPRC delegation. Seaborg recalled that the Chinese
scientists showed obvious pleasure in this rare opportunity to meet with Zhou
and their American colleagues and that the meeting greatly "increased
their legitimacy in China."
Before Mao's death and the arrest of the Gang
of Four in 1976, however, Chinese scientists ran political and personal risks
by taking part in exchanges. As Seaborg learned when he revisited China in 1978,
the cordial reception given to him in 1973 by Qian Sanqiang, a nuclear physicist
and a major architect of the Chinese nuclear weapons project, got Qian into
trouble with followers of the Gang.  Chinese scientists who went on
official visits to the West were viewed with suspicion upon their return. The Chinese Academy
of Sciences suppressed recommendations on science policy made by the first
delegation of Chinese scientists who visited Europe and the U.S. in 1972,
for fear of painting too bleak a picture of Chinese science in comparison with
Western advances. The act drew the ire of Zhou Enlai, who called it an
"arrogant" decision: "This does not correspond to Mao Zedong
Thoughts. The purpose of visiting and touring abroad was to learn the advances
of others." 
The significance of the U.S.-China scientific
exchange should also be viewed in the context of a major politically and
ideologically charged science policy debate over basic research. During the
Cultural Revolution, scientists had defended basic research as the foundation
of technological advances; the radicals denounced it as a reactionary bourgeois
ideology of science.  In early 1970, some senior scientists associated with
the Chinese Academy of Sciences, who fortunately had
escaped the worst of the violence, sought to rehabilitate basic research and
thus reorient Chinese science policy from the radical Maoist emphasis on
production.  Zhou Enlai encouraged them when he directed on January 2,
1970, that the Chinese Academy of Sciences should aim at advancing research
in selected fields: "The Academy
of Sciences should
utilize the brilliant thoughts of Mao Zedong to critically absorb and develop
theories in the natural sciences."  To avoid the political problem of
pure science for its own sake, Z hu Kezhen, a meteorologist and vice-president
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, proposed that the
academy adopt a science policy that would advance both disciplinary development
and practical applications. Instead of engaging in Big Science projects on
elementary particles, the origin of life, or cosmological evolution, he
suggested that the academy focus on the study of the structure of matter, which
included not only solid-state physics but also cell biology and polymer
Zhu's hope for a moderate science policy was
soon dashed, if only temporarily, when the Chinese Academy
of Sciences held a lengthy conference on scientific planning that lasted from
January 5 to March 17, 1971.  At the meeting, Zhou Enlai, despite his own
sympathy for basic research, had to implement Mao's policy of closely tying science
to practical applications and reducing government bureaucracy by turning over
many of the academy's research institutes to local governments, the military,
and ministries of production. The academy was nearly dissolved as a result.
Furthermore, the official report of the symposium accused scientists of
"lacking in political awareness, lacking in feeling for the
workers-peasants-soldiers, and lacking in practical skills." 
Meanwhile, another long-running national conference on education, from April 15
to July 31, 1971, reopened Chinese universities after a five-year hiatus, but
with a new radical education policy.
High school students had to work several
years after graduation before they could go to college on recommendations of
local party leaders. The curriculum emphasized practical skills over
theoretical training. 
Foreign scientists visiting Chinese
universities in the early 1970s were impressed by the emphasis on practical
applications, but many of them also questioned the lack of balance. Among those
who raised the issue of basic research with Zhou Enlai was Chen Ning Yang.
Yang, a Chinese American physicist then at the State University of New York,
Stony Brook, was well known in China
for sharing the Nobel prize in physics in 1957 with Tsun-Dao Lee, a Chinese
American physicist at Columbia.
When the U.S. lifted its ban
on travel to China
in early 1971, Yang was one of the first Chinese American scientists to take
advantage of it. In July 1971, during a meeting with Zhou in Beijing, Yang expressed his concern about the
neglect of theoretical training and basic research. This talk gave Zhou a
rationale to cast doubt on the effectiveness of the new science and educational
policy. In his meeting with the organizers of the education conference, Zhou
mentioned his discussion with Yang and told the educational officials t o treat
the new policy in a spirit of experiment.  On his return visit in 1972,
Yang made a stronger push for basic research. 
Zhou discussed Yang's suggestion with Mao, as
he told a group of visiting Chinese American scientists and scholars on July
14, 1972. "Yang's talk was very honest," Zhou said, "the
Chairman praised him after reading [the transcript of] his talk." Zhou
called on Zhou Peiyuan, present at the meeting as vice-president of Beijing University
and the Chinese Academy
of Sciences, to help him promote basic research at Beijing University
and the country.  "I believe that the research institutes in the Academy of Sciences should focus on basic
science," the premier wrote Zhou Peiyuan following the meeting. He
Whenever there was a [political] movement,
basic research was always the first to he targeted. For this, the Academy of Sciences should also take some blame,
because it was afraid of producing no achievement in the short term and thus
becoming a target of attacks. [In fact] the consistent policy of the Party
Committee has always been that the Academy of Sciences should be responsible for basic
research, only in the past this was not realized.
Chinese scientists seized the opportunity
afforded by the visiting American scientists' advocacy for basic research to
advance not only the cause for basic research, but also the political fortunes
of Chinese science in general.
High energy physics in China
High energy physics is not representative of
all scientific fields in China
(or in the West): it is big, expensive, and often highly politicized science
with attendant controversies. Yet, an examination of the development of this
field in China
gives a good example of how Chinese scientists took advantage of the U.S.-China
scientific exchanges both scientifically and politically. For several reasons,
high energy physics became the most prestigious field of all the sciences in China in the
1970s. Mao Zedong's philosophical penchant for the infinite divisibility of
matter gave the study of the structure of matter a welcome ideological
justification on which the physicists capitalized.  During the Cultural
Revolution, a group of Chinese theorists devised the ideologically correct
"straton model" to explain the structure of elementary particles,
which resembled in some ways the quark theory developed in the West.  The
fact that some of the major participants in the bomb projects turned to high
energy phy sics gave credibility to the enterprise in the eyes of government
officials. The high visibility of the Chinese American particle physicists Yang
and Lee in China
also helped ensure a great following for the field among Chinese students.
Seeing high energy physics as a frontier
field in science that happened to enjoy Mao's personal interest, Zhou Enlai
sought to promote its development as a way to revitalize Chinese science and
technology in general and to facilitate international scientific exchange. When
a group of nuclear physicists in the Second Ministry of Machinery (nuclear
weapons) began to agitate for a Chinese program in high energy physics in 1972,
Zhou quickly responded.  On September 11, 1972, in a letter to Zhang Wenyu,
the leader of the group who was trained in Britain and worked in the U.S. in
the 1940s and 1950s,  and Zhu Guangya, another U.S. trained nuclear
physicist who participated in the Chinese bomb projects and who was then deputy
director of the powerful Defense Science and Technology Commission,  Zhou
asked them to coordinate the formation of a national program: 
This matter cannot be delayed any longer. The
Academy of Sciences must focus on basic science and
theoretical research, and at the same time also closely unite theoretical
research and scientific experiment. High energy physics research and the
preparatory research on high energy accelerators should be one of the main
projects of the Academy
On September 18, 1972, Zhu Guangya gathered
people from the Second Ministry, the academy, and Beijing University
for a conference on the topic. They wrote a report to Zhou Enlai on January 8,
1973, proposing that the Chinese high energy program focus on elementary
particle research, without neglecting nuclear physics and applications.
Institutionally, the group advocated that China establish an Institute on
High Energy Physics based on Zhang's group and construct experimental sites,
including preparatory work on accelerators and detectors. It also suggested
that Beijing University,
and Yunnan University
(the last two in southwestern China)
strengthen their high energy physics programs by conducting research and
training scientists. Internationally, the group proposed that the government
send a delegation to CERN (European
Center for Nuclear
Research). The State Council approved the report and a national conference on
high energy physics was held from March 13 to April 7, 1973.  In a wri tten
statement for the conference, Zhou quoted Mao to the effect that "China should
make a greater contribution to humankind" to justify an expensive national
program in high energy physics. 
The efforts of the Chinese high energy
physicists received a boost from the visit of T.D. Lee in 1972. In a
wide-ranging discussion with Zhou Enlai on science and education in Beijing on October 14 of that year, Lee encouraged Zhou to
own high energy physics program. He also urged Zhou to invite foreign
scientists for visits and to send Chinese students and scientists abroad for
study and research.  Lee assured Zhou that CERN and many other laboratories
in the West would welcome Chinese scientists and that the exchanges would not
create a "Two Chinas" problem because he did not believe that Taiwan was
interested in high energy research. 
Lee and other Chinese American scientists
brought to China
not only the state of the art in science, but also social, cultural, and
institutional approaches to the modernization of Chinese science and
technology. Zhou was curious about science policy in the U.S. and the
West. He asked Lee about how collaboration was carried out in the U.S., to which
Lee responded by describing the peer review process and highlighting, perhaps
inadvertently, the autonomy of the scientific community. "A group of
scientists makes a proposal after discussions among themselves," Lee said,
"then [the government] selects about ten renowned scientists from all over
the country to evaluate the proposal, deciding which will be done first, which
will be done later, and which would not be done at all. The national government
provides all the laboratories. As to research that could lead to development
and applications, such as semiconductors and computer research, capitalists
provided some of the laboratories." 
As a result of Lee's urging and Zhou's
backing, high energy physics became one of the first fields where extensive
exchange with the West began. In May 1973, Zhang Wenyu led a high energy
physics delegation to the U.S.,
visiting Brookhaven National Laboratory, Fermilab, and the Stanford Linear
Accelerator (SLAC) Center. The group next stopped at CERN before returning to China in early
July 1973. Upon their return, the Chinese physicists recommended a 40-GeV
proton synchrotron "comparable with the world's biggest accelerator,"
evidently aiming for both scientific achievements and national prestige. The
move disappointed T.D. Lee and Wolfgang Panofsky, then director of SLAC, who
had suggested a less expensive electron-positron collider with lower energy but
high intensity and potential for applications in other fields.  Zhou gave
the proton project the green light when he approved a report on the subject by
the Chinese Academy of Sciences in March 1975. 
Despite Zhou's repeated personal
interventions on its behalf before his death in January 1976, the project did
not begin in earnest until after the collapse in 1976 of the Gang of Four, who
attacked the high energy physics program as one of Zhou's pet projects. The Chinese Academy
of Sciences organized a national symposium on high energy physics in Beijing in March 1977,
with the participation of 220 scientists from all over the country. The
conference confirmed the earlier decision to build a proton synchrotron at 40
GeV.  Shortly thereafter, the Chinese government under Hua Guofeng, who
backed a grandiose modernization plan on the expected revenue from oil exports,
decided to push the energy level to 50 GeV.  Hua's "great leap
outward" (yang yuejin), as his modernization plan came to be called,
turned out to be terribly unrealistic.
Economic retrenchment ensued in 1980-1981,
which forced the cancellation of the proton accelerator. After two years of
soul-searching among Chinese and Chinese American scientists, the Chinese Academy of Sciences came back, in 1983,
to Lee's original proposal of building an electron collider, with an energy
level now set at 2.2 GeV. Deng Xiaoping, who emerged as China's supreme
leader, personally approved the new design.  On October 7, 1984, Deng,
along with other top party and government leaders, joined Chinese and American
physicists at a much-publicized ceremony marking the start of the construction
of the Beijing Electron Positron Collider (BEPC). The operation of the machine
since its successful completion in October 1988 has been hailed both as a
contribution to world science and as an example of how basic research could
bring practical benefits in the form of medical and industrial applications, an
emphasis that was in line with the new utilitarian science policy in the
Dengist era of market refor m. 
Chinese American scientists
The pivotal roles of C. N. Yang in the debate
over basic research and T.D. Lee in the development of the high energy physics
program provide examples of the profound and at times conflicting influence of
Chinese American scientists in Chinese science and politics. Hundreds of
Chinese American scientists and professionals visited China in the 1970s,
including such prominent figures as the mathematician S.S. Chern of UC
Berkeley, the architect I.M. Pei, and physicists C.K. Jen of Johns Hopkins,
Samuel Ting of MIT, and C.S. Wu of Columbia. Wu was the first (and so far only)
female and Chinese physicist elected president of the American Physical
Society, in 1975. Many of these Chinese American scientists were
first-generation immigrants, who received their undergraduate education in China and came to the U.S.
in the 1930s and 1940s for graduate training, often with funding from the then
Nationalist government of China.
In the 1970s, they carried out scientific exchanges with China in the
name of scientific inter nationalism, but their strongest motivation was
probably nationalism in the sense of an identity with the developmental
aspirations of their country of origin. 
Their active participation in the U.S.-China
scientific exchange was perhaps the single most important factor in determining
the success and character of this transnational scientific network, and in many
ways reflected the unique history of this subnational scientific community. In
turn, the U.S.-China reopening energized Chinese American scientists who had
until then maintained, as a group, a minimal presence in the U.S. scientific
community or the public at large. It aided in the formation of the Chinese
American scientific community and gave it a voice not only in science but in
public policy in the U.S.
For all their contributions to American
science, Chinese scientists had a bittersweet history in the United States.
Racial discrimination often marked their earliest social experiences in the United States
during the era of Chinese Exclusion, which lasted from the turn of the century
to World War II, when most Chinese were not allowed to become permanent
residents or citizens. Even as late as 1954, developers in New Jersey refused
to sell a house to Yang, then a member of the Institute of Advanced Studies at
Princeton. The developer was afraid that "our being Chinese might affect
his sales," Yang recalled.  When the Chinese Communists won the civil
war against the U.S.-backed Nationalist forces in 1949, many Chinese students
decided to return to China.
Having detested the corrupt Nationalist government and experienced humiliating
discrimination in the U.S.,
these students placed great hope in a new China, where the government
appeared to focus on national reconstruction and appreciate the role of science
The Korean War that broke out in the summer
of 1950, however, soon closed the window of opportunity for Chinese students
and scholars who wanted to return to their homeland. The U.S. government forbade Chinese nationals,
especially those specializing in science and engineering, to return to China. The ensuing
McCarthyist Red Scare targeted, among others, Chinese scientists suspected of
left-wing activities and associations. All of these measures further alienated
many Chinese scientists and engineers.
The best known example of the disillusioned
Chinese scientist in the U.S.
was Qian Xuesen (Hsue-Sen Tsien), an aerodynamic scientist at the California
Institute of Technology. As a favorite student of Theodor von Karman, Qian rose
to the top of the profession in the 1940s, helped found the Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
and contributed to U.S.
weapons development during World War II. As an indication of his expertise and
of the U.S. government's
trust in him, Qian was selected to be a member of von Karman's expedition to Europe during World War II to investigate the progress of
German aerodynamics. In the postwar period, Qian became a member of the
influential Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, despite the fact that he
remained a Chinese national. He applied for U.S. citizenship in 1949. 
Trust turned into suspicion during the McCarthy era when he was charged as a
Communist Party member and a spy for Communist China. The U.S. government
put him under house arrest for five years and prohibited him from leav ing the
country. At a dramatic government hearing on Qian's case, an official asked
Qian: "In the event of conflict between the United
States and Communist China, would you fight for the United States?"
Qian, after a long pause, answered, "my essential allegiance is to the
people of China.
If a war were to start between the United States
and China, and if the United States war aim was for the good of the
Chinese people, and I think it will be, then, of course, I will fight on the
side of the United States."
Qian and hundreds of other Chinese scientists
and engineers were eventually allowed to return to China as a result of the Geneva
Conference in 1955. The profound ambivalence in loyalty expressed by Qian
continued, however, to haunt those who chose to remain in the U.S. To stay
out of trouble, many in the Chinese American community, including scientists,
adopted the strategy of striving for achievement in professional fields while
shunning politics.  After the purge of intellectuals during the
Anti-Rightist campaign in China
in 1957, few Chinese scientists in the U.S. returned to their home
country.  Many, including C.N. Yang and T.D. Lee applied for and were
In the 1 960s, the civil rights and
anti-Vietnam War movements stirred Asian Americans to activism; they began to
fight for their own rights in American society and culture.  The Asian
American Movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, according to one
commentator, "made Asian Americans more American and less Asian."
 Chinese American scientists did not play a prominent role in the movement,
although some joined the anti-war protests.  The emotional soul-searching
that accompanied their decision to become U.S.
citizens, however, led many of these scientists to discover the early, bitter
history of Chinese Americans in the U.S. They began to identify with
the plights not only of early Chinese immigrants in the U.S., but also of
contemporary Chinese American communities cloistered in the Chinatowns in major
U.S. urban centers, previously a different world from that of Chinese American
professionals.  They often drew inspiration from examples of community
solidarity provided by other ethnic gr oups, especially the African American
civil rights struggle and the Jewish people's fight to remember the Holocaust.
 By all indications prominent members of the nascent Chinese American
scientific community were becoming politically active and were waiting for a
suitable venue to express their political opinions at the time of the
U.S.-China rapprochement in the early 1970s.
The official reopening of this relationship
provided Chinese American scientists with a golden opportunity both to satisfy
their nationalistic impulse to help their homeland and to emerge from public
obscurity in their adopted country. Along the way, they created a sense of
their own distinct scientific community. Tu Weiming, the scholar of
neo-Confucianism at Harvard, has noted that "The phenomenon of Chinese
culture disintegrating at the center and later being revived from the periphery
is a recurring theme in Chinese history."  For many overseas Chinese,
as Tu explains, "the state, either Nationalist or Communist, controls the
symbolic resources necessary for their cultural identity."  In this
regard, it was remarkable that few Chinese American scientists seemed to have
exhibited much loyalty to Taiwan
when they decided to travel to China
despite explicit expressions of displeasure from the Nationalist government.
Indeed, some scientists went to China
in the face of anonymous threats attributed to pro-Taiwan forces.  For
example, Chang-lin Tien, a professor of mechanical engineering at UC Berkeley
and later chancellor of the campus in the 1990s, was black-listed by Taiwan for several years because of his trips to
Among Chinese American scientists, the
physicists C.N. Yang and T.D. Lee were the most active, and certainly the most
visible, in the U.S .-China scientific exchange. Each in his own way sought to
revitalize Chinese science and society in the aftermath of the Cultural
Revolution, whose destructiveness they, along with most other visitors, learned
of only after it was over in the late 1970s. Yang and Lee were representative
of Chinese American scientists' home-country nationalism. The most important contribution
of his life, Yang said on January 28, 1995, in Hong Kong,
was "to help the Chinese change their perception that the Chinese were not
as talented as others."  Indeed, for Chinese all over the world, Yang
and Lee represented the height of their ethnic pride ever since the
announcement of their Nobel prize in 1957.
Despite their common goal of helping China, Yang and Lee held sharply different
visions for the direction of Chinese science policy, which led them to give
radically divergent advice to China's
policymakers.  Generally speaking, Yang recognized the importance of basic
research and was instrumental in Zhou Enlai's and the Chinese scientists' drive
to rehabilitate basic research in China, yet he thought that much
more should be done in applied research. To him, applied research, in areas
such as computers or biochemistry, served as a link in the chain that would
transform scientific ideas into technologies that would expedite national
economic development. For this reason, he advised against an expensive high
energy physics program in China.
With memory of China's
sufferings in the first half of the twentieth century in mind, Yang regarded
poverty as the source of most of China's problems. "The most
important thing for China,"
he said in 1986, was "to advance its economy." He did not want China to engage
in high energy physics because it had nothing to do with economic development;
it "might even have negative effects, because it is too expensive."
 The same concern for economic development also led Yang to give priority
to stability over political reform, such as democratization and human rights,
even in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square
crackdown in 1989. "Let the economy grow and later on reform," he
told the New York Academy of Sciences' Committee on the Human Rights of
Scientists in 1996. "Eventually we will reach a more open, more democratic
society," Yang said, "but we don't want to go through the problems
they had in the Soviet Union." 
Lee, on the other hand, advocated that China invest in
basic research. He thought that China
should develop its own high energy physics program, including building
accelerators, as a way to keep Chinese scientists abreast of advances at the
frontiers of science. In 1972, Lee expressed to Zhou Enlai his skepticism
toward the Maoist educational policy of sending high school graduates to work
in the countryside for two or three years. He thought it was a waste of time
and was instrumental in changing that policy.  Lee also created, in 1980,
the popular China-U.S. Physics Examination and Applications (CUSPEA) program,
which, until 1988, brought annually about one hundred top Chinese physics
students each year for graduate study in the U.S.  His other projects
included a continuing special class for science prodigies at the University of
Science and Technology of China, Hefei, the establishment of the Chinese Center
for Advanced Science and Technology in Beijing, the initiation of a system of
postdoctoral research in China, and, of course, the Beijing Electron-Positron
Despite the divergence in their advice, the
prominent role of the Chinese American scientists helped moderate the obvious
concern in China
about the political and cultural values that came with scientific exchange. The
patriotic, nationalistic motive of these Chinese American scientists made the
transmission of such values more acceptable. The identification of Chinese
American scientists with Chinese culture also helped alleviate any affront to
national pride when they, rather than westerners who were not ethnically
Chinese, promoted ideas that challenged Chinese orthodoxy. Their close personal
ties with Chinese leaders and their international prominence also enabled them
to speak out on sensitive issues without being censored; for similar actions
Chinese scientists got in trouble. T.D. Lee, for example, told a group of
Chinese graduate students in 1979 that he did not think that philosophy had any
impact on physics.  In 1986, C.N. Yang similarly dismissed this privileged
branch of scholarship in China:
"Physics influenced philosophy, but philosophy never influenced
physics."  Such views, when advocated by people like Fang Lizhi, the
Chinese astrophysicist and dissident who wrote a book entitled Philosophy is a
tool of physics, were officially denounced as attacks on Marxism's guiding role
in Chinese science and society.  Both Lee's and Yang's speeches were
officially published in China
even after Fang was purged from the Communist Party for expressing the same
The U.S.-China reopening gave Chinese
American scientists a real sense of community for the first time. The widely
dispersed Chinese American scientists and scholars forged networks in the early
1970s, when they sought to organize into groups to expedite their visits to China. They
were invariably impressed by the social and material progress in the People's
Republic and upon their return helped shape the American perception of the New
China by giving public lectures and writing articles in the mass media. 
For the first time in the history of Chinese American scientists, they became a
prominent voice in American public policymaking.  Since then, common
interest in the development of Chinese science, technology, and education has
continued to unite them. They urged the American government, for example, to
loosen control of high-technology exports to China. 
Institutionally, Chinese American scientists,
especially physicists, also began to organize themselves at the national and,
later, international levels. In 1977, Yang became the first president of the
National Association of Chinese Americans, composed mostly of scientists and
other professionals and designed to lobby for the normalization of the
U.S.-China relationship.  The influx of Chinese scientists and engineers
who settled permanently in the U.S.
after the reopening of U.S.-China relations also infused the Chinese American
scientific community with much vitality. According to one survey, there were by
the mid-1990s over 1,000 academics above the rank of university lecturers in
the U.S. who came from
Among these, about 800 were in the sciences and engineering, 300 in social
sciences and humanities, and 80 in other fields.  Their entrance into the
research community helped change the race and gender structure of American
science: new Chinese American scientists and engineers incr eased the
proportion of Asian Americans, and a significant percentage of the physicists,
at least, were women.  While the Chinese government has been concerned with
this obvious "brain drain," these expatriates were not a complete
loss for China,
as many of them became entrepreneurs who have done much to promote U.S.-China
trade and have contributed to the Chinese economic boom of the 1990s.
The loose connections among Chinese American
scientists soon developed into a transnational network of the Chinese diaspora,
with potentially significant political implications. In 1980, a conference on
particle physics theories in Guangzhou,
together for the first time many ethnic Chinese physicists from around the
world.  Later, Chinese American physicists organized an Overseas Chinese
Physicists Association, including physicists from mainland China, Taiwan,
and Hong Kong, which sponsored sessions at
American Physical Society meetings.  Most significantly, the First
International Ethnic Chinese Physics Conference was held in Shantou, China, in
1995, just after the Chinese government conducted a series of menacing missile
tests near Taiwan as a warning against the independence movement on the island.
The fact that scientists from the official Academia Sinica of Taiwan came to
the conference was viewed by many as an encouraging sign that scientists might
play a crucial role in the eventu al peaceful unification of China. 
Shih-shan Henry Tsai, a historian of China and
Chinese Americans, has used the term "subnationalism" to depict the
activism of Chinese Americans who are occupied with and try to influence
politics in their home country.  It is perhaps another case of the
periphery, in the form of the overseas Chinese, saving the collapsing center.
 In the case of the Chinese American scientists, this ethno-subnational
scientific community has largely turned itself, under the guise of scientific
internationalism, into the core of an international network for both science
Scientists became privileged politically in
the Chinese society of the late 1970s and 1980s, not only because of their role
in the modernization drive, but also, as Richard Suttmeier points out, because
of their perceived importance in China's international relations, especially
with the U.S.  Such prominence gave scientists a measure of protection
from politics and helped the formation of a nascent civil society, similar to
the protection of Soviet physicists by the Soviet bomb project, as described by
David Holloway. 
The establishment of diplomatic relations in
1979 opened the way for a great expansion in China-U.S. scientific exchanges,
including the arrival of large numbers of Chinese students in the U.S. In May
1979, the two governments signed an agreement on collaboration in a wide range
of topics in oceanography and fishery, including exchange of oceanographic
data, joint research on the sedimentation process in the ocean, mariculture,
oceanographic instruments, marine environment, computer simulation, interaction
between the ocean and the atmosphere, remote sensing in the sea, and fishery
management. As a result, the two nations exchanged dozens of delegations in
various fields by 1984. One of the most significant projects undertaken as part
of this agreement was the study of sedimentation at the mouth of the Yangtze River. It lasted for four years, involving more
than 100 Chinese and 30 American scientists and several research vessels on
both sides, apparently with good results. 
In the 1980s, while the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan helped to sustain a strategic alliance
between China and the U.S., a new motivation emerged in the U.S. to continue and expand scientific exchanges
under Deng Xiaoping launched economic reform, the Reagan administration
promoted contacts as a way both to encourage Chinese reform and to expand the
potential market for American products and technology. In testimony before a
congressional task force on science policy in 1985, John P. McTague, deputy
director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, illustrated
the administration's emphasis on international cooperation in science: 
The example that I find most intriguing, and
perhaps most pertinent to discussions here today, is the People's Republic of China. In spite
of the fundamentally different philosophies of government that guide our two
nations, we have found a strong mutual bond in science and technology. Over the
past 10 years, that shared interest in both basic research and in how
technology can speed industrial modernization has been the essential basis on
which we have steadily narrowed the gap between countries and dramatically
improved relations...As we have seen time and time again, probably the most
effective channel we have found for nations to cooperate has been through
science and technology. The example I cited earlier of the People's Republic of
may be the most spectacular success.
In response to questioning from Congressmen,
McTague stated that "by increasing technological capabilities in other
countries, we then open up new markets for ourselves and, I think, help
stabilize the world situation."  He then went to explain why the U.S. was more liberal in its collaboration with China than with the Soviet
The Soviet bloc has a clearly expansionist
policy right now--Afghanistan is an example--as opposed to the internal
policies where it is clear that the People's Republic of China has decided to
make a very major effort to utilize science and technology to modernize its
nation, to increase its industrial base, to increase the standard of living for
its people, to open its markets with the West. I don't see signs of similar
things happening in the Soviet Union.
Impact of Tiananmen, 1989
In June 1989, the Chinese government's violent
crackdown on the peaceful, student-led demonstration at Tiananmen Square in Beijing drew global
condemnation. The United States
and many other nations imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions against China. The
American scientific community interrupted bilateral scientific and
technological exchanges in protest against the violence. The National Academy
of Sciences and several other American organizations suspended most of their
joint projects with China
in "outrage and sadness." The Royal Society in Britain and
other European organizations followed suit. While these measures received
general approval, more radical forms of protest threatened far-reaching
curtailment of scientific contact and therefore divided the scientific
community in the West.
A subject of soul-searching debate, the
dilemma facing many scientists was how to punish the Chinese government but
avoid isolating their Chinese colleagues. On the one hand, proponents of
radical measures, such as boycotting scientific exchange with China, argued that only an unambiguous public
stand could help improve the situation of scientist-dissidents in China. They not
only urged colleagues to boycott meetings in China, but also campaigned to
prevent holding future conferences there until repression stopped. Business as
usual, as James C. Wang argued, was unconscionable: 
The stark contrast between the recent events
in Eastern Europe and those in China
since [June 1989] argues strongly that all scientists should continue to
boycott activities in China.
Any resemblance to normalcy in our interactions with our friends in China can only
prolong the status quo and confirm the belief of those now in power that memory
is short and history can be rewritten overnight.
On the other hand, there were scientists who
insisted that a boycott would interrupt the free flow of scientists and
scientific ideas, push China
back to intellectual isolation, and hurt both Chinese science and scientists.
As T.D. Lee put it: 
The universality of science and the free
exchange between scientists of all nations has been a powerful force in helping
to preserve civilization in difficult times. This is something I believe in
deeply. Only through continuous contact with our colleagues in China can we
help them in a genuine way.
Still others believed that quiet diplomacy
was more effective than open sanctions. Sharp objections were also raised about
the need to base actions on the interests of working scientists in China and not
on dissidents or exiled scientists.
The debate polarized the vast Chinese
American scientific community; supporters of continuous contact with Chinese
colleagues, such as Lee and Yang, were denounced as tools of Chinese
propaganda. Nor could the institutions of American science, such as the National
Academy of Sciences, the American Association for the Advancement of Science,
and the American Physical Society, agree on a concerted course of action.
By the early 1990s, as the political
environment in China
improved and interest in trade with China grew, scientific and
technological exchanges resumed. Yet, with the end of the Cold War in the late
1980s and early 1990s, the strategic balance shifted and scientific exchange
with China came under
increased scrutiny by the U.S.
government. In 1997, Peter Lee, a Taiwanese-born Chinese American physicist who
once worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, was arrested by the FBI for
transmitting secret technology on lasers and detection of submarines to Chinese
scientists. In a plea bargain, Lee admitted that he leaked classified
information to the Chinese but insisted that it was unintentional--he was
carried away by his enthusiasm for scientific exchange. In view of his
cooperation and the fact that the information Lee leaked was soon declassified,
Lee was given a very lenient sentence, one year in a half-way house. The event
received scant media attention. 
In early 1999, the New York Times reported,
based on leaked information from the government, that Wen Ho Lee, another
Taiwanese-born Chinese American scientist working at Los Alamos, was accused of
transferring information on U.S.
warhead design to China.
It immediately became a prominent national political controversy. Lee was fired
from his position for violation of security rules (not for spying) and, as of
October 1999, was still not formally charged but under investigation by the
FBI. In May 1999, a congressional committee under Rep. Christopher Cox
(R-Calif.) issued a report that claimed that many Chinese students and
scientists in the U.S.
were engaged in spying for the Chinese government.  The spy cases and the
Cox charges, true or not, had a chilling effect on international scientific
communication and led some members of Congress to call for a moratorium on
exchanges with foreign scientists. 
Despite these recent setbacks, U.S.-China
scientific exchange has had profound impact on both countries and proved to be
remarkably resilient. Geopolitics motivated the U.S.
to sponsor scientific internationalism to accomplish essentially nationalistic
goals. The U.S. aimed to
counter Soviet expansion, as did China,
also sought the exchange as a crucial part of its modernization drive. Yet, the
scale of the exchange and enthusiasm of the participants cannot be explained
only by the interest of the state. Traditional scientific internationalism
played a crucial role in the exchange, as historical connections between
Chinese and American scientists from the 1930s and 1940s and especially the
activism of Chinese American scientists gave the exchange programs drive and
The home-country nationalism that motivated
Chinese American scientists to promote the U.S.-China scientific exchange, in
the name of scientific internationalism, actually helped undermine the
authority of the Chinese nation-state. Consciously or unconsciously, the
extensive scientific and cultural exchanges they encouraged helped introduce
liberal-democratic ideas and values into China, which challenged the
orthodoxy of Marxist ideology. The party and government could no longer control
every step of the exchange process, nor could they keep an iron grip on whom to
send, in terms of ideological correctness, where to send them, and what they
would be exposed to. The exchange promoted meritocracy and facilitated the
creation of a public sphere as de-ideologization continued. Indeed, the
clearest indications of this democratic process were seen in the party's
reaction to it: the drive against western "spiritual pollution" in
1982-1983 and then the anti-liberalization campaign in 1986-1987.
A comparison of the U.S.-China scientific
exchange with that between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union, which has been judged
less successful, helps illuminate aspects of Cold War science. 
Geopolitics played an important role in defining the characters of the two
exchanges. There was much unease in the U.S.-Soviet exchange on both sides,
probably because the contacts were to serve the purpose of defusing the danger
of war. In contrast, the U.S.-China exchange was designed more to build an
alliance. Also, the historical ties between senior members of the Chinese and
U.S. scientific communities and the active role of Chinese American
scientists--not to mention the traditional missionary spirit to change China
toward an American model--gave the U.S.--China exchange an emotional appeal
that was missing in the U.S.-Soviet case.
One can also compare the U.S.-China exchange
with that between China and
the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Although China gained
much industrial technology from the Soviets, the effect of the exchange on
Chinese science and education proved problematic. The imposition of the Soviet
model of narrow, technical education broke up the structure of Chinese
universities, which had been based largely on the American model of a liberal,
general education. It also led to the emergence of a generation of technocrats,
who tended to ignore the human factors in big technology projects, such as the
controversial Three Gorge Dam on the Yangtze river.
Some of the Western-trained scientists also got into political trouble for
disagreeing with the Soviet advisors. Then the decision in the early 1960s of
the Soviets to withdraw all advisors, with their blueprints, created chaos and
irrevocable damage in many technological projects. The arrogance and
patronizing tone of some of the Soviet advisors toward senior Chinese
scientists hurt national pride. Again, in the U.S.-China exchange, the
participation of Chinese American scientists significantly reduced difficulties
in this respect, and the old ties from the 1930s and 1940s also helped promote
smooth communication and cooperation.
The U.S.-China scientific exchange benefited
much from the intermixing effect of Chinese American scientists as an
international ethnic and scientific community, which helped blur national
boundaries in science, even at the height of the Cold War. International
exchange, which was born of a geopolitical, nationalistic concern about an
external threat, and encouraged further by the modernization drive, thus led to
the relaxation of control by the nation-state. Even in the post-Cold War era,
U.S .-China scientific cooperation remains crucial in meeting major challenges
to the world in areas such as environment, energy, and the proliferation of nuclear
weapons.  In this endeavor, Chinese American scientists, as agents for
transnational exchange, have played and will likely continue to play an
important role. Yet, the spy cases remind us that in many ways the domination
of the nation-state in scientific communication will continue in the post-Cold
(*.) Department of History, California State
91768. I thank Richard
Suttmeier, Lawrence Badash, H. Lyman Miller, Gene Rochlin, Wolfgang Panofsky,
Xiaojian Zhao, Fan Dainian, Jim Williams, Peter Westwick, Jessica Wang, and
Benjamin Zulueta for reading drafts of the paper and for stimulating
discussions and comments. Translations from Chinese documents are my own.
Generally, names of Chinese in mainland China are rendered in pinyin with
family names first and given names last. For Chinese Americans and Chinese in
Taiwan, names are usually spelled in the Wade-Giles style, with given names
first and family names last: e.g., Chen Ning Yang, with the exception of Tu
Wei-Ming, who uses Wade-Giles but places his family name first and given name
(1.) A. Doak Barnett, China and the major
powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C., 1977), 178, as quoted in Harry Harding,
A fragile relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington,
D.C., 1992), 33; Leo A. Orleans, Science in China and U.S.-China scientific
exchanges: Assessment and prospects (Washington, D.C., 1976), 11, estimated in
1976 that about 10,000 Americans visited China between 1971 and 1976.
(2.) David M. Lampton, A relationship
restored: Trends in U.S.-China educational exchanges, 1978-1984 (Washington,
D.C., 1986); Leo A. Orleans, Chinese student's in America: Policies, issues, and
numbers (Washington, D.C., 1988). See also Kathlin Smith, "The role of
scientists in normalizing U.S.-China relations, 1965-1979," and Richard P.
Suttmeier, "Scientific cooperation and conflict management in U.S.-China
relations, 1978 to the present," unpublished papers, 1998, courtesy of the
authors; Denis Fred Simon, "The role of science and technology in Chinese
foreign relations," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the world: Chinese
foreign policy in the post-Mao era (Boulder and London, 1984), 293-318. There
is also little written about U.S.-Taiwan scientific exchange, which should make
a fascinating comparison with the U.S.-China case. Although it is beyond the
scope of the present paper, I intend to address aspects of that story in the
(3.) Lawrence Badash, "British and
American views of the German menace in World War I," Royal Society of
London, Notes and records, 34 (1979), 91-121.
(4.) J.L. Heilbron, The dilemmas of an
upright man: Max Planck as spokesman for German science (Berkeley, 1986), 104.
(5.) Ibid., 109; Paul Forman,
"Scientific internationalism and the Weimar
physicists: The ideology and its manipulation in Germany
after World War I," Isis, 64 (1973), 151-180; Daniel Kevles, "'Into
hostile political camps': The reorganization of international science in World
War I," Isis, 62 (1971), 47-60.
(6.) Peter Neushul and Zuoyue Wang,
"Between the devil and the deep sea: C.K. Tseng, ocean farming, and the
politics of science in modern China,"
(7.) In 1961, for example, the U.S. National
Institutes of Health (NIH) spent about $20 million overseas and planned to
double it the next year. Eugene B. Skolnikoff to Jerome B. Wiesner, 13 Oct 1961
(National Archives, Office of Science and Technology Records (RG 359), box 87,
folder "International--T[itle] F[older] 1961"). On the Soviet imposition
of its state-dominated model in the East bloc, see Gabor Pallo,
"Internationalism in Soviet world-science: The Hungarian case," in
Elisabeth Crawford et al., eds., Denationalizing science (Dordrecht, 1993), 209-232.
(8.) Hu Jimin et al., eds., Wang Gangchang he
tade kexue gongxian (Wang Ganchang and his scientific contributions) (Beijing, 1987).
(9.) Mikhail A. Klochko, Soviet scientist in
Red China, trans. Andrew MacAndrew (New York, 1964).
(10.) The tortuous histories of the Geneva conference on
Atoms for Peace of 1955, the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-1958,
and the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts on a nuclear test ban illustrate the
tension between international science and national security concerns. See
Walter McDougall, The heavens and the earth: A political history of the space
age (New York, 1985), 118-121; Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik challenge (New
(11.) Robert F. Byrnes, Soviet-American
academic exchanges, 1958-1975 (Bloomington,
1976); Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the test ban (Berkeley, 1981), 201-203.
(12.) Walter Sullivan, Assault on the
unknown: The International Geophysical Year (New York, 1961).
(13.) Yu Guangyuan, "Enshi he
zhanyou" ("Beloved mentor and comrade in arms") in Kexue jujiang,
shibiao liufang (A great scientist and teacher, a festschrift for Zhou Peiyuan
on his 90th birthday) (Beijing,
(14.) Gordon H. Chang, "JFK, China, and the
bomb," Journal of American history, 74 (1988), 1287-1300.
(15.) Luis Alvarez to Claude T. Bissell, 9
Apr 1962 (National Archives, Office of Science and Technology Records (RG 359),
box 141, folder "International--Title Folder 1962").
(16.) Walter G. Whitman to Harrison Brown, 10
May 1961 (National Archives, Office of Science and Technology Records (RG 359),
box 87, folder "International-Chicom [Chinese Communists").
(17.) Neushul and Wang (ref. 6).
(18.) Henry Kissinger, White House years (Boston, 1982), 693,705;
Harding (ref. 1), 35-36, 394-395.
(19.) Kissinger (ref. 18), 1490-1492, quote
(20.) Another example of scientific
internationalism paving the way for sensitive diplomatic overtures occurred in
Chinese-Israeli relations. See "Israel
will open liaison office in China,"
Los Angeles Times (11 June 1990), A7; Lena H. Sun, "China sets official ties with Israel," Washington Post (25 Jan 1992), A14.
(21.) Memorandum of conversation between
Kissinger, Zhou, and others, Beijing, 13 Nov
1973, in William Burr, ed., The Kissinger transcripts: The top-secret talks
with Beijing and Moscow (New York, 1998), 204.
(22.) Zhou Enlai, "Jiancheng shehuizhuyi
qiangguo, guanjian zaiyu shixian kexue jishu xiandaihua" ("To build a
strong socialist nation, the key is modernization in science and
technology"), a talk at a conference on science and technology in Shanghai on 29 Jan 1963, Zhou Enlai xuanji (Selected
papers of Zhou Enlai) (2 vols., Beijing,
1984), 2, 412-416.
(23.) Zhou Enlai, "Zhuajin kexue jishu
kaoca" ("Strengthen the study of [foreign] science and technology"),
a talk with Chinese diplomats on 13 Feb 1966, Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan
(Selected diplomatic papers of Zhou Enlai) (Beijing, 1990), 458-459.
(24.) Zhou Enlai, "Xiang sige xiandaihua
de hongwei mubiao qianjin" ("March toward the grand goal of the four
modernizations") excerpt from "Report on the work of the
government" at the Fourth National People's Congress delivered on 13 Jan
1975, Zhou Enlai xuanji (ref. 22), 2, 412-416. The full report is reprinted in
Renmin Ribao (People's daily) (21 Jan 1975).
(25.) Although disappointed by these
deletions, the American group was nevertheless delighted to hear Premier Zhou
promise that China would
consider sending some students to study in the U.S. See Glenn T. Seaborg, "China journal: Report of a visit to the People's
Republic of China,"
22 May-10 June 1973; unpublished manuscript courtesy of Professor Seaborg,
29-39; Smith (ref. 2).
(26.) Seaborg (ref. 25), 39.
(27.) See, for example, the following trip
reports published by the CSCPRC: Astronomy in China: A trip report of the
American Astronomy Delegation (1979); Oceanography in China: A trip report of
the American Oceanography Delegation (1980); Pure and applied mathematics in
the People's Republic of China: A trip report of the American Pure and Applied
Mathematics Delegation (1980); Solid state physics in the People's Republic of
China: A trip report of the American Solid State Physics Delegation (1976);
Nuclear science in China (1980).
(28.) Anne Keatley, ed., Reflections on
scholarly exchange with the People's Republic of China,
1972 -1976 (Washington, D.C., n.d.).
(29.) Richard Garwin, "China trip:
Transcribed notes of a trip to the Chinese People's Republic, March 18 to April
17, 1974," 21 June 1974, and Garwin, "Discussion at Chinese People's
Institute for Foreign Affairs, December 10-12, 1979," 17 Dec 1979,
unpublished manuscripts courtesy of Dr. Garwin; Laya Wiesner, "China
notes: Jerome and Laya Wiesner's visit to People's Republic of China, October
1974" (Committee on Scholarly Communication with China Archives, George
Washington University Library, Washington, D.C.).
(30.) Yao Shuping, Luo Wei, Li Peishan, and
Zhang Wei, Zhongguo kexueyuan (Chinese Academy of Sciences), Vol. 1(3 vols.,
Beijing, 1994); Zuoyue Wang, "Revolutionary utilitarianism: Science and
political ideology in China, 1949-1976," a paper presented at the workshop
on "Science and political ideology," Union College, Schenectady, NY,
(31.) Only in November 1972 did the State
Council approve a report of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences that
allowed the exchange of scientific books and journals with foreign countries.
See Wu Heng, Keji zhanxian wushinian (Fifty years on the scientific and
technological front) (Beijing,
1992), 362. Wu was a long-time science administrator in the Chinese Communist
Party. One reason Zhou said that China needed to do some preparation
before receiving foreign scientists was that during the Cultural Revolution
most research had stopped, so there was not much to show. See Zhu Kezhen, Zhu
Kezhen riji (Zhu Kezhen diary), Vol. 5 (5 vols., Beijing, 1990), 553, entry for 14 Sep 1972.
(32.) Wu (ref. 31), 353-354.
(33.) Ibid., 346-356.
(34.) Neushul and Wang (ref. 6).
(35.) Seaborg (ref. 25), 39.
(36.) Glenn T. Seaborg, "China
revisited: May 14 - June 11, 1978," report prepared for the U.S.
Department of Energy, courtesy of Professor Seaborg; interview with Seaborg by
Zuoyue Wang, 3 Mar 1992, Berkeley.
(37.) Wu (ref. 31), 361. In 1975, a
scientific delegation visited the U.S. under the leadership of Zhou
Peiyuan and the marine biologist Zeng Chengkui (C.K. Tseng), including a warm
reception with President Gerald Ford in the White House. Upon their return,
however, delegation members found that politics had removed their original
sponsors from power and they themselves became target of attacks. See Neushul
and Wang (ref. 6).
(38.) Wang (ref. 30); Richard Suttmeier,
Research and revolution: Science policy and societal change in China
(Lexington, MA, 1974).
(39.) Zhu (ref. 31), entries for 6-14 Jan
(40.) Wu (ref. 31), 363.
(41.) Zhu (ref. 31), entries for 6-14 Jan
(42.) Long conferences were common in China, probably
due both to inefficiency and to the substantial time devoted to political and
(43.) Wu (ref. 31), 347-349.
(44.) Ibid., 349-352.
(45.) Ibid., 351; Chen Ning Yang, Selected
papers, with commentary (San Francisco, 1983), 76-77.
(46.) Yang (ref. 45), 77-78.
(47.) Zhou Peiyuan, '"Sirenbang' pohuai
jichu lilun yanjiu yongxin hezai" ("Why did the 'Gang of Four'
sabotage basic theoretical research"), Renmin Ribao (People's daily) (13
Jan 1977), reprinted in Chedi jianfa pipan "sirenbang" cuanda duoquan
de taotian zuixing (Thoroughly disclose and criticize the great crimes of the
"Gang of Four" w ho wanted to seize the power of the party) (Beijing,
1977). Zhou Ruling, "Fuqin" ("Father"), Kexue jujiang,
shibiao liufang (A great scientist and teacher a festschrfit for Zhou Peiyuan
on his 90th birthday), 274-307, on 284; Chi-Kung Jen, Recollections of a
Chinese physicist (New York, 1991); Yang (ref. 45), 77-78.
(48.) Zhou Enlai to Zhou Peiyuan, 23 Jul
1972, quoted in Wu (ref. 31), 364.
(49.) For Mao's interest in high energy
physics, see Mao Zedong, "Guanyu Bantian wenzhang de tanhua" ("A
talk on the articles of Shoichi Sakata"), 24 Aug 1964, Mao Zedong Sixiang
Wansui (Long live Mao Zedong thoughts) (n.p., n.d.), 561-567.
et at. (ref. 30), 386.
(51.) The group was called the first division
of the 401 Institute of the Second Ministry of Machinery. See Zhou Enlai xuanji
(ref. 22), 2, 535, n368. On August 18, 1972, the group wrote a letter to Zhou
Enlai describing the status of high energy physics in China and proposing that
China promote research in that field. Ibid., 534, n366.
(52.) Although Zhang was apparently not
involved in nuclear weapons research, his wife, Wang Chengshu, a Ph.D. from the
University of Michigan, was in charge of the diffusion
process to enrich uranium for the bomb. See Peng Jichao, Dongfang jiuxiang:
Zhongguo hewuqi shiyan jishi (China's
nuclear weapon tests) (Beijing,
1995), 52-55, 146-150.
(53.) The Chinese (Nationalist) government
sent Zhu Guangya and T.D. Lee to the U.S.
in 1946 with the hope that they would study nuclear physics and return to build
atomic bombs for China.
See Qiu Zhaoming, "Li Zhengdao" ("T.D. Lee"), Lu Jiaxi,
editor in chief, Zhongguo xiandai kexuejia zhuanji (Biographies of modern
Chinese scientists) (Beijing, 1994), 153-178, on 154; "Zhu Guangya Li
Zhengdao chuan ceng lal mei xue zao yuanzidan" ("Zhu Guangya and T.D.
Lee reportedly came to the U.S. to learn how to make atomic bombs,")
Shijie Ribao (World Journal) (7 June 1998), A9.
(54.) Zhou Enlai, "Zhongshi jichu kexue
he lilun yanjiu" ("Take basic science and theoretical research seriously"),
a letter to Zhang Wenyu and Zhu Guangya on 21 Sep 1972, in Zhou Enlai xuanji
(ref. 22), 2, 473.
(55.) Wu (ref. 31), 369-370.
(56.) Ibid., 370.
(57.) Ibid., 368-369.
(58.) Ibid., 368.
(59.) Ibid., 368-369; Zhou also relied on Lee
to certify discoveries made by Chinese physicists. At a meeting, Zhang Wenyu
asked Zhou whether Chinese scientists should publish the discovery of a new
particle and Zhou said that he would need to discuss it with Lee first. See Zhu
(ref. 31), 558-559, entry for 5 Oct 1972.
(60.) Wu (ref. 31), 370-371; interview with
Panofsky by Zuoyue Wang, Jan 1998, Berkeley. According to Ye Minghan, long-time
Vice Director of the Institute for High Energy Physics, Zhang initially
proposed a machine in the 20-30 GeV range, but C.C. Ting, the third Chinese
American physicist to win the Nobel prize, persuaded the Chinese scientists and
government that to make new discoveries they needed 40-50 GeV. C.N. Yang
recommended that instead of building the accelerator by itself, China should purchase
a small one from abroad. Fan Dainian emails to Zuoyue Wang, 14 and 20 Mar 1998.
(61.) The enterprise was dubbed "Project
753," in honor of the month. Wu (ref. 31), 371.
(62.) Ibid., 372.
(63.) Yao et al. (ref. 30), 414-415. On Hua's
program, see Roderick MacFarquhar, "The succession to Mao and the end of
Maoism, 1969-82," MacFarquhar, ed., The politics of China: The eras of Mao
and Deng (New York, 1997), 248-339, esp. 316-317.
(64.) Yao et al. (ref. 30), 414-415. Even
before this decision, SLAC had maintained extensive exchange and cooperation
with Chinese high energy physicists. See Wolfgang Panofsky to Ingrid H.
Hoffmann, l2 Apr 1986, and attached draft article by Ingrid Hoffmann on
U.S.-China cooperation in high energy physics (Committee on Scholarly
Communication with China archives, George Washington University Library,
Washington, D.C.); Panofsky interview (ref. 60); Liu Huaizu, Beijing zhengfu
dianzi duizhuangji (Beijing electron positron collider) (Beijing, 1994), 36-45.
(65.) Yao et al. (ref. 30), 415-418; Liu
(66.) Chinese leaders, especially Zhou Enlai,
adroitly tapped into the home-country nationalism of Chinese Americans. During
a meeting with C.S. Wu and her physicist husband, Luke Yuan, Zhou showed his
deeply moved guests a map indicating how much Chinese territory formerly under
Russian control he was able to get back from the Soviet Union through
negotiations in the 1950s. See Ts'ai-chien Chiang, Wu Chien-hsiung: wu li k'o
hsueh ti ti i fu jen (C.S. Wu: The first lady of physical science) (T'ai-pei,
(67.) Yang (ref. 45), 57.
(68.) Iris Chang, Thread of the silkworm (New
York, 1995), 143.
(69.) Ibid., 170.
(70.) Ibid., 196-198.
(71.) Li Peishan, "Science and
technology: U.S. impact on China," Beijing review, 34 (18 Nov 1991),
(72.) Yang (ref. 45), 56-57.
(73.) William Wei, The Asian American
movement (Philadelphia, 1993).
(74.) Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, review of The
Asian American movement by William Wei, Pacific historical review, 64 (1995),
(75.) Chi-Kung Jen, Recollections of a
Chinese physicist (Los Alamos, 1991).
(76.) Yang (ref. 45), 56-57. Yang, "My
reflections on some social problems," a speech delivered to the Hong Kong
Student Association in New York on 3 Oct 1970, Yang, Dushu jiaoxue sishi nian
(Forty years of studying and teaching) (Hong Kong, 1985), 55-61.
(77.) Yang, "My reflections" (ref.
76); Ruan Beikang and Ouyang Yingzi, "Zhongmei de huagong yanjiu he
yingyong: Fang Wei Qianguang jiaoshou" ("Research and applications of
chemical engineering in China and the United States: An interview with
Professor James Wei" on 21 Aug 1978), Ruan and Ouyang, Xueren Zhuanfang Lu
(Interviews with scholars) (Hong Kong, 1980), 124.
(78.) Tu Wei-ming, "Cultural China: The
periphery as center," Daedalus, 120 (Spring 1991), 1-32, quote on 12.
(79.) Ibid., 16.
(80.) Jen (ref. 75); interview with Chang-lin
Tien by Zuoyue Wang, 19 Mar 1999, Berkeley. Elizabeth Venant, "A position
of prominence," Los Angeles times (27 Aug 1990), E1-3, on E3 In a way,
Tien represented the second generation of Chinese American scientists, who
usually grew up in mainland China, fled with their families to Taiwan in the
1940s, then came to study in the U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s. I intend to study
their experiences in a future project.
(81.) C.N. Yang, Dushu jiaoxue zhai shinian
(Ten more years of learning and teaching) (Taipei, 1995), back cover.
(82.) The difference perhaps reflected in
some ways the well-known personal animosity between the two early
collaborators. See, for example, T.D. Lee, "Broken parity," T.D. Lee
selected papers, G. Feinberg, ed. (3 vols., Boston, 1986), vol. 3, 487-509.
(83.) Zhu (ref. 31), 544, entry for 4 Aug
(84.) C.N. Yang, "Tantan wulixue yanjiu
he jiaoxue: zai beijing zhongguo kexue jishu daxue yanjiushengyuan de wuci
tanhua" ("On research and teaching in physics: Five talks at the
Graduate School of the University of Science and Technology of China in
Beijing," 27 May-12 June 1986), Yang Zhenning Yanjiang Ji (Speeches of
Chen Ning Yang) (Tianjin, China, 1989), 145-160, on 149.
(85.) Burkhard Bilger, "Holding pattern:
Chinese science has arrived, but the fate of dissident scientists is still up
in the air," Sciences, 36:4 (Jul-Aug 1996), 10-11.
(86.) Zhou responded that the reason was not
ideological but material: the government could not accommodate all the students
in universities. But he agreed that some of the more talented ones should be
allowed to enter university directly. See Zhou Enlai, "Zhongxue biyesheng
keyi zhijie shang daxue" ("Middle school students can go directly to
university"), Zhou Enlai xuanji (ref. 22), 2, 473-474.
(87.) William Sweet, "Future of Chinese
students in US at issue; CUSPEA program nears its end," Physics today, 41
(June 1988), 67-71; Robert Novick, ed., Thirty years since parity
nonconservation: A symposium for T.D. Lee (Boston, 1988), 169.
(88.) See T.D. Lee, Li Zhengdao wenji (Essays
of Lee Tsung-Dao) (Hangzhou, China, 1999). T.D. Lee founded the Center
(Zhongguo Gaodeng Kexue Jishu Zhongxin) in 1986, with funding from the Italian
government. It sponsored colloquia, workshops, and other activities where
Chinese scientists could meet and talk to visiting foreign or overseas Chinese
scientists. See articles about or by Lee in Zuji (Footprints: C.N. Yang's, TD.
Lee's, Samuel Ting's, and Yuan T. Lee's routes to successes) (Beijing, 1989),
(89.) T.D. Lee, "Wulixue ji qita"
("Physics and beyond"), a talk with graduate students at the graduate
school of the University of Science and Technology of China, Beijing," 12
May 1979, in Zuji (ref. 88), 98-102, on 101.
(90.) Yang (ref. 84).
(91.) See Fang Lizhi, Bringing down the Great
Wall: Writings on science, culture, and democracy in China, ed. James H.
Williams (New York, 1991); H. Lyman Miller, Science and dissent in Post-Mao
China: The politics of knowledge (Seattle, 1996).
(92.) Yang also criticized the Chinese
emphasis on collective research in favor of more individual choices. Chen Ning
Yang, "Fahui qiaoliang zuoyong, cujin zhongguo faxhan" ("Playing
the role of a bridge, and promoting Chinese development"),Ning Zhiping,
Tang Xianmin, and Zhang Qinhua, eds., Yang Zhenning Yanjiangji (Collected
speeches by Chen Ning Yang), 195-197.
(93.) Qishi Niandai (The seventies journal),
Liumei huayi xuezhe chongfa zhongguo guangan ji (Reflections on revisiting
China by Chinese American scholars) (Hong Kong, 1974).
(94.) See, for example, Edward David, Jr. to
Henry Kissinger, 22 Sep 1971, on "Visit of U.S. physicist, C.N. Yang, to
the People's Republic of China" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential
Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, FG 6-9, box 1, folder
"[EX] FG 6-9 Office of Science and Technology 1/1/71-"). David was
Nixon's science advisor at the time.
(95.) Yang (ref. 92), 197.
(96.) Nie Huatong, "Wo suo zhidao de
Yang Zhenning" ("The Chen Ning Yang that I know"), reprinted in
Pan Guoju and Han Chuanyuan, eds., Ning zhuo wu qiao: Yang Zhenningfangtai lu
(Interviews with C.N. Yang) (Singapore, 1988), 101-119.
(97.) Wang Xi, "Dalu lumei xueren ziyuan
yu ershiyi shiji zhongguo de fazhan" ("Mainland scholarly personnel
in the United States and China's development in the twenty-first
century"), Shijie Ribao (Chinese daily) (9 Nov 1997), A5.
(98.) According to a survey conducted by the American
Institute of Physics in 1996, women make up 12% among the 144 Asian or Pacific
Islander U.S. Ph.D. physicists, but only 6% of the 1,942 U.S. Ph.D. physicists
of all other ethnic groups. Email from Raymond Chu of AIP to Zuoyue Wang, 5 Mar
(99.) Yang (ref. 76), 89.
(100.) Tung-Mow Yan, "Professor C.N.
Yang's impact on physics," C.S. Liu and S.-T. Yau, eds., Chen Ning Yang, A
great physicist of the twentieth century (Boston, 1995), 451-456.
(101.) Ted Plafker, "Physics meeting
unites the two Chinas--briefly," Science, 269 (18 Aug 1995), 916.
(102.) Shih-shan Henry Tsai, The Chinese
experience in America (Bloomington, 1986).
(103.) Tu (ref. 78).
(104.) Richard Suttmeier, Science,
technology, and China's drive for modernization (Stanford, 1980), 67-94.
(105.) David Holloway, Stalin and the bomb:
The Soviet Union and atomic energy, 1939-56 (New Haven, 1994). On Chinese
scientists' evolution toward political dissent, see Miller (ref. 91).
(106.) Luo Yuru, Zeng Chengkui, and C.K.
Tseng, eds., Dangdai Zhongguo de haiyang shiyan (Oceanography in Contemporary
China) (Beijing, 1985), 416-418.
(107.) Testimony of John P. McTague, 20 June
1985, International cooperation in science, Task Force on Science Policy
Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives, 99th Congress,
1st session, Hearings, 7 (Washington, D.C., 1985), 235-236.
(108.) Ibid., 249.
(109.) James C. Wang, "U.S. scientists
and China," letter to the editor, Science, 246 (22 Dec 1989), 1547. Wang
is professor of biochemistry and molecular biology at Harvard University.
(110.) T.D. Lee, "U.S.-China
relations," letter to the editor, Science, 246(17 Nov 1989), 873.
(111.) See Eric Lichtblau, "Physicist
admits passing laser secrets to Chinese scientists," Los Angeles Times (9
Dec 1997), B1. A group of Chinese scientists who hosted Lee have denied that
Lee passed any military secrets. The open letter by Wang Ganchang et al. is
published in Renmin Ribao (People s Daily), overseas edition (11 Feb 1998), 4.
See also Rone Tempest, "Chinese scientists defend southland spy," Los
Angeles Times (11 Feb 1998), A4; James Brook, "An earlier China spy case
points up post-Cold War ambiguities," New York Times (13 Mar 1999); Jeff
Gerth and James Risen, "Reports show scientist gave U.S. radar secrets to
China," New York limes (10 May 1999).
(112.) U.S. national security and
military/commercial concerns with the People's Republic of China (the "Cox
Report"), U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session
(Washington, DC, 1999). The full text is available on the U.S. House of
Representatives website: http://www.house.gov/conxreport/.
(113.) James Brooke, "Senator tells
nuclear bomb labs to end foreign scientists' visits," New York Times (13
Apr 1999), A14.
(114.) Linda L. Lubrano, "National and
international politics in U.S.-U.S.S.R. scientific cooperation," Social
sudies of science, 11(1981), 451-480; Byrnes (ref. 11).
(115.) See, for example, U.S.
National Academy of Sciences Panel on Global Climate Change Sciences in China,
China and global change: Opportunities for collaboration (Washington, D.C.,
1992). In the mid-1990s, the NAS also launched a joint project with the Chinese
Academy of Sciences on "Cooperation in the energy futures of the Unieted States
and China." See http://www2.nas.edu/oia/24ca.html.