

# Europe's Migrant Affairs:

## How Varying Factors Contribute to the Rise of Radical Party Leaders

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*This thesis examines the impact of migration on European politics through a binary logistic regression of countries within the Schengen Area from the beginning of the implementation of the Schengen Agreement in 1995 till 2014. By examining the historical and recently impactful influx of migrants streaming into and throughout the Schengen Area, I clarify the implications a growing population of foreigners has on their caretaker countries. The time period studied includes each Head of State's migration policies and humanitarian actions aligned or unaligned with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and each country's refugee population in three logits. Some scholars view the economy as the propelling agent for the successes of political parties, however, during mass movements of refugees, radical parties gain substantial support from both the public and opposing parties. This thesis challenges the argument that a country's economy has the biggest influence on the public's choice of political representatives. Therefore, the time series logit also includes gross domestic product, unemployment percentages, year, and European Union membership. Data has been collected from archives, international polls, interviews, data reports, news media and public works. The likeliness of a radical party leader gaining enough traction to become Head of State, in many cases, results from an influx of migrants, the efficiency of a country's asylum system and residential anti-immigration sentiment.*

Europe is more than a year into the largest migrant crisis since the Second World War. The European Union's (EU) external border force, Frontex, monitors the different routes migrants use and the amount arriving at Europe's borders. Frontex found that in 2015 more than 1.8 million had crossed. The mass movement of migrants affects not only the migrants themselves but the countries where they seek refuge. Both are the living testament of photos, videos, and stories of young migrants attending schools in canvas shelters; criminal victimizations stemming from cultural differences; and protests embodying voices of outrage and horror that the rest of the world casually scrolls by in the media. With the United Nation's (UN) calls to action, the EU's inabil-

ity to stay united, and most countries' antiquated system of asylum registration and refugee recognition, the issues surrounding the current and historic flood of migrants has assembled political parties and social activists for and against the acceptance of refugees. Such opposing forces has encouraged a bureaucratic environment.

While many theorists and researchers believe in multiple causations convincing voters to become increasingly conservative, I argue that voters choose to become more conservative because of one source – the fear of societal disturbances as result of migrants. Swedish writer, political commentator and professor of sociology Jens Rydgren (2011) has prescribed a number of theories as to why individuals support

far-right political parties. One of these theories is the ethnic competition hypothesis. In “Voting for the Radical Right in Swedish Municipalities: Social Marginality and Ethnic Competition?” Rydgren (2011) suspects that individuals support far-right political parties because they wish to reduce competition from immigrants over scarce resources such as jobs, housing and welfare benefits. Furthermore, according to this theory, support for the far-right should be higher in areas where there are more immigrants and lower-educated and lower-skilled voters who would face competition from them. In light of the current refugee crisis, history tells us that it is expected of native inhabitants to feel an innate disregard for migrants. In spite of this assumption, the prevailing refugee crisis has upheld the anti-immigration appeal of radical parties steering voters to be more conservative in their values toward migrants.

In many cases right-leaning parties favor the slowing or halt of migration, yet in my findings, not all parties on the right side of the political line defend anti-immigration policies and not all left wing parties are necessarily pro-immigration. Hence my choice of using the label “radical” parties rather than “right wing” parties in order to stray away from the idiosyncrasies of the media as it points only to radical, right wing parties as the culprits of anti-immigration rhetoric. Due to the multitude of parties carrying a variety of unique, political agendas, it would have been inaccurate of me to assume that a conservative, religiously-based, and/or capitalist party is against the migration of asylum seekers into its borders. This predicament is necessary to consider as the thesis moves forward on the discussion of party leaders’ viewpoints on migration. No matter the political association, a leader from a liberal, conservative, centrist, or extremist party faces a difficult challenge during a time of increasingly large, foreign movements and acts of terrorism.

Although the political split on refugee initiatives and human rights concerns has been a longstanding issue, terrorist attacks on caretaker countries’ soil grants further discrimination toward foreign newcomers. An event such as the Paris attacks in November 2015 exemplified the scapegoat method Europe-

an’s already put on refugees. Furthermore, the suicide bombing attack in Istanbul in January 2016, or the September 11 attack in the United States persuades a patriotic consciousness in which the public’s impression of a migrant alters. In such moments, many protest that no migrant, of any kind, is believed to have the right to infiltrate European society with a foreign religion, custom or language. On the other hand, during times of despair and fear other adversaries come together with a communal understanding that the migrants who have fled war and discrimination are surely innocent from acts of such large-scale violence.

Even before the attacks in Paris, Marine Le Pen, the president of the far-right National Front party, was gaining traction by transforming the fear of Islam, migrants and open door policies into political support (Nossiter, 2015). While in anger and mourning, France, and the rest of Europe, witnessed the strengthening voice of the far-right. Seizing the opportunity to expand her appeal, Le Pen demanded a “crackdown” on Islamists in the country while succeeding to force the main center-right party to adopt a stronger anti-immigration stance and convincing President Francois Hollande, a Socialist, to subsequently adopt her radical agenda (Nossiter, 2015). In another part of Europe, a surge of people volunteered to open the doors to their homes in pursuance of fulfilling the detrimental needs of refugees. “Fluchtlinge Willkommen”, or Refugees Welcome, is a German housing organization that has created a skeletal replica of the well-known housing rental company “Airbnb”. Al Jazeera’s Humanitarian Crises section states that to accommodate refugees without fully depending on the government’s housing methods, Jonas Koschke found a way to welcome refugees into German households (2015). All in all, this takes cultural integration to a new level. Refugees integrate with the German culture, and the Germans form an understanding of the refugees’ cultural beliefs, yet German politicians are beginning to question the timetable of this assimilation continuing.

It is worth detailing historical sentiments toward refugee populations. In January 1939, well after the events of Kristallnacht, Gallup’s American Institute

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#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my professors for supporting my endeavors while I lived in Washington D.C., to my fellowship for advising me on my thesis topic, to my roommates who accepted my inability to enjoy the outdoors during the last couple weeks of writing and editing, to my friends who checked in on me when they knew I reached my highest level of stress, to my family who helped me research and edit, and to James for letting me rant on all things migration and my hopes in making the world a better place.

of Public Opinion published a poll asking Americans: “should the U.S. government permit 10,000 mostly Jewish refugee children to come in from Germany?” Turns out two-thirds of Americans said they would not take in 10,000 German Jewish refugee children (as cited in Tharoor, 2015). Ishaan Tharoor had also noted that “no matter the alarming rhetoric of [Adolf] Hitler’s fascist state...popular sentiment in Western Europe and the United States was largely indifferent to the plight of German Jews” (2015). It took decades of convincing reports and authenticated documentation before refugees from Nazism were widely perceived as genuine. Europe and the U.S. are once again in a debate over streaming refugees through their borders making it hard to ignore the mix of unveiled bigotry and sympathy echoing from the past.

The pronounced enhancement in technology from the old refugee crises till now has made a substantial mark in the way in which refugees travel and communicate. Facebook, a social media platform that has given people a voice and a place to arrange protests, currently facilitates a place for refugees to publicly share photos, videos and thoughts with their friends and foes. With refugees’ widening access to smartphones and WiFi connection, Facebook pages, like the “Zaatari refugee camp”, have the ability to give real-time updates to fellow migrants on recommended travel routes, places to sleep and reports regarding the war, border patrols and political initiatives affecting migrants. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has handed out 33,000 SIM cards to Syrians in Jordan and 85,704 solar lanterns, which are used to charge cellphones (Goldberg, 2015). Access to critical technology and finding accountability in GPS services, such as Google Maps, has reinvented the way in which refugees search for safe zones and helped pinpoint the whereabouts of family members. Additionally, the political advertisements surrounding the events of the refugee crisis has also captured the eyes of the public.

Citizens are communicating their views, notably discontent, on the influx of migrants. More specifically, Switzerland’s extremist groups have created an engaging and stream-lined campaign of ads marketing anti-immigration positions. In the months leading up to the Swiss vote on a referendum that limits the influx of foreigners, which essentially violates the European Union’s core treaties of the free movement of people, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) plastered fear-inducing posters which Barbara Stcherbatcheff of Newsweek describes them to be depicting a black, menacing apple tree with tentacle-like roots crushing Switzerland into little pieces, with the accompanying message: “Excessiveness harms! Stop mass immi-

gration” (2014). Likewise, the SVP’s former anti-immigrant campaign illustrates white sheep kicking black and yellow sheep out of Switzerland and black crows pecking at the country (Stcherbatcheff, 2014). Xenophobic rhetoric also prevails in television ads. Producer David Vaverčák oversaw an ad for “HYZA vs Imigranti” in May of 2015 portraying a “Slovak family rejecting foreign and diseased chickens, opting instead for well-bred domestic chicken” (Frej, 2015). Such rhetoric is also prevalent in the mindset of Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. Prime Minister Fico is convinced that “migrants arriving in Europe do not want to stay in Slovakia. They do not have a base for their religion here, their relatives, they would run away anyway” (Frej, 2015). To understand the grand scheme of the effects migration crises are having on European countries, including the heightening developments of politics, culturally mixed communities, and unfamiliar economic values the thesis will use a time series logit and follow with pertinent explanations to answer the following: What factors of Europe’s migrant affairs mobilize radically political agendas?

## Literature Review

It has become apparent that throughout European history an influx of migrants crossing Europe’s borders has caused an increase of support for radical parties. The once anti-semitic and racist morale of Europe’s 20th century parties has grown into today’s anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant radical parties. This facet of Europe’s political party system capitalizes on its hip bigotry. Unlike years before, in this day in age it is unacceptable to discriminate Jews and blacks; yet on the contrary, the push for policies defending anti-Muslim sentiment is quite easily accepted. These instances of minority groups being discriminated by political figures and public backlash is resolved, in many cases, by either the course of time or a source of collective, humane efforts declaring the rights of the particular targeted group. Although party leaders usually affirm an informal agreement in order to halt the progressive stigmatization of unique sets of people based on his or her religion, ethnicity, and cultural beliefs, the first wave of cultural animosity produced by European citizens and politicians is in most cases unstoppable and virtually inevitable.

Research and scholarship educates its audiences on the clash of cultural beliefs between immigrants and European citizens during European migrant crises. However, there has not been enough discussion on the crisis’ relational boost of radical followers as the fear of job loss, fundamental rights and social

inequality seize the minds of concerned voters. This thesis does not include an in-depth list of literature on alternative factors influencing voters' opinion to vote either left or right. This thesis investigates the rise of radical and extremist parties that are dependent upon the European migrant crisis. As such, it is unnecessary to list and address every element of the political agendas and policy plans conceived by various political parties. A thorough examination contingent of the impending European migrant crisis and its effect on right wing party support is, therefore, the concentration for this thesis as literature recognizes the European migrant crisis as a broad inclusion influencing both cultural and economic issues (Pew Research Center, 2014).

The following literature review examines three themes of research reports and scholarship. The first category prioritizes the development of anti-immigrant sentiment and policy adjustments as a result of new, cultural identities. Additionally, a look into the digital use of right wing parties (Simpson & Druxes, 2015) provides a level of political influence unexamined by works of previous crises due to the lack of technological infrastructure. The literature review in the second category investigates public backlash. Public opinion has been an influential element in western governments' inability to successfully integrate refugees. Because the public has become an effective broadcaster of right wing party beliefs, this category includes designated polls on the subject of the historical and current migrant crises. The third category examines the challenges of humanitarian aid during a period in which caretaker countries and its citizens lose faith in foreigners' ability to integrate into a society unlike their homeland.

### *Right Wing Policies and Strategies Disabling Cultural Integration*

The amount of public controversy linked to Muslims in Europe has become increasingly overwhelming. Nielsen (2015, p. 374) highlights the period of the "Danish cartoons of the Prophet", the "burqa bans in Belgium and France", and the "regulations in two Austrian provinces [preventing] the building of minarets" as a time where controversies were "limited in their effects" and scope. Now, controversies are merging into a transnational European phenomenon. It is the international community's duty to integrate and recognize Muslims as a normal part of society, yet Europe's contradictory legal discussion on freedom of expression, "civility" and "common decency" has granted the removal of visible mosques

and religious practices (Nielsen 2015, p. 375). Such discussion must be furthered with scholarship on the interaction of Islamic militancy, new forms of European nationalism, and racism and ethno-pluralism. However, there is an assortment of scholarship on the deeper historical parallels of migration, such as Safran's (1986, p. 99) comparison of "post-war Muslim migration northward from the Middle East and North Africa with the prewar Jewish immigration westward from Poland, Russia and Romania." Underlying values, social relations, customs and overall outlooks differ significantly among civilizations (Huntington, 1998), thus such a comparison is "analytically useful because it points...to the existence of universal patterns in the relationship between immigrant and host society and to the importance of time and context in shaping such relationships" (Safran, 1986, p. 99). Unlike a majority of literature, Huntington's (1997) analysis explains the major difference of politics and economic development deeply rooted in contrasting cultures. This type of realization validates Bach's (1986) attempt to examine the economic progress of new immigrant groups and members of the capitalist class born into an industrial state. Therefore, the literature presumes that when Muslim immigrants enter Western societies, unfamiliar economic interests will begin to shift the host country's economic development (Bach 1986 & Huntington 1997). Other than the fear of reduced occupational opportunities, there is an uneasiness on the integration of newcomers as they may alter a nation's one dimensional economy into a multicultural economy.

The social and cultural changes in response to immigration has raised a political storm between right and left wing parties. Although a large portion of literature considers the economy to be the staple of political discussion between liberal and conservative parties, Art (2011) expresses an alternative staple — anti-immigration. Art (2011) argues that the "dominance of economic issues across Europe in 2008 [did not] allow radical right parties to play their strengths", and as a result, they have taken the opportunity to address a culturally, sensitive issue that offers an emotional appeal (p. 134). This is evident in French workers' sympathy to the xenophobia of the French National Front (FN) and opposition to FN leader Marine Le Pen's proposed management of the French economy (Art, 2011). The maneuvering within radical right wing parties' political agenda plays a significant role in Adams and Somer-Topcu's (2009) study on the policy adjustment by parties in response to rival parties' policy shifts in post-war democracies. The relationship between parties' policy agendas during a period of panic and resolution

heightens the intensity of party system dynamics and political representation (Adams & Somer-Topcu, 2009). For instance, in a period reeking with anti-foreign sentiment, party dynamics enter a mode of either accepting cultural diversity or escaping the threat of cultural diversity (Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky, 2007). Semyonov's et al. (2007) work, and the extension of it by Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris, identifies the intensity of anti-foreign sentiment in "places where the size of the out-group population is relatively large and where economic conditions are relatively suppressed" from 1988 to 2000 (p. 841). Within a similar time period of research, Koopman, Michalowski, and Waibel (2012) produce original data on ten European countries from 1980 to 2000 and found no evidence of cross-national convergence. Citizenship rights were once inclusive, yet in 2002 a stagnation occurred. Immigrants are not born into the political community of their country of destination, therefore it is expected of states to formulate rules and conditions for how immigrants can acquire rights (Koopman et al., 2012; Bach, 1986). However, the electoral mechanisms of long-standing policy traditions have permitted right wing parties to slowly, yet ultimately reverse the aspiring liberalizations of the immigrant electorate (Koopman, et al., 2012).

Media coverage on political party tactics is a newer element in academia. Lara Mazurski's contribution to *Digital Media Strategies of the Far Right in Europe and the United States*, "Right-Wing Campaign Strategies in Sweden", unveils the campaign advertisement of the Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats, SD) during the 2010 parliamentary election. According to Mazurski, the "advertisement associated immigration and Islam with the economic failings of Swedish society" thus energizing a "new embodiment of Swedish identity" and a conceptualization of "the Other" (Simpson & Druxes, 2015, p. 10). The arrival of social networking accelerates the format of new radical right groups and allows right-wing activists to organize around an anti-immigration agenda that authorizes pushback on the increase of migration flows and rejection of multiculturalism (Simpson & Druxes, 2015; Art, 2011). Being that the European migrant crisis has taken up extensive media coverage throughout news sources and social media platforms, the connection millennials have with their social media accounts, such as Facebook, and the groups and organizations they decide to follow, plays a key role in the development of political party engagement and feedback (McCorkindale, DiStaso, & Sisco, 2013). While radical right wing blogs, opinion sites, and social media accounts feed the populists' outrage of contemporary changes in their home-

land, topics like the building of mosques in Germany, the burqa or the headscarf, and the erosion of immigrants' citizenship rights will cause further resistance and rejection of European assimilation with foreign immigrants of non-western values (McCorkindale, et al., 2013; Koopman, 2012; Simpson & Druxes, 2015).

### *Public Backlash*

The European migrant crisis has rallied public backlash in favor of right wing ideologies. Europeans have become decreasingly supportive of refugees entering their borders (Pew Research Center, 2014; "Islam in Europe", 2015), thus making them the biggest promoters of the radical right. According to Pew Research Center (2014), "many [European Union nations] believe that immigrants do not want to adopt their new country's customs and ways of life, and many think immigrants are taking jobs away from native-born citizens" (Most Support Limiting Immigration section, para. 2). This is especially prevalent among the public in Italy, Germany and France (Pew Research Center, 2014). Savage (2004) appeals to a formal commitment agreed upon by both Europeans and Muslims to facilitate a prosperous relationship that does not undermine the dignity of Europe's collective identity and Islamic communities. Furthermore, Savage (2004, p. 25-26) breaks down the "European-Islamic nexus" as a collection of new phenomena which includes, "the rise of terrorism; the emergence of a new anti-Semitism; the shift of established European political parties to the right; the recalibration of European national political calculations; additional complications for achieving an ever closer European Union; and a refocusing, if not a reformulation, of European foreign policy." The European Union's (EU) complex bureaucratic processes and the European Parliament's undemocratic nature has paved a path for right wing extremists (Polychronious, 2009, p. 28). The rise of extremist ideologies is a mirror image of Europeans' disregard for voting in the EU election demonstrated by an abstention rate of more than 55 per cent in total across EU member states (Polychronious, 2009, p. 28-29).

A survey design on public opinion paired with a deliberate explanation as to why the public came to their conclusions, equips crisis observers with viewpoints of those personally affected. This is especially evident in the research methods and polling reports of Rubinstein (1997), "Islam in Europe" (2015), Wilhelm (2015), Blinder (2015), Pew Research Center (2014), Wike (2014), International Organization for Migration (2015), and Esipova, Publiese, and Ray (2015). Rubinstein (1997) showcases the American

publics' anti-immigration sentiment during pre-World War II through polls. This study coincides with Wike's (2014) research on anti-immigrant and anti-minority sentiments, especially felt on the political right. Wike (2014) notes, "in Germany and France, respondents who place themselves on the right side of the political spectrum are more than twice as likely as those on the left to say they have an unfavorable opinion of Muslims" (para. 7). Wilhelm (2015) strengthens Wike's (2014) results with a more intimate study focused on the views of over one thousand Germans. The first part of the study focuses on the participants' personal opinions concerning the increased number of refugees entering Germany and an evaluation of their personal level of engagement, such as donations or time spent volunteering (Wilhelm, 2015). The second part covers an evaluation of Germany's role in addressing the refugee crisis verses that of the EU or United Nations (UN), and an opinion on how peace in Syria could be reinstated (Wilhelm, 2015). Wilhelm's (2015) key findings included: 51 per cent of the population thinks that Germany should host fewer refugees than it does momentarily; almost one-half of the population thinks that hosting refugees will have a negative impact on the German economy (47%) and culture (50%) and over one-half of the population (52%) has never met a refugee who arrived during the current crisis.

### *A Humane Response to Asylum Seekers*

The structure and processes of humanitarian aid is in need of a major overhaul. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) (1999) uses the public's sour outlook of UNHCR efforts to create a forthright report describing the international community's devaluation of humanitarian support. The amount of time and effort made by politicians and world leaders to demonstrate humanitarian aid in places that have the most appeal, for instance disassembling the systems permitting child soldiers in Uganda and prostitution in Thailand, has become obnoxious. Although such causes are necessary, the UNHCR (1999a) explains that the crises that gain the most attention and funding contain the "sexiest" humanitarian operations. The issue in today's humanitarian challenges is the lack of motivation to provide stability and financial support toward the victims of conflict in any given situation (UNHCR, 1999). Unfortunately, it has come to a point in which the humanitarian system is consistently misguided or untouched, and consequently leading international assistance and relations to be ineffective (Malloch-Brown & Barder, 2015). Haavisto and Kovacs (2014) analyze how well

humanitarian organizations address the expectations of sustainable aid. Although there is a pursuit for aid effectiveness, humanitarian organizations rarely publish sustainability reports (Haavisto & Kovacs, 2014). The lack of assessment on humanitarian operations places an uncontrollable hole in researcher's study of humanitarian aid as such information is not available to analyze and evaluate. Furthermore, right wing party leaders challenge the use of humanitarian aid within their own countries and create political agendas that aim to forfeit the attention given to refugees with a simple financial donation to countries neighboring places of conflict. Without a concrete method or negotiation of a resolution benefitting both refugees and countries touching the borders of places infested with war and conflict, the European migrant crisis will continue with no avail (Stafford, 2013). Countries that are in proximity of conflict are inheriting the unfortunate headache that follows an uncontrollable flow of refugees (UNHCR, 2014). Stafford (2013) finds that the amount of financial assistance used to support the various infrastructures and governmental coordination by neighboring countries is not enough to exterminate the barriers preventing reasonable accommodations and relief for the refugee population. More specifically, Syrian refugee camps have turned minor cities into major cities, and the strain on local communities has made it impossible to provide education, water, food, and health care (Stafford, 2013). The future cannot be predicted with certainty; however, when the former UN Under Secretary General and former Commissioner-General of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) Karen AbuZayd (2015) tells her audiences that in Syria over 220,000 have been killed, 6.5 million are internally displaced and tens of thousands have been forcibly disappeared or tortured in detention within, one can only hope that this new millennium strengthens field personnel who are willing to put themselves at risk to help refugees (UNHCR, 1999).

Literature reveals a political pattern continues to transpire in European history. In addition, literature finds that when an influx of migrants enter European borders Europe's far right parties gain leverage in the political arena. A discussion can proceed with a close examination of the various factors of the European migrant crisis ushering in a rise in right wing party support. Considering historical references, such as the UN 1951 Refugee Convention which asserted the need for European countries to accept refugees and asylum from WWII and other war-ravaged areas, the current climate of migration issues will pronounce the ability of extremists to essentially ignore the UN's

call to action which is echoed in today's European migrant crisis. On September 22, 2015, EU leaders met in Brussels to discuss the ongoing refugee and migration crisis, in what the UN cautions "may be the last chance to create a coherent response to end the suffering and exploitation of refugees and migrants" (UN News Centre, 2015, para. 1). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres argues that this crisis combined with the lack of European unity is resulting in a "management mayhem" (UN News Centre, 2015, para. 2). European politicians' tough response is largely due to radical right wing ideologies – which oppose the cultural integration, gain strength from populations hostile to the influx of migrants, and deny refugees and asylum seekers access to basic humanitarian aid.

## Methodology

The time series logistic regression analysis utilizes data collected by the World Bank's data catalog from 1995 to 2014. Statistical data for 2015 and 2016 are in progress and, therefore, not available for inclusion in my analysis. The World Bank Open Data, a free and open database allowing access to data about development in countries around the globe, provided the gross domestic product (GDP) at market price (constant U.S. dollars) calculated by the World Bank national accounts data and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development National Accounts data files, unemployment total (percentage of total labor force) curated by the International Labor Organization, and refugee population by country or territory of asylum formulated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. The refugee population indicator excludes asylum seekers – people who have applied for asylum or refugee status and who have not yet received a decision or people who are registered as asylum seekers.

The GDP and unemployment percentages variables are meant to measure any significance regarding the strengths and weaknesses of a country's economy and its influence on anti-immigration policies. Due to numerous scholarship identifying politicians' economic policies as a main force in the progression or degradation of their political party, I find it is necessary to include GDP and unemployment in the logit analysis. Residents' instinctual and collective fear has been contingent upon decreases in job availability and adjustments in their country's economy and, thereby, underscores political parties' transition to anti-immigration initiatives.

The countries and years collected in my analysis are based on the countries that agreed to the terms of the Schengen Area, as well as the year the Schengen Area began in 1995. I decided to collect data on the countries of the Schengen Area because of the perpetrating challenges its Member States are facing from the influx of migrants and potential terrorists taking advantage of the dysfunctional border controls and asylum systems. The Schengen Area, also known as the Schengen zone, allows travel across Member States' common borders without passports or customs controls. It essentially functions as a single country for international travel purposes with the cooperation of a mutual visa policy. Totalling 26 European countries, the Schengen zone encompasses 22 of the 28 EU Member States. The Schengen Area began in 1985 as the Schengen Agreement through the cooperation of five EU Member States from the European Economic Community. In 1990, the Schengen Convention implemented the Schengen Agreement and set forth a process to abolish internal border control ("The Schengen area", n.d., p. 14). In addition, the Convention aimed to "strengthen external border checks, define procedures for issuing uniform visas, establish a Schengen Information System and take action against drug trafficking" ("The Schengen area", n.d., p. 14). The implementation of the Agreement began on March 26, 1995 with the establishment of the Schengen Area. By 1999, the Schengen Area grew in membership and led to the integration of the Agreement into the legal framework of the EU. Considering the recent attention on the migrant crisis and the Paris attacks, Schengen Area countries have reintroduced temporary border controls. The European Commission's report on the "Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control" explains that the "Schengen Borders Code provides Member States with the capability of temporarily reintroducing border control at the internal borders in the event that a serious threat to public policy or internal security has been established" (2016, para. 1). As a result of the migrant crisis, Denmark temporarily reintroduced border controls in the context of the events "requiring immediate action", while Belgium, Austria, France, Germany, Norway, and Sweden have imposed controls in the context of "foreseeable events" ("Currently Temporarily" section, para. 4).

As the data is revealed, it should be duly noted that according to the UNHCR, the terms refugee and asylum seeker are often confused. The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as someone who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is out-

side the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (UNHCR, p.14) In many cases, an asylum seeker is someone who says he or she is a refugee, but whose claim has not yet been definitively evaluated. National asylum systems are meant to decide which asylum seekers qualify for international protection (“Asylum Seekers”, n.d., para. 2). After a properly administrated procedure, those who are judged not to be refugees, nor to be in need of any other form of protection, can be sent back to their home country. As such, the efficiency of the asylum system is critical. With a swift and fair asylum system, “people who know they are not refugees have little incentive to make a claim in the first place, thereby benefitting the home country and the refugees for whom the system is intended” (“Asylum Seekers”, n.d., para. 3). During a mass movement of refugees, the capacity to conduct individual asylum interviews for everyone who has crossed the border will never exist, nor is it even necessary due to the circumstances forcing them to flee. Such groups are “often declared ‘prima facie’ refugees” (“Asylum Seekers”, n.d., para. 4).

Throughout my readings and data searches it was apparent that the current registration processes are incapable of accurately calculating and determining not only who is an asylum seeker or refugee but a migrant worker or even terrorist. Much of the confusion is due to the fact that national asylum systems will simply depend on word of mouth and not properly share documented information across European countries. With the EU unable to reach a consensus on a successful standard formulation of best methods in refugee registration, the tallying of refugees will continue to pose a problem for the EU and its Member States, the Schengen Area and its Member States, and the electability of party leaders who oppose anti-immigration agendas.

Lastly, I categorized the political stance of each Schengen zone country’s Head of State. The political stance represents a Head’s of State voiced opinion and political actions in migrant affairs. Although a Prime Minister or Chancellor does not have the direct vote of the people, he or she is a representative of the State’s majority party which usually gains its seats by a direct public vote. By examining the beginning of the Schengen Area enactments in 1995 till 2014, I determined each Head’s of State stance on migration using the categories zero, one and two. These levels of measurement account for governments preventing refugee admissions and disregard the involvement of State action in foreigner’s societal assimilation to governments that fully welcome migrants and foster

political action in human rights and cultural acceptance.

### *Category Zero*

Category zero represents Heads of State who advised an anti-immigration stance in the creation of strict migrant policies for the purpose of dismissing refugees from their borders. State leaders violating basic human rights according to Refugee International, the EU, UNHCR, and the general mission and held beliefs of the UN are also designated category zero.

### *Category One*

Category one represents leaders who welcome refugees but only through a system of equitable burden-sharing. These individuals are not particularly clear or forthright in their beliefs on migration, yet they demand that before agreeing to shelter and care for the hundreds of thousands of refugees traveling to their borders, there must be a reliable resolution amongst European countries that the influx of migrants will be shared equally. Some political leaders suggest a quota system, such as Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto of Hungary, in order to uphold a sturdy and fair means of regulation. However, in Hungary’s particular situation, a new kind of burden-sharing plan was devised by Szijjarto. In hopes of relieving Europe of the insurmountable progression of migrants, Budapest aims to implement a quota on “major players” around the world to bear some of the burden facing Hungary and all of Europe (O’Grady, 2015). Additionally, the European Commission’s plans for “permanent and binding” quotas as urged by Berlin and Brussels. The proposal applies to the EU’s passport-free Schengen zone and the EU asylum policy, which allows countries like the United Kingdom to opt out “saying it will not take part in any proposed European refugee-sharing scheme” (as cited in Traynor, 2015, para. 4). The Commission’s plan has triggered resistance by 15 of the 28 EU countries (as cited in Traynor, 2015, para. 3).

### *Category Two*

Category two includes Heads of State who welcome refugees with open arms. These leaders are open to the integration of foreigners and have taken upon themselves the responsibility to provide quality aid for refugees. Category two Heads of State include leaders like Finnish Prime Minister Juha Sipilä offering his private home in Northern Finland (Uras, 2015) and ex-Prime Minister Antonio Guterres of



Portugal elected to High Commissioner for Refugees by the UN General Assembly from 2005 to 2015. While awaiting further instruction from the EU and UN, these State leaders enforce protection policies on the refugees' behalf in order to preserve human rights and cultural harmony within society.

## Results

I determined the political stances through the use of international and national news articles, reports made by think tanks and distinguished news media, speeches given at UN, EU and state-wide conferences, campaign websites, and academic books and journals. The task at hand was to identify the differentiating opinions of the political leaders without being blinded by the false interpretations of the media and misleading dialogue. For instance, what the Head of State may say to their political party advisors and supporting constituents might contradict a conversation taking place among members of the UN. Ultimately, it was up to me to decide if level zero, one or two was the best fit for the political leader currently under investigation. In addition, it should be kept in mind that the data does not showcase the political gains of extremist parties. Although, in most cases, extremist party members have been unable to gain enough political stamina to achieve Head of State, they have been elected to multiple seats in a country's parliamentary division and city government. If extremists are not earning seats, they are surely influencing the political agendas of current and potential Heads of State.

To assess the effects of GDP, unemployment, refugee population, years, and EU membership on a Head of State's political stance concerning migration affairs, I find it appropriate to use the binary logistic regression. This political stance variable does not consist of a large range of categories. Consequently, the following results will take into account only two of the three categories of political stances in order to perform a binary logistic regression resulting in three different logits. A logit works well in this methodology as the dependent variable encompasses only two categories at a time. Moreover, the methodology features the beta coefficient (top), standard error (bottom), and identifies the significance (\*) of each independent variable as it compares to the categories of political stance.

Table 1 illustrates the effect refugee population, GDP, unemployment rate, year, and EU membership has on political stance categories anti-immigration stance (0) and burden-sharing stance (1). The logit between zero and one is significant for unemploy-

**Table 1. Logit between anti-immigration stance (0) and burden-sharing stance (1)**

Refugee Population	.000 .000
GDP	.000 .000
Unemployment Rate	-.104* .039
Year	-.057* .029
EU Membership	4.297* 1.039
Constant	110.574* 57.149

\* Indicates significance value under .05.

ment rate, year and EU membership, and not significant for refugee population and GDP.

The economic concerns surrounding unemployment rates could have intimidated voters into switching the political party in power. If individuals are losing jobs in a decreasingly dependable job market the blame, in many cases, is set on the current Head of State. In order to readjust the job market, voters attempt to change the party leader and sometimes succeed which can explain the stated significance for the year. Certainly, the political stances on migration correlate with the political stances on economic policies affecting unemployment rates and EU membership. The EU expects authorities of each member country to correctly implement EU legislation into national law, and the international community and European countries look to the EU as it is a symbol of security and fiscal worth. When Member States remain compliant to the establishments and regulations of the EU, then the EU's topical resolutions on migration and economic policy will signal to voters that there is a sense of stability amongst each Member State. On the other hand, Europe's disjointed and arbitrary handling of the migrant crisis and the growing debate on EU

referendums symbolizes EU’s instability. Therefore, the EU’s contested stability in economic and migration laws influencing voters and their leader’s political stance is a cause for significance.

The beta coefficient explains that as the unemployment rate and year increase, the political stance moves from burden-sharing stance (1) to anti-immigration stance (0). This indicates that as the unemployment rate goes up, and as time moves on, the political party in power is stricter in its policies and less inclusive of foreigners moving into their country. For instance, over the course of the 20th century, Denmark of nearly six million became home to refugees and immigrants from the Soviet bloc, Balkans, and Middle East. As discussed by Edward Delman of The Atlantic, “today, immigrants and their descendants account for ten per cent of [Denmark’s] total population” (2016, para. 2). Also, having been an advocate for refugees and asylum-seekers, Denmark was one of the first countries to become a party to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, and fully funds the humanitarian group Danish Refugee Council. Even so, within 2015, 21,000 people sought asylum in Denmark causing the welfare state to respond with a series of dramatic steps aiming to dissuade migrants from entering (Delman, 2016, para. 3). At the beginning of 2016, the Danish parliament passed a bill empowering authorities to seize assets exceeding \$1,450 from asylum seekers in order to help pay for the migrants’ subsistence in the country (Delman, 2016, para. 1). Over time, voters are more trusting of political leaders who believe in this manner and who are also efficient in boosting job security.

As countries become EU members, the political stance moves from anti-immigration stance (0) to burden-sharing stance (1). This demonstrates that the shift moves toward a political party that is somewhat inclusive in scope yet will agree only to terms that include a burden-sharing strategy. While in pursuance of a quota system based on the concept of equitable burden-sharing, the countries of the Schengen zone depend on EU laws and regulations to reach a consensus on overcoming the effects of migrant crises and assembling stability. However instances exist in which a non-EU member country successfully solves a crisis without the use of EU laws and regulations. Consider the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia).

The FYR Macedonia was not a candidate for accession to the EU during the Kosovar refugee crisis and has still not yet entered into accession negotiations. The refugees of Kosovo generally received adequate assistance. The UNHCR’s “The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of UN-

HCR’s Emergency Preparedness and Response” (2000) reports that the Kosovar refugee crisis came to a point of near-disaster in which the refugees were trapped at the Blace crossing point on the border between Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. FYR Macedonia was refusing to admit massive refugee flow unless it had reasonable assurance of the aid in other States. As a result, a ‘burden-sharing program’ based on the UNHCR’s “underlying premise that protection is a common responsibility of states” (Main Conclusions section, para. 3) went into action. “Governments rather than [the] UNHCR took the initiative in these [burden-sharing] programs, particularly the United States of America [another non-EU member]” (Main Conclusions section, para. 3). The logit, along with this example, illustrates that EU membership is unnecessary to combat an anti-immigration stance.

**Table 2. Logit between a burden-sharing stance (1) and welcomes refugees stance (2)**

Refugee Population	.000 .000
GDP	.000 .000
Unemployment Rate	.061 .041
Year	-.020 .026
EU Membership	-3.257* 1.025
Constant	43.427 52.185

\* Indicates significance value under .05.

Table 2 represents the effect refugee population, GDP, unemployment rate, year, and EU membership has on political stance categories burden-sharing stance (1) and welcomes refugee stance (2). The logit between one and two is significant for only EU membership.

It is important to define a separation between burden-sharing stance and welcomes refugees stance. In all phases of European refugee policy to date, the question of sharing the burdens of refugee protection has played an important role. The Dublin Regulation of 1990 was a turning-point in the development of a European asylum policy. The Regulation established a hierarchy of criteria for identifying the Member State responsible for the examination of an asylum claim in Europe. The hierarchical criteria were based on family links followed by responsibilities assigned on the basis of the State through which the asylum seeker first entered (European Council on Refugee and Exiles, para. 1). In the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, “the Member States agreed to jointly address important aspects of asylum and immigration policies, and draft uniform norms and procedures within five years” (Angenendt, Engler, & Schneider, 2013, p. 1). At its meeting in “Tampere in 1999, the European Council formally approved the establishment of a shared European asylum system” (Angenendt, et al., 2013, p. 1). The following two examples will further explain my reasoning in designating two seemingly similar categories into one logit.

As the Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi migrant crises became more troubling, various party leaders agreed to allow refugees into their borders. However, pressure from the EU, UN and neighboring countries may have been the true force pushing political leaders to be more willing to allow refugees to enter their country's borders. If it was up to Prime Minister Joseph Muscat of Malta, he would not have allowed as many refugees into his borders; yet, with the promising declarations of the EU to disperse asylum seekers to other nations and to alleviate financial and housing burdens from Malta, Prime Minister Muscat was more willing to allow those seeking asylum to enter. Secondly, the Slovenia Press Agency explains that Interior Minister Vesna Györköös Žnidar set out his case against binding quotas on EU Member States to accept refugees in the bloc via the Mediterranean (as cited in “Slovenia Opposed”, 2015). Slovenia has allied with a group of ten Central and Eastern European countries calling for voluntary quotas, while Germany and France lead a group of countries favoring binding quotas. A formula that considers the size of urban centers, existing capabilities for handling refugees, historical migration flows, and financial availability is necessary to properly apply burden-sharing measures – whether through voluntary or binding quotas – to all member countries.

Based on the negative beta-coefficient, as EU membership is fulfilled, the political stance moves from welcomes refugees stance (2) to burden-shar-

ing stance (1). Therefore, EU member countries are more willing to agree upon a burden-sharing stance. EU member countries depend on fellow members to share a similar burden in sheltering and assimilating refugees into European society rather than expanding open-door policies.

**Table 3. Logit between a burden-sharing stance (1) and welcomes refugees stance (2)**

Refugee Population	.000 .000
GDP	.000 .000
Unemployment Rate	-.027 .024
Year	-.047* .020
EU Membership	.828* .259
Constant	93.144* 39.794

\* Indicates significance value under .05.

Table 3 illustrates the two most distinct categories of political stance. The effect refugee population, GDP, unemployment rate, year and EU membership has on political stance categories anti-immigration stance (0) and welcomes refugees stance (2) are displayed in Table 3. The logit between zero and two is significant for GDP, year and EU membership, and not significant for refugee population and unemployment rate.

Considering that Table 3 demonstrates the most drastic logit of the three, the significance of each variable is the best indicator in resolving my thesis question. The refugee population in this logit reached the closest to a significance value under .05 unlike the previous logits. As such, this logit does show that when there is an increase in refugees entering a country, there is a developing comparison between a Head's of

State political stance and their country's refugee population. In October 2015, the far-right Freedom party of Vienna, Austria achieved a record result in a city election after concentrating its campaign on Europe's refugee crisis. Tens of thousands of refugees had passed through Vienna throughout the progression of the campaign. Their sudden arrival prompted an outpour of sympathy and fears of rising immigration dismembering the national security of Austria. Reuters reports, "The election had increasingly become a personal contest between the mayor of 20 years, Michael Häupl, and the head of the Freedom party, Heinz-Christian Strache, who has repeatedly called for Austria to build a border fence to keep migrants out" ("Refugee crisis fuels", para. 2). Furthermore, in February 2014, the Dutch lower house of parliament approved a controversial bill from the center-right government to expel 26,000 asylum seekers. According to BBC News, "the plans would force the failed applicants, many of whom have lived in the Netherlands for years, to leave [within] a three-year period" (2004, para. 1). The political gains in Austria and the Netherlands are two examples of the rise in radical views dominating authorities of the State. Such examples on the expansion of migration movements and boost in radical support prove that the logit and its comparison to refugee population will lead to a value closer to significance.

On the other hand, Prime Ministers of the Social Democratic party in Lithuania have made it a point to aid migrants even in increasingly delicate times of massive migration and threats of illegal immigrants. In September 2015, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania held a debate "On the Approach of the State of Lithuania to the Refugee Crisis" which included the attendance of Social Democrat Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevičius and Minister of Foreign Affairs Linas Antanas Linkevičius. Foreign Minister Linkevičius "pointed out 95 percent of Syrian refugees are to be regarded, under the terms of the Geneva Convention, as refugees in need of protection", and countries like Italy, Greece and Hungary, that have set up the initial registration points, should put great focus on migration management centers ("Seimas discussed", 2015, para. 2). In response to a recent study showing that 51 percent of residents of Lithuania would agree that Lithuania should take in refugees and 23 percent would oppose such a decision, Prime Minister Butkevičius addresses a strategic plan to bring cooperation amongst government agencies and working groups to draft a description of procedures that will serve as a basis for the thorough screening of refugees as the number of admissions increase ("Seimas discussed", 2015). Accordingly, during a migration

influx, residents are also willing to approve the governments intake of refugees.

From an economic standpoint, it was peculiar to see significance for GDP yet no significance for unemployment. Due to the many residential complaints regarding the inability to acquire jobs and with the abrupt inclusion of refugees who are assumed to diminish job security, one would think unemployment would have carried significance. The Hungarian government has taken a strong stance on the migrant numbers entering its borders by means of excluding migrants and taking on an anti-immigration approach. The Hungarian Free Press explains Prime Minister Fidesz Viktor Orbán's government continued to print 333 billboard-size posters reading: "If you come to Hungary, you can't take away the jobs of Hungarians," after activists of the Y-GEN wing of the Együtt opposition party were arrested for defacing the government's xenophobic billboards (Adam, 2015, para. 2). In addition, the Stratfor Global Intelligence's "Sweden's Electoral Season Reveals Growing Concern with Immigration" (2014) report recognizes the effects growing migration and faltering economies have on major political elections.

Stratfor's (2014) research initiates a discussion on Sweden's newest issue during the 2014 electoral debates: growing immigration and its financial and cultural impact. Despite Sweden's sturdy economic performance kept by Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt of the liberal conservative Moderate Party, the country began to move onto issues related to the violent riots shaking Stockholm's immigrant-heavy suburbs, revealing Sweden's struggle to integrate immigrants into mainstream society. Stratfor (2014) states that although "Swedes still largely support the idea of living in a country that is open to asylum seekers, they are [equally] worried about the economic and cultural impact of increased immigration" (para. 8). This is one of the factors driving the significant support for the anti-immigration Sweden Democrats (SD). Garnering 5.7 percent of the Swedish Parliament votes in 2010 followed by polling at around ten percent in 2014 illustrates the SD's new electoral weight. Prime Minister Reinfeldt said that he would continue to exclude the SD in deals on issues such as asylum and immigration, yet he seeks cooperation from them on other policy issues (Stratfor, 2014). Reinfeldt's acknowledgement of the SD is yet another milestone in the party's rapid growth.

The relationship between the discriminate political stances and EU membership is significant. The recent migration crisis has supplied additional reasoning for referendums on whether to remain in the EU or not. Canadian economist, Governor of

the Bank of England, and Chairman of the G20's Financial Stability Board Mark Carney makes the case that EU membership delivers economic benefits because it makes the economy "open" (Kirkup, 2015). In Carney's view, economic benefits rest in part on EU immigrants: "It's vital that we remain in the EU in order to go on enjoying the benefits of hundreds of thousands of foreigners coming to live and work here" (Kirkup, 2015, para. 11). Therefore, in accordance to Carney, migration has a positive impact for EU members and in assuring economic benefits. Whether opponents like it or not, Carney appeals to the admission of migrants.

As time passes and data is made available from 2015 and 2016, the year and political stance comparison might reach a significance value below .05. The role a year plays into a political party's agenda on migration policy holds importance as time fluctuates with various political, social and economic issues of concern. For instance, the manner in which German Chancellor Angela Merkel handles the progression of the migrant crisis, among other issues, will determine whether she will be victorious in her fourth consecutive German general election in 2017 – that is if she does not resign beforehand. Reuters (2016) finds during 2015, Merkel was plummeting in approval ratings, yet starting in February 2016, Merkel and her conservative bloc rose in voter support while the anti-immigrant far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party fell ("For the first", 2016). Such situations in which a Head of State is winning and losing support from 2015 to 2016 as a result of the current migrant crisis cannot be fully diagnosed in the logit, because data from 2015 and 2016 are not yet available.

The GDP's beta coefficient has a weak effect. Despite GDP being significant, a value of .000 is not strong enough to evaluate its impact on political stance. This proves that the theorists and researchers, who believe that the GDP is the deciding factor in convincing voters to elect a radical party as the State's majority, are misguided. Although I am unable to prove that the refugee population has a significant influence on the State leaders' political stances, the logit does show that the push toward radicalism is not entirely due to GDP.

The beta coefficient for the year reveals that as time goes on, the political stance moves from welcomes refugees stance (2) to anti-immigration stance (0). Respectively, as the years progress the refugee populations tend to increase. As a result, the evolving years emphasize the evolution of voters becoming more susceptible to radical parties, while at the

same time the amount of refugees increase from year to year.

When countries assume membership to the EU, the political stance moves from zero to two. One of the fundamental criteria towards becoming an EU Member State is possessing "stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities" (Membership criteria section, para. 2). By assuming responsibilities of membership, the EU members of the Schengen Area have demonstrated welcoming characteristics concerning their borders, thus the beta correlation moves away from an anti-immigration stance (0) to a welcome refugees stance (2).

Throughout my research, I found barriers that may have caused some discrepancies in my analysis. To represent the political stance, I collected the specific stances of each Head of State for each country of the Schengen Area. This led me to understand the changes in the public's thinking based on the government's majority party at the time, however, the data misses the rise in voter turnout for radical and extremist groups that failed to achieve Head of State. In addition, the data is missing new extremist parties that had not been created until recently due to the migrant crisis. For instance, Finland's Soldiers of the Odin, a new far-right citizens group, has multiplied in members as the country has become gripped with "fear and paranoia" after multiple sex assaults allegedly committed by asylum seekers on December 31, 2015 (Faiola, 2016). Furthermore, the data collected ends in 2014 and the additional numbers are not to be released until mid-2016 and mid-2017 for the years 2015 and 2016, respectively. This dilemma prevented me from analyzing changes in political agendas closer to the recent crisis. A large amount of research was put into understanding the true, distinct beliefs of political leaders. What is said during a United Nations conference may be different than what is said during a national conference. Therefore, what I came across during my research may have slight deficiencies in accuracy. I exercised judgment in determining if a particular leader was categorized as zero, one or two. To conclude, the data does not tell us who voted for the leaders or who the Heads of State represent: youth, adults, retirees, minorities, and/or social activists. Additionally, each country has its own voting dates. The voting dates may or may not coincide with migrant crises. Thus, the timing could play a major role in the electability of political parties.

## Conclusion

Throughout my research, I found weaknesses in previous academia findings on the rise of Europe's radical parties. The current and past refugee crises have changed the minds of politicians and voters which academia tends to exclude. The urgency of vulnerable migrants streaming in at alarming volume from countries engulfed in war, civil unrest and discriminatory practices places a strain on a host country's willingness and ability to aid refugees in need of welfare and safety. Migration policies have hardened in response to the more than 1.8 million refugees entering Europe's borders. Media coverage on the abuses committed by and toward refugees has increased. Foreign cultures and religions have suddenly become a larger influence in European society as a result. Muslim refugees have obtained a reputation for jihadist actions and religious delusion. These characterizing incidents, stemming from the migrant crisis, are substantially influential in a voter's decision to choose politicians with radical political agendas over more lenient party agendas on the matters of migration and refugee assistance.

The future of the Schengen Area has been reportedly hanging in the balance as EU leaders are on the verge of agreeing to a suspension as increasingly toxic relations between countries reach alarming dimensions. According to the European Commission, the reintroduction of internal border controls within the Schengen Area will reduce EU economic output over a ten-year period between €500 billion and €1.4 trillion. In addition, the direct costs for border controls will cost between €5 billion and €18 billion annually.

As of early March, the European Commission hosted a summit addressing the intension to confront migration pressures and save the established Schengen Agreement. The Commission proposed the restoration of a fully functional Schengen system that would lift all internal border controls by the end of 2016. It also announced a pledge of €55 million to address the immediate needs of Syrian school-children in Turkey for access to formal education, and €40 million in humanitarian aid through the World Food Program and Turkish Red Crescent ("Refugee crisis", 2016). The summit concluded with varying solutions, yet the EU's relocation idea of a "one in, one out" migrant deal, strongly asserted by Chancellor Merkel, is proceeding in an insensitive and possibly illegal course of action according to UN officials (Rankin, 2016, para. 3). Aiming to instill self-serving policies while balancing working relations with Turkey, the EU garners increased Turkish

involvement to curb the flow of refugees into Europe thereby reducing the impact radical parties have on domestic policies. Even with these developments, the direction in which European leaders and international players are moving is uncertain. Whether or not the proposed resolutions and operations are effective, the current migrant crisis, like all others, has left lifelong wounds on asylum seekers and refugees, undermined Europe's ability to collectively resolve cultural and economic stigmas, and weakened the relationships between international entities such as the UN, EU and Schengen Area.

An anti-immigration approach in a political party's agenda is enough to integrate extremist and nationalistic policies into society. State leaders have even sought radical politicians to aid in the creation of strong immigration policies and regulation. Overall, as discussions of anti-immigration policies gradually imbed into party agendas, Europe has seen less resistance from the usually moderate and humanistic political parties. A case in point of this political phenomena is the French Socialists' indecisive methods in dealing with the effects of immigration, such as unemployment or inadequate welfare state benefits. Marcus (1995) finds that the French Socialists' strategy failed as it "quickly became clear that the real motor behind policy in this area [of immigration] was not so much the objective problems posed by immigration, but the public perception of these problems" (as cited in Williams, 2006, 104). The National Front had created an irrational fear that could not be diluted through moderate and rational policy action. According to Michelle Hale Williams in "The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies" the Socialist party's tendency was inaction or to stand behind broad inclusive notions of French citizenship which does not always bode well with voters who believed the National Front configured a better answer to the problems of immigration. Minkenberg (1998) argued that the pressure to respond to the radical right prompted Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin to actively contain the National Front by responding with "actions such as increased border patrols and also stopping foreigners at the border and detaining them when they carried invalid documentation for entry in 1997" (as cited in Williams, 2006, p. 104).

Europe's radical and nationalist parties have not accumulated enough strength to form a government of their own. Nevertheless, they maneuvered their motives in way that has impacted the political agendas of moderate parties. In order to further their political evolution, radical parties must gain access to ruling alliances. Even if the majority of European

countries are far from reaching a point of complete radicalism, the expansion of parties such as Sweden's Social Democrats, Germany's Alternative für Deutschland, Norway's Progress party and France's National Front confirms that radical parties are grow-

ing, and not only in countries that have been hit hardest by weakening GDP and unemployment rates, but by countries that have experienced the acceleration of migration movement firsthand.

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*Syrian and Iraqi refugees arrive from Turkey to Skala Sykamias, Lesbos island, Greece. Spanish volunteers (life rescue team - with yellow-red clothes) from "Proactiva open arms," Oct. 30, 2015. Photo used with permission from Ggia.*

## Melissa Petersen



Melissa Petersen completed her undergrad in March 2016 with a degree in political science as well as leadership experience with ASI's Lobby Corp, the Political Science Club and awardwinning National Model United Nations team. She plans to continue her work at Los Angeles City Hall, complete her graduate degree abroad in international development or public policy and finish off her career serving the United Nations with a focus in education. Thank you Cal Poly Pomona for making my aspirations possible!  
Go Broncos!

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