Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism: The Replicability of Best Practice

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Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency have been widely debated subjects amongst security scholars in terms of best practice and rate of success. Scholars have found best-practice methods regarding both approaches, but heavily debate as to which is more advantageous in curbing global terror and insurgency and whether these results are replicable. This study engaged in a multifaceted approach in analysing counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies to determine when these methods find success, and whether success is replicable on a generalised scale or is region and context specific. Using case studies in Iraq, Afghanistan and Malaya, the goal was to analyse what factors led to their successes and whether they were idiosyncratic or mutually generalisable for a variety of conflicts. This study fills in the gap created by previous scholars and establishes a direct understanding of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in terms of strategic best practice. Consequently, this study reveals the nature behind the factors that lead to successes in the war on terror and global insurgency, with the goal of aiding future security policy.

The disciplines of counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) have been a focal point of debate amongst international security scholars since the September 11th World Trade Centre attacks forever changed the nature of conventional warfare. Since that fateful day and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the two disciplines have been widely debated as to which is more advantageous in curbing the global terror and insurgency threat that we face today. As insurgency and terrorism have evolved throughout the decades, it is important to ensure that the strategies and methods used to counter them are likewise evolving. As such, this type of research is incredibly pertinent to pursue as the international security community seeks to neutralise global terror and insurgency.

The Global War on Terror has seen a plethora of different methods and strategies within the CT/COIN domain used to address and neutralise terrorist and insurgent activity, with varied success. Scholars disagree as to which approach, as well as subsequent methods and strategies, yield the most effective success. Furthermore, scholars also disagree as to whether the limited success that has been seen throughout various CT and COIN op-
erations are mutually replicable on a generalised scale for a variety of conflicts, or if they are region and content specific.

In order to answer these questions, it is pertinent to establish understanding of the factors behind the limited success as well as the demonstrated consequences of the differential use of CT and COIN strategies. Fully understanding the logistics of success against insurgents and terrorists, while understanding the residual effects of these tactics, will allow security scholars to empirically analyse their effectiveness.

Consequently, CT and COIN have been a widely debated subject amongst security scholars in terms of best practice and rate of success. Scholars have found best-practice methods regarding both approaches, but heavily debate as to which is more advantageous in curbing global terror and insurgency and whether these results are replicable. This study engaged in a multifaceted approach in analysing counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies to determine when these methods find success, and whether this success is replicable on a generalised scale or is region and context specific. Using case studies of the CT and COIN approaches used in Iraq, Afghanistan and Malaya, the goal was to analyse what factors led to their successes and whether they were idiosyncratic or mutually generalisable for a variety of conflicts. This study fills in the gap created by previous scholars and establishes a direct understanding of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in terms of strategic best practice. This study thereby reveals the nature behind the factors that lead to successes in the war on terror and global insurgency. As such, by addressing this debate and analysing the arguments and factors behind each discipline, future security policy can be correctly tailored in order to effectively address current and future threats.

Literature Review

Regarding a definitive end to global terrorism, and thereby insurgency, the existing literature is quite split in terms of the most advantageous approach, and whether a definitive end is realistically achievable. Within this great debate, there are two schools of thought: counterterrorism, which mainly consists of an enemy centric approach of hard power precision strikes, and counterinsurgency, which consists of a combination of hard and soft power with a mostly population centric approach. Scholars on both sides offer differential strategies and critiques of the other, which will be discussed below.

As the concept of terrorism has evolved throughout the years, it is important to set a standard definition of terrorism that will be used throughout this literature review. As set by the United States Code, terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (22 U.S. Code 38 §2656f, 2000). Furthermore, the Code of Federal Regulations specifies terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (20 CFR Section 0.85). The distinction made by the words “subnational groups” and “clandestine agents” are important to note, as they developed as a result of the evolving nature of terrorism that has occurred since the late 60s.

It is also pertinent to define insurgency as well. Taken from the Department of Homeland Security’s Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, insurgency is defined as a “protracted political-military struggle directed towards subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power and completely or partially controlling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organisations” (DHS 2012). The most important distinction, as noted by the DHS, between terrorism and insurgency is the objective: gaining control of a population or a particular territory, including its resources. Although terrorism and insurgency share some similarities, they are distinct from one another and therefore warrant differential approaches. The definitions provided are mutually accepted by the scholars discussed below and provide a basis for this review.

“Old” v. “New Terrorism”
Before the debate between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency can be discussed, the distinction must be made between "old" and "new" terrorism. Traditional, or old terrorism, arguably arose in the late 60s and was characterised by five categories that explain the motives of contemporary terrorism. These categories include right and left-wing (or ideological), ethnopolitical, politically-religious, state-sponsored, and single-issue (Gosnarina & Gottlieb, 2014). During the Cold War, the most common forms of terrorist violence were ideological, state-sponsored, and ethno-political. Since the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent rise of globalisation in the 1990s, the framework of terrorism started to categorically alter, and continued to do so. This has consequently led to the current takfiri (global violent jihad) insurgency threat that we face today (Gofas, 2012).

Serving as the senior advisor to General Petraeus during the Iraq Surge from 2006-2007, David Kilcullen provides further discussion regarding the effects of globalisation upon the international security environment, namely its effects pertaining to insurgency. Kilcullen denotes six implications that have occurred as a result of globalisation. Of these, a few are important to discuss before moving further into the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency approaches. First, traditional societies — particularly those that maintain deeply held religious, social, and cultural identities — have experienced the most "corrosive effects of globalisation . . . sparking violent antagonism to Western-led modernisation and its preeminent symbol: perceived US cultural and economic imperialism" (Kilcullen, 2005). This led to increased violence against the US and the Western world, which has also made counter-insurgency efforts particularly difficult in these traditional societies due to the reluctance of populations to work with the perceived imperialist US presence.

Kilcullen’s sixth principle is also important to note: the uneven pace and spread of globalisation has created ‘gap countries’ that have benefited far less from globalisation than have Westernised nations. These gap countries thereby have the potential to become rogue or weak states since takfiri groups wilfully exploit breakdowns in the rule of law, poor governance, and preexisting conflict and instability. This creates the prime environment in which insurgency and terrorism flourish.

Scholar Andreas Gofas mostly agrees with Kilcullen’s six principles, albeit with some subtle differences regarding the distinction between “old” and “new” terrorism. Gofas adds to the Kilcullen discussion, stating that organisational structure, operational range, motives, tactics, and new attitudes to the Westphalian system are the drivers behind this shift from “old” to “new” — disagrees with Kilcullen in the sense that “old” and “new” are fundamentally different. Gofas, instead, agrees with Stanford University professor Martha Crenshaw, that “today’s terrorism is not a fundamentally or qualitatively new phenomenon but grounded in an evolving historical context. Much of what we see now is familiar, and the differences are of degree rather than kind” (Crenshaw 2008). Thereby, both Crenshaw and Gofas argue that the main factor behind this distinction lies within the evolving nature of terrorism that has been driven by the technological and political advancements of the globalisation era.

However, this post-Cold War era has distinctly changed the way in which terrorist groups and insurgencies operate, and has been universally classified into four features, among which scholars find mutual agreement. Thereby, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency agencies have had to fundamentally alter the way in which they operate in order to succeed. To begin, the accessibility to weapons and dual-use technologies have vastly increased as a direct result of the Cold War. Throughout the multitude of proxy wars between the United States and the former USSR, both sides showed an inherent disregard for the states and populations directly involved. At the conclusion of many of these wars, no attempts were made to seize the weapons, technology, and equipment that were injected by both the US and USSR into these regions, leaving behind a plethora of weapons and technologies that ended up in the hands of terror groups and insurgencies. Both powers also made no attempt at mitigating the ethnic conflicts that had arisen out of these wars, thus maintaining tension between factions. Thereby, many of the foreign and volunteer fighters involved in the conflict continued to incite jihad in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, as can be seen from the Soviet-Afghan War of 1979-1989. Following the conclusion of the war, this local jihad movement gained traction and continued to spread—becoming the global takfiri movement that is seen today (Kilcullen, 2009).

The next characteristic distinguishing “new” terrorism from “old terrorism” is the ease of international travel, with an emphasis on refugees. As most migrants seek refugee status after fleeing from violence within their home-states, many have experienced violence and destruction. In the post-Cold War period, the US and coalition forces (including the UK, France, Germany, and Russia), have made wide use of aerial bombings and scorched earth tactics which cause heavy collateral damage to both the civilian population and infrastructure. This ultimately leads refugees to be much more vulnerable to extremist indoctrination, as many have lost their homes and family members as a result of these tactics. This concept has been coined by scholar and war veteran, Seth Jones, as insurgent maths, in which the more insurgents neutralised (and subsequent collateral damage incurred) the more insurgents are created under these hard power tactics as further civilians are displaced or killed and their loved ones seek revenge (Jones, 2013). Jones appears to agree with Kilcullen in that the ease of international travel has also aided in uniting radicalised populations in Europe and the rest of the world, with insurgencies within the Middle East, namely Al Qaida and ISIL (former AQ). This change, according to both scholars, fundamentally improved the outreach efforts of terror organisations and insurgencies alike, thereby creating a new level of threat for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency actors.

The next characteristic marking the shift from “old” to “new” terrorism arises from the shift between international to internal disputes, especially ethnic and religious conflicts, many of which are a direct result of the Cold War era’s proxy wars. Rohan Gunaratna (2014) states that, “in contrast to ideological conflicts featuring left- and right-wing groups (Columbia, Philippines, Nepal, India), about 70-80 percent of contemporary conflicts worldwide are ethno-political and politico-religious” (Gunaratna & Gottlieb, 2014).

Another factor distinguishing between “old” and new” terrorism according to scholars, is the increased and immediate flow of ideas, technology, communication and information that has occurred as a direct result of the internet. Insurgency and terrorist groups alike have made widespread use of these new technologies, using them to spread propaganda that has had a heavy hand in the radicalisation of both local and foreign Islamic communities. These technologies have also had a unifying effect among insurgents, making it easier to form coalitions with one another while also maintaining the cell structure that has been a defining characteristic in the shift from “old” to “new”. It is important to note, that with this shift, modern governments fighting terrorism and insurgency now face a two-fronted threat: from traditional group-centred terrorism as well as homegrown terrorism.

Motive is also an important factor in making this distinction, as it is argued that motives have heavily changed from traditional terrorist organisations and insurgencies to the type of threat we face today. Traditionally, terror groups had motives that were relatively realistic — involving the use of kidnappings, bombings, and assassinations — such as those of many left-wing Marxist groups— with the hopes of achieving some political goal (Forest, 2012). These goals were considered generally achievable, as they remained relatively local. Today, the underlying theme of most insurgencies and terror groups, namely that of al Qaida and later ISIL, is to establish a global Islamic State—which is distinct from the motives of prior “old” terrorism groups in terms of their short-term and relatively achievable goals. This new motive is much more global in scale, vastly unachievable, and therefore perpetuates a cycle of insurgency and terror. Even if governments are able to directly neutralise a terror group or leader, as the US did with the killing of al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden in 2011, it doesn’t neutralise the overall threat. Bin Laden was promptly replaced by Ayman al-Zawahiri and the insurgency was emboldened by this loss, prompting further support from affiliates. In both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency approaches, therefore, the biggest threat comes from the belief system and ideology that perpetuates the cycle of
violence. This marks a significant distinction between “old” and “new” terrorism.

The shift from “old” to “new” demonstrates that terrorism is constantly evolving. The threat from both terrorism and global insurgency has worsened, as marked by the high-profile attacks on the World Trade Centre in both 1993 and 2001 as well as the sarin gas attack of the Tokyo subway in 1995. A more recent example can be drawn from the 2015 Paris attacks, which serves as a prime example of “new” terrorism. Statistically speaking, terrorism and insurgency casualties are increasing (both civilian and military) and these insurgencies have become more widespread and interconnected since the “old” terrorism tactics of the pre-Cold War era (Kilcullen, 2009). Terrorism and insurgencies will most likely continue to evolve as they face further international pressure and conflict, and as they continue to adapt to the new strategies adopted by both counterterrorist and counterinsurgency agencies.

Counterinsurgency vs Counterterrorism

Kilcullen suggests that the war on terror is best understood as a transnational global insurgency that is extremely large in scale. This comes as a direct result of the distinction between “old” and “new” terrorism and the coinciding technological and political advancements. Kilcullen argues that since AQ, now ISIL, and similar groups have turned their goals towards a global takfiri jihad, in which they seek to mobilise the global population of Sunni Muslims in order to intimidate, co-opt, or mobilise that base for support” (Kilcullen, 2009). Concurring with many other scholars, Kilcullen suggests that counterinsurgency, rather than counterterrorism, is the ‘best-fit’ strategy in dealing with this elevated threat. Moreover, even those who view counterterrorism as the most beneficial focus (such as Tellis and Eggers in the case of Afghanistan), agree that without a counterinsurgency strategy “the narrow focus (on counterterrorism) would mean a sharp reduction in US economic and political assistance, which would further weaken the Afghan government’s capacity to cope with the insurgency—thus making the objective of containing the Taliban even more difficult to achieve” (Tellis and Eggers, 2017). These scholars further argue that counterterrorism strategy effectively falls short in terms of success and feasibility.

Counterinsurgency, at its core, involves “seeking the mutual assistance of state governorship towards the end goal of crippling terrorism and, second, using actors within the population who would become useful and critical partners in undermining terrorist ideology” (Aljunied, 2011). Thereby, the importance of using in-state actors to your advantage against the insurgency is of prime importance. Furthermore, the inherent goal of counterinsurgency is to debunk and destroy the support for these takfiri insurgencies, as uniting the ‘hearts and minds’ of local populations against terrorist organisations can prove detrimental to their continued operation and can stop the ideology from gaining further support. However, this approach requires a deep understanding of the culture and societal rules of the communities that they seek to build relationships with — something that historically, US and European countries need to drastically improve.

Kilcullen also discusses a phenomenon that other scholars allude to but have yet to coin the term as he has: the accidental guerrilla syndrome. As takfiri groups seek to spread their ideology and exploit local populations to achieve these goals—it is important to note how exactly they have managed to do this despite US and outside efforts at curbing these insurgencies. Kilcullen, observing this firsthand in both Afghanistan and Iraq, states “AQ moves into remote areas, creates alliances with local traditional communities, exports violence that prompts a Western intervention, and then exploits the backlash against that intervention in order to generate support for its takfiri agenda.” Furthermore, as takfiri ideology tends to be initially rejected by most of these traditional societies, “it [AQ] draws the majority of its strength from this backlash rather than genuine popular support” (Kilcullen, 2009). Consequently, Kilcullen suggests that these ‘accidental guerrillas’ are a response to traditional hard power counterterrorism, highlighting the importance of gaining the support of these local populations as the primary goal of counterinsurgency.

According to scholars referenced above, under-
standing the various different aspects of Islamic society and culture, tribal politics and identities, and the relationship between the population and these various identities as part of counterinsurgency strategies, may yield success by undermining the ideology as a whole and diluting the support system for the insurgency from within the population. The underlying theme of counterinsurgency is its population-centric approach. Rather than directly fighting the enemy through hard power strikes as has been the approach of counterterrorism strategies, counterinsurgency involves first securing the population as a means to reduce the operational capacity of the insurgency within the population. As a result, one of counterinsurgency’s primary goals is separating the insurgency from the population, and thus alienating the group and removing them from the population, as Kilcullen denotes.

John Nagl and Richard Weitz also find agreement with these sentiments, asserting that “NATO should continue to build on its COIN capacity, unify its efforts across Afghanistan, and operate effectively alongside civilian reconstruction efforts” (Nagl & Weitz, 2010). Agreeing with Kilcullen, these scholars emphasise the importance of a population-centric approach and working alongside local security forces in order to strengthen the legitimacy of government and secure the population. Kilcullen (2009) explains “Fundamental to counterinsurgency is an ability to undercut the insurgent’s appeal by discrediting their propaganda, exposing their motives, and convincing at-risk populations to voluntarily reject insurgent co-option and intimidation” It is pertinent, then, to gain the support of the local population in seeking success over the insurgency, and for the US and coalition forces to operate at a lowered capacity behind the scenes with local actors as the face of the operations. As Nagl and Weitz agree, while local initiatives provide less Western control, they carry a much higher likelihood of success in thwarting the appeal of insurgency to local populations.

Further discourse on the subject comes from Nathan White, of the Institute for National Strategic Security, in the emphasis on counterinsurgency strategies over classic counterterrorism, particularly that of population support and removing leadership barriers. White suggests that the failures in the Afghanistan approach “persisted as a result of institutional barriers within the US national security system that prevented the implementation of the new approaches” (White 2017), not the strategy itself. Therefore, it seems that counterinsurgency strategies must be accompanied by a clinically designed plan as to how best to tailor the strategies to the specific environment. Thus, White suggests that counterinsurgency requires a strictly enforced chain of command in which all levels of leadership are in agreement of the designed framework. Counterinsurgency efforts have frequently failed due to the constant transition of leadership positions that would not use the intelligence and best-practice methods of their predecessors—creating an uneven and unreliable stratagem within the counterinsurgency framework.

In agreement with White, a co-opted book entitled From Insurgency to Stability Volume II: Insights from Selected Case Studies, cites leadership and a lack of a uniformly implemented framework for the counterinsurgency strategy. The authors suggest that (again, in reference to the Afghanistan approach) “performance was patchy across the country, with many military commanders focused on direct action, rather than population-centric measures . . . seeking to engage the enemy, rather than the population in an attempt to stamp out Taliban and al Qaeda members” (Rabasa et al., 2011). This highlights the importance of uniformity in counterinsurgency approaches—ensuring that each stage of leadership is on board with the strategy and seeking to secure the population. Likewise, the authors also claim that these failures were in part due to the poor understanding of power dynamics in the population, namely of the tribal politics and identities that have deeply held cultural roots within traditional societies such as Afghanistan. The authors cite that this “extends from the top of the bureaucratic structure to the smallest village,” (Rabasa et al., 2011) emphasising the importance of uniformity and intelligence at all levels of leadership. In reference to the enemy-centric approach, Kilcullen also suggests that it is often counterproductive as it mostly harms the civilians and adds to the previously discussed insurgent maths phenomenon, while the enemy simply “melt away when pressure becomes too great” (Kil-
Vetern John Nagl provides insight as to why the US has ultimately failed at implementing counterinsurgency, using Malaya as an example. “The better performance of the British army in learning and implementing a successful COIN doctrine in Malaya is best explained by the differing organisational cultures of the two armies; in short, that the British army was a learning institution and the American army was not” (Nagl, 2005). Nagl claims that the deciding factor in victory against an insurgency is the Western powers capacity to learn and assess best-practice strategies in reference to the counterinsurgency approach, and maintain consistency pertaining to what works and what doesn’t. Continual assessment of best-practice is therefore an important factor within the counterinsurgency approach.

Rinehart (2010) is inclined to agree with Nagl, claiming that the debate between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency has become more blurred as US administrations have moved focus toward counterinsurgency approaches. Rinehart argues, however, that counterterrorism itself cannot be ignored, as the use of the hard power that co-opts counterterrorism strategies is still necessary when the ‘hearts and minds’ approach isn’t feasible (Rinehart, 2010). Kilcullen finds agreement here as well, also stating that hard power cannot be ignored. For the insurgents that are ‘too far gone’ and unreachable, traditional counterterrorism strategy of neutralisation is perhaps the only way to mitigate the threat.

While scholars have provided a variety of perspectives regarding the importance of the population-centric approach, Seth Jones takes another route. While Jones (2008) agrees that external actors play a key role, he suggests that the indigenous force should be the default. He writes “when the US is involved in COIN warfare, the primary focus of its efforts should be to improve the performance and legitimacy of indigenous actors ... improving the quality of police and other security forces, strengthening governance capacity, and undermining external support for insurgents.” (Jones 2008). Ultimately, Jones advocates for the focus in counterinsurgency to be on improving the local government and security forces as a means to maintain a ‘light footprint’ in the background, rather than putting populations face-to-face with foreign troops.

Lastly, Jonathan Gilmore’s (2011) analysis of the effects of counterinsurgency touches on the findings of the previously discussed scholars. Gilmore views counterinsurgency as having limited potential in its current form due to the US affinity for “high impact war fighting, despite recognition of the negative impact of such operations on local populations” (Gilmore, 2011). Furthermore, he views counterinsurgency as an oppressive instrument of the global ‘War on Terror’, that has the capacity to disempower local populations as it is merely a “kinder, gentler machine-gun hand” (Gilmore, 2011). Gilmore suggests a coalition effort in which successful aspects of both approaches are the key to success yet states that this is largely infeasible at its current state.

Methodology

This thesis is a qualitative study that analyses the successful use of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy by the United States and United Kingdom in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Malaya in order to ascertain strategic best-practice principles from these conflicts. This thesis further analyses these strategic best-practice principles to address whether they are mutually generalisable on a global scale or are region and context-specific to the previous conflicts.

This research is formatted as a country-conflict multiple case study analysis consisting of three cases: Iraq before and during the Surge of 2007, the war in Afghanistan from 2001-2008, and the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960. It analyses relative success based upon reported casualties and attacks regarding both civilians and military members within the specified time frames. Furthermore, it analyses the relationship and dynamic between US/UK security forces and the local populations in evaluating CT/COIN progress within these conflicts. In analysing this data, this thesis will also look at the consequences of the various strategies used, in respect to both short and long term goals and overall effectiveness.

In choosing these cases, this thesis seeks to es-
tablish a well-rounded analysis that provides a multitude of varied conflicts from the Middle East and Asia. In choosing the region of the Middle East, specifically Iraq and Afghanistan, this thesis is able to provide an up-to-date and relevant analysis of modern-day counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactics, in order to aid both current and future security strategy and tactics. By including an in-depth analysis of the Malayan Emergency, occurring prior to the events of September 11, 2001, this provides an analysis of pre-9/11 methods and strategies in dealing with a localised insurgency and terror group. As noted in the introduction of this thesis, the events of 9/11 changed the way in which both the US and UK operate in regard to their CT/COIN approaches. As mixed success has been seen in all three countries, this provides a mixture of successful and failed tactics to analyse the overall effectiveness of the strategies taken by the US or UK in these instances. As a result, this made it pertinent to include a case prior to these events in order to ascertain the success and potential replicability of the strategies that were implemented at the time.

Given the fact that these conflicts evolved in categorically different ways and involved varied use of different strategies and methods, these cases provide a multifaceted study of the current takfiri insurgencies/terror groups and their countermeasures while also including a distinctive study of past insurgency and respective countermeasures. This diversified the case studies and ensured this thesis did not focus on one security force in terms of their CT/COIN approach in order to maintain potential generalisability for a variety of conflicts.

**Results**

**Case Study 1: Iraq**

When the US invaded Iraq in 2003, security officials thought this would be a quick cut-and-dry conflict; after all, the poorly organised insurgents in Iraq couldn’t possibly stand against the might of the US military. However, this notion, as noted in the literature review of this thesis, was shortly reversed after the first initial successes the US had in toppling the Hussein regime. The subsequent insurgency that ensued after these events effectively robbed the US from any further success regarding the CT strategies they initially operated under (Gompert et al, 2014). As the US still did not have a huge amount of experience fighting insurgency (minus the disastrous events in Vietnam), the initial strategies and tactics used mirrored that of typical conventional warfare. This was characterised by large-scale battalion patrols, hard power strikes, and a protective divide between the US soldiers and the civilians. The troops on the ground would largely patrol in armoured High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV, colloquially known as Humvees) which served as a physical barrier between the local populations and US forces. While this was meant to protect US lives, this disconnect only contributed to the generalised rejection of the US forces by the local populations, effectively cutting off an incredibly vital resource.

As such, when the US invaded, the rejection of their presence by the locals had an incredibly detrimental effect—it allowed the radical takfiri insurgents to infect them with their violent ideology by playing into their rejection of the outside forces. The insurgents were empowered by the violence and the popular rejection of the foreign presence, which bolstered their ranks, resources, and ability to launch larger scale and more frequent attacks.

During this phase, leading up to the Surge (2004-2006) attacks within the region actually increased, rather than decreased, allowing the insurgents to direct the blame for this violence and death towards the US forces (Kilcullen, 2009). This created a major problem for the US forces, as the local population was directly feeding the insurgents through flow of resources, finances, information, and most importantly—providing them safe refuge. Without the aid of the local population, US forces had no choice but to continue their hard-power enemy-centric methods to neutralise insurgent forces as effectively as they could at the time, but this only added to the problem. US forces, in between their hard-power conventional warfare. This was characterised by large-scale battalion patrols, hard power strikes, and a protective divide between the US soldiers and the civilians. The troops on the ground would largely patrol in armoured High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV, colloquially known as Humvees) which served as a physical barrier between the local populations and US forces. While this was meant to protect US lives, this disconnect only contributed to the generalised rejection of the US forces by the local populations, effectively cutting off an incredibly vital resource.

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nounced did not have the intended effect as many of these locals were innocent as the intelligence was poor in the initial stages. This only bolstered the divide and disdain towards US forces.

The insurgents at this time were operating as a learning institution—analysing the effect the invasion had on the locals and co-opting them served to create a community ripe for ideological infection. Furthermore, noting US tactics of large-scale response operations, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and fellow militant insurgents used this to their advantage. They would frequently attack soft targets that had a strong population presence in terms of both US forces and locals. These attacks would usually come in the form of car bombs, suicide bombers, and hidden improvised explosive devices (IEDs) prompting a chaotic response (Jones, 2008). US and Iraqi security forces would scramble a large battalion together to respond to the attack, but by the time these forces arrived on scene the insurgents would already have disappeared back into the population. As the locals were intimidated into coercion, these insurgents could effectively evade capture by using their community connections—making it impossible for US and security forces to successfully thwart and prevent these attacks. US forces at the time were clearly placing force protection as the main priority over population protection.

Further exacerbating these issues, US forces’ treatment of all Iraqis as potential threats only served to alienate them and overall cooperation and sharing of information with the Iraqi security forces and government was lacking. During 2006, despite many Iraqi politicians indicating a high interest in population centric measures to protect Shiites from Sunni terrorism and foster cooperation between the two forces, US military leaders at the time didn’t heed these notions, thus reinforcing the disconnect. As a result, the US hard-power and large-scale counterterrorism strategy proved to be ineffective, and any overall success was clearly not replicable in this region. The region ultimately descended into chaos, mitigating any prior success as AQI and Sunni militants murdered and brutalised Shiites, while Shiite’s formed retaliatory squadrons and militias that would similarly murder their Sunni counterparts. During this time, civilian deaths peaked between 2006 and early 2007 (Kilcullen, 2009).

In response to this total loss of control, the US Surge of 20,000+ troops, finances, political attention, and allotted resources in 2007 initiated a shift of focus. Under the leadership of General David Petraeus, US military doctrine in Iraq shifted to a COIN approach, revising the United States army manual to reflect the evolving nature of the Iraq War. Creating a team of COIN experts under the Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT), General Petraeus was able to create the Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) 2007-2008 which successfully created a fully integrated joint civil-military plan to mitigate the damage from previous CT strategy. This plan would include confidence building measures and improve population security in order to repair the relationship with the local population. Furthermore, by the insistence of General Petraeus, the Joint Campaign Plan was to be based upon previous COIN best-practice strategy. The plan signaled a shift from an enemy-centric focus towards a population-centric approach: instructing and educating troops and security forces to co-opt the population at the grassroots level to figure out how US forces could best serve their needs. Effectively, the troops’ main focus moving forward was competing with the insurgents for population influence in order to separate the insurgents from the locals, thereby removing their constant flow of resources, manpower, and finances (Nagl, 2002).

In adopting the new counterinsurgency doctrine, US forces shifted from large-scale patrols and hard-power strikes and instead sought to make greater use of ground patrols that directly engaged with the locals and built cooperative relationships with community leaders. General Petraeus pushed his troops and military leaders to improve dialogue with community leaders, in the form of tribal elders, in order to create a beneficial relationship between the two. This came in the form of social work projects such as road building, well-digging, and US forces would occasionally serve as mediators regarding tribal conflicts (Gilmore, 2011). This was an effort to displace the insurgents from the populations through these forged relationships in order to co-opt them against AQI and insurgent militants. US forces sought to marginalise the
insurgents in order to successfully separate them from the population. This way, US forces could reduce civilian casualties and thereby avoid exacerbating the locals into radicalism.

Moving forward, military strategy was centred upon development, improving governmental legitimacy, capacity-building in the form of strengthened governmental infrastructure and local population and tribal engagement. This heavily reduced civilian casualties and aided in restoring some sense of political stability in the region. Locals were commuting with US forces and helping them root out insurgents, successfully reducing violence within the Baghdad city limits. These strategies returned control of the region to the government forces and were successful in alienating the insurgents from the population. By mid-2007, violent attacks and civilian casualties were drastically reduced (Jones, 2008).

The new approach was unique in the sense that it did not only make use of just one discipline but used a conglomeration of best practice methods of COIN approaches while using traditional CT hard-power precision strikes to address the irreconcilable militants and AQI strongholds. As such, US forces sought to disrupt the safe havens for AQI and militant extremists outside of the city-limits, making use of larger scale squadrons to rescue local populations from AQI control in the rural farmlands and tribal villages. The goal in doing so was to create trustworthy relationships with local security forces and link them with governmental resources in order to permanently secure these areas and establish government legitimacy. This successfully disrupted AQI operations and ensured that the insurgents couldn’t simply relocate once US forces had moved on to the next region.

Throughout this period, as noted in the literature, civilian casualties dramatically fell in August of 2007, and US casualties were also reduced by 70% by the end of the year, recorded as the lowest casualty numbers throughout the entire war (Kilcullen, 2009). This success was substantial and statistically significant, resulting in saving thousands of Iraqi lives—civilian and military, as well as reducing US troop casualties. Yet, it is important to note the extent to which this success was idiosyncratic to the region. While initial US strategy prior to the Surge of 2007 did not operate as a learning institution and is responsible for bolstering the AQI insurgency, the subsequent success following the Surge did involve external factors that could have aided its success. Following the onset of the civil war between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq, the scale and ferocity of the violence used by AQI and extremist takfiri insurgents drastically increased. This pushed many tribes who had previously been sympathetic to their cause to turn on them, instead throwing their support towards governmental forces, backed by the US, in the hopes of restoring political stability to the region. These tribes were entirely consequential to the success seen during the Surge, and it is pertinent to point out this factor when analysing overall generalisability of the best-practice methods used to promote this success. Furthermore, this success was clearly contingent upon continued support from the US in terms of manpower, financial flows, and general resources in order to ensure continued stability. Thus, this success was contingent on this continued support and strategic political cooperation amongst all levels of leadership.

Conclusions on Iraq

As demonstrated throughout this case study, the success seen in Iraq following the Surge during 2007-2008 was the result of a combination of CT and COIN doctrine to produce an adaptable population-centric approach. This blend further included focus on securing the population from the insurgency, capacity building, increasing governmental infrastructure and legitimacy, co-opting reconcilable militants against the insurgents, joint civil-military coordination at all levels, commitment of resources, small-scale operations led by local security forces, and coordination of clear political strategy to ensure permanent results. These best-practice methods significantly contributed to saving thousands of US and Iraqi lives during the period and was incredibly pertinent to mitigating the blunders of the previous US strategy. As many of these best-practice strategies General Petraeus included in the JCP were the product of previously used strategy in conflicts such as the Malayan Emergency (discussed below), this presents a case
for the mutual generalisability of these methods. However, this success wouldn’t have yielded as significant results had the Iraqi Tribal Revolt against AQI not occurred. In this respect, a portion of this success is regional and context specific to the tribal dynamic of the Iraqi regions outside Baghdad.

Furthermore, this success was inherently fragile and is thereby contingent upon maintaining the same commitment throughout the duration of these types of conflicts to fully overcome the insurgency. This is a necessary aspect of successful CT and COIN best-practice in order to ensure long-term stability. Thus, while these best-practice methods present a considerable degree of mutual generalisability for a variety of insurgent conflicts, there were regional and content-specific factors within Iraq that significantly contributed to this success. This would conclude that successful CT and COIN operations must remain adaptable and continue to act as learning institutions as insurgency and terrorism also continue to evolve in order to yield the most effective strategy.

**Case Study 2: Afghanistan**

The study of the conflict in Afghanistan presents a challenging and unique one as the successes in this case were mixed, and political stability within the region is yet to be achieved. Thus, by including Afghanistan, this study must reveal the factors behind the few successes as well as the ultimate failures in order to fully understand how CT-COIN strategy evolved as the conflict progressed. After the Taliban refused to turn over Osama Bin Laden following the attacks on 9/11, the US and UK forces, with the support of Afghanistan’s anti-Taliban tribal rebels, launched a vast hard-power offensive approach against the Taliban in order to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist and insurgent stronghold. This joint coalition sought to effectively neutralise the military capabilities of the extremist Taliban, and thereby put an end to the global support of terror within the region.

Success within the region was initially rapid and substantial. By December 2001, Taliban leaders surrendered their final official territory within Afghanistan and remaining militants retreated into the mountainous southeastern provinces. In response, the Coalition launched an offensive into these regions to remove the remaining Taliban and AQ presence to further promote stability. Coinciding with their previous success, it appeared the Taliban had been largely neutralised, and insurgency seemed to be out of the question (Rabasa et al., 2011). The strategy used in Afghanistan at the time was largely a mixture of hard-power precision strikes with a joint enemy-centric focus as the Coalition sought to neutralise extremist militants. Since the Coalition included anti-Taliban tribes and security forces native to Afghanistan, there was a level of dialogue between civil-military leaders that prompted success throughout the region.

After these initial successes the Coalition switched gears, focusing on rebuilding the Afghan state and achieving governmental legitimacy, and thereby, social and political stability. With the help of the UN, political leaders within Afghanistan were able to put together a rough plan for the creation of a democratic government with the support of the Coalition to promote security. This international effort was instrumental in promoting stability during this time and resulted in a massive reduction in violent attacks and casualty numbers during this period. However, the remaining Taliban and AQ presence sought refuge in Pakistan to restructure themselves. From 2002-2006, the Taliban was able to restore their capacity to launch attacks within the Afghan territory. By mid-2006, casualty numbers and violent attacks drastically increased, surpassing the levels prior to their defeat in 2001 (Rabasa et al., 2011). Ultimately, the Taliban’s restructuring and violence mitigated the success and stability achieved in 2001, and the Afghan state fell into chaos and insurgency. Thus, the hard-power tactics focusing on an enemy-centric approach did not yield sustainable results—proving to be largely ineffective at successfully quelling the violent terror and later insurgent threat.

Making it even harder for the Coalition to effectively fight the insurgents, the terrain in which they resided largely were only reachable through valleys with only one way in and out, making them prime ambush locations, a frequent thorn in the Coalition’s side. Furthermore, the US had adopted a “light footprint” approach given their campaign in Iraq as well—which remained the main focus. It
is important to point out that despite this being a joint international security operation, in terms of US funding, Afghanistan was allocated less than 27% of the resources and funding provided to the Iraq campaign (Kilcullen, 2009). This made progress even harder to achieve. As Afghanistan descended further into violence, the US Coalition shifted focus from trying to directly defeat and neutralise Taliban and AQ strongholds to capacity building within Afghanistan in order to create an Afghan state that could effectively handle and deal with the insurgents. The Coalition further sought to increase confidence within the Afghan government in order to achieve legitimate political stability.

Following the operations during the Surge, Coalition leadership tried to engage in the same population-centric approach that had worked in Afghanistan: co-opting reconcilable militants and using local resources to root out the insurgency. Furthermore, using social-work projects such as road building and well digging, in order to bolster support from the locals was seen as advantageous. While there was some small-scale success in this regard, the regional and cultural differences between Iraq and Afghanistan made this more difficult. In Iraq, meeting and appeasing tribal elders would result in the support of large populations consisting of multiple in-network tribes. In Afghanistan, however, every village operated differently than the last, and tribal alliances were less likely. Thus making it an arduous task to gain the support of multiple tribes—a necessity to effectively root out the insurgency.

Therefore, the population-centric measures were not as effective in Afghanistan; however, this was partly due to the lack of proper funding and resources that this type of COIN approach required to ensure success. This led to a generalised inability to stabilise and secure the country effectively, prompting the full return of the Taliban to previously stabilised regions. The Coalition simply did not have the funding or resources to promote communal security and policing in order to successfully secure the population from the insurgency. Likewise, the Taliban and AQI were using an exhaustion strategy in order to overcome the coalition force and undermine the prior success seen during 2001, which remained effective. Their numbers increased over time in areas they sought to establish a firm presence, usually choosing southern provinces in which the terrain was arduous. Furthermore, their guerrilla units had become more sophisticated and reduced in unit size, making them much easier to freely operate throughout the Afghan State. As such, this made it extremely difficult for Coalition forces to neutralise these units, as they were well hidden.

These series of events lead us to the situation in Afghanistan today — one in which any success seen during the 2001 efforts has been entirely mitigated. The Taliban, today, holds nearly twice the terrain they had when US troops first intervened and have arguably surpassed their prior strength. As US forces are withdrawn in 2021, this has only served to benefit the Taliban as they now have a marked calendar date for when the US forces will leave, bolstering their power further. The Taliban have used this to their advantage, and although claiming to have rooted out the extremist factors of their organisation, they are still very much alive in their desire for a global Islamic state.

Conclusions on Afghanistan

While the CT focused strategy during the first two years saw legitimate and widespread success throughout the region, the lack of commitment, resources, and finances mitigated this success and created an environment in which insurgency could flourish since the Coalition forces were not acting as a learning institution when their initial tactics lost their effectiveness. As the population-centric measures were not widely applicable throughout the region due to the lack of resources and funding, these measures did not yield success.

In areas in which these measures were possible, and social work projects such as road building were completed, the Coalition found success. Specifically, these successful social works projects promoted engagement amongst tribal leaders and co-opted them to join against the Taliban, allowing Coalition forces to successfully separate the insurgents from the population and connect the people with governmental infrastructure. Thereby, in these specific cases, governmental legitimacy was promoted,
and relative stability in these regions was able to be worked towards. However, the lack of commitment from the US and Coalition allies did not allow for the conditions in which insurgency could be defeated, and thus Afghanistan did not yield resolute victory.

Concerning the replicability of the best-practice methods used in the Afghanistan case, there are some signs that point towards generalisability. The initial plan consisting of hard-power strikes and search and destroy operations against the Taliban, which align closely with conventional warfare, saw success within the first two years. As such, due to the relative success of the initial methods, this case demonstrates a degree of replicability. However, this success was not sustainable due to the myopic focus on CT strategy over COIN, and thus allowed for the return of the Taliban.

In instances where population-centric measures were possible, limited success was seen. For example, road-building projects reduced the frequency of IED bombings and thus allowed locals to safely travel and achieve some level of stability. Furthermore, these projects would push tribal leaders to create dialogue amongst each other, resulting in increased allies against the Taliban and built confidence in governmental legitimacy. Many of these tribes are still in conflict with the Taliban today, and conflict will likely worsen once the US fully withdraws troops.

As such, this case presents the shortcomings of these strategies, and shows what leads to ultimate failure. For Afghanistan, the lack of commitment and resources to this conflict is responsible for the full resurgence of the Taliban, as US forces were not able to act as a learning institution and adapt their strategy to the region. A full-scale regional approach was never able to be achieved, thus creating a large disconnect between civil-military relations—a key requirement of successful COIN best-practice strategy.

Concerning the overall replicability of the successful use of COIN best-practice doctrine, there is a level of generalisability. As these methods saw success in Iraq, and limited success was achieved in Afghanistan where resources were adequate, it can be concluded that the population-centric measures involving a regional-wide approach and co-opting reconcilable populations are generalisable aspects of COIN best-practice.

Case Study 3: Malaya

After discussing two cases of modern-day conflict, it is helpful to examine a historical case, one from which many traditional best-practice COIN methods stem. The Malayan Emergency occurred from 1948-1960 and was a clear-cut example of military forces acting as learning institutions in adapting their COIN strategy to get desired results. The ability of the British army to successfully create, promote, and test their various COIN strategies are what drove the success of this campaign, and these same strategies were adopted by General Petraeus when reworking US strategy in Iraq.

Similarly to Iraq and Afghanistan, British army doctrine initially focused on large-scale battalion search and destroy sweeps in order to neutralise the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) insurgency with little success. While these tactics resulted in some damage towards the insurgents’ influence over the population, the insurgents were focused on an exhaustion strategy, seeking to destroy British property and economic prospects in order to make it more difficult for the British to have a hold on Malaya. The insurgents’ overall goal was to completely remove British influence within the area and remove them from the region entirely. Furthermore, they sought to establish a communist regime, in line with China. Through a strategy of protracted insurgent warfare, the MCP launched terror attacks on farms, mines, and estates that were under British control.

The MCP recognised the local population as the defining factor towards achieving victory, and they were correct. Using the local population to ferry supplies, messages, and information throughout their guerrilla cells, the MCP was able to launch quick attacks against soft targets and disappear back into the jungle before British troops could react, causing substantial economic drain on British holdings (Nagl, 2002). In response to these attacks, and seeing the inadequacy of their initial tactics, British leadership sought a bottom-up structure reorganisation to effectively respond to the insurgency. Furthermore, recognising the insurgents’
use of the population, the British sought to do the same and effectively created a special constabulary force consisting strictly of Malay locals in order to involve them in protection duties. This partnership thereby afforded the British access to a vast human intelligence resource that would begin to aid their efforts in separating the insurgency from the overall population.

After a shift in leadership, British counterinsurgency shifted towards disrupting the safe havens for the insurgents: the Chinese occupants on Malay land that were funnelling resources, information, and weapons to the MCP insurgents, and co-opting the local populations. Furthermore, the British focused efforts on increased training for soldiers at the lowest level in anti-guerrilla warfare. This enabled British soldiers and co-opted Malays at all levels to have direct training experience regarding COIN tactics. Similarly, recognising the political nature of the conflict, British leadership sought to establish a regionwide, all-encompassing civilian-military strategy that promoted innovation and creative thinking at all levels. In an attempt to bolster innovation, British leadership replaced senior positions with younger officers, and actively promoted the creation and testing of beneficial COIN strategies. These actions clearly demonstrate the learning nature of the British army during this time, which was vital to their overall success in the region.

Under the leadership of Lieutenant General Harold Briggs and later General Sir Gerald Templer, British COIN operations began a section-by-section operation in which the primary objective was to separate the insurgents from their recruiting and resource supplies. It also involved changing the active role of the British army personnel in the region who were only to act in close conjunction with local police forces, and to headquarter themselves amongst the local populations to build confidence and popular support and bolster intelligence gathering. These tactics proved to be very beneficial, and insurgent attacks on populated areas became less frequent, presenting a falling casualty rate (Nagl, 2002). Placing key emphasis on intelligence gathering, Templer was able to overcome the lack of early and accurate information by successfully co-opting the locals, including the Chinese squat-
ters suspected of aiding the insurgents. As such, the flow of reliable and timely information increased, promoting further stability in populated areas.

The insurgency was brought to an end after the MCP effectively lost the population support of both native Malays and the Chinese squatters. Denying political legitimacy to the MCP further ensured the insurgency would remain defeated, bringing the civil-military cooperative strategy to a full-circle close, concluding with decisive victory over the communist insurgents. Securing the population, separating them from the insurgency, armed social work projects, and a regional-wide civil-military strategy that promotes innovation were the defining factors behind victory throughout the Malayan Emergency.

Conclusions on Malaya

Consequently, the initial British strategy focused on large-scale battalion sweeps focused on neutralising enemy insurgents and disrupting their safe havens. While this yielded some success, it did not ensure long-term stability as the insurgency was likewise acting as a learning institution with their exhaustion strategies in response to British tactics. As such, innovative officers prompted by upper-level leadership were able to create and test effective techniques against the insurgents by winning the support of the local population. The civil-military strategy, with the joint goal of political stability, ensured that the insurgents would not be able to retain any power after defeat, and further ensured they would not simply restructure and relocate. The Malayan Emergency presents a decisive counterinsurgency win and served as the basis for the creation of COIN best-practice methods that were later used in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

However, similarly to the prior two cases, there was also a level of region-specific factors that contributed to the success and effectiveness of the British army. Colonial ties were beneficial to the British, as they were inherently used to the terrain and were able to use the connections that had been formed over the prior decades to aid in their COIN efforts. As such, this must be noted when analysing this case in terms of replicability on a generalised scale. Overall, however, generalisability
can be drawn from this case. Focusing on a region-
al-wide population-centric approach of securing
the population, separating the insurgents from
the population, civil-military cooperation, letting
local security forces take the lead and strictly using
military to provide support, co-opting militants,
and social work projects were all major contribut-
ing factors in overcoming the insurgency. As these
factors were discussed in all three prior cases, and
contributed to successes in each, it can be conclud-
ed that these best-practice methods are replicable
on a generalised scale.

**Conclusion**

Through analysing the Surge in Iraq, the War in
Afghanistan, and the Malayan Emergency, this the-
sis has reviewed the factors behind successful CT
and COIN best-practice. Each conflict, although
displaying varying degrees of regional and context
specific factors that partially contributed to the
successes, presents a clear demonstration of stra-
tegic best-practice. In reviewing these three cases
(two modern conflicts, and one pre-9/11 conflict)
nine best-practice methods have been revealed be-
hind successful joint CT and COIN operations:

First and foremost, a population centric ap-
proach is key to securing success over terrorist
groups and insurgency. Through prioritisation of
securing the population, governmental forces can
promote confidence amongst the population and
begin the best-practice process.

Second, separating the insurgency from the
population is vital. One of the most complicating
factors of terror and insurgent warfare is the diffi-
culty to discern militants from local populations,
as they manipulate locals in order to blend in. As
such, taking every necessary action to mark this
distinction is a priority. To achieve this, the next
best-practice method comes into play.

Third, forces must act beyond the tradition-
al role of soldier—they must also wear the hat
of the social worker. Armed social work projects
regionally tailored to fit the specific needs of the
population is paramount in promoting legitimacy
and trust—two necessary components in yielding
success. This builds confidence within local popu-
lations and encourages cooperation—aiding in the
separation of insurgents from local populations.

Fourth, military forces at all levels need to fo-
cus on forging mutually beneficial partnerships
with local forces, populations, and leaders. Only
through cooperation with those native to the re-

gion of conflict can success be found. Local popu-
lations and institutions are a vital source of human
intelligence, which is required to understand the
cultural aspects of the insurgency as well as the
population as a whole.

Fifth, a joint civil-military coalition must be es-

blished at every level of the organisational pro-
cess in order to remain effective in overcoming
the insurgency or terror group. Communication,
allocation of resources, intelligence gathering, and
strategy need to correlate and work together in tan-
dem to ensure success. Furthermore, these actors
need to ensure that commitment to the conflict is
maintained, in order to ensure long-term stability.

Sixth, all military forces, cooperatives, cultural
and political leaders need to ensure the focus is on
a regional approach which places the eradication
of the insurgency as the overall goal. Long-term
success is the overarching goal, and in order to do
so every aspect of the conflict must be examined in
relation to the region in its entirety to promote
longevity.

Seventh, co-opting reconcilable militants needs
to occur wherever possible. By successfully turning
insurgents against the ideology and convincing
them to take up arms with legitimised forces reduc-
es the ranks of the insurgency, who are also vital
sources of intelligence. By co-opting reconcilable
groups and individuals, long-term stability can be
promoted as the insurgents are thus unable to sim-
ply move back in once military forces have moved
on to another region.

Eighth, traditional hard-power precision strikes
must be used only in instances of irreconcilable
militants. Disrupting insurgent strongholds, and
neutralising extremist militants are necessary in
deconstructing the insurgency in its entirety. These
militants cannot be allowed to relocate and re-
structure, as the case study in Afghanistan displays
the inherent dangers if they are able to do so. Irre-
concilable militants must be neutralised, but only
through small-scale strikes that minimize any po-
tential collateral damage to infrastructure or local
Lastly, and most importantly, these best-practice strategies must be tailored to the specific needs of the population, region, and conflict. In order to do so, military forces must act as learning institutions that are able to adapt and tailor their strategies to all aspects of the region in conflict. While these best-practice strategies display generalisability, that doesn’t diminish the importance of clinically tailoring each strategy to directly address the specifics of the region.

As such, these methods are mutually generalisable for a variety of conflicts, but the last method of best-practice CT/COIN must be followed to ensure success. Each case study in this thesis presents a degree of regional and content-specific factors that required adjustment of the initial strategy. In each instance of success, these methods were clinically tailored to fit the specific conflict and population, which is the most vital aspect of successful CT/COIN best-practice.

In conclusion, this thesis has analysed the factors behind successful CT/COIN strategy and has demonstrated that these factors are able to be replicated and generalised across a variety of conflicts. Moving forward, security policy must focus on remaining effective against the many threats facing the international security community today; consequently, it is vital scholars continue to evolve these methods as insurgency and terror continue to evolve and adapt.

References


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