GLOBALIZING CONFUCIANISM: THE RUDAO (儒道)

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I. Globalization

Globalization is a complex concept. Moreover, it is a controversial idea, and like all contested and intricate concepts, simply trying to define the term is difficult. Along with the obvious spatial metaphor of encompassing the whole world, literally globalization, we also need to consider the temporal dimensions of the term. For instance, W. C. Smith (1981) begins his study of world/global theology by telling a fascinating story of globalization, a particular process that took more than two thousand years work its way around the world. There was certainly a great deal of interaction among cultures prior to the modern world, though admittedly the speed and intensity of the contact has increased dramatically. One of the interesting questions is: does the increase in the velocity and quantity of transmission of everything collated by the idea of globalization really mean a complete change from the past? Is globalization a completely new event in the history of the world?

Smith (1981, 7-11) begins and ends his story in India. He starts with a story drawn from pre-Aryan India about a fascinating case of what we would now call globalization—perhaps. Smith commences with an account of the religious transformation of the like of Leo Tolstoi. As Tolstoi wrote in his Confessions, he found one story, a Christian hagiography of Saints Barlaam and Josaphat that changed his life. It is a story of a young prince, Josaphat, who goes into the desert and is converted by a Sinai desert monk, Barlaam—a clear reference, as we will see of a Buddhist bodhisattva tale. The version that Tolstoi read probably came to Russia from Mt. Athos in a Greek recension attributed to John of Damascus or from a older Georgian Christian Georgian tradition.

The story of spiritual discernment was just beginning its global journey. The Georgian version depended, in turn, on an Arabic version. The basic story stays the same: a young prince converted to a noble and more ascetic religion by a wandering

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1Chapter 9 of Nayan Chanda, Bound Together: How Traders, Preachers, Adventurers, and Warriors Shaped Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007) provides an excellent history of the use of the term globalization. The 'Introduction' of Jurgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Peterson’s short history of globalization (2003, 7-8) also provides a good overview of various uses of the term globalization as well. What is clear here is that globalization is now something confined to the last decade of the 20th Century and the beginning of the 21st Century. It is a process, an idea with a long history. I want to thank Dr. David Scott for his valuable bibliographical aid in identifying a range of discussions of and debates about the definition of globalization.
monk. It appears that the Muslims got their versions from Manichees in Central Asia. They, in turn, no doubt got their version from the Buddhists. The Buddhist version of this story is from the second century of the Common Era and is found in the text of the *Lalitavistara*. We are not finished yet. The Buddhist version probably had Hindu and Jain ancestors as well and may have even been of pre-Aryan origin at the very beginning of Indian civilization.

Now back to Tolstoi and his readers. One of them was the young Indian intellectual studying law in England, M. K. Gandhi. Gandhi wrote that this reading of Tolstoi’s story had a profound impact on his life. And the rest, as we say, is history. But not quite. The story of Gandhi’s life and teaching of non-violent resistance had a great impact on a young American civil rights crusader, Martin Luther King, Jr. When King traveled to India he called his visit a pilgrimage to the home of *ahimsa* and the philosophy of non-violent protest against the denial of civil rights to any person whatsoever.

One of the key features of sociological theory of modernization and globalization provided by scholars such as Peter Berger was the theory that modernization would mean secularization. This thesis, of course, was predicated on an early and mid-20th Century reading of the cultural trajectories of the North Atlantic world. However, as has become clear in the last half of the 20th Century and on the beginning of the 21st Century, modernization, even globalization, does not necessarily imply secularization. Actually just the opposite seems to be more the case. Berger now argues that although the classical modernity-causes-secularization thesis does indeed fit what has happened in parts of Northern and Central Europe, it does not make sense of the robust revival, renewal and flourishing of religions around the world in the 21st Century. What we have is many different modernities and many forms of globalization.

Berger goes on to make another important point. Whereas the various forms of modernity we find around the world today may not include rampant secularization, all the multiple modernities manifest increasingly sharper awareness of cultural diversity. So modernity = awareness of diversity is a distinctive feature of the modern world. This might seem somewhat paradoxical when we think about those scholars who argue that globalization means the export of one particular cultural form. What globalization, in this alternative reading, actually means as not so much uniformity per se but a special kind of uniformity, namely the realization of the diversities of modernities.

Before we puruse the question of the globalization of Confucianism, we should dwell for a moment in the examination of some characteristic current definitions of globalization as a transcultural phenomenon. In terms of concise and influential contemporary definitions, Roland Robertson (1992, 8) writes, "Globalization as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole." Anthony Giddens (1990, 64) also stressed the fact that globalization compresses distances that in the past would have made communication improbable if not impossible. He writes of globalization as the "intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice
versa." Gibbens also adds a notion of reciprocity to the process of globalization.


Globalization has been variously conceived as action at a distance (whereby the actions of social agents in one locale can come to have significant consequences for 'distant others'); time-space compression (referring to the way in which instantaneous electronic communication erodes the constraints of distance and time on social organization and interaction); accelerating interdependence (understood as the intensification of enmeshment among national economies and societies such that events in one country impact directly on others); a shrinking world (the erosion of borders and geographical barriers to socio-economic activity); and, among other concepts, global integration, the reordering of interregional power relations, consciousness of the global condition and the intensification of interregional interconnectedness. What distinguishes these definitions is the differential emphasis given to the material, spatio-temporal and cognitive aspects of globalization.

Along with the spatial and temporal elements of the process of globalization, Held and McGrew add material and cognitive aspects. Hanicles (2008, 15) offers a summary of some of the key elements of the conversation.

* Increasing global interconnectedness, so that events and developments in one part of the world are affected by, have to take account of, and also influence, in turn, other parts of the world. It also refers to an increasing sense of a single global whole.
* As experienced from below, the dominant form of globalization means a historical transformation: in the economy, of livelihoods and modes of existence; in politics, a loss in the degree of control exercised locally--for some, however little to begin with--such that the locus of power gradually shifts in varying proportions above and below the territorial state; and in culture, a devaluation of a collectivity's achievements and perceptions of them. This structure, in turn, may engender either accommodation or resistance…

Reflections on the concept of globalization has grown to such complexity that, as with Mooney and Evans (2007, 101; 240; 241), we now even have short glossaries to help us sort out current usage when discussing globalization as well as definitions of the genealogies of globalization.

II. Genealogies (of Globalization)

Genealogies of globalization refers to a particular post-structuralist, post-Foucauldian (that is, after the influence of Foucault’s work) way of GENEALOGIES (OF GLOBALIZATION) answering “how” and “when” questions about globalization. Genealogies of globalization are accounts of globalization that do not seek its origins in a particular set of circumstances, or distant antecedents. Rather genealogies of globalization seek to give an account of globalization at the level of forms of knowledge and practice. As Larner and Walters put it “at what point does the globalization emerge as a way of knowing and acting on and in the world?” (2004a).
Genealogies of globalization focus on questions about: how did it become possible to think in terms of the global? What techniques were required? How are these ideas and techniques transferred in and between organizations? Embodied in what forms of expertise? Answering these questions requires different kinds of studies than would be required for a “point of origin” account of globalization. For instance examining how technical advances in statistical mapping allowed particular kinds of indicators to be developed that made it possible to think of a space beyond the nation-state (O Tuathail and Dalby 1998). This recognizes that globalization does not exist as a phenomenon or entity waiting to be charted, analyzed, understood and then reacted to. Seeing globalization in a genealogical light recognizes that globalization does not exist “in a strong sense until governments, international agencies, corporate actors, scholars and activists began to name globalization, and develop ways to measure its extents and effects” (Larner and Walters 2004a). Genealogies of globalization would implicate scholars and key theorists in the “territorialization” of globalization, as their works, including this collection, help constitute what globalization is rather than just reflect the “effects” of globalization. They continue with the following general definition of globalization as a form of universalism.

III. Universal Civilization

The idea of a universal civilization is closely tied to the argument that globalization homogenizes. There appear to be more voices against the prospect of a realization of a universal civilization than predicting it. The once conservative John Gray argues that free market trade is the latest attempt to create a universal civilization. He writes, “The inexorable growth of a world market does not advance a universal civilization. It makes the interpenetration of cultures an irreversible global condition” (1998: 193). Presumably this leads to the “clash of civilizations” discussed by Huntington.

In addition, Mooney and Evans link the notion of globalization to certain religious concepts. This is useful also if we were to add philosophy to religion: both can become forms of universalism in the process of globalization. Here too they point out that the tendency of this kind of process is towards a certain homogenization. But here Confucians would wonder if we can really have harmony without uniformity in terms of the modern impact of globalization. Does the increasing exchange of ideas necessarily mean a single religious or philosophical system will become the hegemonic norm for globalization?\(^2\)

\(^2\)Along with these mostly secular definitions of globalization, there also has been and continues to be an extended Christian theological discussion of globalization as a religious phenomenon. While, as we will note later, there is a massive debate on whether or not one can even call Confucianism a religion in any meaningful sense, in the current discussion of globalization it is hard to escape the feeling that there is almost a religious dimension to the advocates of globalization. Perhaps the debate is not carried out using the language of historic Christian notion of mission, nonetheless globalization certainly is about the transmission of values of worth to all human beings, including religious as well as secular ideas and ideologies.

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The very notion of globalization as a mono-directional process causes pause in the minds of some scholars. Does the term globalization itself imply a strong form of cultural hegemony for the transmission of the cultures of the North Atlantic world to the rest of the world? Is this just another case of the West and the Rest?

In both the introduction and concluding chapter of Mou Bo’s edited *History of Chinese Philosophy* (2009), Mou argues for a different term to describe the process of the globalization of Chinese philosophy. He prefers to call this process the emergence of World Philosophy. Or as the title of the concluding chapter (pp. 571-72) puts it, “Constructive Engagement of Chinese and Western Philosophy: A Contemporary Trend toward World Philosophy.” Mou is arguing for the process of philosophical exchange to be a dialogue that focuses on the complementary nature of the conversation. The emergence of World Philosophy denotes how previously isolated streams of philosophy are now mutually entangled in the modern world. It also argues that this is a fruitful entanglement that will enrich both Chinese and Western philosophy. While the focus is on Chinese philosophy, Mou’s thesis is that there is nothing parochial anymore about this kind of exchange. As other scholars have argued, this is really a dipolar process of globalization and localization. It is not about tradition, ethnicity, or even a research focus: it is simply that features of traditional Chinese philosophy have come to fascinate a contemporary scholar.

However useful these contemporary definitions of globalization may be, we need to go back even one further step. As all the definitions suggest, globalization is a process of action, often at a distance, that compresses space and time and gives a sense of immediacy lacking from previous eras. It is a network of interconnected peoples, corporations, governments and even cultures. But such set of processes and interactions depends, in the first place, on something interacts. In this case it would be people interested in the globalization of Confucianism. So this prior question

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3For instance, see Deng (2011) for a collection of essays on this topic from a number of interdisciplinary perspectives. Along with globalization the authors also call for reflection on the localization of the process and outcomes of globalization. See also Wang (2004) for a set of essays that focuses specifically on the globalization of philosophy. Mou’s (2009) edited history of Chinese philosophy also touches on globalization, often with very thoughtful critical reflections.

4Of course in the introductory essays to this fine resource guide various scholars make the strong case for the very notion of Chinese philosophy—which is not always a notion recognized by many Western philosophers. For instance we can quote Anthony Flew’s (1971, 36) dismissal of non-Western philosophy in his *An Introduction To Western Philosophy*: “Philosophy, as the word is understood here, is concerned first, last, and at all times with argument. (It is, incidentally, because most of what is labeled Eastern Philosophy is not so concerned – rather than for any reasons of European parochialism—that this book draws no materials from any sources east of Suez. Such works of the classical Chinese Sages as the Analects of Confucius are in their own kind great. But that does not make them in the present sense philosophy).” One can only hope that this kind of judgment does not remain normative for Western philosophers in the future.
demands an answer to the question of what is Confucianism? And how could it be globalized?

IV. Encountering Confucianism

There is much debate about how to define Confucianism as there is about the nature and scope of contemporary globalization. In the first place, Confucius and Confucianism are Western neologisms that find their origin with the early Jesuit missionary-scholar encounter with East Asian religio-philosophical traditions beginning in the 16th Century. The Jesuits decided, in distinction from Daoist and Buddhists, there was a major group of scholars called ru 儒 in Chinese. But by the time the Jesuits arrived in China, ru had commonly come to mean scholar, but a particular kind of scholar and certainly one to be distinguished from lao 老 (Daoist or the follower of Laozi and the extended tradition that followed the Lao/Daodejing) or fo 佛 (Followers of the Buddha and the tradition that depended on the Buddha’s dharma). The ru, as the Jesuits reasoned, were those scholars who followed the teachings of Kongzi, and hence used one of Kongzi’s titles, kongfuzi, for the designation of the tradition as Confucianism. The problem of course is that Confucian and Confucianism have no precise counterparts in Chinese or East Asian usage. However, for practical purposes it is fair to say that Confucians did use the term ru as a designation of their tradition and honored Kongzi with its name.

Of course, Kongzi would probably have been greatly surprised by this designation, as he never wearied of explaining that he was a transmitter and not an innovator. What he meant by this is that his teachings were based, as accurately as he could make them, on the classical lore of pre-dynastic sages, including especially the rulers of the Zhou dynasty. Among the Zhou paragons, the Duke of Zhou particularly impressed Kongzi. However, as if often the case, there is often no more transformative force in a tradition than the person passionate to restore the tradition to its pristine origins. For instance the great Protestant Reformers such as Luther and Calvin believe that they were engaged in a process of returning the church of their day to its roots in the New Testament without the layers of accretion from the development of the Roman Catholic Church. Yet the Protestant Reformers and Kongzi actually began a dramatic and creative transformation of their cultures.

Kongzi had analyzed the problems of his day in the Zhou Dynasty and had a plan for how to transform the current situation back into some reflecting the glory of the founding of the dynasty centuries before. This plan was to teach his disciples, and hopefully then the powerful feudal lords, about the proper virtues and socioethical praxis necessary for a flourishing society and state by returning to and relying on the records of the Zhou paragons. Of course in doing so Kongzi really initiated a unique interpretation of the Chinese past that later became identified with his name.

There seems little doubt that Confucianism, as a teaching about a way of life, the Dao 道, is a philosophical tradition. In some respects the general recognition of Confucianism as a philosophical tradition is itself a product of the ongoing process of globalization as an intercultural transmission of ideas from one culture to another.
The day is rapidly ending when every philosophical tradition is judged by criteria completely derived from current Western philosophical discourse and history. Such a view has become much too parochial (Flew 1971 above), even though the question of how to define philosophy becomes more complicated when we factor in the intellectual and cultural histories of the Islamic world, the traditions inspired by Indian thought, and the contributions of East Asian scholars for thousands of years. What is clear is that philosophy as a form of second order self-reflective thought arising in the Axial Age is something that can be found across Eurasia and beyond. While there is no common definition of what defines the philosophical enterprise it is an exciting time to think about what philosophy will come to mean when Al Arabi, Nagarjuna and Xunzi are all taken into account as paradigmatic world philosophers.

The founding philosophical sensibilities can vary greatly along many different tangents. Take for instance the discussion of the good or the foundations of ethical conduct. Socrates is famous for pushing his interlocutors not just to give him examples of good people or actions but also to provide a suitable definition of what the per se good. Socrates would have been very cross with Kongzi because the Chinese scholar refused to provide one propositional definition of his highest vision of the good, ren 內 goodness, humanity, co-humanity et al. From Kongzi’s point of view there is probably no one definition that would cover the range of conduct and appropriate role of defined action and intentions that could encompass what he wanted to teach about ren as a cardinal virtue.

Nor do you have to consider Kongzi naïve in his appeal to examples and metaphors to define ren. For instance, the work of scholars such as Lakoff and Johnson (1980; 1999), among many others, has demonstrated that we not only live by but also reason by metaphors. So a philosophy that stays close to its root metaphors illustrated by narrative example might simply be making a strong case that all thinking, including ultimately propositional or assertive philosophy is based not on other strict propositions but on metaphors. Of course metaphors, definitions and propositions can be cheerfully mixed if this is the taste of the philosopher. In Chinese philosophy the great Zhuangzi is a perfect example of such a mixture—albeit with a wicked sense of humor about the whole exercise.

Here Justus Buchler’s tripartite division of the art of query, his most generic term for what would encompass philosophy along with other forms of spoken, acted and written discourse. Buchler (1974: 97-98) argues that we really display the richness of philosophical discourse if we think of it expressing three dimensions of query and inquiry.

(1) When we can be said to predicate, state, or affirm, by the use of words or any other means; when the underlying direction is to achieve or support belief; when it is relevant to cite evidence in behalf of our product, we produce in the mode of assertive judgment, we judge assertively. [Here the domain is often science]

(2) We can be said to do or to act; when the underlying direction is toward effecting a result; when “bringing about” is the central trait attributable to our product, we produce in the mode of active judgment, we judge actively. [This is often the domain of moral action or assessment]
(3) When we contrive or make, in so far as the contrivance rather than its role in action is what dominates and is of underlying concern; when the process is shaping and the product as shaped is central, we produce in the mode of exhibitive judgment; we judge exhibitively. [here the focus would often be art]

The point here is that Kongzi could argue that we cannot define ethics until and unless we make sure of material from all three modes of inquiry. When seeking a definition for ethical conduct, and indeed Kongzi does offer some definitions from time to time, it may be the case that we need to consider an action rather than a definition.

Moreover, if we are discussing an action then narrative or an example may be the superior and more illustrative way to express this mode of inquiry. So rather than being perversely anti-intellectual, Kongzi’s penchant for giving examples of ethical action might well better serve, or at least serve very well, the discussion of ethics. Of course, all three modes obtain in the richness of daily life for Buchler and a truly excellent modern and/or global ethical discourse should find a way to integrate all of these three modes of judgment in framing its ethical theory and praxis. While these three modes of query and judgment, according to Buchler, are not always transferred from one into the other, they can be translated by each other. They can be related and no one is more fundamental than any other. For example, “To assume that stating [assertive mode] is also judicative is to assume that it is the sole means by which man discriminates and appropriates traits of his world (Buchler 1974: 100).” But often in ethical and artistic actions the active and exhibitive modes predominate. Hence if ethical discourse is discriminated, then Kongzi’s and the Confucian desire to illustrate ethical conduct via an active mode, a story of ethical conduct, makes a great deal of sense.

Furthermore Buchler has a definition of the things and events of the world that is helpful here. “The expression ‘natural complex’ …applies to whatever is, and therefore to whatever can be dealt with; to what is produced by men as to what is not” (Buchler 1974: 100). These natural complexes can be specified by any of the three modes of judgment—assertive, active or exhibitive. Moreover, Buchler also holds that there is an ontological parity of all natural complexes. There is no really real or something more fundamental prior to natural complexes. Buchler makes a distinction between ontological priority and parity, preferring parity as the better understanding of natural complexes. This comports well with the Confucian cosmology of qi and its field and focus resulting in the myriad things and events of the cosmos.

In terms of its ethical constructs, Confucianism’s most distinctive common approach is often likened to Western Virtue ethics, though some contemporary scholars have suggested that this it be modified to be a role ethics (Rosemont and Ames 2009) or conduct ethics (Mou 2009b) as a more nuanced description of Confucian ethical discourse. Both role and conduct ethics are clearly virtue ethics but with specifications appropriate to the sensibilities of the Confucian tradition. An even more complicated issue is whether or not Confucianism can also be considered a religious tradition, as would be the case for both Daoism and Buddhism. However, the question about the religious nature of Confucianism need not detain us at this point. It is enough to note that no one really ought to question the philosophical nature
of the Confucian Way. It is this philosophical element that stands at the heart of what is globalized as it transmitted from its East Asian home to the wider world.

Of course, the Confucian Way as a philosophical teaching is transmitted as more than a series of traditional texts. As Tu Weiming has argued, Confucianism is something like a part of traditional East Asian cultural DNA. While modern people, who would never define themselves as Confucian or know about the origins of many of their values, do continue the sensibility of the Confucian Way through inculcating admiration for education, hard work and respect for family and the elderly. While other East Asian traditions also teach about these sorts of life principles, goals, and values, these virtues certainly were and are part of the Confucian Way.

Nonetheless, in traditional East Asia, the best way to define a Confucian was if the person ordered his or her life according to the accepted Confucian canon. This probably an overly academic way to define the tradition but it does have some merits. For instance, there is this interesting definition of ‘Confucian’ found in the K'ung ts'ung Tzu: The K'ung Family Masters' Anthology (Ariel 1989: 135), Prince P'ing-yüan said: "From where is the term 'Confucian' derived?" Tzu-kao [312-262 BCE] answered: "It is derived from the idea of the combination of the various exquisite virtues, and the conjoining of the six arts, such that whether in action or repose [the Confucian] never loses the core of the Way."

Here the combination of the exquisite virtues and the six arts points to the need for both formal learning and the cultivation of the mind-heart.

For instance, in many Confucian schools it was indeed the quality of a person’s xin 心 mind-heart that helped define the critical ability to participate in the Confucian Way. So someone who was not a scholar, in fact someone who was completely illiterate but who might have heard conversations about Confucian virtues in her or his family and actually took this instruction to heart and practice, let us say family reverence/filial piety xiao 孝 or true faithfulness xin 信 to a friend, was a better Confucian than a scholar who knew the classics and their commentaries by heart but who was completely immoral.

Nonetheless, as with all the great Axial Age philosophies and religions, a basic, even informed, command of the classical canon functioned as the deep keel and rudder of the tradition. Confucians were firm about this. The third of the great classical Confucians, Xunzi 荀子, pointed out that everyone needed texts and a teacher. Perhaps those without wealth and learning could do without the texts but not without the teacher. And of course, what marks a person a teacher in the Confucian Way is a twofold achievement. The first is a command of the grand textual tradition that grew around the Five Classics and expanded into the commentaries on the classics as well as commentaries on the works of great Confucian scholars over the long centuries. The second, dependent on the first according to Confucian scholars, was a living appropriation of the ethical, historical, and social teachings of the classics. A person needed to get the tradition for oneself in service to others. In the famous formulation of Wang Yangming of the Ming Dynasty, knowledge and action must be one. If you cannot be a real minister or father or friend, then you do not really know the teachings of the Confucian sages. One virtue, of course, stands behind all of
Confucian learning, namely family reverence (filial piety) xiao 孝. From the Confucian viewpoint, it is within the family that we begin our embodiment of the Confucian Way and it is in the family that we are always rooted in personal growth and social endeavors.

In terms of the legacy of the specific themes from Kongzi we can identify a number of such items. Of course it has always been obvious that one can only devise such a list with caution and humility. Arthur Waley once remarked that the mark of a work we consider a classic is its ability to inspire new interpretations down the centuries. It is always such a rich work that no matter how diverse the interpretations might become, they always do share a linkage, a stronger connection and an even strong inspiration from the original text.

Moreover, there is always a cosmos of qi 氣. Of course the definition of qi is one of the most complex of all Chinese philosophical terms. It has been called the ether, matter-energy, configurational force, vital force, vital energy and a host of other terms. However there is very little doubt that qi most cogently discussed as a philosophical term, in the Neo-Confucian period but relying on classical roots, is the matrix of everything in the cosmos. To be is to be qi, or perhaps better put, to be part of qi. It is interesting to note that among the Neo-Confucians it was never a highly contested term. It seems to be the case that it was such a fundamental part of the Neo-Confucian conceptual scheme that everyone assumed they knew what they meant by it. This makes it very hard to translate into English because it implies, among others, the twin traits of both material substance and energetic activity. Zhu Xi, the most famous of the Song Neo-Confucian philosophers, would always talk about it in terms of wushi 物事 as both things and events. The early Jesuit scholar-missionaries found it to be simply a contradictory concept, one that violated the law of non-contradiction in the sense that something could be both an energetic process or action and a very concrete thing at the same time. This dipolar aspect of qi does not seem so outlandish in the day of quantum physics and string theory, however. We can summarize some of these traits in the following fashion.

1) This cosmos of qi is a world of constant change and transformation. The classical statement of this view is drawn from the Great Appendix of the Yijing The Book of Changes. The key phrase is that the cosmos is governed by shengsheng buxi 生生不息 constant generation or ceaseless creativity. Calling it creativity might be pushing the case, but it is certainly and without a doubt the ceaseless generation of the things and events of the world. What this constant generation, change and transformation produces, within the field-focus of qi, the things and events of the cosmos’ wushi 物事. The notion of a thing, some concrete object is fairly clear, but what was meant by an event is slightly more opaque. A good example of an event would be a successful ethical act. It is complex and because the situations and roles of each and every person are always themselves changing, each ethically successful act, while it may express a fairly settled general type, such an act of filial reverence or

\footnote{For a discussion of various forms of Chinese themes of creativity or transformation, see Berthrong (2008).}
piety *xiao*孝, is always a new configured action at that specific point and time. It arises out of the past definitely, but it generates something new at the same time.

2) This constant change and transformation of the *qi* cosmos is, as Roger Ames (2011) writes, a *creatio in situ* (in contrast with *creatio ex nihilo* for instance). It is not just one thing after another however, which would be *paisheng*派生. It is rather a true case of *huasheng*化生 or true transformation. While there are elements that are passed down from generation to generation of things and events, each new thing or event is an exemplar of the process of ceaseless transformation (themes two and three are conjoined in this view of the cosmos).

3) This is also a cosmos represented by “field” and “focus” (Ames 2011) in terms of the relationships of its parts/whole. There are various ways to define how parts are related to a whole, and vice versa. In the Confucian case it is best to think of this relationship of a general field to a specific focus. The field is the one cosmic configurational vital energy of *qi*. There is nothing beyond, below, above, before or after the field of *qi*. If there is a holistic vision of cosmic *qi*, what about the emergence or generation, birth, of distinct things and events? The particular things and events are the focal points that come together out of the field of *qi*. To be a thing or event is to have a particular focus or location as it were within the field of *qi*. For instance, this is the theme that causes, to follow Zhu Xi, to talk about how each human being has an allotment of *qi* as a specific focus, that is to say, a particular configuration of *qi* as a local event/focus within the constantly transformative field of *qi*.

4) The most common way to talk about the two most common forces within *qi* are the binary interaction of yin and yang 阴阳. One is tempted to treat yin-yang now as part of the English language. While many English speakers will only have a vague idea of the historical origin and philosophical development of these fundamental binary forces, they do seem to grasp that they denote two ways of looking at the constitution of anything or event in the cosmos. There are a myriad of ways to describe yin and yang: light and dark, soft and solid, responsive and energetic, female and male—and so forth.

5) Another popular way to discuss the interrelationship of the things and events of the cosmos is encapsulated in the common saying, *tian*[di]ren heyi 天「地」人合— the unity of heaven (the supernal), earth and humanity. Earth is in brackets because the most common version is just *tianren heyi*, although the notion of earth is often included. The third of the great classical Confucians, Xunzi, for instance did emphasize that there was a unity or interaction of heaven, earth and humanity. Xunzi also stresses that these are distinct elements of the cosmic field of *qi*, but they were all interrelated in complex manners. From Xunzi’s viewpoint each one of three domains of heaven, earth, and humanity needed each other to complete the great pattern *dali*大理 of the cosmos. Different thinkers would express this in different ways, and it was such a common theme in Chinese philosophy that Daoists and Buddhists shared this theme with Confucians. What the theme expresses most forcefully is that the cosmos is relational in nature and every thing or event is in some fashion related holistically to every other thing or event. Of course from the Confucian view, this

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power of the relationship can and often should vary. For instance, the deference due various roles and family and social relationships varies from role to role, human relationship to human relationship.

V. The Sociology of Knowledge

Most contemporary scholars employing the concept of globalization, as we have seen in our short review of a number of current definitions, assume we are talking about current events. Of course there is a point here. The main argument is that in terms of globalization theory quantity and immediacy matter. It matters that we can travel in about 13 hours from Beijing or Shanghai to Boston. The sheer quantity of raw materials, goods, people, ideas and even diseases makes for not only an increase in quantity, let us say of trade over the volume along the Silk Road, but a qualitative transformation of the transmission of people, products and culture that is the modern globalization process.

If we follow W. C. Smith’s charming story about the transmission of the ideas from ancient India to modern Boston and then back to India, while it did take more than twenty-five hundred years for Martin Luther King, Jr., to get on the plane from the United States to India, it was still a fascinating example of intercultural exchange. In fact one could make something of a counter-claim that what is really at stake here is intercultural exchange—and it is the exchange that matters no matter how long it takes. Another example is the transmission of Buddhism from India and Central Asia into China beginning in the Han Dynasty. This constant flow of information, books, merchants and monks was a large enterprise and one that had a profound impact on Chinese civilization. But was it globalization?

The Buddhist conquest of China, in the famous phrase and extensive historical account of Erik Zücher, was indeed an impressive example of globalization if we accept that the Buddhist impact on China was one of the supreme examples of religious mission as globalization in the pre-modern world. Much the same could be said for the later rapid expansion of Islam and then Christianity. These three great Eurasian missionary religions could be counted as early and highly successful examples of globalization. A new culture, often both intellectual, spiritual and material, flowed from one culture to a new culture, to be received and the transformed by the new host culture. It was certainly a reciprocal process. For instance, Chinese monks journeyed to India to take part in the lively debates in great Indian monasteries, and in turn Japanese pilgrims travelled to Tang China to learn more about the Buddha’s dharma. There is even a fascinating moment (Moffett II) when the Tang scholar-monks asked a Nestorian Christian colleague to help the Japanese better understand the complexities of translating the original Indian and Central Asian languages into Chinese, and then into Japanese. If we are willing to expand the temporal dimension of globalization, I think the Buddhist, Islamic and Christian examples do count.

Moving into even a wider geographical sweep, Donald F. Lach (1965--) and his collaborators in multiple volumes have chronicled the role of Asia in the making of Europe. It is an epic story and much richer than most people would surmise. There
has been a great deal more information and material objects flowing from Asia into Europe going back to Hellenistic and Roman times. We all know of the famous list of Chinese inventions such as paper, the compass, gunpowder and printing that helped transform Western Europe centuries ago. As Lach has explained, it was an extended time of first contacts and exchanges, of discovery and centuries of wonder. Here again though the time it took for ideas, people and products to move from Asia to Europe and back was often counted in decades and not hours. The actual information that was known and recorded in European sources was a mixture of solid fact on occasion often mixed with fabulous misunderstandings and myths. Of course all of this changed after the Portuguese sailed into the Indian and then Pacific Oceans. Portuguese and Spanish, and then a host of other European explorers, missionaries, merchants and military adventures, soon followed this lead. Each group brought back tales of wonder. For instance, Europeans came to highly value Chinese porcelain and spent decades trying to figure out how to produce their own versions of these Chinese exports.

As Lach tells this complicated story of commerce and military adventure we could well call this an era of globalization though at first the flow of goods and ideas was more from Asia to Europe than the other way around. Save for gold and silver a country like China expressed little interest in any European goods. In terms of ideas the Chinese and Japanese were intrigued by the scientific knowledge and technological skills brought by the Jesuit scholar missionaries. As Europeans learned more about China from extensive Jesuit reports some Western scholars were intrigued by what they were being told. Famous scholars such a Leibniz (Lach 1957) took Chinese ideas very seriously. In the 17th and 18th Centuries the reports about Confucian social ethics proved valuable ammunition for radical European philosophers who wanted to argue that the Chinese case proved that you could have a highly organized and sophisticated ethical culture that was not dependent on the revealed Christian religion and churches. It was somewhat ironic that the Jesuits, in their eagerness to report on the China mission, provided fodder for the Enlightenment critique of the old regime in Europe.

According to Randal Collins (1998) the ideas that have circulated back and forth from Asia to Europe and vice versa has a long developmental history. Moreover Collins has developed a sophisticated sociological interpretation of how philosophical schools arise, flourish, and in time, develop in their home cultures and then also sometimes migrate around the world. Of course, Collins is primarily interested in the internal origins of particular scholarly communities, but because these scholarly collectives are very corporate in nature, they have an ability that allows them to move within cultures and outwards to new and diverse homes far from their places of origin.

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6What is especially impressive about Collins’ opus is that he does not just focus on Europe but includes extensive sections to Indian, Chinese, Japanese and Islamic traditions. It is model for what a globalized history of world philosophy can and ought to be. Collins Romanized Chinese using the Wade-Giles system but I will change this is the now more universally accepted Pinyin Romanization system.

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All we need think of is the spread of Buddhism and later Islam from their places of origin to the farther reaches of the Eurasian world.

Collins explains his vision of global philosophy in this fashion. “My strategy has been to focus on intellectual networks: the social links among those thinkers whose ideas have been passed along in later generations (1998: xvii).” What is so useful about Collins’ project is that these ideas are not only shared from generation to generation but they also have a spatial transmission and hence provide the background of contemporary philosophical global or world philosophy. He describes his theory as “… arguing that if one can understand the principles that determine intellectual networks, one has a causal explanation of idea and their changes. In a very strong sense, networks are the actors on the intellectual stage (Ibid.).” This view challenges us to think about the growth and transmission of philosophical systems from a different perspective. While some scholars might be a bit nervous about the reification of philosophical networks as compared to the concrete achievements of individual thinkers, I believe Collins has a point, and one that is especially relevant to Chinese philosophy in general and Confucianism in particular. As Kongzi reminded us in Analects 4.25, virtue always has neighbors; hence we could likewise stress the corporate nature of the Confucian Way. Confucianism has almost always been articulated as a project of likeminded scholars who share a common tradition, a friendship within the global republic of letters. So Collins’ view of the importance of scholarly networks helps to better understand, for instance, why the Confucian tradition places such emphasis on commentarial discourse to engage its philosophical core issues. Confucians most certainly have a strong sense of networking, so much so that Kongzi also wrote that he transmitted but did not innovate and was faithful to the old, Analects 7.1—述而不作, 信而好古.

VI. Case Study: Zhu Xi’s Daoxue

As a case of how we might present the work of a major Confucian thinker in terms of the current process of globalization as world philosophy, we will examine the thought of Zhu Xi (1130-1200). Although a remarkably creative new endeavor, the contemporary New Confucian has its roots in the world of the Neo-Confucians. It is the Neo-Confucian and now New Confucian intellectual world that is part of the current process of globalization.

There is a large consenlus that Zhu Xi, or Master Zhu as he has been known for eight centuries, may be the most influential Confucian thinker of the last millennium and perhaps one of two or three most important Confucian thinkers for all time. Likewise, as with almost all great thinkers, he is exalted by some and sharply criticized by others. The very form, content and structure of his vast scholarly achievement has delighted or worried generations of scholars from his time till today. In terms of comparative global/world philosophy his role in the Confucian Way has been compared, and justly so, with the role of Thomas Aquinas in the Christian faith. Both men were immensely learned and both had an astounding list of publications on the entire range of what counted for scholarship and even practical matters in their
respective cultures. Master Zhu wrote essays, commentaries, poetry, philosophical anthologies, ritual texts, government memoranda and a huge collection of dialogues and letters to his friends and students.

Zhu Xi was also as systematic thinker as he was expansive in the range of topics he addressed and the literary forms he wrote. In many ways it is the systematic philosophical vision that makes him such a fascinating figure. He had a powerful worldview that ordered his entire life project. Even this commitment to the creation of a systematic presentation of what he considered to be the Confucian Way as articulated by his revered Northern Song masters posed a problem to later students of the Confucian Way. In the first place he wrote so much more than most of his colleagues. If many Confucians were somewhat reticent about writing and publishing their works, Zhu Xi went in another direction entirely. The modern Shanghai edition of his collected works runs to twenty-seven large volumes. His scholarly output was massive. There are a number of reasons for this output. Perhaps the simplest explanation is that he passed the highest imperial examination at the remarkable age of eighteen. The average age of someone to pass this highest examination was well into the 30s. This gave Zhu extra decades as a scholar to produce a philosophical masterpiece. Moreover, while committed (in theory) to government service, Zhu managed for the most part to take up posts that allowed him to spend most of his time on scholarly pursuits. The second reason can only be attributed to his burning desire to expound and explain the work of the Song revival of Confucian scholarship that has become known as Neo-Confucianism in the West and as Songxue 宋學 in Chinese.

But even within the wide ambit of the Song revival of Confucian thought Zhu Xi played a specialized role. He had a very particular take on what were the defining philosophical elements of a Song representation of the authentic teachings of the Confucian Way. In order to do this he argued that he was simply following the best insights of his favorite Northern Song Master. He would have argued that in doing this he was following the hallowed Confucian method of transmitting the wisdom of his teachers and hence being faithful to what he called the daotong 道統 or Transmission of the Way. Of course Zhu turned out to be just as creative in his role of a transmitter as Kongzi long before. For instance, if Kongzi focused his attention on the cardinal virtue of ren 仁, Zhu was equally famous (or infamous for his critics) for selecting the notion of li 理, which he drew primarily form the work of younger of the Cheng brothers, Cheng Yi. Li, like so many Chinese philosophical terms, has a long history within the developing Confucian Way and defies a simple translation into English. We will examine the nature and role of li in much greater detail below. However, the most common English translations of li are pattern, order, texture or principle—all governed by the notion of coherence as a key hermeneutical element in trying to understand Zhu’s philosophical intent and systematic vision. So for instance, we now find notions such as coherent pattern or coherent principle as translations attempting to capture the structure, content and sensibility of Zhu’s philosophy.
VII. The Four Architectonic Domains/Traits

The four key domains catalog and order the intricate architectonic integral web schematizing the four major fields and foci of Zhu Xi’s (1130-1200) complex axiological cosmology in terms of his philosophical lexicography. The terms and concepts outlined below are obviously not exhaustive of Zhu’s massive corpus but they partially encompass the cosmological vision of the Southern Song master—although, for instance, Zhu’s political concerns only register tangentially even if they would have mattered greatly to the Song master. Therefore, when Zhu Xi described any of the events 事 or things 物 of the world, he would have recourse to these and other terms either singularly, or more commonly, as clusters of concepts, some vague and some complex, that allowed him to explain, describe, and even commend the vast variety of things, events, dispositions, characters, actions, inner and outer social and mental states, roles of personal and social activity, and modes of cultivation that any person must seek out in order to become a worthy student of 道學 道學 the Teaching of the Way.

The concept of field/focus draws on the work begun by David Hall and Roger Ames. We will review some extensive quotes from Hall and Ames (2001: 10-11) to illustrate the meaning of field and focus.

The Chinese world is a phenomenal world of continuity, becoming, and transitoriness. In such a world, there is no final discreetness….Thus, things are not objects, but foci within a continuous field of changing processes and events. A deobjectified, defactualized discourse is the language of processes, and to speak and hear that language is to experience the flow of things.

A processive language precludes the assumption that objects serve as references of linguistic expressions. The precise referential language of denotation and description is to be replaced by a language of “deference” in which meanings both allude to and defer to one another in a shifting field of significances…

…On the other hand, the language of deference does not employ proper names simply as indicators of particular individuals or members of classes, but invokes hints, suggestions, or allusions to indicate foci in a field of meanings. “Confucius” is a corporate self, and as such, his name is a particular context calls forth a range of associations—persons, historical events, ideas—out of which the meaning of this invocation emerges for this particular audience.

Often the notion of field can be described as the field of formless, dynamic qi out of which all the things and events of the world find their place as a foci within the field.

Hall and Ames continue,

The language of focus and field that we shall be employing in our interpretation of the Zhongyong is readily contrasted with the substance language dominant in the West. The latter is expressive of a world characterized by “wholes” and “parts”—a world patterned by discreteness

It was a great loss to the study of Chinese philosophy when Professor David Hall died shortly before the publication of this translation and commentary on the Zhongyong.

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and permanence in which change is primarily the rearrangement of that which is unchanging. The language of focus and field expresses a world always in a state of flux, a world in which items cannot be fixed as finally this or that, but must be seen as always transitory states passing into other, correlative, states. There is no final whole we call “Cosmos” or “world.” The world is an interactive field. It is \textit{wanwu}—"the ten thousand things." (loc. cit.)

I believe that we can appreciate the insight about the field-focus hypothesis without agreeing with the rest of the Hall and Ames interpretation of either the \textit{Zhongyong}. It is just these kinds of reflective hypotheses that are part of the globalization of Confucian philosophy. Of course, each specific Confucian tradition and scholar will have their own interpretation of what the field and its foci constitute. For instance, for Zhu Xi the notion best used to describe the field would be \textit{qi} as the dynamic matrix within which the things and events of the world emerge as determinate natural complexes, to use Buchler’s terminology. The beauty of Buchler’s formulation is that it does not simply reduce the foci to be things, or even events. A natural complex is indeed a foci of the field, but it expresses a sense of philosophical parity of the things and events and not a priority as would be the case if we were talking about parts and wholes.

In framing this modern transposition of Zhu Xi’s rich philosophical achievement, I have tried as best I can to mirror the Southern Song philosophical vocabulary of Zhu Xi’s literary Chinese as my model for these four architectonic domains. As we shall see, each domain has a number of intricately connected traits that help express its role in Zhu’s vision of the cosmos. But we can also transpose Zhu’s terminology into English as well. Therefore I suggest the following English transpositions for Zhu’s lexicon:

1. \textbf{States/Conditions/Formats $\Rightarrow$} Forms, patterns, formatting, texture or coherent principles that “format” the things and events of the cosmos (\textit{li} 理); the coherent principles/patterns \textit{suoyiran} 所以然 for the natural dispositions and sedimentation of all things and events. The fundamental matrix of the Dao.
2. \textbf{Functions/Processes $\Rightarrow$} The dynamics of any given situation; most cogently the functions and processes, field and focus of \textit{qi} 氣— the protean power of cosmological auto teleic generativity \textit{shengsheng buxi} 生生不息.
3. \textbf{Civilizing Cultural Achievements $\Rightarrow$} the trait of unification of the formal and dynamic dimensions constituting the emergence of an event or thing (\textit{he} 和 & \textit{wen} 文) encoding the cosmic, social and personal balance needed to achieve harmony.
4. \textbf{Axiological Values & Virtues $\Rightarrow$} the values that are achieved, shared, and embodied through the selection of appropriate \textit{yi} 義 cultural norms or coherent principles or patterns \textit{li} 理 expressed as \textit{de} 德 refined \textit{wen} 文 virtues and appropriate conduct via civility \textit{li} 礼.

\textbf{VIII.} Zhu Xi’s Four Paradigmatic Domains

In terms of Zhu’s Chinese text I correlate the four architectonic domains with the set of Zhu’s Chinese terminology. For instance, \textit{yong} as the expression of the dynamic functions and processes of the Ten Thousand things is quite clear. So also, with a bit more explanation, so should the domain of \textit{benti} and \textit{li} 理 should also be clear. In thinking of domains I am stressing the fact that for Zhu there are four primary areas of philosophical concern and each domain is populated, as we will see below, with a variety of terms that help give the domain interpretive substance. In many ways this is what we should expect from a rich historical tradition such as Zhu inherited. Each of

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these domains is richly sedimented with a variety of terms; and each term can therefore highlight a specific trait of the domain depending on the specific point that he is trying to emphasize in an essay, dialogue, anthology or commentary. Translating from Chinese to English the following equivalences obtain:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benti</td>
<td>Patterns, Coherent Principles &amp; States, Conditions &amp; Texture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yong</td>
<td>Dynamic Functions or Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He [Wen]</td>
<td>Harmonizing Cultural Outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De</td>
<td>Axiological Values &amp; Virtues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The domain of *benti* is represented by the trait of patterns, coherent principles and states, textures, formats and conditions. We will now illustrate this domain with the following examples drawn from Zhu’s analysis of the coming into determinate focus of the ten thousand things. We begin with *Tian* 天 heaven, *tiandao* 天道 or the Supernal Dao; *di* 地 earth; *ren* 人 the person as the paradigmatic states that constitute the grand cosmological triad of *daoxue* discourse and reflection derived from Zhu’s reading of the classical Confucian texts. *Tian*, *di* and *ren* as heaven, earth and human beings form the main narrative cosmological triad for *daoxue*—and the inclusion of *di* 地 as earth always reminds Ru/Confucian thinkers that human beings are part of the organic matrix of all objects and events in a unified cosmos. One famous maxim defining the relational nature of the cosmos is *tianrenheyi* 天人合一, the unity of supernal heaven and humanity or *tiandirenheyi* 天地人合一 or the unity of heaven, earth and humanity. The *benti* 本體 acts as the fundamentally profound source of the patterning of the Dao as the field for the focus of the things and events of the cosmos.

In terms of what Zhu borrowed as the most famous feature of *daoxue* from Cheng Yi, *li* 理 functions as the state, condition, pattern, constructive pattern, order, coherent principle, or rationale *suoyiran* 所以然 of the cosmos. *Li* is, for instance, a concept found in the classical Ru/Confucian Xunzi as the great pattern 大理 of the world and a critical concept, even defining element, in Song and post-Song philosophical discourse. The supremely excellent *li* is identified as *tajii* 太極 the Supreme Polarity (Ultimate) of the yin-yang 阴阳 vital energies of *qi* within the primal *dao* 道. Zhu often makes use of another Northern Song maxim, *liyi fenshu* 理一分殊 or the teaching that coherent principle or pattern is one as an ordering format or unified trait while its manifestations are many or diverse. Often this state of *liyi fenshu* is deemed to be characteristic of the holistic, organic, pluralistic and yet realistic sensibility of Ru/Neo-Confucian thought and cosmology in Song and post-Song periods. While there is a unity of moral order to the cosmos, there is also a diversity of outcomes based on the dynamics of vital energy, the interaction of yin-yang, and the constant circulation of the five phases *wuxing* 五行.

In order to express the dynamic nature of the domain of pattern, order, coherent principle as a supreme condition, Zhu used the notion of *Taiji* 太極 the Supreme
Polarity (Supreme Ultimate⁶) as the highest formal and unified trait of the li of the cosmos and for each particular thing or event as its specific ming 命. All of these complementary states or formal traits are often discussed in terms of benti 本體 or the origin-root or source of all the objects and events or for human beings as the benxin 本心 manifesting the fundamental mind-heart of the person. Of course, the most famous of ultimate state traits is Dao 道 as the perfect good or ground of being shi 實 and/or emptiness xu 虛 of all that is, will be or can be. It is designated as the totality of the cosmos manifesting shengsheng buxi 生生不息 [yi (己)] generation without cessation, the processive and relational domain of Zhu’s vision of the field and focus of the Confucian way. Moreover it also usually implies a moral ‘more’ to the myriad things and events of the cosmos. For Ru/Confucians it functions as the axiological focus of Dao 道 as creativity itself for all things and events as tiandao 天道 the Supernal Dao.

Zhu Xi has another set of traits that exemplify the dynamic yong functions of the configuring foci within the Supernal Dao as field for the foci. The most universal trait is Qi 氣 generative energy, vital action, configuring vitality or force functioning as the dynamic matrix from which all object or events emerge and into which they all return when their focal careers have been completed. Rather for the Buddhists, nothing lasts forever for Zhu Xi. Qi 氣 is the unceasing creative, generative field or matrix of the myriad things and events of the cosmos. It is manifested for the emerging human person as zhi 質 functioning as the ‘basic stuff’ of the shen 身 body. Yin and Yang 隱陽 operate in a cooperative dialectic as the negative and positive forces or poles of generative energy and the dual and balanced modalities of the Supreme Polarity taiji 太極. Yin and Yang are the complementary dynamic vital forces and primal generative traits of the differentiating forces of the cosmos. The sedimented meanings include yang 陽 as the sunny side of a mountain with yin 涼 as the shadow side; yang 陽 as male, yin 涼 as female; yang 陽 as active and firm, yin 涼 as passive, yielding, responsive; yang 陽 as expansive, yin 涼 as reactive or recessive; yang 陽 as penetrating, yin 涼 as encompassing, etc. Yin 涼 and Yang 陽 are analogous and related to active and quiescent dongjing 動靜 states of the related/correlative polarity of taiji.

In terms of human life, xin 心 functions as the mind-heart at the living center of the human person. The mind-heart needs to be cultivated by proper ritual civility li 禮 with complete integrity jing 敬 in order to realize true virtue de 德; this demand for moral self-cultivation requires an elevated level of informed intention zhi 志 or committed conformation to the daoxin 道心 the mind-heart of the Dao or the benxin 本心 root mind-heart of the Dao and of its manifestations. This moral goal of the achieved conformity to the daoxin is contrasted to renxin 人心 the human (passionate)

⁶The most common English translation of taiji has been Supreme Ultimate, but Joseph Adler has more recently suggested that Supreme Polarity better captures how Zhu Xi understood the term.

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mind-heart prone to error. The student seeks the process zhengxin yangshen 正心養神 to correct the mind-heart in order to cultivate spirit as the human expression of the mind-heart of the Dao.

Zhu Xi believes that Xue 學 study is critical for the proper/appropriate yi 義 cultivation of the mind-heart. The Analects/Lunyu (1.1) begins with Kongxi’s praise for study as the first step on the path of self-cultivation. Without the study of the teachings of the sages and investigation of the things and events wushi 物事 of the cosmos, a person cannot begin to follow or conform to the Dao. Study is a paradigmatic example of role of communication both in the cosmological and pedagogical domains as jiao 教 intersection, meeting, exchange and interaction (ganying 感應), and reciprocity and recompense bao 報. Study can also be liked to jiwei 積偽 accumulation of intelligent action of contrivance wei 偽 in Xunzi. Further, study leads to teaching jiao 教 what one has learned in dialogue with other people and classical the texts of the sages. If virtue loves neighbors, then study and teaching love friends equally dedicated to the examination of way of the sages.

Therefore it is hard to overemphasize the role of jiao 教 teaching, education and learning as a prime process or method by which a person becomes a junzi 君子 or a profound or xian 贤 worthy person; only with further education and self-cultivation might the junzi become a sheng 圣 sage, the highest and most perfect state a person can aspire to achieve. The root method of Ru/Confucian self-cultivation is the process of learning, educating, teaching, self-cultivation, and authentic ethical action. It is the excellence de 德 of living out and embodying the highest ideals of the Confucian Way.

Zhu Xi followed his discussion of (1) the formal states or conditions and (2) processes and functions with reflections on the outcome of the fusion of these two domains. One of the key elements of this fusion of the formal states and the dynamics functions is what Kongzi called zhengming 正名 or correcting, rectifying and matching names in the sense of adjusting in an appropriate way the names of things, events, and social and personal roles so as to express a proper relationship of the personal, social and natural world. Names ming 名 are often discussed in terms of their relationship to the fullness, the veritable inexhaustible plenitude of shi 實. For Confucians such as Zhu Xi the Confucian Way is a realistic pluralism dominated by a sense of creative process and relational contexts. While names cannot completely capture the true plentitude of creative matrix of reality, names can mirror reality for better or worse.

But names do not just name even when they are helping us act in an appropriate fashion. Something more is required and this is jian 諫 remonstrance as the proper duty of a son to a father, minister to ruler, wife to husband, sibling to sibling, and friend to friend. While deference, most concretely xiao 孝 filial piety or familial reverence, is an obligation, even an appropriate role virtue in many situations, a
person must always have the moral courage to remonstrate when it is clear that another person is in grave error such that this error will cause grievous harm to the person and/or the person’s family, colleagues, society and even the cosmos. In the case of the ruler, such harm could cause disaster for the state and all of its citizens. Hence prudent, gracious, and civil remonstrance is a true Ru/Confucian social and personal virtue.

Zhu Xi did not stop with remonstration. If one is to remonstrate in an appropriate fashion, then one needs some methods of self-cultivation and reflection that will allow the person to be effective in such a delicate undertaking as remonstration within one’s family and with the authorities of civil society. The twin methods Zhu suggests are encapsulated in the maxims of daowenxue 道問學 and zundexing 尊德性 as the appropriate forms of the self-cultivation practices of (1) serious study and reflection and (2) honoring the inherent moral tendencies or dispositions xing 性 as key classical rubrics for two diverse yet interconnected ways of nurturing the xin/心 mind-heart and as appropriate approaches to moral epistemology. The first form of self-cultivation stresses patient cognitive reflection and determined study and the second honors the innate, intuitive cultivation of the moral seeds duan 端 of morality. Le 樂 joy and happiness are concomitant results of true self-cultivation for the person. The Ru/Confucian path is one of delight and not sorrow or ascetic self-denial or anxiety. The metaphors and examples of this creative process are often drawn from cooking and music. In both good cooking and music there is a respect for the uniqueness of ingredients along with the harmony of the perfectly crafted dish; in music the instruments have their own voices but are combined in a symphony of sound and rhythm.

Zhu Xi had a method and suggestion for how one begins the process of reflection and cultivation. This is the famous dictum of gewu 格物 as the investigation or rectification of things in order to extend or embody knowledge. Actually Zhu probably would have agreed even with his critics such as Wang Yangming that ultimately one cannot pull apart of the process of learning from the outcome of learning—both express a profound commitment to the moral vision of the Confucian Way. Yet gewu has remained a key [and highly contested] epistemological concept for the examination of the living objects and events of the world and the proper cultivation of the mind-heart. Gewu is critical in order to zhujing qiongli 主敬窮理 reside in reverence to exhaust [comprehend] coherent patterns or order through gongfu 工夫 as a structured effort of the self-cultivation of the person’s mind-heart. These epistemological reflections are closely connected to the theories of jiao 教 teaching and jing 敬 reverence for oneself as a student living in the midst of a pluralistic and realistic field of unceasing transformation and focus on the uniqueness of each new object or event.

But even such a profound meditation on moral epistemology is not yet enough for Zhu Xi. He argues that the most complex aspect of moral insight and action is guan 權 as the weighing of difficult choices, the process of assessing, discerning, and finding the necessary discretion in making problematical and complex decisions for
which there is no clear or precise guidance, admonitions, or precedent from the sages. Linked to the highest form of human knowledge as wise discernment, guan is often held to be provisional in nature even for a sage, much an ordinary scholar. Yet it is a confounding and likely task for any person when confronted with a novel moral decision. Whatever the novel choice to be made, it must be in accord with the spirit of the classical teachings of the sages by weighing all the possible permutations of the situation.

According to Zhu Xi, along with the various methods of personal cultivation there is always the social and historical dimension of the Confucian embodied especially in the classical text and the commentaries of learned scholars that have been added to the conversation over the generation from Master Kong. Zhu called this the daotong 道统 or the Transmission of the Way or Genealogy of the Way. Zhu Xi’s version of who was in and who was out of the proper transmission of the Confucian Way was a highly influential, though highly contested, account of the revival of the Ru/Confucian Way by a fellowship of Northern Song philosophical masters. The story of the generation and transmission of the genealogy of the Way can be and has been constructed and reconstructed in diverse manners over many centuries. At the heart of this transmission of the way is Siwen 斯文 or ‘this culture of ours’ as the expression of refined self-cultivation and the manifestation of coherent principle, pattern, and order outward from the self, family, community, society into the entire cosmos. This cultural goal represents the social outcome of humane flourishing, a world in which the five virtues are manifested in appropriate situations in a timely fashion. The notion of wen 文 is critical in seeking the quality of virtuous endurance and perseverance. For instance, wen includes the fine arts shi 詩 poetry, shi 史 history, hua 畫 painting, and shuhua 書畫 calligraphy, etc. All of these cultural achievements, which represent the fine arts, make for a fully rounded and grounded cultural experience. This culture, of course, is inscribed in the Ru/Confucian jing 经 classics and give le 勒 profound joy to the student of the Confucian Way.

Zhu Xi then explains in great deal the profound axiological virtue embodied in the conduct of a student of the Way. Ren 仁 remains as the paramount virtue of humanness, benevolence, co-humanity and marker for the other prime virtues such as appropriateness or justice/yi 義, ritual action or civility/li 禮, knowledge, wisdom or discernment/zhi 知, and faithfulness/xin 信. These five constant chang 常 virtues of excellence de 德 provide the moral and axiological sensibility for the Ru/Neo-Confucian enterprise. These virtues are always linked to commensurate roles of relational connected such as filial reverence/piety xiao 孝 as an expression of primordial familial relationships. The primordial correlative virtues and roles are also linked to the method of xiushen 修身 or cultivation of the person which becomes a critical issue for reflection and ethical praxis especially Zhu’s third domain of cultural achievements. The axiological outcomes of Zhu’s philosophy are a set of key elements of the functional process of ren 仁 manifested as the iguan 一贯 or the one
moral thread of *zhong* 忠 determined moral effort and loyalty and *shu* 恕 as empathy or concern consciousness *youhuanyishi* 愚患意識 which indeed leads to *ren*.

Zhu never believed that this self-cultivation was an easy task. A person committed to the Confucian Way needed *yong* 勇 courage, strength, determination to carry out any action bravely, fearlessly and with great determination. Courage/yong, nonetheless, must be constrained by *ren* humaneness in order that it not become reckless, thoughtless, or misguided bravado. Courage as brave and wise perseverance in the good is one of the key virtues listed in *Zhongyong* and also commended in the *Analects*.

Just as for the great Confucian master who came before him, Zhu has a profound respect for *li* 礼 as ritual action or civility; the social norms, habits, and practices that hold persons and society together and in fact help to constitute the humane moral exemplar. *Li* closely linked to *yi* 義 as the appropriate form of equity in moral interchange with the intent to create a civilized form *wen* 文 of humane flourishing. It is, as Ames (2011) argues, to be defined as “achieving propriety in one’s roles and relations.” Civility is especially critical, as the great classical Ru/Confucian scholar Xunzi taught, for complex social orders, and in fact is the basis for a truly civilized social order with sufficient harmony *he* 和 to be *wen* as a beautifully adorned humane society with appropriate reciprocal *bao* 報 relations.

In terms of the hoped-for outcomes of ethical and intellectual cultivation, one of Zhu’s favorite terms is *cheng* 儀 sincerity, genuineness, integrity, authenticity and the self-actualization of the moral virtues such that one achieves a morally harmonious life via various forms of *xiushen* 修身 self-cultivation by means of such the praxis of *jing* 敬 reverent mindfulness or attentiveness. This praxis of *cheng* is the ‘how’ of the moral self-cultivation of the five constant virtues. When a person reaches a certain advanced stage of the process of *cheng*, one important result is *zide* 自得 or to get authentic self-realization for oneself no matter what the situation as a moral person may be; as a paraphrase of the whole *daxue* project this means to be able to get the Dao for oneself in service to others. Moral self-cultivation, if it is to be successful, also demands authentic courage *yong* 勇 in order to realize *shendu* 慎獨 the integration of one’s *xin* 心 mind-heart into full and authentic morality and social praxis. *Jing* 敬, always closely linked to *cheng*, connotes reverence, attentiveness, and the serious and authentic commitment to the transformation of the self through self reflection and cultivation. *Jing* bespeaks a truly serious esteem for residing in true virtue. It is the concern consciousness *youhuanyishi* 悠患意識 such that the self and world be nurtured by means of ultimate concerns and respect; it is to have a care for the Dao while *zhujing* 主敬 residing in sincere reverence.

Nor did Zhu neglect the virtue of *zhi* 知 or 智 [智藏] as the arts and dispositions of learning, discernment and wisdom leading to the outcome of the faithful and revential embodied discernment *tizhi* 體知; it is likewise the *zhicang* 智藏 as Wisdom hidden and stored [concealed until manifested] in the Way *dao* 道 itself as the creative
rationale of *tian* 天 supernal heaven. It is wise to remember that wisdom always entails a moral sensibility was well as the cultivation of critical intelligence.

In terms of talking about the outcome of all these processes, *he* 和 or harmony, *he* 合 as unity and uniqueness, *zhong* 中 or centrality, balancing, and *renxing* 忍性 (*nai* 耐) or patience function designations of the goals or outcomes of the successful cultivation of all the virtues necessary for humane flourishing as the goal of *de* 德 excellent virtue. One seeks harmony but not compete uniformity *tong* 同 or as Kongzi defines it, *he er bu tong* 和而不同 harmony without uniformity. Moreover, one needs enduring patience 忍性 to achieve these noble ends.

Zhu also had a vision of the highest goal or outcome of the entire process of self-cultivation and the search for discerning wisdom. He call this *zhishan* 至善 or the highest good as the realization of harmony and centrality; this sense of harmony functions as the ideal for a person seeking to become a *sheng* 聖 sage (theoretically possible but in practice very, very difficult to achieve) or perhaps more realistically, a *junzi* 君子 or as a *xian* 賢 worthy or noble person who seeks harmony with *tiandao* 天道 the Supernal Way. The person who achieves such a lofty goal finds *le* 樂 joy as the quality of true happiness, the reward of virtue for a *Ru*/Confucian 儒. As Kongzi, to be able to hear the Dao in the morning one can die content in the evening.

Of course there were various reactions to Zhu’s great synthesis over the next eight centuries. Not all of the reactions were positive to say the least. Some later scholars achieved fame for their rejections of Zhu’s work, as thinkers as diverse as Wang Yangming (1472-1529) and Dai Chen (1723-1777) proved to be. Yet all of these thinkers were tied together in the web of Song and post-Song philosophy (called Neo-Confucianism in the West) that became the gateway to the first major globalization of the Confucian way. It is important for the history of the globalization of the Confucian tradition that we remember that what was and is globalized is really a Neo-Confucian version of the Confucian Way.

However much someone such as Dai Chen disputed the genealogy and content of the Confucian Way with Zhu Xi or Wang Yangming, they were still tied together by the development of Confucianism from the Song dynasty on. It proved to be almost impossible for later Chinese scholars to read the story of Confucianism without using the lenses of Neo-Confucian philosophical speculation. As we shall see, the great modern revivers of the tradition now known as the New Confucians, are heirs both of the classical Warring States masters such as Kongzi, Mengzi, and even Xunzi as well as the Northern Song masters, Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming, and Dai Zhen. As we shall see, the first stage of the globalization of the Confucian Way took the Neo-Confucians as the subject of this process of introducing the Confucian tradition outside its traditional East Asian home.

IX. The First Phase of the Globalization of the Confucian Way

In terms of the first phase of the early modern globalization of the Confucian Way the story really begins in earnest with the arrival of the Jesuit scholar-missionaries in the early 17th Century in late

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Ming China. Of course, there was an earlier phase of such Confucian-Christian exchange between the Church of the East, often called Nestorian, in the Tang dynasty. We have evidence of this early religious globalization because of a famous semi-official stele erected in 781 CE in Ji’an during the Tang dynasty marking the arrival of Bishop Alouben (Alopen) in 635 CE. It is a fascinating story but contributes little to the globalization of the Confucian tradition except as the Jesuits used the famous stele to demonstrate that Christianity had a long history in China and had been accepted as a legitimate religion by the emperors of the Tang dynasty. If the Tang emperors could accept the Church of the East, so the argument went, so too could the late Ming and then Qing emperors allow the propagation of the Christian faith in China. Along with the members of the Church of the East in Tang China, there were also sporadic contacts during the medieval period between China and the West with Marco Polo being the most famous example.

While the term globalization, as we have seen, is used primarily to discuss the current rapid exchange of material objects as well as intellectual artifacts, the story of the reception of the Jesuit accounts of what they learned about Confucianism is indeed the first phase in the globalization of the Confucian way. Moreover, it is a story that has been often told in great detail. Without too much of a doubt this is the first time that Confucianism was introduced in any sophisticated and sustained detail in the European world. Great European philosophers such as Leibniz, Wolff and Hegel joined in the conversation.

It is also only the first phase in the Western globalization of Confucianism. As many European intellectual historians have noticed, the reception of Confucianism began with fascination and ended in rejection. At first many Europeans were indeed spellbound by the Jesuit story of what they found in their conversations with the learned scholars of China. Confucianism often even played a role in internal European philosophical and religious debates. For instance, the growing chorus of critics of the European established churches was quick to point out that China and Confucian scholars demonstrated that you could create a highly civilized and powerful culture without the benefit of Christian revelation. However, philosophers such as Hegel ultimately rejected the notion that China had anything significant to offer early modern Europe. Hegel was of the opinion that Confucian China was all smoke and mirrors in terms of any substantive philosophical achievement. But between the early Jesuits’ appreciation of China and Kant and Hegel’s later rejection, there is still an important story to be told, and especially around the figures of Leibniz and Wolff.

X. Early Modern Globalization of Confucianism

As Leibniz searched for elements of universal signification as the basis of human thought, the early accounts of the Chinese language and philosophy intrigued the great German philosopher. Mungello (1977; 1985) provides a detailed account of how Leibniz interrogated his Jesuit sources of Chinese wisdom. Nor did this kind of trail end with Leibniz, to whom we return below, but continues on with the work of philosophers such as Wolff, Couplet and Bouvet. These Jesuits, Couplet and Bouvet,
continued Ricci’s attempt to find an accommodation between Confucianism and Christian theology while Wolff found nuggets of practical ethical wisdom in the writings of the Confucian sages.

It is clear that Leibniz and Wolff, albeit in a dialogue conducted at a great distance, favored the accommodating Jesuit approach. For instance, in terms of what became the Rites Controversy, Leibniz sided with Ricci in believing that for the best educated Confucians the Confucian rites were civil and not religious per se in nature. Therefore Leibniz saw no reason for the Confucians to reject ancestor veneration. This actually makes a great deal of sense given Leibniz’s desire to seek religious and political accommodation wherever possible. Hence it is also not surprising that Leibniz would likewise be inclined to charity in his readings about and estimation of Confucianism. Nor was he always inclined to a completely benign interpretation of all things Chinese or Confucian. As Cook and Rosemont (1994, 1-18) point out, he was less than impressed with the state of Chinese astronomy.

What is truly intriguing is how well Leibniz was able to reason out what, for instance, the Neo-Confucian philosophical position, with a focus on Zhu’s style of daoxue, actually was. Contrary, for instance to another learned Jesuit, Longobardi, who maintained that the classical and Neo-Confucians were materialists and atheists, Leibniz maintained a much more nuanced and sophisticated interpretation of Confucian thought. Many of the Jesuits assumed that the classical Confucians retained at least a vestigial understanding of the divine reality via the Shang and Zhou doctrines of shangdi 上帝 (Lord on High) and tian 天 (Heaven). This was a form of Confucian wisdom about supernal matters that, unfortunately from the Jesuit position, waned over time. In fact, we know that some of the most famous of elite Christian converts made by the Jesuits were impressed with how the Jesuit fathers helped them to reconstruct the theistic import of some of the early Confucian classics. While the flow of this early globalization, interestingly enough, was from China to Europe, Chinese Confucians were very much part of the process of the exchange of ideas.

Leibniz wrote (Cook and Rosemont 1994, 72):

I would think that many philosophers from the Orient, no less than the Platonists and Stoics, regarded God as the World-soul or as the universal nature immanent in things; that other spirits also assumed bodies; and that some even considered the soul as a divine particle of the divine aura, which would return to the Ocean of souls with the body’s death.

While this is not the way Confucians would normally deal with such matters, it would not be impossible to find analogies to Leibniz’s formulation in Neo-Confucian writings. Moreover, as we shall see, many of these questions of divine-world relations have become a perennial aspect of contemporary Confucian Christian dialogue.

What is even more fascinating is how well Leibniz actually deduces the Neo-Confucian interpretation of what he calls spiritual substances. We must remember here that Leibniz is working from the materials sent to him by the Jesuits, and they often presumed that the Neo-Confucians were atheistic materialists. Leibniz wrote (Ching and Oxtoby 1992: 87ff; 89) “Initially, one may doubt whether the Chinese
recognize, or have recognized, spiritual substances. But after thinking hard about it, I judge that they did, although perhaps they did not recognize these substances as separate, that is, existing quite apart from matter." Leibniz then goes on to give an account of how he understands the Neo-Confucian philosophical discussion of the *li*-*qi* dyad, no doubt the signature cosmological and axiological theory debate internal to the Neo-Confucian would of discourse. *Li* is often translate as pattern, order, cosmic principle, and coherent principle or texture and *qi* (which almost defies translation into even multiple English terms) as vital energy or configurational force in terms of the Neo-Confucian philosophical debates.

What is so absorbing in reading Leibniz is that he intuitively understood the profundity of the Neo-Confucian debate that swirled for centuries (and continues today) around the correct understanding of the *li*-qi interaction. Aquinas once argued that a philosopher or philosophical theologian had a special obligation in discussing the work of other thinkers. Not only did the scholar need honestly need to describe the work of others even when in disagreement, but that this description must be based on the best possible interpretation of the other position. Aquinas even went so far as to argue that if the critical scholar could think of a better defense of the other position, then the scholar must provide this improved version of the material under debate. This is precisely what strikes a modern reader of Leibniz. Perhaps because of his detachment form the China mission field he as able to more dispassionately analyze the Neo-Confucian worldview. It is probably not an exaggeration to state that no European thinker gave his readers a better or more sophisticated reading of the Confucian and Neo-Confucian philosophical world than Leibniz until well into the 20th Century. It took hundreds of years for European scholars to catch up with Leibniz’s brilliant dialogue with the Confucians of Ming-Qing China.

While it is now clear that the general early modern European enthusiasm for Confucianism waned by the end of the 18th Century and the beginning of the 19th Centuries as witness in the negative opinions of great philosophers such as Kant and Hegel, in the early part of the 18th Century Christian Wolff continued the work of Leibniz in two fascinating short essays (Ching and Oxtoby 1992), *Discourse on the Practical Philosophy of the Chinese* (1721-1726) and *On the Philosopher King and Ruling Philosopher*. As Wolff explained, these two texts caused him a number of problems in the republic of letters of his day. Defending what Wolff took to be the just appreciation of Confucian philosophy did not sit well with more conservative Protestant and Roman Catholic thinkers.

While Leibniz was especially famous for his interpretation of the philosophy and philosophical theology of the Confucians and Neo-Confucians, Wolff rightly chose to write about the practical and ethical aspects of the Confucian Way. In this regard Wolff demonstrated as much foresight as his older colleague Leibniz (Ching and Oxtoby: 1992). Whatever else Confucianism may be, it is certainly a form of personal and social ethics as well as an extended reflection on statecraft. In Chinese this is summarized by the formula of *neisheng waiwang* 内聖外王 or the sage within, the king without. This means that an authentic Confucian must cultivate the sagely mind-heart as a person and share this learning with the larger social world. As Wolff noted
this meant that ultimately there should be the conjunction of the philosopher and ruler, the dream of the philosopher king that was as old in the European tradition as it was in the Confucian Way.

XI. The Modern Globalization of Confucianism

We can distinguish two phases of the modern globalization of Confucianism. The first modern phase covers the first sixty or seventy years of the 20th Century. It was a paradoxical and difficult period for the Confucian Way: on the one hand by the 1920s the traditional Confucian order had been swept away from the modernizing zeal of the early Chinese republic. Moreover, a great deal of public discourse was directed against “Confucius and Sons” as a major reason for China’s humiliating lack of self-respect as being demoted to an era of semi-colonialism. Confucianism was a ready target for a great deal of social and intellectual anger, and much of it may have been deserved. But on the other hand, by the 1920s, there was a small group of public intellectuals and scholars who argued that while Confucians may have made many grave mistakes in China’s failed attempt to modernize and compete with the European powers, there was really still something worth saving from traditional China’s long cultural history. One of the things worth saving was, albeit clearly in a very reformed modality, the Confucian Way.

While there was little sense of cohesion or group identity among these defenders of the restoration and reform of the Confucian Way in the 1920-30s, a group of scholars who would later be known as the New Confucians were beginning the task of the hermeneutics of retrieval. As John Makeham (2003a, 2008) has argued, the term New Confucian is a retroactive designation, even though, in hindsight, it does make sense in defining the contemporary revival of Confucianism. By the 21st Century, the New Confucians are seen to have a genealogy, one that now spans three or four generations depending on how the movement as a whole is defined. But not everyone often included in the list of New Confucians is entirely happy with this assigned role. For instance, the highly influential historian and former student of the eminent Qian Mu, Professor Yu Yingshi, resolutely refuses to be linked to the New Confucians, and adamantly rebuffs the claim that Qian was a willing co-founder of New Confucianism. Professor Yu’s point is that he and his teacher were and are historians and not speculative philosophers as are the bulk of the members of the New Confucian Movement. This is a worthy caution from Professor Yu. It demonstrates that the borders of New Confucianism are porous and the boundaries are constantly subject to revision and debate.

If we are seeking a date to attach to the emergence of the New Confucian movement, 1958 is often the preferred date. Of course, as historians of the new movement such as Makeham (2008), Metzger (2005) and Bresciani (2001) point out there was a lot going on prior to 1958. However it is also clear now that it was not until well after 1958 that the New Confucian movement gained the kind of momentum it has sustained since the mid-1980s in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Chinese Diaspora and now in the Peoples Republic of China. In late 1957 a group of distinguished Chinese scholars, Carsun Chang (Zhang Junmai), Tang Junyi, Xu
Fuguan and Mou Zongsan, drafted and published on 1 January 1958 an essay about the future of Chinese culture (Chang 1957-62, 2: 455-483), namely “A Manifesto for a Re-Appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture.” The ambitious aim of the four refugee authors was to (1) counteract what they believed to be a biased and truncated Western interpretation of Chinese philosophical and cultural history and (2) to encourage scholars to engage in a revival, revision and reform of Chinese culture. While the authors were ecumenical in their appeal, mentioning the role of Daoism, Buddhism and even Christianity in China’s long history, it was obvious that it was Confucianism that they considered to be the linchpin of Chinese civilization. It was this vastly sedimented Confucian tradition that they sought to rescue from the scrap heap of history. We must remember that when they wrote this manifesto many people, even with deep sorrow, had come to believe that Confucianism, like other traditional forms of life (Levenson 1968), was now dead and could only be preserved in the museum of intellectual history. There was simply no future for the Confucian way in any form whatsoever in modern China. The death of Confucianism, as they say, was reportedly very prematurely.

XII. New and Global Confucianism Case Studies: The Actors

While the date of the 1958 publication of “The Manifesto for a Re-Appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture” makes sense retrospectively, the genealogy of the New Confucian movement goes farther back in time. Moreover, genealogy matters in this case. Not should this come as any surprise to a student of Confucian intellectual history. One of the ways that the tradition has described itself especially since the Song dynasty has been to construct meta-narratives about the Transmission of the Way daotong 道統.

The most famous account of the Transmission of the Way, of course, is the catalog constructed by Zhu Xi. Of course Zhu accepts that there was a line of sages from the early culture heroes through the founders of the various early dynasties, including the founders of the Zhou dynasty. After these remarkable early sages we find the figures of Kongzi and Mengzi as defenders of the Confucian Way. But it is at this point the story takes a turn that not everyone can countenance. Zhu argues that while Confucian Way, “this culture of ours” siwen 斯文, never completely disappears, for the next centuries it becomes somewhat obscured in the sense that figures such as Xunzi, Dong Zongshu, Han Yu and Li Ao did not fully grasp the richness of the inheritance of Kongzi and Mengzi. In fact, Xunzi, faulted for contradicting the Second Sage with his misguided chapter claiming that human nature of odious or perverse, was banished from the mainstream of the Confucian Way.

However, the tide turned and with the work of Zhu's beloved Northern Song masters, the authentic Confucian Way was rediscovered and revived, and even made clearer than it had been for centuries. These masters were Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi. What Zhu then argued is that if a scholar understood the teachings of these masters then such a student could engage a true teaching of the Confucian Way. Of course there were many scholars who were skeptical of the very
notion that something as vast and all encompassing as the Confucian Way could have simply been misplaced since the end of the Warring States period until the Northern Song. And even among Confucians who sympathized with the Confucian revival that occurred during the Northern Song, there could be great debate about just who actually should be counted on to carry forward the transmission of the Way.

This was not just an empty debate among scholars because these genealogical claims would involve the oversight and confirmation of the emperor. It was even ironic that Zhu Xi, the author of the account of the transmission of the way, died in disfavor and his version of the dao tong, which he called dao xue 道學, was condemned not as the orthodox teaching but as a spurious teaching, a wei xue 偽學. There is an added irony in this condemnation of Zhu’s account in that it used the term wei 偽, which of course has been Xunzi’s favored technique for constituting the Confucian Dao. However, the condemnation was short lived and by a few decades after his death Zhu Xi was restored to favor and his account became more and more accepted as the correct way to understand the development of Confucianism from the Northern Song on. It was finally the Mongol Yuan dynasty that officially made Zhu’s dao tong and his dao xue the orthodox imperial teaching; this was an imperial imprimatur that would last till 1905 when the Qing court formally disestablished Zhu’s educational program.

According to the four authors of the 1958 Manifesto there was already a revived transmission of the way to be found among Confucian scholars since the 1920s. Depending on how one reads the history of the rise of New Confucianism the movement has at least three and now probably four generations to its credit. The first generation was a small band of scholars who sought to defend the Confucian tradition from what they saw as the tide of complete Westernization. It is important to remember that these founding fathers of New Confucianism were neither deaf to nor unaware of the problems that had befallen late imperial Confucian thought. They, along with the fierce critics of the shop of Confucius and Sons, realized that it was a tradition in need of a massive overhaul if it were to survive in the modern world.

They were emboldened in their work by a number of events and intellectual movements of their time. The first was the shock of the First World War. It was suddenly clear that not all was well with the seemingly impervious edifice of Western civilization. The left wing of the critics of China’s past moved quickly to embrace Marxism as an antidote to both the ills of China and of the modern world as well. The more conservative liberal wing, represented by scholars such as Hu Shi, urged a more moderate adoption of liberal Western democracy on the American and English model and the manifest benefits of modern science and technology. Here Confucianism would still be relegated to a place in the museum of Chinese intellectual history and would not be expected to contribute to the renewal of China in the 20th Century. Not without good reason many New Confucians agreed with at least part of the liberal agenda, namely the need for the Confucian embrace of democracy and science.

Another feature of the New Confucian defense of Chinese culture and the central role in this long cultural history of Confucianism was an account of the virtues of Eastern philosophy. While recognizing the worth of Western culture and philosophy,
some bold scholars argued that Eastern philosophy had many positive things to recommend it, and in fact that a new global or world civilization would do well to adopt aspects of the Confucian Way. Liang Shuming (1893-1988) wrote an important work, *Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies* in 1921 that started a heated and long running debate on the positive and negative features of Eastern and Western thought (Bresciani 2001, 14-16). Another young philosopher, Zhang Junmai (1886-1969), joined the fray by engaging in a debate about the relative merits of metaphysics and science. It is not clear that these early scholars thought of themselves as New Confucians, though they are now clearly some of the founders of the various streams of thought that have flowed into the river of New Confucianism.

But, as historians of New Confucianism argue, there was already a beginning of the New Confucian movement contemporaneous with the debates engendered by young scholars such as Liang and Zhang.

In ironic reversal, the globalization of Confucianism now returns to China and the cast of scholars in the New Confucian movement. As we shall see later, there is yet another turn of the wheel and a group of Euro-American scholars now joined luminaries such as the Jesuit scholar-missionaries, Leibniz, and Wolff in a renewed globalization process. But none of this would have happened without the profound contribution of the early 20th Century scholars now counted among the New Confucians. In an interesting twist of fate, the New Confucians and Western scholars of the Confucian revival took up the kind of speculative philosophical work pioneered by Leibniz and Wolff.

The notion of New Confucianism has become as contested and interrogated as Zhu Xi’s Southern Song theory of the authentic “Transmission of the Way.” There is a striking parallel in the debate about, for instance, who constitutes the membership of the New Confucian movement. Again, just as with Zhu Xi, one version of the story of the development of New Confucianism focuses on philosophical issues, often at the expense, as its critics would argue, of other aspects of the general history and philosophical sensibility of Song and post-Song Confucianism. The case of Qian Mu is a good illustration of the intellectual debates at play in the rise and cataloguing of the membership lists of New Confucianism. First, Qian Mu did not sign the famous 1958 Manifesto. But of course, many other Confucian scholars did not sign it as well. But the point, so aptly and forcefully defended by Qian’s erudite student Yu Yingshi, is that there was a reason why Qian should not be counted among the New Confucians.

This reason, according to Professor Yu, is that Qian Mu is first and foremost a historian and not a philosopher. While some may quibble with Yu’s firm distinction between philosophy and history, the point is one that has become an important

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10 In terms of chronicling the history of the rise of the New Confucian movement, Bresciani (2001) has provided a highly useful general account along with chapters outlining the philosophical contributions of the various members of family of the New Confucians.

11 It is certainly entirely plausible to say that Qian Mu was a great intellectual historian with a keen interest in Confucian philosophy among other things. As with all great intellectual
debating point in the study of Confucian intellectual history. The argument goes back to the Song Neo-Confucian revival. The kernel of the debate is the assertion that Zhu Xi and his fellow daoxue colleagues selected and valorized a vision of Confucian intellectual history that was biased towards the contributions of the Northern and Southern Song intellectuals scene provided by scholars primarily interested in philosophical questions. For instance, in Zhu’s and Lü Zuqian’s (呂祖謙) famous anthology, Jinsi lu/Reflections on Things at Hand, included only a select few Northern Song thinkers, namely Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi. Equally great philosophers such as Shao Yong and members of the Hu School are excluded. Also excluded are famous scholars, poets, historians and public intellectuals and political figures such as Sima Guang, Su Shi, Ouyang Shu and Wang Anshi—just to mention a few immensely important Confucians not to make it into the anthology. Although there were complex reasons for Zhu and Lü’s selection matrix, it is clear to modern scholars that the two friends selected Northern Song figures who exclusively belonged to the most philosophically inclined membership of that outstanding generation of Confucians intellectuals.

A common complaint about the emerging account of the genealogy of New Confucianism is that it, like its Song predecessors, privileges philosophers as the leaders of the movement. Therefore scholars such as Professor Yu argue that his teacher Qian Mu should not be included in this highly self-selecting group of modern Confucian philosophers. This is an important point. However, it is still possible to take a more irenic position on New Confucianism. If we take New Confucianism, like its Neo-Confucian forbears, to include a much richer cast of characters than those Zhu Xi singled out for being part of the dao tong, then we can include and discuss a wide-ranging group of contemporary scholars. For instance, we can provisionally grant Professor Yu’s assessment that Qian Mu was not a New Confucian if we hold that to be a New Confucian means to support a particular philosophical position and at the same time note that Qian Mu was part and parcel of the larger revival of interest in Confucian studies in the 20th Century. No one has done more to restore and renew the study and appreciation of Zhu Xi’s epic philosophical synthesis that Qian Mu. Moreover, Qian did this in spite of the fact that Zhu Xi’s daoxue was not the favored expression of the authentic Confucian worldview according to the majority of those within the fellowship of New Confucianism. Rather, most New Confucians were partial to other Neo-Confucian luminaries such as Lu Xiangshan, He Wufeng, Liu Zongzhou and Wang Yangming. It is actually refreshing to read Qian Mu’s positive appreciation of Zhu Xi’s philosophy. Therefore we can have multiple accounts of who does or does not count as a New Confucian. For the purposes of this exercise we will stay with those who embrace, at least, the role of philosopher.

historians, they sometimes cheerfully and learnedly comment on and take part in philosophical debates while never abandoning their role as a historian.

12 Feng Youlan also tended to follow Zhu Xi in the elaboration of his own philosophical writings in the 1930s and 40s.

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What is also noteworthy about the New Confucians is their cosmopolitan stance in terms of global philosophy. Most of them either studied in Europe and North America or studied Western philosophy with great care in China. A good example is Mou Zongsan, often considered the outstanding original speculative philosopher of the second generation of New Confucians. While Mou did not study outside of China, he was a profound student of Western philosophy and was the translator of a significant selection of Kant’s corpus into Chinese, along with strong interests in Whitehead, Russell, Heidegger and Husserl. Mou also reworked the history of Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism and in the last phase of his intellectual journey he engaged most seriously with Chinese Buddhism, especially with Tiantai thought.

It is clear that the revival of Confucianism today in many ways resembles the Song era. While there is a sustained interest in reviving Confucian philosophy, the philosophers have been joined, as the 20th Century passed into the 21st Century, by social theorists and ethical reformers. This makes a great deal of sense given the previous history of Confucianism. The Rudaow has never been exclusively about philosophical matters. The heart and soul of the tradition has always been, as were so many of the founding classical schools of thought in the Warring States period, about guiding the conduct of life. Philosophy per se has a role to play but is never merely academic or technical in nature. In one of the most concise discussions of the emerging genealogy of New Confucianism, Liu Shuxian (2003b) provides an influential account of this debate. It is always about how to live life, and for a Confucian, living life is always about both personal edification that is always in service to the family, community, state, environment and world. However, in order to focus the range of globalization, here we will primarily concentrate on the philosophical side of the revival.

If the flow of information about Confucianism was from China to Europe on the early modern period the reverse was true for the 20th Century. It was during this tumultuous century that Chinese Confucian intellectuals came to terms with the influx of Western philosophy, science, technology and social theories. It was the century of Chinese semi-colonialism and also of China’s greatest modern revolutions. After the death of Mao the Confucian tradition began its comeback in Mainland China as well as in Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Singapore and the rest of what Tu Weiming has called cultural China. It was here that the fruits of the first and second generation of the New Confucians began to have a major impact.

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13 Makeham (2008) has a discussion not only of the philosophers most closely identified with the rise of New Confucianism but also the other voices that have emerged in contemporary Chinese academic discourse. Liu Shuxian (2003b) provides a similar account, but from the perspective of one of the most recognized of the third generation of New Confucian philosophers and intellectual historians.

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XIII. The Genealogy of the New Confucian Movement

Although it is true that hindsight is always clearer than contemporary vision, the New Confucians have crafted an account of the generational chronology of the revival begun in the early part of the 20th Century. It should go without saying that this is, as we have already seen, a contested vision. Who belongs in New Confucianism depends on whom you ask and what their working definition of the movement is. However, even if they would argue with substance of the sense of membership, the following has emerged as a fairly standard account.

There are now three or four generations depending on how to affiliate different scholars with different students. Bresciani (2001: 34ff) has a chart where he outlines the first three generations of the most famous of the philosophical wing of New Confucianism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Generation (1921-1949)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liang Shuming (1893-1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Yifu (1883-1968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiong Shili (1885-1968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Junmai (1886-1969)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feng Youlan (1895-1900)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He Lin (1902-1992)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Second Generation (1950-1979 [1995])</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fang Dongmei (1899-1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tang Junyi (1906-1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xu Fuguan (1903-1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mou Zongsan (1909-1995)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third Generation (1980—)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cheng Zhongying (1935—)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Shuxian (1934—)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Du (Tu)Weiming et al (1940—)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Missing from Bresciani’s original list is the combination of Qian Mu (1895-1990) and Yu Yingshi (1930—) representing a distinct line of intellectual historians. No one has done more in many respects in helping to understand and redefine the path of the philosophical New Confucians. While historians are never value free, they do often decline to take a partisan stand in support of a particular philosophical position or school. This is the case for Qian and Yu. In fact, the distinction between historians and philosophers will play itself out in even more detail is the presentation of the third and fourth generations of the contemporary revival of Confucianism. Bresciani’s presentation actually conforms to the way critical scholars have told the story of how the New Confucians themselves tell the story of their origins. For instance, in the first generation all the scholars knew each other, though there were no direct teacher-student relationships.

It is in the second generation that we can talk about a rising school, though again this is now more obvious in retrospective than it was at the time. Here we find the pivotal figure of Xiong Shili being a teacher of Tang, Fu and Mou. The third generation of philosophers all had various teacher-student links to the other second-generation masters and are also all well known to each other. They were also the
teachers who in turn have trained many new students over the last decades of the 20th Century and the first two decades of the 21st Century.

There is also now a fourth generation emerging. These would be the students of the third generation. These generational matches can be somewhat tricky, as would be obvious by looking at the dates of the first and second generation as well. For instance, I was a student of Du [Tu] Weiming’s at Berkeley and had the honor of meeting with Mou Zongsan in Hong Kong in the 1970s. Does this make me a third generation or a fourth generation New Confucian (albeit a Boston New Confucian)? Or are there scholars to be found in both the third and further generation? This is probably the case with any post-factor genealogy. What is clear is that a great deal of mutual influencing and even teaching and study has gone on between the various peer groups of the New Confucians, precisely the multi-generational philosophical cohort that is now globalizing the Confucian Way.

The diversity of the third and fourth generations of the revival is more and more manifest. In some respects the work of current Confucian scholars bears a fascinating parallelism to the rise and diversification of the Song tradition. Of course, following Zhu Xi’s philosophical reconstruction of the work of the Northern Song masters, it would appear that one of the most important features of the Song revival was philosophical in nature. However, it is equally clear that the Song revival included the great political reforms of Wang Anshi, the Buddhist-influenced poetry of Su Shi and the history and ritual works of Ouyang Xiu and Sima Guang. One of the most noteworthy aspects of the contemporary revival from the late 1990s on has been the emergence of Confucian intellectuals who believe strongly that no Confucianism worthy of the name can escape social and political engagement. In fact some scholars go so far as to argue that without political theories and ritual revivals the philosophical work would not be faithful to the long history of Confucian theory and praxis, especially the praxis of shared social life. Of course Liang Shuming, sometimes referred to as the last Confucian, would have agreed with the critique of a purely academic form of philosophical Confucianism as being a highly truncated ideal for the Confucian Way. Liang was as justly famous for his rural development work as he was for his speculative scholarship.

Therefore any consideration of the globalization of Confucianism from the 2010s ought to reflect on the whole range of contemporary Confucian discourse, both philosophical in the strict sense and also the extended elaboration and reconstitution of the tradition including ritual, social and political theory.

The argument is both direct and cogent considering the long stretch of Confucian theory and praxis. The critics of the philosophical New Confucians are at least twofold. First, there are those who hold a different view of the possible future philosophical development and renewal of Confucian thought from most of the first and second generation New Confucians. The criticism is that most of the philosophically inclined of the New Confucians lean in one direction, namely that of Liu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming, or what is called the School of Mind-Heart.
xinxue 心學 as opposed to other forms of Neo-Confucianism. 14 Second, and the more pressing criticism, is that it does not really matter in which direction the philosophical development of New Confucianism goes, whether a version of xinxue or Zhu Xi’s lixue 理學. What really ought to matter is a return to a revived and reconstructed Confucian praxis. Without attention to ritual and patterns of life li 禮 from the family to the state and even international world, Confucianism is not really Confucianism. It might well become a fascinating form of modern global philosophy, but it will not longer be a transformation of Confucianism but rather a Westernized version of some aspects of Confucian philosophy grafted onto Western patterns of thought.

One very important version of this cultural criticism is embedded in the reformed Confucian political thought of Jiang Qing 江慶. Jiang has developed a religious justification for his version of Confucianism in practice. For him Confucianism is “…the personal experience of spiritual beings and the sages (shensheng 神聖) and the expression of the way of heaven” (Makeham 2008; 263). 15 As Makeham explains Jiang’s position, only a revived Confucianism can provide the living mandate (shengming 生命) of a teaching worthy of being the national teaching guojiao 國教 of China. In order to give a proper direction to the revived Confucian Way Jiang argues that rather than following any of the Neo-Confucian paths of thought contemporary Confucians need to return to gongyangxue 公羊學 Gongyang Learning (an interpretation of Confucianism drawn from the political valences of the canonical Gongyang text). As many commentators have noted, Jiang’s contemporary Confucianism is more resolutely political and nationalistic in nature.

As Jiang has continued to work on his project he has even suggested a potential new Confucian style constitution for China. One of the most interesting features of this constitutional reform proposal is the suggestion that one of the main branches of government ought to be a house or chamber of Confucian scholars. First, the Confucian House would connect the modern Chinese state to its true foundation according to Jiang, namely the Confucian Way. Second, it would provide a place for intellectual and academic merit in government, something Jiang finds sorely lacking in many Western democratic states. Only Confucian scholars, Jiang believes, will have the breath of moral and historical vision to provide the necessary long-term

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14 I have often thought that this is one reason why Feng Youlan is not usually listed as one of the great first or second generation New Confucians. No one has done more to introduce Confucianism to the Western world than Feng through his highly influential histories of Chinese philosophy. Moreover Feng’s own philosophical work in the 1930s and 1940s envisioned New Confucianism in the style of Zhu Xi. Feng himself called his work xin lixue 新理學 or a new study of coherent principle. Feng certainly deserves to be considered a prime example of the globalization of Confucianism.

15 It is interesting to note that while Makeham chronicles all the various kinds of emerging trends in New Confucianism he is yet to be convinced of its enduring creativity—or advance over the kind of speculative philosophy that has dominated Confucian thought ever since the Song dynasty. Liu (2003b) presents the case for the enduring value of New Confucian speculative philosophy and sensibilities.
solutions to many of the modern problems of the age. For instance, the ecological crisis clearly demands intelligent and sustained analysis and programs to mitigate the damage done to the environment by rapid industrialization. This kind of deliberative action Jiang believes is precluded by a purely Western style democracy because the elected officials are rarely people of intelligence and learning; and moreover they spend most of their careers seeking to be re-elected than serving the long term needs of the people and the country.

Fan Ruiping (2010) provides an extended defense of this kind of renewed Confucian theory and praxis. Like Jiang, Fan argues that what is needed for a genuine Confucian revival is return to the classical sources of the Confucian tradition and not merely an extension of Neo-Confucian philosophy that so defines the New Confucian movement as a philosophical enterprise. Fan wants to find Confucian moral answers to contemporary issues that are not merely a pale form of Westernized liberal Confucianism. As an example Fan provides an analysis and suggested reforms for medical ethics and policies in contemporary China that are based on different principles than those defined by Western liberalism’s foundation based on human rights discourse. Fan urges more consideration of modern Confucian theories that take into account the role of the family in moral and social development and a healthy respect for deference based on merit and not momentary political appeal.

The kind of attraction of socially engaged scholars such as Jiang and Fan is that they are appealing to important aspects of the Confucian tradition; these socially connected development and political aspects are as vital and enduring as those of scholars such as, among others, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, A. S. Cua, Liu Shuxian and Du [Tu] Weiming discuss in terms of philosophy. But in terms of globalization, the whole question of 礼 is a highly tricky business. Rituals are very hard to transfer from one culture to another, although it can certainly be done over time with enough effort. For instance, Koreans point out that after the founding of the Choson dynasty in 1392 Korea became more wedded to Zhu Xi’s entire philosophical and social reform package than did Ming-Qing China. But it is harder to see how any massive importation of the full range of social, political and/or philosophical modern Confucianism will happen in the globalized world of the 21st Century. We will return to this issue below.

The case of Tang Junyi, one of the most important philosophically inclined second generation New Confucians, is instructive in terms of the globalization of Confucian philosophy per se. As with so many New Confucians, Tang combined a sense of profound connection to the myriad things and events of the world inspired by Mengzi’s classical sense of forming one body with the cosmos. To the end of his career Tang believed strongly and defended extensively the primordial Confucian sense of moral concern for the world and the reasons governing the world were intelligible. More than just intelligible, they were part of the spiritual tradition of Confucianism that ought to inform the revival of contemporary Confucianism.

In step with his colleague Feng Youlan, Tang first discovered how he might link his Confucian intellectual, social and moral commitments to global philosophy via reading the New Realism popular in American philosophical circles in the 1920s. Later, Tang would expand his reading to include Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Lotze, Paulsen...
and Royce. These Western thinkers joined his work on Buddhism and Neo-Confucians to a great synthesis of multicultural philosophy that is a fine representative of globalization. Tang also has a major impact on his good friend Mou Zongsan in the 1930s—so he functioned as a dialogue partner with other New Confucians and as a teacher of the third generation of New Confucian philosophers. As Thomas Metzger has perceptively remarked in his extended discussion of Tang’s life and work (2005), Tang was able to construct a form of globalized ontological idealism replete with a strong commitment to the enduring values of the Confucian Way.\textsuperscript{16}

Probably the most influential of the New Confucian philosophers was Mou Zongsan.\textsuperscript{17} If there ever was a global philosopher it is Mou. Early in his career he was fascinated by Whitehead’s process philosophy and its possible connections to the thought world of the \textit{Yijing}. But as every student of Mou knows, he then turned his attention to a life-long study of and philosophical dialogue with Kant. Later he included discussions of contemporary philosophers such as Husserl and Heidegger as well. But this was not all. After re-writing the entire history of the rise and development of Neo-Confucianism, Mou wrote extensively on Chinese Buddhism and made Tiantai thought an integral part of his later philosophical synthesis. In a single paragraph or page Mou will combine classical and Neo-Confucian philosophy with Tiantai speculations and the work of European philosophers. There is little doubt that more and more Western philosophers will become aware of his vast philosophical corpus in the years to come.

Given the great range of Mou’s work it is impossible to offer even a cursory summary of his work in a short space. Yet Mou himself explained in many of his books what he was seeking to achieve. He put his explanation in globalized terms via his engagement with Kant. As Mou argued at great length, if Kant has a metaphysics of morals the Confucian tradition is best understood as a contrasting moral metaphysics. By this Mou asserted that Confucianism (aided by Tiantai Buddhism in his case) could solve one of the main problems in Kantian philosophy, and by extension most of Western thought, namely the inability for the person to know things in themselves but only the phenomenal manifestation of things and not their noumenal reality. Mou thought that, when properly cultivated, Confucian thought allowed for true intellectual intuition that provides insight into and understanding of the noumenal reality of things-in-themselves. This would allow for Confucian philosophy to claim a holistic, realistic and creative understanding of the cosmos that embraces the moral, empirical and intellectual. It was a vast claim and there is a

\textsuperscript{16}As is the case with so many of the New Confucians, save for the third generation scholars who often publish in English, there is not a huge amount of material in Western languages on many of these figures. However, Metzger’s chapter in \textit{A Cloud Across the Pacific} (2005), pp. 185-290, functions as a monograph on Tang’s life and thought.

\textsuperscript{17}With a spate of recent publications about Mou in English (see Clower, Sernia Chan, and Billioud), French and German there is a chance for Western scholars to be able to gauge the rich scope of Mou’s achievement.
Along with the influence of the second generation of New Confucians, the continuing globalization of Confucianism also depends on the work of a group of Chinese and Western scholars such as Wm. Theodore de Bary, the late Wing-tsit Chan, Du [Tu] Weiming, Liu Shuxian, A. S. Cua, Cheng Chung-yeng, the late Julia Ching, John Makeham, Rodney Taylor, Umberto Breciani, Stephen Angle, Robert C. Neville, Henry Rosemont, the late David Hall, and Roger Ames, just to mention some of the more prolific scholars writing in English. The work of these scholars ranges from discussions of Confucian-Christian dialogue, the nature of Confucian and Neo-Confucian philosophy, the history of the development of New Confucianism, to individual reconstructions and elaborations of Confucianism and a global philosophy in the 21st Century.

The group can be divided into two main groups, namely the Chinese and the Western scholars. The Chinese scholars have been writing about this for the longer period, now spanning four decades. One very interesting feature of their work as a group is the affirmation of the religious nature or dimensions of the Confucian tradition. This actually follows the line of thinking affirmed by New Confucians such as Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi. It is an interesting point because as W. C. Smith once wrote, this is a question that has been considered very hard to answer in terms of the Confucian tradition if certain Western definitions of religions are used. However, like Herbert Fingarette’s (1972) memorable phrase, the secular is the sacred for Confucians. The social ethics and practices of self-cultivation according to this group of scholars do become a spiritual quest, even if it does not resemble any form of West Asian religious tradition. One of the ways to finesse this discussion is to say that Confucianism may not parallel West Asian religious worlds, but it does have religious and/or spiritual dimensions that inform the whole tradition from Kongzi to the modern revival of New Confucianism. For instance, Frederick Streng’s definition of religion as “ultimate transformation” captures a way to describe the Confucian commitment to a spiritual dimension of self-cultivation and the habits of the mind-heart. Another feature of their collective writings is the fact that along with proposing new forms for a revived Confucianism, they are also careful to provide historical accounts of the classical and Neo-Confucian traditions appropriate to a Western audience.

The Western scholars provide a similarly wide range of approaches to introducing Confucianism to a Euro-American audience. Some, such as Robert

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18 There is also growing interest about New Confucianism in Europe as well. A fine work in English that gives great insight into European scholarship is Billioud’s (2010) study of Mou Zongsan’s moral metaphysics.

19 With the notable exception of Wm. Theodore de Bary’s great contribution to Confucian studies that goes back now teaching at Columbia University in 1950; it is a career that continues till now (2012). Along with his friend the late Wing-tsit Chan, de Bary helped to introduce generations of Western readers to the classical and Neo-Confucian world.
Neville’s work on Boston Confucianism (2000; 2008) are a combination of a discussion of comparative issues in Confucian philosophy and religious thought embedded in Neville’s own creative speculative philosophy. The work of Stephen Angle (2009) and Roger Ames (2011) also present and commend a comprehensive view of Confucianism that both describes and commends the tradition. In terms that Lee Yearley has suggested, Neville, Angle and Ames both explain/explicate and elaborate the history of Confucianism within the matrix of defending their own philosophical interpretation of the tradition. In doing so they are very much globalizing the Confucian Way, albeit now from a Western perspective.

XV. Why the Globalization of Philosophy?

The focus of this account of the globalization of Confucianism has dealt primarily with the vicissitudes of its philosophical revival over three or four generations from the 1920s forward. The simple reason is that it was indeed a group of philosophers who played the primary initial role in the Confucian revival in the 20th Century. We can suspect that if the revival continues and bears fruit in Chinese and East Asian life, it will be possible that other domains of social and political life will be touched by New Confucian theory and praxis. As noted above, this is indeed beginning to happen. Some New Confucians are moving beyond the speculative philosophical roots of the revival. We now find more and more studies that touch upon the social sciences and Confucian impact and influences on more than just speculative philosophy. Confucians, as we have seen above, are thinking about art, the economy and politics as well as more purely philosophical issues.20

Moreover there are, even within the academic realm, other avenues of transmission. For instance, the Chinese government, in cooperation with Chinese universities, has been establishing Confucius Institutes around the world. These institutes do not promote Confucianism per se but rather encourage a whole range of engagement with the world of modern China, including historical studies, language training, cultural and artistic exchanges. It is emblematic of the changing fortunes of Confucianism that the Chinese government has chosen to call the vehicles for this work Confucius Institutes. There are also new institutions such as the Nishan Forum on World Civilizations in China that promote Confucian studies. The Nishan Forum takes as one of its primary tasks the organization of dialogues between Confucianism and the religions of the world in order to promote understanding between religions and spiritual traditions. It is hoped that such dialogues will lead to a more harmonious world culture. The Nishan Forum goes about its work by organizing large conferences

20For a good example of the emerging social science approach to these issues see Yang and Tamney’s new work (2012). Yang Fenggang has helped to pioneer the ongoing sociological study of Confucianism for instance. Fan Ruiping (2010) provides a cogent examination of the political, moral, ethical and ritual dimensions of a reconstituted Confucianism that is critical of the group of philosophers identified as the New Confucian school but very much in support of a reconstituted Confucianism taking a role in the globalization of modern philosophy.

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as well as more focused and specialized educational seminars dealing with various aspects of the Confucian tradition.

Yet the philosophical project has been and continues to be one of the major exports of a globalizing New Confucianism to date. There are a number of reasons for this. As we have noted, New Confucianism was founded by philosophers and public intellectuals and the philosophical revival and discourse has continued unabated now for four generations. But there is yet another reason that can be advanced based on the nature of philosophical discourse itself. Philosophy, for better or worse, is abstract in nature, even in its most rhetorical and metaphorical moments. It is based on second order reflection on the nature of things. Whereas a novelist, either Chinese or Western, will tell the complicated story of the loves and tragedies of a variety of characters, a philosopher will ask a more abstract set of questions, namely what is the nature of human nature, how can we know it, and how can we interpret what we purport to know about human nature, and ultimately, what does it matter that we think in this fashion at all? What is the best dao to follow in the conduct of life? Of course the questions posed by a philosopher will depend on the historical tradition that the philosopher embraces. Chinese philosophy will ask a different set of questions than those normal in Western circles, though Chinese philosophers have uniformly been more influenced by Western concerns than the other way around. Western philosophers are just now beginning to become aware of the scope of Chinese philosophy in general and Confucianism in particular.

The abstract aspects of philosophical discourse make it both hard to transmit from culture to culture and yet it is something that also facilitates such a global transmission. The very abstract nature allows for us to discover if we are really talking about apples and oranges when we are in Beijing or Shanghai, Boston or London. Of course this account rests on the hypothesis that human beings are going to view and speak about the world using a fairly regular sorts of mental processes based on a fairly regular set of sense organs. Whereas the fact of globalization now precludes any easy discussion of universal human traits as defined by just one cultural area, it does necessarily make the cross-cultural philosophical conversation richer because of its diversity. Philosophers ask how the abstractive nature of their discourse can facilitate globalization. But globalization does not mean uniformity however. As Kongzi commented so long ago, he er butong 和 而 不同 harmony in the sense of mutual respect for the dialogue partners but not uniformity in questions, methodology or even goals. This insight holds true today. We can seek a kind of harmony that may glide along almost unnoticed as one of the ramifications of globalization. People talk with each other, write about each other, and ponder each other’s actions, thoughts, passions and motives. They learn to communicate better and better, and sometimes find this an enriching and even pleasant process.

Buddhism as a world (globalized) religion is a case in point. As Buddhism moved into China it first was meet with a great deal of incomprehension. Early thinkers speculated that Buddhism was really a strange form of Indian Daoism based on the legend that when Laozi left China he travelled west and hence Buddhism was how the Indians understood the Daodejing. The Chinese rapidly figured out that
Buddhism was not Daoism but something entirely new in the world of Chinese philosophy and religion. Over the centuries a distinctive form of Buddhism with Chinese characteristics arose and flourished. Along with Confucianism Buddhism continues it globalization today as the most rapidly growing religion in North America. Christianity appears to be growing in China also at a rapid rate. Religion is definitely not just philosophy but religious people are drawn to philosophy as moth to the flame. Frederick Streng (1985), in a most economical and yet ecumenical fashion, defined religion as “ultimate transformation.” Philosophers, of course, will by their very inquisitive natures, want to ask the saint, guru, avatar, mendicant, nun or sage just what she or he means by the ‘ultimate’ and ‘transformation’. The Buddha would often chide philosophers for asking questions that do not conduce to liberation from the toils of illusion, but he too gave what can fairly be construed as philosophical responses to some kinds of queries.

Extrapolating from the example of Buddhism in China, what is the future of a globalized Confucianism? Actually we already know that the globalization has happened before and is continuing to happen. An example is the profound globalization of the philosophies of Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi—among many others of their generation and later generations of scholars, now on both sides of the Pacific. Both of these celebrated thinkers of the second generation of New Confucianism were profoundly committed to the revival of Confucianism in the modern world. Moreover, as we have seen, both scholars were equally committed to a careful and sustained engagement with Western philosophy. Through translations of their own works and the ongoing influence of their students, Confucianism is becoming globalized beyond its traditional East Asian world.

Of course being abstract philosophy is not some kind of conceptual panacea. Mistakes can and are made. The history of the interpretation from the time Jesuits in the 17th Century down to the modern era is littered with blunders. Easy assumptions were and are made about how to define terms and translate them across and between cultures. Is xìng 性 really ‘human nature’? And which of the many Confucian views of human nature are we talking about because there are surely as rich a plethora of definitions of human nature in the history of Western philosophy as there are in Chinese intellectual history. Just because Zhu Xi thought that xìng was intertwined in the texture of being human as li 理 does not bring more clarity—it merely complicates the discussion. Yet the vague, general and abstract nature of philosophical discourse about topics like human nature allows for a conversation to begin. Of course there will be transformations. Such was the case of Buddhism in China. Yet the transformations that produced Tiantai and Huayan Buddhism were remarkable examples of the globalization of a highly complex religio-philosophical tradition moving from one culture to another.

What will be the transformations, the transitions, the transmissions of the Rudao 儒道 in China? No one now knows because the question of the future of Confucianism boils with a new intensity. Will there be something like Boston Confucianism? What could the dialogue across the Pacific possibly become? Nonetheless, the dialogue will, if it happens, be part of the ongoing process of globalization.

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