MEANING, RECEPTION, AND THE USE OF CLASSICS:
THEORITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN A CHINESE CONTEXT

Zhang Longxi

Abstract: Reception seems to have invigorated classic studies and become a major way to talk about the history and function of classics in the past and in our own time. Reception theory maintains that meaning is always mediated, and that there is no originary moment when the classics are what they “really are” before any reading and interpretation. In the history of reception, classics have indeed been interpreted from different ideological and political stances and made use of in different time periods. Facing the various uses of classics, some of which evidently deviate from the textual meaning in an allegorical interpretation, it becomes a significant problem—how does one define the validity of interpretation and guard against “overinterpretation” (Umberto Eco) or “hermeneutic nihilism” (H. G. Gadamer)? This paper will discuss such theoretical issues in the context of Chinese reading and commentaries on the classics, both Chinese and Western, and suggest a way to reach a balance between the classics and their interpretations.

I. Reception Theory and Classical Studies

According to Charles Martindale, Professor of Latin at the University of Bristol, reception theory has invigorated the study of Greek and Roman classics in the UK and the US, with such academic indicators as conference panels and course offerings on both undergraduate and postgraduate levels, as a special category set up for the purpose of research assessment of classical studies, and as publisher’s requirement of a substantial reception element to be included in such book series as Cambridge Companions to ancient authors, etc. The adaptation of reception theory, says Martindale, has become “perhaps the fastest-growing area of the subject” since the early 1990s.1 As he acknowledges, reception theory originated in Hans Robert Jauss’ argument for a paradigmatic change in the study of literary history, his plea for paying critical attention to the historicity of interpretation or what he called Rezeptionsästhetik, which in turn owes a great deal to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, particularly the concept of the “fusion of horizons.”2 If we look at reception theory and indeed Gadamerian hermeneutics in the context of 20th-century intellectual history, we may see that they form part of the general tendency in the postwar world towards a more open and more self-consciously historical perspective that moves away from the 19th-century positivistic beliefs in the objectivity, progress, and scientific truth in human understanding and knowledge. “Understanding is not, in fact, understanding

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better,” as Gadamer puts it. “It is enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all.” This remark clearly indicates the shift of emphasis in modern hermeneutics from a stable meaning in a correct understanding based on the recovery of the authorial intention to the variability of meaning based on the diversity of subjective perspectives or horizons. People understand differently because they have different subjective positions, and recognition of the important role played by that subjectivity necessarily leads to the recognition of the reader’s or the spectator’s function in making sense in understanding and interpretation.

In Jauss’ argument, a literary work is “not an object that stands by itself and that offers the same view to each reader in each period,” but it is “much more like an orchestration that strikes ever new resonances among its readers and that frees the text from the material of the words and brings it to a contemporary existence.” The idea that a literary work is not immobile, but always changing in the aesthetic experience of reading as a “contemporary existence,” can be traced to Gadamer’s discussion of the work of art as play, which is always a “presentation for an audience.” Reception theory can be said to have built on Gadamer’s understanding of art as play and the experience of art as participation, on the concept of “contemporaneity,” which means, as Gadamer explains, “that in its presentation this particular thing that presents itself to us achieves full presence, however remote its origin may be. Thus contemporaneity is not a mode of givenness in consciousness, but a task for consciousness and an achievement that is demanded of it.” That is to say, in a spectator’s or a reader’s aesthetic experience, the work of art achieves full presence in the consciousness and becomes something that exists at the present moment, “contemporaneous” with the reader’s consciousness, even though the work itself may originate in a remote past. From this we may conclude that meaning of a literary work or a classic is always the merging of what the work says and what the reader understands it as saying in the contemporary situation, a Gadamerian “fusion of horizons.” The study of reception is thus the study of how the fusion of horizons happens in the reading of a classic, and how the changes of horizons constitute the history of a classic’s reading and interpretation. Reception acknowledges the historicity of understanding, and sees all texts, including the classics, as having their meaning generated in the encounter between the text and the reader.

Precisely on the concept of the classical, however, Jauss parted company with Gadamer. For Gadamer, the classical is “something raised above the vicissitudes of changing times and changing tastes.” Here a crucial element of textual constancy or normative sense is introduced in the understanding of classics beyond changing tastes and trends. “What we call ‘classical’ does not first require the overcoming of historical distance, for in its own constant mediation it overcomes this distance by itself. The classical,” says Gadamer in a significant paradox, “is certainly ‘timeless,’ but this timelessness is a mode of

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3Ibid., pp. 296-97.
5Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 109; emphasis in the original.
6Ibid., p. 127.
7Ibid., p. 288.
historical being.”

If Gadamer’s rehabilitation of “prejudice” makes many to think of him as a radical relativist, then, his concept of the “timeless classical” seems to make him to look like a conservative traditionalist, but of course both views are mistaken, for “prejudice” is just “pre-judgment” or what Heidegger calls “the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself,” the very horizon we bring to all understanding, the start of the hermeneutic circle, which contains “a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing.”

As for the timeless classic, Gadamer consciously stands in a long tradition in biblical hermeneutics from St. Augustine to Thomas Aquinas to Martin Luther, which maintains that the scripture, or in this case the classical, as Gadamer quotes Hegel as saying, is “that which is self-significant (selbst bedeutende) and hence also self-interpretive (selbst Deutende).” This is not a conservative statement about the timeless classic based on a constant and universal human nature, but a crucial concept of textual integrity that has the power to oppose obfuscating and dogmatic commentaries, as can be seen in Luther’s proposal of a radically new understanding of the Bible vis-à-vis Catholic exegeses. I shall come back to this important point later, but Jauss does not like the idea of “timelessness” and believes that such a concept “falls out of the relationship of question and answer that is constitutive of all historical tradition.”

Martindale, who follows Jauss closely, likewise emphasizes the changing meaning of the classics and dismisses the idea of an original, recoverable meaning. “The desire to experience, say, Homer in himself untouched by any taint of modernity,” says Martindale, “is part of the pathology of many classicists, but it is a deluded desire.” Sappho provides yet another example. We know very little about the life of Sappho, but modern critics have understood her as a lesbian. Since we cannot get rid of our modern concept and cannot think otherwise, says Martindale, “why should we seek to pretend otherwise? Whatever the case in Archaic Lesbos, the certainty is that Sappho is now a lesbian (as Emily Wilson wittily puts it, ‘it is only a slight exaggeration to say that Baudelaire, through Sappho, invented modern lesbianism, and Swinburne brought it to England’). Should we give up all this richness—in exchange for little or nothing?”

There may be some tension between “whatever the case in Archaic Lesbos” and the modern conviction that “Sappho is now a lesbian,” but for Martindale, the former is elusive and forever lost, while the latter is “the certainty” achieved in modern criticism despite its 19th-century provenance. There seems a clear privileging of the modern and modern understanding over whatever the ancient condition and its texts might be. In this sense, reception theory puts more emphasis on the reader and the reader’s present situation than anything else.

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8Ibid., p. 290.
11Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, p. 30.
13Ibid., p. 12.
Modern subjectivity gets an even stronger confirmation in William Batstone’s remark that “we cannot understand what we do not understand, and so, when we come to understanding (of any thing, of the other) we come to self-understanding.” That seems a very strong endorsement of the circularity of the hermeneutic circle, but if all understanding is self-understanding, is there any criterion outside the interiority of the hermeneutic circle, by which we may judge one understanding from the next in terms of persuasiveness or validity? What would be the legitimate ground for differentiating various understandings and interpretations? Or has reception theory with its emphasis on the constructedness of meaning eschewed that question altogether? Batstone brings up the political dimension of this issue when he deliberately asks: “How might Goebbels or Mussolini or even Stauffenberg figure within the claim that Virgil can only be what readers have made of him? These readers require an oppositional reading, a reading that suppresses their ambitions.” He puts it provocatively, saying that “Goebbels was right, and that is why Thomas believes in the suppression of Goebbels’ reading.” But in what sense was Goebbels right? In Batstone’s formulation, the politics of reading becomes a pure game of politics but no reading, because a previous reading needs to be suppressed not because it is in any sense wrong or a distortion of the text’s proper meaning, but because the regime or political situation has changed. Thus reception theory puts the reader’s role to the fore and argues that all understanding is self-understanding, and that all interpretations are imbedded in the social, political, and intellectual conditions of their times. Goebbels’s reading needs to be suppressed not because it is invalid, not even because its Nazi ideology is wrong, but only because the Nazis are defeated and its ideology needs to be suppressed by the winner’s ideology. In such a formulation, then, the politics of reading is constituted by nothing but political power, in which interpretation is not a matter of validity or invalidity, but a matter of discursive authority totally depending on who has the power to speak.

II. Greek and Roman Classics in China: From the Late Ming to the 1980s

Perhaps we may use the reception of Greek and Latin classics in China as a test case to look into the questions we raised above. The first thing we may notice is that understanding and interpretation of the classics indeed change as the social and historical conditions change in time. The earliest introduction of Greek and Latin classics to China can be dated back to the late Ming dynasty in the late 16th and the early 17th centuries, when the Jesuit missionaries used classical rhetoric for religious purposes. In 1623, Father Giulio Aleni published a book in Chinese called Xixue fan or Introduction to Western Learning, in which he described five methodological principles of rhetoric based on Cicero’s works. So Aleni, according to Li Sher-shiueh, produced “the earliest writing in China explicating Cicero’s ideas about rhetoric.” But

15Ibid., p. 19.
16Li Sher-shiueh 李奭學, Zhongguo wan Ming yu Ouzhou wenxue: Ming mo Yesuhui guodianxing zhengdao gushi kaoquan 中國晚明與歐洲文學：明末耶穌會古典型證道故
even before that, the Jesuits already used Aesop’s fables to convey Christian ideas through intriguing stories about birds and animals, taking advantage of those fables’ easily adaptable plots and didactic morals. In so doing, they often altered those fables as exempla for the teaching of Christian doctrine, “reshaped the classical tradition,” and engaged in what Harold Bloom calls the act of “misreading.”17 From the late Ming to the modern times, there have been many Chinese translations of Aesop’s fables. Ming dynasty translations mostly done by the Jesuits were based on Latin originals, but in the Qing dynasty and the Republican period, translations were mainly from English. “Not until the 1950s and the 1980s,” as Ge Baoquan observes, “did we have complete translations from ancient Greek texts.”18 It is noteworthy that the 1950s and the 1980s look like two peaks of translation of the classics and foreign literature in general, while the time in between becomes a gap, a period of self-enclosure in which very little foreign literature or philosophy was considered valuable. This simple statistic already shows the change of the political climate in China, in which Greek and Roman classics are read and interpreted.

Before the 1950s, there were different interpretations of Aesop’s fables. Lin Shu (1852 – 1924), who knew no foreign language but worked with assistants knowledgeable in the originals, produced a version in 1903 and said in his preface that “Aesop’s book is a book based on knowledge gained from experience; it speaks strangely through conversations of plants, trees, animals, and birds, but they contain eternal verities when one savors them deeply.” He compares Aesop’s fables favorably with several Chinese collections of similar strange and funny stories and claims that “insofar as the special function of fables is concerned, no book is as good as Aesop’s Fables in making children laugh and enjoy, and gradually understand the changing human dispositions and the different nature of things.”19 In a satirical essay published in 1941, Qian Zhongshu (1910 – 1998) offers an interesting counterargument, deliberately saying that Aesop’s fables are unfit for teaching the young. “Looking at history as a whole,” says Qian, “antiquity is the equivalent of mankind’s childhood. The past is childish, and having progressed through thousands of years, humanity has gradually reached modern times.”20 Continuing in that sarcastic vein apparently from the perspective of a modern reader confident of his advantage over the ancient writer,

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Qian claims that Aesop’s work contains morals far too simple from the modern man’s point of view. For example, the bat that pretends to be a bird among birds, but a mouse among animals, is not sneaky enough. “Man is much smarter,” says Qian:

He would do the reverse of the bat’s trick. He would pretend to be an animal among birds to show that he is down-to-earth, but a bird among animals to show that he moves above the hustle and bustle of the world. He tries to look refined and cultured in front of the military type, but plays a macho hero in front of men of letters. In the high society, he is an impoverished but hardy commoner, but among commoners, he becomes a condescending intellectual. This is of course not a bat, but just—a man.21

As for the fable of an astronomer who falls into a well because he is always looking up at the stars, Qian turns the astronomer into a politician, and thus his fall is “a fall from power or from office.” He would never admit, however, that he has fallen because of his carelessness; instead he would declare that he is “deliberately going down to his subordinates to do some investigation work.”22

By reading a number of Aesop’s fables in such a twisted way, Qian offers a biting critique of the modern notions of evolution and progress, a satire on the corrupted modern man. Aesop’s fables, says Qian in conclusion, are not fit for children, and he mentions that Rousseau in Emile also objected to children’s reading of fables, though their objections are based on exactly opposite reasons. “Rousseau thought that fables would make simple children complicated and cause them to lose their innocence, so fables are objectionable. But I regard fables as objectionable because they make naïve children even more simple-minded and more childish, cause them to believe that the distinction between right and wrong and the consequences of good and evil in the human world are as fairly and clearly set out as in the animal kingdom, and thus when those children grow up, they would easily get duped and encounter difficulties everywhere they turn.”23

Aesop’s fables, those stories of beasts, birds, insects and plants, as Annabel Patterson argues, have “their function as a medium of political analysis and communication, especially in the form of a communication from or on behalf of the politically powerless.”24 In the 1950s and after, however, Aesop’s fables as “fables of power,” the Aesopian language and its political function, all became suspect in a more and more tightly controlled society where the authorities were always on the lookout for political subversion. Satires and parodies became quite impossible, and the kind of ironic reading of Aesop’s fables like Qian Zhongshu wrote in the 1940s all but disappeared.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, many intellectuals felt hopeful of a new era for China’s rejuvenation after a long period of war and the crisis of national survival, the social and political atmosphere in the early 1950s was relatively relaxed and optimistic. The Soviet Union provided a model for new China, and translation of foreign works, including Western classics, was thriving, though the most translated was Soviet and Russian

21Ibid., p. 32.
22Ibid., p. 33.
23Ibid., p. 36.
literature. That “brave new world” euphoria, however, did not last long. In Yan’an in 1941, even before the communists took over the whole country, Mao Zedong already criticized intellectuals within the Communist Party for their predilection for Western learning, complaining that “many scholars of Marxism-Leninism also cite the Greeks whenever they speak.”

Mao traced this problem of Westernization to the influence of Chinese students returning from Europe, America, or Japan, who “only know how to talk about foreign countries without their own understanding, and thus play the role of mere gramophones.” As Mao became the supreme leader in the 1950s, his critique of intellectuals “citing the Greeks whenever they speak” cast a dark shadow on Chinese intellectual life and made it almost impossible to talk about Greek classics in earnest, even though some of the classics were translated and published quietly. Roman classics were even more neglected, however, as Roman civilization had been less appreciated in China. According to Yang Zhouhan, “not until the 1930s did Roman literature become relatively known in China.”

Virgil was discussed in some essays published in Xiaoshuo yuebao 小說月報 [Fiction Monthly] in 1930 and 1931, and Wang Li 王力 published a short history of Roman literature in 1933, but the first Roman work translated into Chinese, Virgil’s Eclogues, did not appear until 1957. Yang himself translated several classics from Latin: Ovid’s Metamorphoses came out in 1958 and Virgil’s Aeneid in 1984. Between the late 1950s and the early 1980s, however, there was little to speak of as reception of Greek and Roman classics. With the Anti-Rightist campaign in 1957 and many other political campaigns, the intellectual environment quickly deteriorated, and during the Cultural Revolution that lasted from 1966 to 1976, China was completely closed off to the outside world and nothing foreign was considered of any value in that period of extreme xenophobia.

Interestingly, Karl Marx himself had spoken of the ancient Greeks with marvel and admiration. Given his politico-economic theory of dialectical materialism, the superstructure of arts and ideas should correspond to its material basis in social structure and economic development, and everything in the arts should be accountable in terms of its economic and material basis. But there is a problem in the correspondence of arts and economics, the superstructure and the material base, because it is a well-known fact that “certain periods of the highest development of art stand in no direct connection to the general development of society, or to the material basis and skeleton structure of its organization,” says Marx. “Witness the example of the Greeks as compared with the modern nations, or even Shakespeare.”

26Ibid., 3:756.
bound up with certain forms of social development. It lies rather in understanding why they still constitute for us a source of aesthetic enjoyment and in certain respect prevail as the standard and model beyond attainment. I shall come back to the question of the classical later, but from this we may see that to cite or speak of the Greeks is not a sin in Marx’s eyes.

In China from the 1950s to the 1970s, however, there was an increasingly rigid Party line of materialism and realism in the study of literature and the humanities in general. Anything accused of being idealist would immediately be dismissed as bad or even reactionary, and literature was thought to be a reflection or copy of social reality. In this context, then, it is particularly noteworthy that Qian Zhongshu made use of the Aristotelian theory of representation to refute the rigid dogma of art as “reflection.” In his preface to Selection of Song Dynasty Poetry with Annotations, first published in 1958, Aristotle was brought in literally from the margins, in the form of a footnote. Qian begins by contextualizing the selected poems in their historical conditions, but quickly dismisses the simplistic understanding of the relationship between poetry and history. “A work of literature is produced in the author’s historical milieu and takes root in the reality in which he lives,” says Qian, “but the ways in which it reflects the milieu and gives expression to the reality can be multifarious and varied.”

Poetry may realistically describe the social condition of a time, but realism cannot be the sole criterion to judge the value of poetry, because it is not the main purpose of poetry to depict reality as it is. History “only focuses on the appearance of things,” but literature “may probe into the hidden essence of things and bring out the protagonist’s unexpressed psychological intricacies”; history “only ascertains what has happened, but art can imagine what should have happened and conjecture why it has so happened. In that sense, we may say that poetry, fiction, and drama are superior to history.”

The argument is unmistakably Aristotelian, and Qian directly refers to Aristotle’s Poetics in a footnote, while drawing on classic Chinese texts, the historical book Zuo zhuang 左傳 and a famous poem by the Tang poet Bo Juyi 白居易 (772 – 846), to support Aristotle’s view. Both Zuo zhuang and the poem Song of Everlasting Sorrow have recorded speech of private conversations or even a monologue, which neither the historian nor the poet could have possibly known and taken as actual records, but while the veracity of the historical narrative in Zuo zhuang has been put into question, readers have always accepted Bo Juyi’s poem without accusing the poet of lying. The clear distinction in Chinese readers’ reactions towards historical narrative and poetic imagination effectively points to the distinction of the two kinds of discourse, thus consolidating Aristotle’s view in Poetics as well as Qian’s oblique critique of the Maoist doctrine of literature as a mechanical copying or reflection of reality. No wonder that Qian’s work was under attack soon after its publication, for the orthodox Party line of a rigid “reflection” theory could not stand up to scrutiny, and

29 Ibid., p. 360.
30 Qian Zhongshu 錢鍾書, Song shi xuan zhu 宋詩選注 [Selection of Song Dynasty Poetry with Annotations] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue, 1958), p. 3.
31 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
32 See ibid., p. 5.
therefore no scrutiny was allowed to question the authority of the “reflection” theory.

When the extreme anti-intellectualism was finally over after the ten-year disastrous Cultural Revolution, translation of Western classics experienced a revival in the 1980s, when many old translations were reprinted and new ones were attempted. The whole 1980s consciously continued what had been left unfinished during the May Fourth period at the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly in reaching out to Western ideas and values of science and democracy. Economically China was opening up and making changes, and the intellectual sphere was also opening up and filled with hopes and enthusiasm for political reform. Perhaps Gu Zhun’s (1915 – 1974) work on Greek city-states and democracy, first published in 1982, best represents the 1980s and the aspirations for political change among Chinese intellectuals. Through a comparative study of ancient Chinese and Greek political institutions, Gu Zhun articulated the desire for political reform in the post-Mao era. In ancient China, there were many small states and polities that may bear some similarities with the Greek city-states, says Gu, “but the other characteristic of the Greek system that made it possible for those small city-states to retain their independence was totally unknown in ancient China, namely, the power of sovereignty resting with the people and the system of direct democracy.” 33 Aristotle’s notion of a citizen, which puts emphasis on a citizen’s right to participate in the decision-making activities, shows a crucial difference between Greek democracy and the Chinese political system not just in antiquity, but also in our own time. In Politics, Aristotle thus defines the concept of a citizen:

Whoever is entitled to participate in an office involving deliberation or decision is, we can now say, a citizen in this city; and the city is the multitude of such persons that is adequate with a view to a self-sufficient life, to speak simply. 34

Having quoted this important passage from Aristotle, Gu Zhun explains that Greek citizens are the masters of a city-state, and that they have the responsibility to defend the city in war and also the right to participate in the affairs of the state or a court of law. The concept of the rule of law became important both externally in relation with other city-states and internally in governing the transactions and relationships of individual citizens. All these are lacking in the Chinese political system, and Gu Zhun’s work inspired many readers to think about the difficulty as well as the necessity of political reform. Indeed, demand of reform and further opening-up characterized the 1980s, which culminated in the students’ demonstrations in Beijing in 1989. The bloody suppression of the students’ demonstration in Tiananmen was not only a traumatic experience in recent Chinese history, but also marked the point of significant changes in China, the further opening-up in economic policies and the rapid growth of economy, but at the same time also the disintegration of intellectual vision, the rise of nationalism, and the emergence of some scholars who would argue more in line with the state

33Gu Zhun 顧準, Xila chengbang zhidu 希臘城邦制度 [The Institution of City-States in Greece], in Gu Zhun wenji 顧準文集 [Collection of Gu Zhun’s Writings] (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin, 1994), p. 72.
than the individual, for a nationalistic exceptionalism than cosmopolitan aspirations, and in defense of authoritarianism than liberal democracy.

III. Classical Studies in China Today

As we move into the twenty-first century, there have been a number of initiatives in promoting the study of Greek and Roman classics, particularly in some of China’s major universities. Peking University established a Centre for Classical Studies in 2011, and similar efforts at teaching Greek and Latin and classical studies also started in Fudan University and a few other places. So in China now there are indeed encouraging signs of serious studies of Western classics. What has attracted more attention, however, is the promotion of classical studies, both Western and Chinese, by two fairly well-known scholars, Liu Xiaofeng and Gan Yang, who occupy prominent positions at People’s University in Beijing and Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou respectively, with a journal as a forum to air their views, *Gudian yanjiu* 古典研究 or the *Chinese Journal of Classical Studies*, of which Liu Xiaofeng is editor-in-chief. Neither Liu nor Gan can be called a classicist by any stretch of the imagination, and what they emphasize is not philological knowledge, but annotations and commentaries in Western classical scholarship. For example, Liu Xiaofeng published a Chinese version of Plato’s *Symposium* in 2003, which, as he admits in the translator’s preface, “is neither directly translated from the Greek original, nor indirectly from a translation in a Western language, but is an experiment of *exegetical* translation—that is, a translation based on several annotated editions by contemporary classicists, in consultation with a number of translations with commentaries in Western languages, and also in comparison with the Greek original.” The last phrase is rather disingenuous, as Liu declares that knowledge of the Greek language is not essential, because “even if one has studied ancient Greek for eight to ten years, it is probably still impossible to have the assurance to translate Plato ‘directly’ from the Greek original.” In other words, Liu advocates a translation based not so much on what the text itself says but what a certain classicist or an exegetical tradition has understood it as saying. For him, Leo Strauss and Carl Schmitt are the two guiding spirits for his understanding of Plato and the other Greek and Roman classics. Plato’s *Symposium*, says Liu, has many different ideas and themes, and its interpretation, very much like the orchestration of a music piece, depends on the skills of a virtuoso performer. “In the hands of a virtuoso (like Strauss), it can unfold its rich meaning in depth,” for the *Symposium*, he explains in a footnote, “looks like a discourse on love, but Strauss in his reading reveals the essence of Platonic political philosophy.” Political allegories à la Strauss become the main approach in Liu Xiaofeng’s way of reading Western classics, a methodology that has made it possible for him to interpret Greek and Roman classics in a particular way, to make use of the classics in serving a certain purpose with a strong political orientation.

In her review of the changing reception of ancient Greek classics in China, Shadi Bartsch has insightfully detected a significant “turn” in present-day

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35 Liu Xiaofeng 劉小楓 (trans.), *Bolatu de Huiyin* 柏拉圖的《會飲》 [*Plato’s Symposium*] (Beijing: Huaxia, 2003), p. 3.
36 Ibid., p. 2.

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Chinese study of Western classics, which evidently differs from the enthusiastic embracement of Western classics and ideas by Chinese intellectuals from the May Fourth period at the beginning of the twentieth century till the 1980s. If earlier generations of Chinese intellectuals called for science and democracy and studied Greek and Roman classics to understand the foundation of Western culture, then, scholars like Liu Xiaofeng and Gan Yang are now advocating a way of reading Western classics with a very different agenda, “a strategy of appropriation and alteration rather than an effort to understand them in their original cultural context.”37 Such a change of attitude and purpose has a great deal to do with the major changes I mentioned earlier that started to take place after 1989—the disintegration of intellectual vision, the rise of nationalism, and the emergence of scholars who advocate a kind of national ideology in derision of liberal democracy, an ideology that becomes popular with a fairly large following, while at the same time sending out signals of an intellectual program that the state may find serviceable. This is a new way to read Greek and Roman classics in China at a time when China is gaining in economic and political power with increasingly greater influence in international affairs, when traditional culture, particularly Confucianism, is being revived to boost a sense of national pride under the dubious name of guo xue 國學 or “national learning,” and when the relationships between scholarship and politics become somewhat tangled and complicated, with some scholars eager to offer ideas that might be useful in legitimizing the power to be with “unique” Chinese characteristics.

Gan Yang, for example, proposed the idea that reading classics is a way to strengthen the “cultural subjectivity” of the Chinese in his argument about the Chinese cultural tradition, which, he claims, runs all the way from Confucianism to Maoism and Deng Xiaoping’s thought as a consistent legacy that lays the foundation for such a Chinese “cultural subjectivity.”38 Liu Xiaofeng has called Mao Zedong guo fu 國父 or “Father of the Nation,” the true great leader who made China strong and self-sufficient, with military and political strength much more effective than Chiang Kai-shek or Sun Yat-sen, who did not have real control of the country in their weak Republican political system. Liu’s worship of a strong leader shows the influence of Carl Schmitt and his political theology. Schmitt’s political theory, Liu explains, needs to be understood in its historical background, that is, “the position of a weak country Germany fell into after the First World War,” and it was in that context, Liu continues, “Schmitt followed Thomas Hobbes and believed that only a state that is capable of making strong decisions can declare war, and the evidence whether a state is strong lies in its ability to determine who is the enemy and who is friend, while retaining the tension between the two.”39 Liu Xiaofeng’s effort to introduce Schmitt to Chinese readers today seems to answer a similar need at a time when China is changing from a weak country to a powerful state. The obsession with power naturally leads to the worship of a strong leader, as Schmitt once did in the person of Adolf

38See Gan Yang 甘陽, Tong san tong 通三統 [Unifying the Three Legacies] (Beijing: Sanlian, 2007).
Hitler as the Führer. “The leader, as an almost mystical embodiment of the Volksgemeinschaft, expressed the popular will,” as Jan-Werner Müller remarks. “Thus Schmitt could claim that ‘law is the plan and the will of the leader.’” These words seem to have an uncanny relevance to the Chinese situation past and present, and therefore are worthy of our reflection. The ideas proposed by Liu Xiaofeng and Gan Yang should also be understood in the social and historical context in China today, but it is important to know that their ideas are controversial, and not at all representative of contemporary Chinese thinking as a whole. A diversity of thinking and multiplicity of positions may be more descriptive of the intellectual scene in China today, but controversies have made Liu and Gan well-known in China, and their promotion of classical studies as part of a general education program embodies their cherished idea of “leading the leader.” The emphasis on power and the aspiration to become intellectual leaders manifest themselves in the way Liu and Gan speak, in their particular style, for they typically write in such a way as though they command some kind of authority, speak largely ex cathedra, in an aggressive, self-assertive manner, while dismissive of others and their different views.

Bartsch identifies three approaches Liu and Gan adopt in their use of Western classics: the first concerns the very purpose of their endeavor, namely, “using the Western classics to criticize the West itself”; the second takes advantage of contemporary Western theoretical trends, particularly the postmodern critique of the Enlightenment and rationality, that is, “to link ancient philosophy and the Enlightenment as both fatally flawed by the emphasis on rationality,” which is negatively understood as “instrumental rationality”; and the third relates to Leo Strauss as providing a methodology of reading that emphasizes the hidden, “esoteric” messages beyond the literal sense of the text. Putting these together, one may get the picture that this is a way of reading that has a particular purpose, a definite ideology, and a methodology that allows an “esoteric” reading to accommodate the use of the classics for an illiberal interpretation. The emphasis on “esoteric” messages, supposedly hidden in the text and to be revealed only by a small group of elite interpreters, makes it possible for the Straussian interpreter to claim certain mystical insights and to offer allegorical interpretations beyond what the text literally says. “Like Strauss,” as Bartsch observes, “the Chinese Straussians look especially to ‘hints’ in the text given by the characters in the dialogue and find Plato’s meaning here rather than in what Socrates himself says.” That kind of allegorical interpretation works, as I have argued elsewhere, as a “displacement” of the text “by a moral or political commentary.” Of course, reading and interpretation always put a layer of commentary onto the literal sense.

41That has often been a dream of those scholars who want very much to involve in politics and offer advice to state leaders in the capacity of what in Chinese is called dishi 帝師 or “the emperor’s teacher.” Schmitt had that dream for Nazi Germany, but eventually, as Müller comments, “leading the leader,” as Schmitt had imagined he could, turned out to be an intellectual’s hubris.” Ibid., p. 39.
43Ibid., p. 16.
of the text, so in that sense, all interpretations move beyond the text to a certain degree, but there is a crucial difference between interpretation of the meaning of a text in respect of textual integrity and the displacement of the text by a strongly ideological interpretation.

IV. The Classical and the Limitations of Reception Theory

Reception theory privileges the present and the modern over the past and the ancient. “The text is ‘refashioned’ in the act of reception, which is therefore an act of representation,” as Duncan Kennedy observes. “It is but a short step from here to allegorical interpretation (allegoresis). Allegory (‘speaking otherwise’) explicitly acknowledges the distance between writer’s text and reader’s text: the enduring value or interest of the writer’s text is endorsed, but not its comprehensibility, and it is reconfigured to speak in the reader’s terms.”45 That is to say, allegorical interpretation turns the text, particularly a classic text, into a “reader’s text,” i.e., a text understood from the reader’s perspective at the present over “whatever the case in Archaic Lesbos” or ancient China might be. The privilege of the reader’s perspective is predicated on the distance or gap between the past and the present, but the classical, as Gadamer argues, overcomes the very idea of historical distance. The classical implies a continuous historical mediation between the past and the present. “Understanding,” says Gadamer, “is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated.”46 In Batstone’s summary, the starting point of reception theory is the idea that “All meaning is constituted or actualized at the point of reception”; but from there it moves towards the extreme position that the classical is what the reader makes it to be: “Virgil can only be what readers have made of him.”47 Paul Valéry has said something very similar, which serves as an endorsement of Jauss’s concept of reception and his emphasis on the constructedness of meaning. Valéry’s remark—that an object of art is completed by the viewer in an aesthetic experience—“frees aesthetic reception from its contemplative passivity by making the viewer share in the constitution of the aesthetic object,” says Jauss; “poiesis now means a process whereby the recipient becomes a participant creator of the work. This is also the simple meaning of the provocative, hermeneutically unjustifiably controversial phrase: ‘mes vers ont le sens qu’on leur prête’ (my poetry has the meaning one gives it, Pleiade, I, 1509).”48 Here we see a strong tendency towards allegorical interpretation which makes the classic text mean what the reader or interpreter would have it to mean, beyond whatever the text literally says. Thus Virgil’s Aeneid can be read as an epic justifying the power of the Roman imperium, in total neglect of the tragic pathos in the text that comes from the conflict between the personal and the impersonal, the sacrifice of love and the founding of an empire: what Adam Perry once called the continual opposition of

46Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 290; emphasis in the original
two voices, the voice of “the forces of history” and that of “human suffering.”

Likewise Plato’s Symposium, despite its obvious level of meaning as a discourse on love, can be understood in a Straussian allegorical reading as essentially about politics, giving expression to Plato’s anti-democratic ideas. Reception theory may indeed free the reader from the passivity and positivistic notions of objectivity and truth, but an over-emphasis on the reader’s role at the expense of everything else creates a set of problems the reception theorist is unwilling or unable to solve.

Although the theory of reception draws on Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer holds very different views from Jauss when it comes to the assessment of the reader’s role and the degree to which the reader participates in the construction of meaning. Gadamer acknowledges that Valéry thought of a work of art as incomplete, only to be completed by the viewer or the reader, but Gadamer criticizes him for not working out the consequences of his ideas. “If it is true that a work of art is not, in itself, completable, what is the criterion for appropriate reception and understanding?”

Valéry indeed frees interpretation from the normative sense of the classical, but he does not give up the normative function of the classical when he says: “the most important thing about the concept of the classical (and this is wholly true of both the ancient and the modern use of the word) is the normative sense.” Valéry’s claim that his poetry means whatever the reader understands it to mean is therefore misconceived and irresponsible, and Gadamer calls it “an untenable hermeneutic nihilism.”

Gadamer’s concept of the classical stands as exemplary of the type of texts which contain the basic values we always hold in respect and try to learn from, not some kind of narcissistic mirror to reflect our own subjectivity.

As I mentioned earlier, Gadamer’s concept of the timeless classical stands squarely in a long tradition in biblical hermeneutics from St. Augustine to Thomas Aquinas and to Martin Luther. In his book, On Christian Doctrine, Augustine argues that Scripture offers plain words to satisfy those who are hungry for clear understanding; but to those who disdain plainness and seek rhetorical adornment and complexity, the obscure and figurative part of the Bible gives pleasure. “Thus the Holy Spirit has magnificently and wholesomely modulated the Holy Scriptures so that the more open places present themselves to hunger and the more obscure places may deter a disdainful attitude,” says Augustine. “Hardly anything may be found in these obscure places which is not found plainly said elsewhere.”

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50 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 94.
51 Ibid., p. 288.
52 Ibid., p. 94.
53 Ibid., p. 95.
hermeneutic principle that puts the plain sense of the scriptural text as the legitimate ground for any understanding and interpretation. This is exactly what Thomas Aquinas argues in an important passage of the *Summa theologica*, in which he insists that “all the senses are founded on one—the literal—from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended allegorically, as Augustine says.” He cites Augustine to support his view and continues, “…nothing of Holy Scripture perishes because of this, since nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward clearly by the Scripture in its literal sense.” Several hundred years later, Luther, Calvin, and the other reformers found this line of argument helpful in their anti-Catholic polemics, so they followed Aquinas in seeing the Bible as self-explanatory and arguing that Christians need not go through the Catholic Church for adequate understanding of the Scripture. As Karlfried Froehlich observes, there are three aspects in Lutheran hermeneutics which inherit late medieval, and specifically Thomist, presuppositions, namely, the interest in the literal sense, in the clarity of Scripture, and in historical continuity of the exegetical tradition. “Holy Scripture,” in Luther’s classic formulation, “is its own interpreter (*scriptura sui ipsius interpres*).”

For Luther, as for Augustine and Aquinas as influential Christian theologians, the literal sense is not opposed to the spiritual meaning; it is “not so much a *sensus litteralis* as the *sensus spiritualis,*” as Gerald Bruns remarks. “It is rather the spirit or fore-understanding in which the text is to be studied.” So in Lutheran hermeneutics, the literal sense is not opposed to the spiritual meaning, and thus not truly or unconditionally literal; it is, rather, the *sensus litteralis theologicus*. Thus the literal sense of Scripture, as Froehlich remarks, is quite different from “mere words, a purely grammatical sense, the dead letter.” In this exegetical tradition from Augustine and Aquinas to Luther, however, the literal sense is absolutely essential, as it forms the only legitimate ground for any interpretation and serves as the guard against far-fetched allegorization, against distorting misreading and misinterpretations. When Gadamer insists on the normative sense of the classical, he transfers this hermeneutic principle from biblical exegesis to the reading of secular, classical texts without necessarily religious implications.

In modern criticism, Umberto Eco is one of the earliest to argue for the openness of the text, and the role of the reader. Perhaps in reaction against the American theories of reader-response criticism, particularly as proposed by Stanley Fish, which make the reader the sole creator of text and meaning, Eco poses the question of the limits of interpretation, and further, the problem of what

he calls excessive and untenable “overinterpretation.” In postmodern criticism, the author is famously and ironically pronounced dead by the French author Roland Barthes, even though the irony has escaped many of his readers and followers. The text thus becomes a space for the uncontrollable free play of signifiers, as well as the intertextual multiplicity of different quotations and diverse voices. Yet, all these signifiers engaged in a free play still need a place to coalesce for the text to make sense, even if momentarily. “There is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader,” Barthes declares. “The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost.” If the author is dead and the intention of the author (intentio auctoris) is often irrelevant anyway, Eco proposes an interesting notion of the intention of the text (intentio operis) to balance out the wayward intention of the reader (intentio lectoris). Eco’s “intention of the text” is actually the basic assumption of textual coherence or textual integrity, a conjecture on the part of the reader guided by the semiotic structure of the text as a whole. “How to prove a conjecture about the intentio operis?” asks Eco, and he gives the following answer: “The only way is to check it upon the text as a coherent whole. This idea,” he goes on to add, “is an old one and comes from Augustine (De doctrina christiana): any interpretation given of a certain portion of a text can be accepted if it is confirmed by, and must be rejected if it is challenged by, another portion of the same text. In this sense the internal textual coherence controls the otherwise uncontrollable drives of the reader.” Here in Eco’s concept of the intention of the text we recognize the same tradition in biblical hermeneutics that Gadamer has also adopted in his concept of the classical, namely, the exegetical tradition from Augustine to Aquinas and Luther, secularized in modern criticism, which puts the textual coherence and integrity as the basis of all readings and interpretations.

Eco’s emphasis on textual coherence and Gadamer’s on the normative sense of the classical can all be understood as an effort to acknowledge the actual practice of reading; which in reality is not and cannot be totally free and arbitrary, without restrictions set up by the whole structure of the text with words and phrases which internally correlate with one another. This correlation forms the hermeneutic circle within which meaning is generated in the movement from parts to the whole, and from the whole to the parts. Understanding, Batstone argues, is always self-understanding, and such an argument tends to justify the use of the classics, as understanding seems always to move in a hermeneutic circle. Of course, we all have our particular horizons from which we begin to understand things, so we start with our preconceived notions or what Heidegger calls the fore-structure of understanding. Before we understand anything, we already have some idea about that which we are to understand; that is, our anticipations or prejudgments, and the process of understanding appears to move

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62 Eco, Interpretation and overinterpretation, p. 65.
in circularity. The point of the hermeneutic circle, however, is not to confirm the circularity of understanding or the subjectivity of our own horizon, for “the point of Heidegger’s hermeneutical reflection is not so much to prove that there is a circle as to show that this circle possesses an ontologically positive significance,” as Gadamer explains in an important passage of *Truth and Method*. “All correct interpretation must be on guard against arbitrary fancies and the limitations imposed by imperceptible habits of thought, and it must direct its gaze ‘on the things themselves.’”63 It becomes clear that even though Jauss’s reception theory derives a lot from Gadamer’s hermeneutics, their difference is nonetheless important, and the degree of the reader’s participation in the aesthetic experience, though fully acknowledged in Gadamerian hermeneutics, cannot exceed the proper proportion in the “fusion of horizons.” Whatever context we may put the classic into for innovative interpretation, the classical text has its own horizon or, as Eco puts it, its own intention, which has always to be taken into consideration for adequate understanding.

RECLAIMING THE CONCEPTS OF VALUE AND CAPITAL

Jeanne A. Schuler and Patrick Murray

Abstract: The situation faced by radical philosophy today is the mismatch of trying to base radical critique and action on bourgeois concepts. Fundamental concepts disclose — or fail to disclose — the world; they establish horizons of discourse. Poor fundamental concepts keep important features of the world out of sight and out of our talk about the world. The two central concepts of Marx’s critique of political economy are value and capital. Since capital is value that increases its value, to understand capital we must begin by understanding value. Loose talk about “adding value” and misidentifying every imaginable sort of capital: human capital, social capital, natural capital, intellectual capital, etc., abounds today. We identify and criticize five misconceptions of value and capital that circulate widely and obstruct the progress of radical philosophy. These misconceptions divert thinking from the concepts of value and capital worked out by Marx in his mature critique of political economy. (1) Value is utility. We follow Marx in identifying utility as bogus, a pseudo-concept. (2) Value is use-value. (3) Value is exchange-value. There is nothing wrong with either the concept of use-value or that of exchange-value per se. But one of the first lessons of Capital is that understanding capitalist society requires a third category, value, which is what Marx calls the “third thing” that commodities have in common and makes them quantitatively comparable. (4) Capital is any sort of resource. Like use-value, resource is an unobjectionable concept, but to equate capital with resources is to eliminate everything proper to the capitalist mode of production. (5) Capitalist society is governed by instrumental reason, which we identify as another pseudo-concept. Neither concept, utility or instrumental reason, plays a role in Marx’s Capital. We reject George Ritzer’s Weberian conception of “McDonaldization” as governing the world by instrumental action.

“It is naturally still more convenient to understand by value nothing at all. Then one can without difficulty subsume everything under this category.”

I. Introduction

The situation faced by radical philosophy today is the mismatch of trying to base radical critique and action on bourgeois concepts. For the most part, we are stuck trying to contest the practices of advanced capitalist societies, where wealth, income, and opportunity are increasingly unequal and stratified, with concepts unfit for the task. Among the pseudo-concepts that clog understanding are “the

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2This situation is not new. Marx criticized the Gotha Programme of the German Workers Party for its “bourgeois phrases” that ascribed “supernatural creative power to labor” [Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, edited by C.P. Dutt, New York: International Publishers, 1966], p. 3].
economic,” utility, instrumental reason, and other imposters that claim to explain the world of value and capital. Pseudo-concepts sound good on the surface but lack traction with the world. It is not paranoid to note that the predominant mindset fostered by capitalism, what Marx calls “the bourgeois horizon,” makes it hard to think about capitalism. Possibilities for overcoming capitalism begin with the conceptual possibility of identifying it. Good concepts are phenomenologically adequate: they get to the matter at hand and open up the world.

The two central concepts of Marx’s critique of political economy are value and capital. Since capital is value that increases its value, to understand capital we must begin by understanding value. Loose talk about “adding value” and misidentifying every imaginable sort of capital: human capital, social capital, natural capital, intellectual capital, etc., abounds today. Such expressions reduce social forms that are specific to capitalism to pseudo-concepts like utility or to generally applicable notions: capital is whittled down to resources, and value shrinks to use-value.

II. Fundamental Concepts and Horizons of Discourse

Fundamental concepts disclose — or fail to disclose — the world; they establish horizons of discourse. Poor fundamental concepts keep important features of the world out of sight and out of our talk about the world. Thomas Pynchon writes, “If they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don’t have to worry about the answers.” The right questions may never be asked because they lie outside the bounds of discourse set by poor concepts. The basic question that Marx answers in Capital, namely, what is the specific social form and purpose of wealth and labor in capitalist societies, is such a question. Questions like these go unasked. They lie outside the horizons of the dominant public and scientific discourse, which allows for questions about how much wealth there is, perhaps even how wealth is distributed. The questions of what is being distributed, what is the specific social form and purpose of this wealth, and what consequences do they have do not come up.

Simon Clarke contrasts Marx’s scientific revolution with the regressive “neoclassical revolution” in economics, which, Clarke argues, established the discursive horizons of modern sociology as well as economics. He writes: There was a scientific revolution in nineteenth-century social thought … It was inaugurated by Marx’s critique of the ideological foundations of classical political economy, which he located in the political economists’ neglect of the social form of capitalist production … Capitalist society is a society based on a particular social form of production, within which the production and reproduction of

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3Martin Heidegger writes, “Fundamental concepts are determinations in which the area of knowledge underlying all the thematic objects of a science attain an understanding that precedes and guides all positive investigation” [Martin Heidegger, Being and Time translated by Joan Stambaugh, revised by Dennis J. Schmidt (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 2010), 9].

material things is subordinated to the production and accumulation of surplus value.\textsuperscript{5} Marx’s revolutionary new fundamental concepts are designed to overcome discursive horizons that put social and historical specificity in the shadows. Capitalism exudes “the illusion of the economic,” that is, the capitalist economy appears to be devoid of any specific social form or purpose; it appears to be the economy in general.\textsuperscript{6} Marx describes this common way of thinking about capitalist production as “the obsession that bourgeois production is production as such.”\textsuperscript{7} Thus, neoclassical economics presents itself, as a generally applicable science. But there is no economy in general; there is no “production as such.” All epochs of production may have certain common traits, so that we can pick out general features of any specific social way of organizing production, but that does not amount to a science. Use-value and the labor process are among the generally applicable categories in Capital, whereas all the “value categories,” commodity, exchange-value, value, surplus-value, capital, wages, and more, are explicitly social and historical. Failure to see through the “illusion of the economic,” failure to develop concepts of the social forms and purposes specific to capitalism, such as the commodity, money, surplus-value, capital, and wage-labor, closes off the world.

III. Five Misconceptions of Value and Capital

We believe that value and capital, properly conceived, remain fundamental critical concepts for grasping and changing the world today. We accept Marx’s conception that value is intrinsic to products produced on a capitalist basis, not for the false, naturalizing reason that Ricardo gave, namely, that labor is embodied in them. To say that value is intrinsic to the commodity is to say that the commodity is a fetish possessed of a peculiar purely social and supersensible objectivity and power. Value is intrinsic because it belongs to the peculiar social form of products of commodity-producing labor. Misconceptions of value and capital in public discourse, as well as in social science, repeat errors that Marx exposed a hundred and fifty years ago. Thoughtless talk about value and capital crowds out the discursive space for critical concepts of value and capital.

Value is the core concept of Marx’s account of capitalist society; capital is value that is valorized, that is, increased in value. Value is a phenomenological concept, it describes a determinate way of being in the capitalist world: commodities exist as values. Unlike use-value, wealth, needs, and labor, value is not a general category that is found in every kind of society. It is historically specific and grasps what is peculiar to capitalism. The concept of value is complex; it takes time to develop, and it is confounding in its implications. Value is the ghostly presence that has taken real possession of our world.

\textsuperscript{5}Simon Clarke, \textit{Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology} (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982), 240.
\textsuperscript{7}Karl Marx, \textit{Theories of Surplus-Value}, Part II, edited by S.W. Ryazanskaya and translated by Renate Simpson (London: Lawrence & Wishart 1968), 529.
It is unfortunate that the most powerful reality on the planet, value, shares the name with what is considered purely subjective. Concerning value, skepticism rules; we commonly refer to value as personal, a matter of opinion, pleasure, or cultural outlook. Values are added to events like a coat of paint; they exist only relative to a subject, like perspective. In the bourgeois horizon, facts stand their ground and objects are already there, but values drift in the supposed space within us. Displacing values from this precarious state is the first task in thinking about capitalism. As Marx argued in his polemic with Samuel Bailey, a sharp critic of David Ricardo and a forerunner of neoclassical economics, this is a two-fold task. The task is to defend the objectivity of usefulness against subjectivism and to defend the objectivity of value, the kind of value that money represents and measures, as intrinsic to wealth that takes the commodity form. In a world where profit is the purpose of production, we should tell our students that the primary way in which the book in their hands exists is as value; the book is value, value is not given to the object by how we feel about it. If the book were not a value, if it did not have exchange-value, it would not be printed. Value is not in our heads. The skeptical project of driving values out of the world is an obstacle to thinking and, in particular, to thinking about capitalism.

We identify and criticize five misconceptions of value and capital that circulate widely and obstruct the progress of radical philosophy. These misconceptions divert thinking from the concepts of value and capital worked out by Marx in his mature critique of political economy. (1) Value is utility. We follow Marx in identifying utility as bogus, a pseudo-concept. (2) Value is use-value. (3) Value is exchange-value. There is nothing wrong with either the concept of use-value or that of exchange-value per se. But one of the first lessons of Capital is that understanding capitalist society requires a third category, value, which is what Marx calls the “third thing” that commodities have in common and makes them quantitatively comparable. (4) Capital is any sort of resource. Like use-value, resource is an unobjectionable concept, but to equate capital with resources is to eliminate everything proper to the capitalist mode of production. (5) Capitalist society is governed by instrumental reason, which we identify as another pseudo-concept. Neither concept, utility or instrumental reason, plays a role in Marx’s Capital. We reject George Ritzer’s Weberian conception of “McDonaldization” as governing the world by instrumental action.

III-1. Value is not utility; utility is a bogus concept.
To grasp value, Marx asks the question for which value is the answer: how can a certain amount of one commodity, such as corn, be equated with a certain amount of another commodity, such as silk? What is equal about the two commodities?

8 Subjectivism regarding (use) value is challenged by Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 71, where he writes that the usefulness of things “must not be understood as a mere characteristic of interpretation, as if such ‘aspects’ were discursively forced upon ‘being’ which we initially encounter, as if an initially objectively present world stuff were ‘subjectively colored’ in this way.” See also Barry Stroud, “‘Gilding and Staining’ the World with ‘Sentiments’ and ‘Phantasms,’” Hume Studies, Vol. XIX, No. 2 (Nov. 1993): 253-72, and Chapter 4, “Value,” in Barry Stroud, Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction: Modality and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 90-124.

9 This is not meant to deny that demand is a co-factor in the determination of value. As Marx notes, if something is deemed useless, it has no value.
For one amount to be equal to the other, corn and silk must share some property that can be compared. But corn and silk do not share any physical traits. Since fair exchange occurs with no harm to commutative justice, there must be a “third thing” that both commodities possess which can be measured. This third thing Marx calls value. If value cannot be a physical trait, then what is it? Answering this question leads straight to the pseudo-concepts that pretend to explain the value of commodities.

The most common response is to say what corn and silk share is utility. Utility is the accepted answer to the question: what is value? Utility can be defined in various ways, but it always signifies a common element that can be compared and quantified. The utility found in corn exchanges for the equal amount of utility in the silk. Theories of utility abound. For some, utility signifies what is purely subjective: the pleasure produced or the preference satisfied by the corn or silk. For others, utility signifies what is purely objective: the usefulness of the corn or silk: its capacity to improve a situation. Whether utility signifies what is in me or out in the world, it can be quantified.

Utility is a fixture of economic and ethical theories, and acceptance of the notion is widespread. The term invites confidence for several reasons. First, we know that prices exist and prices can be fair. Prices are quantities, so what prices measure must be quantities too. Utility is the name given to the quantifiable element of commodities that prices measure. Another reason to trust utility is how practical it sounds. The subjectivity of values is exhausting. We want to hit the ground with something that is calculable and real. Utility is not about the best possible world. It is what makes a discernible difference here and now. The pragmatic sound of utility is reassuring in a world of hype. For those who teach ethics, utility is the theory that contrasts with Kant’s deontological ethics. Utility measures consequences of actions or rules; Kant’s moral imperative demands the universalizing of the maxim that underlies action. Weighing consequences appears more relevant to daily life than Kant’s categorical imperative. Writers like Peter Singer show the radical potential of utility in making the case for animal rights and justice toward the poor of the world. Why not accept utility as the answer to Marx’s question: what is value? Utility provides no answer to the question. We cannot make sense out of capitalism (or anything else) with this thoroughly defective concept. The arguments against utility are conceptual and phenomenological. The conceptual argument observes that the value of commodities could not possibly consist of utility. Utility is the wrong kind of category. Value is a historically specific feature of capitalist societies, while utility presents itself as a general category of human existence. The common criticism that Marx (inexplicably) overlooked the option that utility might be the

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10 Marx and Engels write of utility: “this apparently metaphysical abstraction arises from the fact that in modern bourgeois society all relations are subordinated in practice to the one abstract monetary-commercial relation” [Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, translated by Clemens Dutt, in Volume 5 of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1976), 409]. In a similar vein, Bernard Williams observes, “Utilitarianism is unsurprisingly the value system for a society in which economic values are supreme; and also, at the theoretical level, because quantification in money is the only obvious form of what utilitarianism insists upon, the commensurability of values” [Bernard Williams, Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 89].
substance of value rests on the failure to recognize that value is socially and historically specific. One of the most distinctive features of Marx’s theory of value is that value must be expressed as price: value and money are inseparable. Nothing of the sort holds for the notion of utility. Products made by slaves in ancient Egypt had utility, according to utility theory, but they were not commodities sold for a profit; they had no value measured by price. The concept of value is historically specific; utility theory has no place for that kind of category.

The phenomenological argument shows that utility disregards the features of objects that actually make them useful. For corn or silk to be useful means that the physical properties of the object must meet the person’s needs. Usefulness is neither in the object nor in the subject exclusively but resides in the fit between them. In Heidegger’s terms, the useful resides in how objects are circumspectly handled by humans. Utility theory brackets the distinct features of corn and silk, but without the food value of corn or the strength of silk, they have no usefulness. The word “utility” sounds as if it honors the usefulness of things, but it actually erases their usefulness. There is no phenomenon that utility describes—no generic pleasure that all objects produce and no generic consequences that all objects produce that can be compared. Pleasures are specific to kinds of things; there is no dimension within which the pleasure of food can be weighed against the pleasure of music or conversation. Pleasure is always pleasure of. Utility disregards the phenomenological features that make things useful or pleasant; utility should have no more place in intelligent discourse or critical theory than phlogiston has in explaining combustion. It is not a mistaken concept; it is a mystifying one. It should be a primary task of radical philosophy to contest utility theory and refuse to equate use-value with utility, since utility is precisely that bogus concept which liquidates use-value and blocks access to the value that money measures.

III-2. Value is not use-value.

Some of the loose talk about “adding value” identifies value with use-value. If I carve a block of wood into a flute, I have added use-value value, but have I thereby added value? If value is what money measures, then value is not use-value. To be measured by money, value must be a quantifiable dimension common to all commodities. Value, this common element, cannot be any sensible property, since commodities have none in common. But the usefulness of any useful thing “is conditioned by the physical properties of the commodity, and has no existence apart from the latter.” The supersensible objectivity of value contradicts the qualitative objectivity of use-value. Value cannot be use-value because useful things are found whenever and wherever we encounter human beings; use-value is a generally applicable category. But value is a socially and historically determinate category. Value, in Marx’s account, is something “purely social”; it belongs to capitalist sociality. If value were use-value, then value would exist wherever and whenever use-value does.

11 Karl Marx, *Capital Volume One*, 126.
12 “The concept of value is entirely peculiar to the most modern economy, since it is the most abstract expression of capital itself and of the production resting on it” [Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, translated by Martin Nicolaus (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), 776].
Purchasing power is a popular way of conceiving of value. But it either reduces value to use-value or gets us nowhere. Either purchasing power is defined in use-value terms — how much food I get for my money — which wrongly assumes that the value of food does not change or (b) purchasing power is defined in terms of the value of the goods one receives in exchange. In that case, purchasing power does not explain value; it presupposes that the value of things has been determined in some other way. If we take value to be purchasing power, understood in use-value terms, so that I have the same purchasing power from year to year if I can purchase the same basket of goods, then Marx’s theory of relative surplus-value is rendered unintelligible. Relative surplus-value is increased by increasing the productive power of labor that produces goods which enter into the value of labor-power, that is, that affect the value of the goods that workers purchase. As the productive power of that labor increases, the value of those goods decreases, which means that the value of the wage can decrease even while workers continue to purchase the same basket of goods, and possibly even a larger one.

Conceiving of value as use-value makes the purpose of production on a capitalist basis, namely, the accumulation of surplus-value, unintelligible. Unlike use-value, surplus-value has no natural limit: “Use-values must therefore never be treated as the immediate aim of the capitalist … His aim is rather the unceasing movement of profit-making.” Misconceiving value as use-value disguises the madness of capital’s motivation.

III-3. Value is not exchange-value or price. Value is intrinsic to a commodity; exchange-value is what one gets in exchange for a commodity, namely money, a separate physical object, which is not intrinsic to the commodity. This is why Marx says that a commodity is a value but has an exchange-value. Exchange-value cannot be value because there is nothing for which a commodity can be exchanged that is not subject to a change in value. A fixed measure of value was the Holy Grail for many political economists, but Ricardo and others recognized that there could be no such thing. Something whose value is subject to change can hardly be value itself. If money simply were value, what sense would we make of inflation and deflation? In thinking through the concepts of value and exchange-value (money), Marx draws on Hegel’s logic of essence, according to which essence and appearance are not separable: essence must appear as something other than itself. Marx argues that this is how it is with value and money: money is not value but it is the necessary form of appearance of value. Money and value are not independent variables; they are inseparable. But if value is inseparable from money, then talk about “adding value” in situations where money is not involved obscures a fundamental truth about value.

III-4. Capital is not just any resource. Capital is value that is valorized, not a resource of whatever sort: human capital, social capital, natural capital, intellectual capital, political capital, the list is constantly expanding. In a report that aired on September 4, 2010, National Public Radio news cited a woman from a group in Washington, D. C. called

13 Karl Marx, Capital Volume One, 254.
Concept Capital. Another report from the same day featured a woman anxious to “bring value” to one thing or another. Capital has a specific social purpose, the production and accumulation of surplus-value. Capital cannot be understood apart from value, which involves the features already mentioned, such as its inseparability from money. Since the source of surplus-value is the surplus labor of the class of wage laborers, capital cannot be dissociated from wage-labor any more than it can be dissociated from money and commodities.

III-5. McDonaldization represents real subsumption under capital not the spread of instrumental reason. In The McDonaldization of Society, George Ritzer identifies the four “principles of McDonaldization” as “efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control [through nonhuman technology].”\textsuperscript{14} We take these four to be specifications of instrumental reason. Max Weber describes instrumental reason as the defining rationality of capitalist society. For the modern world, setting human goals is not the task of reason; our ends arise from our interests, feelings, or appetites. Goals are assigned by authority or embedded in institutions. Reason plays the subsidiary role of determining the best means to reach those ends. Reason is instrumental, not substantive or critical. It solves problems but cannot decide which problems are worth solving. Instrumental reason is a depleted caricature of reason. Like utility, instrumental reason is at odds with the basic features of human existence and becomes plausible under the peculiar conditions of capitalism.

We argue that efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control are shadows of the value forms, which are the constitutive social forms of these societies undergoing McDonaldization. Shadows forms are derivative of constitutive forms and do not stand on their own: just try to organize society based on instrumental reason. To understand the phenomena that Ritzer calls “McDonaldization” and explains with instrumental reason calls for the concepts provided by Marxian theory. McDonaldization can then be identified with what Marx calls real subsumption under capital, that is, the material transformation of production for the express purpose of making it more profitable. The means of McDonaldization support the substantive goal of expansion of value. As we will see, Ritzer is forced to the same conclusion.

Among the “principles of McDonaldization” is “an emphasis on the quantitative aspects of products sold (portion, size, and cost) and services offered (the time it takes to get the product). In McDonaldized systems, quantity has become equivalent to quality; a lot of something, or the quick delivery of it, means it must be good.”\textsuperscript{15} McDonaldization brings about “the assurance that products and services will be the same over time and in all locales … The workers in McDonaldized systems also behave in predictable ways.”\textsuperscript{16} “Homogeneous products dominate a McDonaldized world.”\textsuperscript{17} “Don’t dare ask for a rare burger,” Ritzer advises. “The work routines in the fast-food restaurant

\textsuperscript{15}George Ritzer, McDonaldization, 12.
\textsuperscript{16}George Ritzer, McDonaldization, 13.
\textsuperscript{17}George Ritzer, McDonaldization, 183.
are highly standardized. Even what the workers say to customers is routinized.” What McDonaldized technologies produce are “flattened, featureless products,” food that, on its way to stretching the profit margin, has undergone real subsumption under capital. 18

These principles of McDonaldization, efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control, do not provide the conceptual power to explain a coherent, internally dynamic, and self-reproducing social order. They are shadow forms, not constitutive forms. These shadow forms have nothing to say about why the products of McDonaldization take the form of commodities, or why McDonaldized workers work for a wage, or why profits matter. Marx’s observation that “In capitalist production the tendency for all products to be commodities and all labor to be wage-labor, becomes absolute” has no traction. 19 On the contrary, Ritzer’s Weberian conception of McDonaldization bypasses the basic questions concerning the social form and purpose of wealth and the production of wealth. There is no conceptual path from these “principles of McDonaldization” to any actual social forms and purposes characteristic of capitalist societies. The path goes in reverse. Without definite social forms and purposes, these shadow forms presuppose an illusory “economy in general” as the backdrop to McDonaldization. Marx argues that capital has the immanent drive to accumulate, but none of the four principles posit any coherent driving force. What guides and limits the pursuit of efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control?

Ritzer makes no bones about the Weberian inspiration for his theory of McDonaldization:

Weber demonstrated in his research that the modern Western world had produced a distinctive kind of rationality … that Weber called formal rationality. This is the sort of rationality we refer to when we discuss McDonaldization or the rationalization process in general. 20 But Ritzer grants that Weber argued that “ultimately, material or, more specifically, economic interests drive rationalization in capitalist societies.” Likewise, Ritzer lists “material interests, especially economic goals and aspirations” among the “three other factors are also important in understanding the drive toward increasing McDonaldization.” In the end, he concedes that “economic factors lie at the root of McDonaldization.” 21

By invoking the term “economic” Ritzer veers from one pseudo-concept to another, one shadow form to another. For there is no “economy in general.” The adjective “economic” refers to aspects of the “economy in general,” but there is no such thing. Reality eventually gets the better of Ritzer; he drops the phony talk of the “economic” and invokes value forms, specifically, profit: Profit-making enterprises pursue McDonaldization because it leads to lower costs and higher profits. Clearly, greater efficiency and increased use of nonhuman technology are often implemented to increase profitability. Greater predictability provides, at the minimum, the climate needed for an organization to be profitable

18 George Ritzer, McDonaldization, 189.
19 Karl Marx, Results of the Immediate Production Process, translated by Rodney Livingstone, in Karl Marx, Capital: Volume One, 1041.
20 George Ritzer, McDonaldization, 23.
and for its profits to increase steadily from year to year. An emphasis on 
calculability, on things that can be quantified, helps lead to decisions that can 
produce and increase profits and makes possible measurements of profitability. 
In short, people and organizations profit greatly from McDonaldization, and as a 
result, they aggressively seek to extend its reach.\footnote{George Ritzer, \textit{McDonaldization}, 168.}

Ritzer presents all this as though his four “principles of McDonaldization” 
were the driving forces and that is a happy coincidence that they boost 
profitability. But he has put the cart before the horse. His account is inverted, for, 
along with Weber, he has already granted that “economic interests” “drive 
rationalization in capitalist societies.” But that is to admit that his four 
“principles of McDonaldization” are derivative. They are not even co-
constitutive principles of capitalist societies; rather, they are shadow forms. 
Instrumental reason is a shadow form. The four “principles of McDonaldization” 
are no principles; they are abstractions from the actual principle of real 
subsumption under capital, that is, the material transformation of production and 
products to increase profitability, what Marx also calls the drive to increase 
relative surplus-value.

McDonaldization, then, is all about capital’s reach; “Mc” is the prefix of real 
subsumption.

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Abstract: The paper analyzes the nature, objectives and trends of African social and political philosophy. It distinguishes two major axis: identity and emancipation of Africa as well as democracy and cultural diversity. The former includes theories such as negritude, African socialism, African humanism, pan-Africanism, while the latter concentrates on ideas of democracy, civil society and cultural diversity.

Introduction

African social and political philosophy is deeply interlaced with the daily life of African people. Therefore, the paper explores the development of this philosophy in agreement with some major events characterizing African history from the colonial period up to now. The paper is divided into four sections. The first section explores both the object and nature of African social and political philosophy. Three objectives are considered: the well-being of African people, the issue of power and the search for a suited paradigm of social and political organization. This section also examines the relationship between African social and political philosophy and ontology as well as it reminds some neglected sources of this philosophical thought, such as literature, music and art. The second section concentrates on antecedents of today’s African social and political philosophy, introducing personalities such as Africanus J. B. Horton and the issue of modern African states, Edward W. Blyden about African regeneration, J. E. Casely Hayford with regard to the claim for African self-governance. The third section analyzes ideas of African identity and African emancipation. It puts emphasis on notions such as African socialism, African Humanism, African liberation, and African modernization. The fourth section focuses on the current context of Africa exploring challenges such as African rush towards democracy, African civil society, and cultural diversity. African social and political philosophy is an important field of research. The paper concentrates on its panoramic presentation, evoking main trends and suggesting new debates and challenges. The expression “African political philosophy” will stand for “African social and political philosophy”.

Dr. ALBERT KASANDA, Centre of African Studies and International Research, Brussels, Belgium. Email: albertkasanda@yahoo.fr.

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I. Defining African Political Philosophy

I-1. What is African Political Philosophy about?
African political philosophy is a less explored field of study in comparison to research areas such as metaphysics, anthropology, theology, sociology and economics (Táíwo 2004, 243; Boele van Hensbroeck s.d., 9). Many people confine this discipline to theories of one or another emblematic African leader such as Nkrumah (1909-1972), Senghor (1906-2001) and Nyerere (1922-1999). Others reduce this philosophy to both the vicissitudes and hazards of African politics in considering it as a chronicle of ups and downs of African nations. These two approaches deform the nature of this philosophy and they skip over the effort of African people to frame rationally their social and political organization. As a reflection on the polis, African political philosophy is concerned with people’s everyday life, everyday experience of alliances and collective actions. This reality constitutes its roots and nourishing sap. It is advisable speaking of “common world”, to make use of Arendt’s expression (Arendt 1994). This idea defines political sphere as a space where people reveal themselves to each other as equal, and where they manifest their desire to build together a humanizing community. This anchoring of political philosophy in the common world is unavoidable and necessary at a time, because it is the means by which this philosophy specifies its object and forges its identity. Three classical concerns of political philosophy can be considered as essential to African political philosophy: the well-being of African citizens, the power, and the suited paradigm for social and political organization. The issue of well-being of citizens is a permanent topic of political philosophy. From Socrates up to today, nobody omits this topic even if each philosopher assigns to it a particular content and sketches differently the modalities of its achievement. In this regard, African political philosophers have to deal with multiple challenges: African emancipation, poverty, human rights, gender, and democracy, to mention some few.

African political philosophy also addresses the issue concerning the nature and justification of power. Following questions are often debated: who governs the polis? By which principles does he/she achieve such a duty? According to what modalities and in response to what purpose does he/she rule? The search for a suited paradigm of social and political organization has been reduced to the choice between capitalism and socialism, in Africa. For many leaders, socialism was the best option because it was thought to be in compliance with African culture. Senghor, Nkrumah, Nyerere, Sekou Touré, Mboya have made of this option their priority. Many others leaders remained loyal to capitalism. This was the case of people such as Mobutu (Congo/Zaire), Ahidjo (Cameroon), Eyadema (Togo), and Bongo (Gabon). Beyond this ideological option, they all remained submitted to foreign (Western) interests and policy as well as they developed a philosophy of power based on a single party rule principle.

I-2. African Political Philosophy and Ontology
The relationship between political philosophy and ontology is a fundamental issue because it concerns the relevance of ontological considerations in the sphere of political philosophy, and vice versa. This issue is very complex about Africa: on the one hand, some African philosophers consider the search of African quintessence as an unavoidable background to analyze issues of the polis. On the
other hand, the political sphere is viewed as only a space of empirical attitudes and pragmatism.

The debate on Tempels’ work, *Bantu Philosophy* (1947), contributed to denounce epistemological and cultural imperialism denying the existence of any particular philosophy beyond that inherited from the Greek genius. It also revealed the difficulty for African philosophers to formulate a consensual definition of African philosophy (Bell 2002, 21-22). However, it is convened—at expenses of the concept of philosophy— that African philosophy exists even before the work of Tempels (Bidima 1995, 9). This assertion can be also considered valid about African political philosophy, as this philosophy has always accompanied African people in their search for a better polis. The evoked debate allowed the systematization of premises underlying this search. Theories of African humanism and African socialism, for example, rest on this premise. For many scholars and political leaders the ontology as sustained by Tempels constitutes an invaluable *vade mecum*. The idea of Senghor concerning African peculiarity, for example, rests on this background (Bidima 1995, 13).

This ascendancy of ontology in African political philosophy rises suspicion about two stumbling blocks of political philosophy, formerly denounced by Strauss in his famous lecture: *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie politique?* (Strauss 1992). First of all, it can be mentioned the temptation to consider political philosophy as a particular application or a subcategory of general philosophy, by transposing problems and concepts of the latter in the sphere of politics. The search for African quintessence characterizing political reflection of many African thinkers made this deviation more than likely. Theories such as negritude, African socialism and African humanism are likely the most affected by this criticism, because they put more emphasis on ontological speculation than on the daily struggles of African people (Adotevi 1998, 51-80). This attitude can be compared to what Arendt denounced in her criticism of Plato’s political philosophy: the withdrawal of the thinker from the world (Arendt 1994). According to Arendt’s view, the concept of “world” refers to the notion of “common world” which includes factors that are essential and essentially not philosophical at a time, and they cannot be reduced to metaphysical category. Such is the case of poverty, social exclusion and gender, for example.

The second stumbling block concerns the propensity to perceive political philosophy as a systematization of opinions that are already present in the polis. This perception is the Achilles’ heel of trends of African political philosophy relying on the exhumation of African past and the rehabilitation of African cultures.

I-3. Neglected Sources of African Political Philosophy

This reflection started by an observation about the scarcity of studies and publications on African political philosophy. This observation can make believe that this philosophy is a discourse conceived and expressed only by professional philosophers and political leaders. To think in this way hides the diversity of its

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2 The expression «professional philosophers» is not here opposed to «ethnophilosophers» as it is the case for many scholars classifying African philosophy in categories such as ethnophilosophy, ideological philosophy, and professional philosophy (Smet 1980, Mudimbe 1988). It just refers to the institutionalization of African philosophy.
protagonists and also its modalities of diffusion. More and more studies claim the relationship between African philosophy and other disciplines such as literature, music and art. Scholars such as Appiah (2004), Bidima (2004), Okolo (2007), and Rettová (2013) denounce the prejudice confining mentioned disciplines to the sphere of entertainment, and consequently denying them all aptitude to conceive and express philosophical ideas. As an illustration, let us explore the relationship between African political philosophy and literature.

According to Bidima, “both literature and philosophy have a number of intertextual relationships, particularly as regards three domains: namely, political philosophy, philosophy of history, and aesthetics. One illustrative fact in particular should be emphasized. The political tendency of the critique of ethnophilosophy among African francophone philosophers (...) owes a great deal to numerous passages in Discours sur le colonialisme by the poet Aimé Césaire; which is yet another confirmation of the extent to which philosophy and literature both journey along similar paths” (Bidima 2004, 557).

Taking stand on the existentialist philosophy developed by Sartre (1905-1980) for whom the main broadcasting mode of ideas was theater, Rettová shows both the aptitude and the relevance of literature to express philosophical questions, to reach the public and to call it to an interactive and productive debate (Rettová 2013). In the same vein, Okolo examines the relationship between African literature and political philosophy (Okolo 2007). For Okolo, both these disciplines are equally interested in dealing with ideas. The affinity between them is noticeable in areas such as their moral influence on human behavior, their effect on language, their contribution to development, their social incidence and political criticism (Okolo 2007, 13-22).

The proliferation of African writers interested in African political philosophy strengthens the previous hypothesis that the overlooking of African literature –as well as areas such as music and art- as one of the major loci of production and diffusion of this philosophy is a prejudicial attitude.

II. Precursors of African Political Philosophy

The history of ideas cannot oversee events that have marked the development of Africa, such as slavery and slave trade, colonization, African emancipation and globalization. This section introduces some antecedents of today’s African political philosophy, particularly personalities such as Africanus J. B. Horton (1835-1883), Edward W. Blyden (1832-1912) and J. E. Casely Hayford (1866-1930).

II-1. Africanus J. B. Horton: The Plea for the Constitution of Modern African States

The interdiction of the slave trade propelled England to the rank of the most active marine police in tracking recalcitrant slave-traders. The concern to assure a land of freedom for freed slaves and to re-locate “slaves to become” captured in the triangular trade led British authority to establish, in 1787, the colony of Sierra Leone whose capital city took the name of Freetown (Wesseling 1991, 142). According to Ilife, approximately 74,000 freed slaves were deported to this colony that they dominated soon after thanks to the education received from Church Missionary Society (Ilife 1998, 203), which was based on British cultural
Taking stand on this education, many people from Sierra Leone dreamed about their political freedom. Horton embodied this aspiration. Horton was born from parents of Igbo origin who have been captured by British police on their crossing to slavery, and were relocated in Sierra Leone. He studied at King’s College of London and at University of Edinburgh where he got his doctorate in medicine. During his stay in London and Edinburgh, he adopted the nickname of Africanus which will be associated with his identity and his political engagement. This choice was very challenging in a context where to be different – to be "someone colored" - was not the best asset, as it was during this period that pseudo-scientific racist doctrines, of which Gobineau is one of the striking names, were expanding (Delacampagne 2000, 164-174).

A report of the House of Commons of 1865 proposing the disengagement of British in Western Africa was the opportunity for Horton to express his political concern. This report stipulated that British policy “should be to encourage in the native the exercise of those qualities which may render it possible for us more and more to transfer to the natives the administrations of all the Governments, with a view to our ultimate withdrawal from all, except probably Sierra Leone” (Boele van Hensbroek s.d., 39). In reaction to this report, Horton published, in 1868, West African Countries and Peoples. This work includes a description of Western British African communities and proposals for the implementation of African institutions. Horton aimed at the creation of autonomous West-African British colonies built according to the example of Australia and Canada. Concerning his own native land, for example, he notes that: “constitutional form of government must form the basis of his administration, consisting of House of assembly which should be composed of men elected by the people, as it will be difficult for his Government to stand without popular confidence, and the only means by which that can be secured is by giving the people the power to elect one branch of the Legislature... Each member should have landed property, be over the age of twenty-two, and be properly educated” (Ibid., 44).

Horton was persuaded of the possibility to modernize African States in agreement with the principle of self-government. For him, the mediation of a modern State with a similar experience was necessary to implement such a project. Therefore, he insisted on that British authorities should rather consider it a duty to promote and to oversee the advent of modern African States as part of their mission.

Some people considered Horton as either a paternalist thinker or a voice of British domination because of his favorable attitude about British protectorate. Let’s note that the issue of Western protectorate has been very present in the mind of various African freedom fighters, as many of them considered it as a good strategy towards emancipation. This idea was proposed, for example, by the Belgian scholar, Professor Van Bilsen, concerning Congolese independence. The “Van Bilsen plan” recommended to Belgian Kingdom to keep his Congolese colony for about thirty years more, the necessary period of time to prepare Congolese to assume and manage themselves. Some Congolese leaders accepted this project and included it in their political agenda (M’Bokolo 1985, 201).

II-2. Edward W. Blyden and African Revival

Blyden is native of Saint Thomas, in the Danish Antilles. He arose from black, free and educated parents. In 1850, he went to United States to study theology.
Unfortunately, he was never admitted to any American university because of racial discrimination. Blyden migrated to Liberia, in 1851, thanks to the support of the New York Colonization Society. This new orientation of his life derives from his passion for Africa that he considered as his fatherland. It also derives from his commitment to promote pan-Africanism. Once in Liberia, he took courses at Presbyterian High School of Monrovia. In 1858, he was ordained as a Presbyterian minister of worship.

At the beginning, Blyden defended the abolitionist concern for which slavery, including the deportation of black slaves to America and the return of former slaves or of their descendants to Africa, were part of the divine providence project. God would have allowed these tragedies to happen in order to promote the regeneration of Africa. Thanks to the return of former slaves - now civilized and Christianized - to Africa, the sons of Cham remained in African darkness have access to Christian faith and civilization.

By his work within African communities and thanks to his journeys inside Africa, his studies of African cultures and history - including the study of Arabic and Islamic culture -, Blyden enlarged his knowledge of Africa. This allowed him to make an epistemological break with regard to his original perception of Africa. He got rid of Christian abolitionist hypothesis leaning on a pejorative image of African cultures to justify their eviction. Paradoxically to his position as a Presbyterian worship minister, Blyden does not consider any more Christianity as a universal paradigm and as a suitable factor to regenerate Africa. For him, African cultures must not be annihilated for the benefit of Christianity or in order to regenerate Africa. They must be protected because they are essential to African identity and they hold values that don’t exist in Western culture. Standing on his epistemological break, Blyden develops a new perception of African Regeneration which excludes the purification of black Africa of its alleged paganism. This regeneration must be rooted in African cultures.

The premise according to which all black people of the world are a single nation, and consequently they must unite is one of Blyden’s main ideas. It also constitutes the background of pan-Africanist movement. For Blyden, every race is a natural unit with its own territory and specific mission. He is proud to be black, and he exhorts his fellow black men to behave in the same way: the consciousness and the pride to be black are essential to the progress of Blacks.

Following his abandonment of Christian abolitionist view, Blyden became critical about the mixing of races being even against the idea of identifying as black someone having a drop of black blood. In this respect, his attitude seems rather close to the theory of racial purity. To put things positively, he developed an antiracist racism.

II-3. J. E. Casely Hayford: the Claim for Native Self-Governance
African colonization and its subsequent economic exploitation always did not go without awakening the resistance of local communities. Such was the case, for example, in Sierra Leone, about a colonial law of 1890 aiming at the attribution of idle lands to the Crown (Waste lands, crown lands). This law hurt the patriotic feeling of Sierra Leone’s leaders because, in addition to the land concern, it affected the foundation of their culture and social organization. As a result, «West Africans felt cheated of their land, deprived of their right of self-government,
defrauded of their economical resources and stripped of the very essentials of
their culture and way of life» (Quoted in Boele van Hensbroek s.d., 63).

In reaction to this law, Sierra Leone's intelligentsia set up an association to
defend their rights and to protect their social and cultural assets, named the
"Aboriginals Rights Protection Society" (ARPS). This association also developed
political ambition as it claimed the right of indigenous to their own educational
system and self-government. «We want our education to enable us to develop and
to improve our native ideas, customs, manners and institutions» (Ibid., 62). For
the ARPS leaders, Japan represents the model to follow because this country
rested successfully on its values and traditions while undergoing the assaults of
Western culture under Meiji era.

Casely Hayford who was a journalist and a Cambridge trained lawyer,
counted among noticeable leaders of the ARPS. Contrary to a wide-spread
prejudice considering African cultures as conservative, he was optimistic and he
believed in the potential modernization of these cultures. For him, there was no
contradiction between modernization and African cultures. He thought that like
Japanese traditions, African traditions were able to match the requirements of
modernization if such an opportunity is offered to them. Casely Hayford was
opposed to the idea of cultural purity sustained by Blyden.

III. African Identity and African Emancipation Discourses

III-1. Ethnophilosophy

The term Ethnophilosophy was successful in the
euphoria subsequent to the debate on the existence of African philosophy. Contrary to a wide-spread opinion (Appiah 1992, 85-106; Hallen 2009), this
custom did not appear in the 1970s, particularly as a consequence of the usage
that thinkers such as Hountondji (1970) and Towa (1971) made of it. Its earliest
usage in African philosophy is attributed to Nkrumah. After his Master's degree
in philosophy, in 1943, Nkrumah intended to present a doctoral thesis in
Ethnophilosophy at the American university of Pennsylvania. He drafted a
doctoral dissertation entitled: "Mind and Thought in Primitive Society: A Study
in Ethno-Philosophy with Special Reference to the Akan Peoples of the Gold
Coast, West Africa" (quoted in Hountondji 2004, 533. See also: Hallen 2002, 72).

Out of the evoked reference, there is no comment about the meaning of this
expression. Considering this want of explanation, Hountondji formulated the
hypothesis to search for the meaning of this word in the domain of “ethnics
sciences”. For him, when Nkrumah elaborated his doctoral project
“l’ethnophilosophie (…) était une de ces disciplines nées aux Etats-Unis dans la
foulée des ethnosciences, qui s'étaient elles-mêmes développées à partir de
l'étude ethnolinguistique des langues et cultures amérindiennes: ethnobotanique,
ethnozoologie (…), l'originalité du chercheur qu'était Nkrumah était donc
d'appliquer à sa propre société la théorie et la méthodologie de cette discipline
déjà reconnue”3. In using this expression, Nkrumah sought to promote the idea
according to which anthropology should, by going beyond its traditional topics,
set up "a synthetic ethno-philosophy" through which “[elle] s’efforcerait de

pénétrer les significations les plus fondamentales et les plus profondes qui sous-tendent toute culture, en sorte qu’elle atteigne une Weltanschauung culturelle de base par laquelle l’humanité reconnaîtrait que, malgré les différences de race, de langue et de culture, elle est une en ce sens qu’il n’y a qu’une race: l’Homo sapiens.” (Ibid. Underlined in the text).

The attempt to trace the genesis of the concept Ethnophilosophy clarifies the very contribution of Hountondji and Towa, which consisted in that these two philosophers diverted this expression of its previous and positive meaning, and they consequently assigned to it a pejorative content consisting in a criticism of some philosophical method and attitude. They denounced «une pratique de la philosophie qui se donnait pour tâche de décrire les visions du monde collectives, pratique qui (…) trahissait la vision première de la philosophie qui est non de décrire, mais de démontrer ; non de reconstruire de manière conjecturale le système de pensée de tel ou tel peuple, de telle ou telle société, de tel ou tel groupe de personnes, mais de prendre soi-même position, de manière responsable, sur des questions posées en acceptant la contrainte de justifier de manière rationnelle ces prises de position» (Hountondji, art. cit.). According to Hountondji’s own words: “Le mot existait bien avant les années soixante-dix. Towa et moi ne l’avons pas forgé. Notre seule originalité était de l’utiliser dans un sens péjoratif et polémique pour stigmatiser une pratique que nous rejetions, alors qu’il était jusque-là, quand il était employé, le nom d’un projet consciemment revendiqué” (Ibid. Underlined in the text).

It is advisable to note that Hountondji and Towa evolved in their perception and criticism of ethnophilosophy, as they both recognize some positive contribution of this trend of thought to the development of African philosophy (Ibid.). However, some scholars denounce the silence of Hountondji and Towa on the limits of scientific methods that both thinkers consider as essential to African philosophy. Bidima, for example, criticizes the positivist attitude underlying the thought of both the mentioned thinkers and their lack of coherence regarding epistemological imperialism and obscurantism. He notes: “Hountondji et Towa ont le réflexe d’un positivisme du XIXème siècle qui faisait de la science le sauveur. On surprend chez une attitude bizarre se traduisant par la suspension de l’esprit critique. Tout se passe comme si la réflexion critique qui les anime s’arrêtait au seuil de la science (…) Towa et Hountondji se taisent quand il s’agit de la technoscience, on ne critique plus, on fait confiance à la science qui sauve des impérialismes et obscurantisme. Il y a un glissement d’une attitude critique (…) à une attitude de foi. Leur discours sur la technoscience est celui de l’idéologie dominante qui, pour mieux capter, saisit chaque objet en le coupant de la réalité de ses contradictions” (Bidima 1995, 99).

Ethnophilosophy and African Political Philosophy. Ethnophilosophy is based on the assumption that “there is a metaphysical system, and an ideology, embodied in the traditional wisdom, the institutions and the languages of Africa” (Kaphagawani 2000, 89). It aims at trashing out from myths, folktales, beliefs, proverbs, and languages, “the quintessential African approach to the world” (Ibid.). This project aims at disqualifying the racist discourse defending the ruling system. Thinkers such as Hegel, Kant, Hume, count among those who shared this discourse. Hegel’s attitude to reject Africa from the world history under the pretext that this continent doesn’t have any contribution to the history of the world is one of the most frequently evoked illustration in this respect (Eze 1997,
Against this attitude, protagonists of ethnophilosophy looked for equivalences between African heritage and Western culture. Some among them dedicated themselves to make the inventory of African contributions to the history and development of humankind (Bidima 1995, 29-31). Standing on this background, ethnophilosophy can be viewed as both a political attitude and a research method.

Thinkers such as Tempels (1948), J. Mbiti (1970), and Gyekye (1987), to quote a few, represent this trend of thought. African leaders of the first generation, such as Kaunda, Senghor, Nyerere, Nkrumah, can be viewed as pragmatic ethnophilosophers, for relying on both ethnophilosophical methodology and perspective to perform their political project. Their search for African quintessence through the exhumation of African past is illuminating in this respect.

It is also advisable noting that Ethnophilosophy is not a single theory (Bell 2002, 22-23). It includes two major trends: universalistic approach and particularistic perspective. These approaches rest on the metaphysical premise asserting the uniqueness of the being. They differ from each other in that the former universalizes its assertions on cultural unity while the latter emphasizes the diversity of African cultures. Thinkers such as Tempels (1945), Mbiti (1977), and Senghor (1995) illustrate the universalistic trend, while Scholars like Gyekye (1987) and Wiredu (1996) represent particularistic approach that aims “to show that cultures differ – specifically cultures within sub-Saharan Africa - and that each has its own coherence and distinctive truth - functional way in which it conceives of and expresses its world. The philosophy of one culture is not to be extended to another – thought there may be a number of family resemblances between cultures. Thus the Dogon and Yoruba, the Sambura and Dinka, the Kuria and Bambara, the Zulu and San have differing cosmological, ethical, and social systems that may be seen to be coherent world views in their own right” (Bell 2002, 23).

Criticism of Ethnophilosophy as a Trend of Political Philosophy. Subsequently to works of Hountondji (1970) and Towa (1971), the concept ethnophilosophy originated productive debates: Appiah (1992, 185-106), Bell (2002, 22-26), Mudimbe (1988), and Eboussi-Boulaga (1977). Two criticisms can be applied to its usage in the context of African political philosophy: the temptation to consider political philosophy as collective and anonymous thought, and the ascendancy of ontology in political philosophy.

To consider philosophy as a collective thought implies the exemption of thinkers from their statements by covering them with the authority and the anonymity of cultural traditions. As a result, this approach cancels all responsibility of African leaders and thinkers on their own action and thought. It is worth reminding that this perception gave support to authoritarianism as it sterilized all political debate in the name of African cultural traditions.

The search for unicity favors the escape into ontology, as it promotes the ignorance of the common world. This attitude encourages what Arendt called the "retreat of the thinker from the world" (Arendt 1994), and that Césaire qualified as the search for “ontological satisfaction” in his criticism of Tempels (Césaire 1955, 36-37).

III-2. Concerning African Identity
The concern for African identity rests on two premises: the rehabilitation of African cultures and the threat of cultural homogenization due to globalization. Let’s focus on Senghor’s perception of African peculiarity.

Negritude: A Struggle for Recognition and Cultural Rehabilitation. Negritude is one of the best known movements struggling for both African recognition and rehabilitation. For its protagonists, it is essential to assume being black, to cultivate ones pride and self-appreciation. That is the reason why, being themselves in a situation of despair, contempt and powerlessness, the founders of this movement didn’t have another choice than the courage “to get rid of (their) loaned clothes, those of the assimilation, and to assert their being, that is (their) negritude.” Sartre saw in this movement a kind of paradox consisting of a “negation of the negation of black people”.

The claim for the recognition of black peculiarity put the question of identity in the heart of negritude’s concern, as it implies the statement of constituent features of this peculiarity. Senghor remains one of the most enlightening thinkers on the issue. According to him, contrary to Western people for whom Reason constitutes the fundamental characteristic, black people are characterized by the ascendancy of emotion. Emotion defines their epistemology and configures their world vision (Senghor 1995). The famous aphorism according to which “the emotion is as negro as the reason is Hellenic” seems to be the best synthesis of this perception of African peculiarity (Kasanda 2013, 213).

This theory of Senghor provoked a general outcry of African intelligentsia. Some people considered it as the continuation of Western racism towards black people (Adotevi 1998, 99-105). Others denounced the essentialism characterizing this perception (Eboussi-Boulaga, 1977) that puts all black people of the planet in the same and unique category of black race, and this without any consideration for specific trajectories of various social groups and individuals (Kelman 2005). Some others thought of this analysis as a treason of African struggle.

Senghor is aware of those criticisms. He wrote: “Some (...) Negro intellectuals (...) have reproached me for having reduced the knowledge of the African negro to pure emotion, and for having denied that African negro is endowed with reason and technical knowledge” (Senghor 1995, 121). In his own defense, he sustains that Reason is unique and common to everybody, but its articulations and modalities of application depend on psychological and physiological features of every race. Therefore, he maintains his idea according to which West is characterized by its reference to analytical reason, whereas African universe is based on intuitive and participative reason. He notes: “They have read me absent-mindedly (...) Reason has always existed (...) Reason is one, in the sense that it is made for the apprehension of the Other, that is, of objective reality. Its nature is governed by its own laws; but its modes of knowledge, its ‘forms of though’- are diverse and tied to the psychological and physiological make up of each race (...) The reason of classical Europe is analytic through civilization, the reason of the African negro, intuitive through participation.” (Ibid.).

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4 This section is based on our work: Kasanda (2013).
5 http://www.tidiane.net/culture/afrique-negritude.htm.
6 http://www.tidiane.net/culture/afrique-negritude.htm.
The reaction of Senghor is far from calming down criticisms due to his perception of African peculiarity. Let’s leave aside this interesting debate, and underline the originality of Senghor’s intuition. Senghor developed his reflection in a racist context. In the first half of the twentieth century, France or rather Europe was under influence of racist theories inherited from the nineteenth century, for which thinkers such as Blumenbach (1752-1840) and Gobineau (1816-1882) are among the most representative (Delacampagne 2000). Senghor was aware of these surrounding theories. His originality consists in the reversal of stigmas and claiming for racial difference. It is in this perspective that he interprets emotion not as the reign of low instincts, but as a source of high spirituality and deep sense of artistic creativity (Mosley 1995, 219).

The concern for the emancipation of African cultures is still relevant even nowadays, as numerous studies postulate a potential disappearance of cultural diversity because of globalization (Barber 1996. Fornet-Betancourt 2011). In this respect, it is worth assuming that the point here is not only the defense of black people and cultures for themselves, but also the claim for recognition of human diversity and defense of otherness.

Senghor doesn’t consider difference as a sign of exclusion nor as an expression of any antagonism. On the contrary, it is and it should be the hyphen between peoples and cultures, because it contributes to their mutual enrichment. Therefore, he pleads for a civilization of the universal: “Le rendez-vous du donner et du recevoir”. Such a civilization doesn’t absorb other people and cultures, but it calls for the knowledge of values of the other cultural and geographical areas through dialogue (Senghor 1995. Shutte 1998).

III-3. About African Modernization

Since African independence, the idea of modernization appears at the top of the schedule of African countries. Two reasons explain this priority at the same time as they suggest the content of this discourse: the African deficit of development and the desire of African leaders to distinguish their project of society from colonial purposes.

_African Modernization as a Development Project._ Strictly speaking, the concepts of modernization and development are not synonyms. However, they can stand for each other to refer to a worldwide pattern in which local cultures and communities undergo important changes due to different factors at both the national and international levels. Those factors include the need to improve human living conditions, technological progress and sciences. With regard to Africa, these two concepts express the Westernization or the Americanization of African communities regarding economy, science and technology. In this respect and as Karp and Masolo observed “Africans have been ambivalently drawn to both sides of the dominant and competing development ideologies and strategies. (…) The debate between collective and individual reason or between reason and culture produce antagonistic categories and ambivalences similar to those found in the Enlightenment period from which capitalist ideology derives its terms” (Karp and Masolo 2000, 175).

However, modernization of Africa was mainly conceived as a “jump forward” in a linear progress. In this perspective, it refers to the idea of “catching up” Western nations by overcoming the accumulated delay of African nations on technological equipment and sciences. Modernization was thought as the
cornerstone of the struggle against stagnation which represented, according to the American President, H. Truman, a challenge for humankind and also a threat to rich nations (Gélinas 1994, 24). African leaders followed philosophies of development proposed by both the world ruling countries and institutions (Karp and Masolo 2000, 175). The heel of Achilles of those philosophies is that they are not rooted in the “common world” of African people. Consequently they don’t match African expectations. The balance sheet of Structural Adjustment Program imposed to Africa in the 1980s is illuminating in this respect (Traoré 1999, 39-51).

This situation calls for a permanent critical approach to development, its mechanisms and articulations. Several African scholars get involved in this process, regardless of their domain of investigation, analyzing topics such as African knowledge and development (Wiredu 2000, Eboussi-Boulaga 2000, Hountondji 2004, Karp and Masolo 2000, 175-258), African culture and human rights (Njoku 2004), African economic growth and global economy (Moyo 2009), globalization, international cooperation and governance policy (Lauer 2007).

Modernization as a Reform of African political institutions. Two trends can be outlined in this respect: the will to keep as such structures inherited from colonization and the desire to transform them in agreement with African cultures (Teffo 2004, 443-449). More than a simple choice between two political reforms, this dilemma concerned the nature of African state.

Majority of African leaders opted for Western paradigm because they considered it able to overcome ethnic cleavages and to contribute to the rise of modern African states. The opponents to this option think that building African state on account of a Western paradigm leads to the absorption of African peculiarity. Such a state is nothing else than a centralized entity that has nothing to do with the people’s reality. Consequently, they insist in organizing the state in agreement with African traditions (Wiredu 1996, 155-190).

These two perspectives constitute the background on which are debated issues such as democracy, one party rule, development, human rights, African integration in both the regional and international (and economic) structures (Wiredu 1996, Eze 1997). III-4. Struggle for African Liberation
The concept of liberation expresses the experience of majority of human beings consisting in the struggle to break chains of domination and exploitation, as well as to overcome the subsequent poverty. In Latin America this expression favors the concern for the “poor” as a category of victims of the ruling system (Dussel 2002), while in Africa, this notion refers first of all to the idea of national sovereignty. Let’s explore some of its penetrating formulations: African “désaliénation”, African humanism, African socialism, and pan-Africanism. Fanon and the «Désaliénation» of Africa. Fanon’s impact on African philosophy is noticeable (Hallen 2009, 98-99, Keucheyan 2010, 281). He was persuaded that colonization caused deep traumas in African people. In order to promote a new African society, Fanon aimed at the purification of mind of former colonized people from negative representations of themselves inherited from colonization. Works such as Peau noire, masque blanc (1975) and Les damnés de la terre (1979) are instructive in this respect.

Fanon distinguishes individual alienation from collective alienation. The former focuses on individual sphere as it deals with the assimilation of
stereotypes and prejudices by individuals. Such is the case concerning, for example, the myth of superiority of white man, and reversely the idea of inferiority of black people (Fanon 1975). The latter refers to social sphere, to African collective life. For Fanon, many African leaders and members of labor unions, for example, have a deep complex towards their fellow countrymen, particularly to peasants and illiterate (Fanon 1979).

Considering this double context, Fanon thinks that African emancipation cannot be a simple permutation of roles between colonizers and colonized. It rather implies a radical change: the exorcism of African mind. African Humanism. It is worth noting that the idea of African humanism doesn’t fully coincide with Western perception of humanism. If these two approaches consider the human being as their starting point, they interpret it differently. The Western perspective puts emphasis on human being as an individual being; the individual is viewed as able to perform and acquire knowledge about different aspects of human life as well as to manage, by virtue of his/her reason, a political order that is useful to his/her own self-realization as a human being (Spitz 1996). African conceptions of humanism insist on human being as a social being. For this approach, the individual is a relational being; he/she is viewed as a “bridge maker” or a “hyphen” between different beings.

For Senghor, human being remains also the measure of everything. It is on account of this premise that he criticized Marxism to stress on “materialism and determinism, praxis and means, to the detriment of dialectics and ethics (...) to the detriment of man and his freedom”. (Senghor 1964, 76; quoted in Taiwo 2004, 246). Senghor describes African humanism as follows: “Thus, though our humanism must have West African man as its major objective. It cannot, without peril, end with West Africa, not even with all of Africa. An effective humanism must be open; it obviously includes not only Malianism (...) but also nationalism and pan-Negroism, (...) pan-Africanism and, with greater reason pan-Arabism. The one “Pan-isme” that meets twentieth-century requirements is (...) pan-humanism- a humanism that includes all men on the dual basis of their contribution and their comprehension (Ibid.).

It also is advisable noting the emergence of the concept of Ubuntu as an expression of African humanism. This idea has been popularized by the Anglican archbishop Tutu within the framework of his responsibility as the head of Justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. For Tutu, the concept of Ubuntu can be considered as “a central feature of the African Weltanschauung (...) Ubuntu is very difficult to render into Western languages. It speaks of the

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8See also: Memmi (1985).
very essence of the human being. When we want to give high praise to someone we say, ‘Yu, U nobuntu’; ‘Hey, he or she has ubuntu’. This means they are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate. They share what they have. It also means my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs. We belong in a bundle of life. We say, ‘a person is a person through other people’. It is not ‘I think therefore I am’. It says rather: ‘I am human because I belong.’ I participate, I share.” (Tutu 1999, 34 – 35. Underlined in the original).9

**African Socialism.** It is worth keeping in mind that since the last decade of the twentieth century, African socialism is no longer an appraised topic in African political and philosophical landscape. However, this trend of thought is still significant as an original contribution to African intellectual history as well as a specific address of African intellectuals on “issues of (…) colonialism, neocolonialism, Africa as a victim of the so-called cold war (…) where Africa’s best interests lie when it comes to contemporary social, political, and economic development” (Hallen 2009, 94).

African socialism was a syncretic attempt to reconcile Marxism, Christianity, modern economic theories and African values. The Dakar Colloquium10 revealed two major trends of this socialism: humanitarian socialism and scientific socialism. The former relied on precolonial African values and traditions as the starting point to tackle African people’s needs and to build a new Africa. This option rested on the idea that socialism is closed to African world vision. In this respect, the *Ujamaa Project* launched by Nyerere is an illuminating illustration. The latter form of African socialism puts emphasis on scientific objectivity and considers socialism as a universal doctrine that is free from all cultural admixture. National peculiarities are not important, as they are only a result of social praxis, and in any case they are not contrary to the ideal of universal brotherhood. Nkrumah can be mentioned as one of the leading figures in this respect. To disentangle a bit this distinction, let us sketch the vision of African socialism developed by these two statesmen: Nyerere and Nkrumah.

Nyerere is also known as “Mwalimu”, the Swahili term standing for “Teacher”. He was the leader of the party11 that led Tanzania to national emancipation in 1961. Like many leaders of his generation, he became the first president of this new country. His Tanzanian socialism, qualified as *Ujamaa* (the Swahili concept for “family-hood”), drew on African culture and traditions. For Nyerere, there was an African style of life, traditions and values in precolonial Africa, particularly in Tanzania. These values and traditions must be regenerated in order to build a new African nation-state free from the spirit of capitalism. According to Hallen, traditional values of greatest significance for Nyerere were: “that every member of society was expected to do work of some form as a contribution to their own well-being and thereby that of the community, and for that reason every one deserved to be rewarded sufficiently to satisfy their needs; that the sense of being a community (*ujamaa*), on the part of the people was

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11 The Tanganyika African Union (TANU) was created in 1954. It became later «Chama Cha Mapinduzi» (The Revolutionary Party).
conscious and was significant in terms of determining their relationship with and regard for one another” (Hallen 2009, 97).

In Nyerere’s opinion, capitalism could destroy this humanitarian worldview because of both its individualism and propensity for the exploitation of other people. Nyerere is distrustful of theories that value class antagonism (capitalists against workers, for example) and present this conflict as motivating force for social change. For him, this way of thinking is not relevant to Africa (Tanzanian) because there are very few capital owners, and subsequently majority of people are subsistence farmers. Nyerere wanted an ideology that is pragmatic and tailored for African context. He encapsulated his socialist project in One-party rule, which he thought to be representative of African way of living.

Nkrumah also assumed the existence of precolonial African values. He equally insisted on the opposition of these values to Western world vision, as he considered them more communally than individually oriented. Subsequently, he thought of capitalism as not able to bring development for African people. For political reasons, he served both the masters at a time: capitalism and socialism. Hallen notes in this respect: “Nkrumah was no overt enemy of the so-called West but, obviously, he was no champion of it either since he had negotiated the liberation of his country from European (British) rule. The Cold War between East and West unquestionably had an effect on his international policies and status. In certain respects he was forced to play both ends (East and West) against the middle (himself and his country’s interests), eventually at some cost” (Hallen 2009, 96).

Contrary to Nyerere, Nkrumah was more theoretically and a speculatively inclined. For him, African cultural heritage must be systematized prior to all usage and philosophical considerations. He insisted on African Consciencism that he considered to be not a psychological attitude, but the “effect, the expression, the articulation (…) of a people’s cultural predispositions at a particular point in time. Once articulated (…), it can then be refined and explicitly instituted by deliberate social and political programs” (Hallen 2009, 96-97. Hence, for him, African socialism has “to be a formalized, (economically and politically) institutionalized expression of indigenous humanitarian social and moral values.” (Ibid.)

African socialism didn’t survive its founders. This disappearance doesn’t imply the end of the search for a suitable paradigm of social and political organization. Many former defenders of socialism have recycled themselves joining alternative trends of thought and critical of liberalism such as post-colonial theory, ecology and sustainable development, global justice and debt issue, intercultural dialogue, and so forth.

Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism originated in African Diaspora at the end of the nineteenth century, and spread in Africa in the beginning of the twentieth century. It relies on the premise that black people all over the world constitute a single race; they have a common destiny and therefore they must unite to fight against humiliation, injustice and discrimination inflicted on them by the West. The paternity of this thought is commonly attributed to Blyden. This movement had many leaders, different philosophical interpretations and political strategies. People such as Booker T. Washington (1856-1915), for example, considers that

12 See also : Appiah 1992, 158-172.
this solidarity has to begin with the sensitization and education of Blacks; for Marcus Garvey (1887-1940), the emancipation of black people includes their return to Africa. W.B. Du Bois (1868-1963) structured this movement giving to it a theoretical frame and defining its objectives. He chaired the five first Pan-African congresses.

The torch of Pan-Africanism was transmitted to African leaders thanks to the support of G. Padmore (1903-1959). Nkrumah became the chief proponent of the movement, sometimes to the detriment of the interests of his own country (Appiah 1992, 158-172). He organized both the sixth and the seventh Pan-African congresses in Ghana, Kumasi (1953) and Accra (1958). Several African leaders also joined the movement such as Fanon, Diop, Sekou Touré, Modibo Keita, to quote a few. For African Diaspora, racial solidarity aimed at the rehabilitation of black people and the claim for their civil rights, while for African leaders, this solidarity aimed at African emancipation. Two tendencies shaped pan-Africanist movement in Africa: «maximalist» pan-Africanism and «minimalist» pan-Africanism.

«Maximalist» pan-Africanism contests the division of Africa inherited from the Conference of Berlin (1884-1885). It aims at the recomposition of African geopolitics through the creation of a wide state structure susceptible to transform Africa into a major economic, political and cultural level: the "United States of Africa". Nkrumah, Nasser, Modibo Keita, Sekou Touré were among defenders of this tendency. «Maximalist» pan-Africanist project came up against two obstacles: first, the resistance of former colonial powers who saw in this project an infringement on their interests; secondly, the lacking support from the world leading countries, such as the Soviet Union, China and the United States.

«Minimalist» pan-Africanism insists on the right of every African state to be autonomous and sovereign. This tendency defends the intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization and it advocates for the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of every African country. Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor are representative of this trend which gave rise to the Organization of African Unity (1963), which later became the African Union (2001).

The search for African unity on account of the idea of race has been a topic of severe criticism. According to Appiah, for example, the definition of African unity on such a basis follows Crummel’s world vision which claims both racial purity and community. Taking a stand on the experience of Nazism, Appiah considers this form of pan-Africanism to be a threat for common life and African unity itself. For him, Africa should unite more on basis of common issues such as ecological challenges, struggles against poverty and underdevelopment, than around the idea of race (Appiah 1992, 180).

However, the concern for the rehabilitation of African cultures remains a preoccupation for many scholars and researchers on African studies: Appiah; People such as Molefi Kete Asante and Kemi Seba lean on the intellectual legacy of C.A. Diop to claim the cultural unity of Africa, while scholars such as Appiah (1992; 2006), Karp and Masolo (2000), Eze (1997), Wirdu (1996), Wamba-dia-Wamba (1994) and many more explore challenges such as democracy, African cultural diversity and globalization.
IV. African Democratic Turn

African political landscape has dramatically changed in the two last decades of the twentieth century due to factors such as the collapse of communist system, the change of development aid policies by the international financiers and Western countries, the disappearance of one party rule, the liberalization of African economies (Mbembe 2005). This change originated new challenges for African political philosophy; consequently, topics such as democracy, good governance, cultural diversity, ecology, gender, peace, justice and reconciliation, have become of major interest. This section explores three topics: democracy, African civil society and African cultural diversity.

IV-1. Rush Towards Democracy

The yearning for democracy was expressed through the criticism of the single party regime that dominated African political scene during more than a quarter of a century. This criticism denounces the unpopularity of the single party rule and its sophism about, for example, the usage of African traditions as a basis to both social and political organizations (Eboussi-Boulaga, 1977). In addition to that, single party rule was not able to achieve its own promises on development, eradication of tribalism and construction of national unity (Appiah 1992, 158-172). This situation gave rise to the craze for liberal democracy. However, the history of Africa reveals that, soon after independence, majority of African countries had opted for political pluralism. Most of them gave up this option for the advantage of single party rule. The idea of national unity, the concern for development and the desire abide by African cultures were evoked to justify this change of paradigm.

With respect to this antecedent, it is worth wondering about the increase in value justifying this return to democracy. Does this change outline new values that are favorable for a better living and development of Africans? What do African leaders understand by democracy? How do they consider its achievement? These questions generate a long debate that can be divided into two tendencies: universalistic trend and particularistic approach to democracy.

Universalistic Trend of Democracy. This perception is actually the most widely shared among African thinkers. It borrows its main ideas from conceptions of democracy putting emphasis on human rights, civil society, freedom of speech and freedom of association, freedom of religion, separation of powers, multi-party rule and free elections.

This approach suffers from a gap between the claim for principles of democracy and their concretization. Indeed, democracy is more than a matter of principles, as it deals with people’s culture and traditions. In this perspective, it constitutes a permanent struggle against egocentricity and obscurantism. Escapades of African leaders regarding their endless reign illustrate how much the concern for principles for themselves can be a piece of bluff for democracy. Universalistic approach to democracy rested on the premise that democracy is a sacred and untouchable principle that is valuable for everybody regardless of time, social and historical peculiarities. For this premise, any potential dysfunction would not be attributable to the ruling institutions as such, but rather to individuals, particular cultures and traditions. It is in this sense that many studies on African political philosophy fall in excessive generalization and condemnation.
of African cultures as not being able to assume fundamental principles of democracy.

**Particularistic Approach to Democracy.** Protagonists of particularistic perception to democracy have something in common with the defenders of universalistic perspective: the rejection of single party rule. For Wiredu, for example, “the disappearance of the one–party system from the African scene is, and should remain, un lamented” (Wiredu 1998, 378). The reason to adopt this attitude is not, according to Wiredu, “to flog a dead horse; it is, in fact, to point out the good parts of a bad case. One valid point which was made again and again by the one-party persuaders is that there is no necessary connection between democracy and the multi-party system. An associated insight was that indigenous African systems of politics (…) offered examples of democracy without multi-party mechanism” (Ibid.). According to Wiredu, the drive towards liberal democracy has been achieved “under sustained Western pressure to adopt the multi-party way of life” (Wiredu 1998, 378-379).

Wiredu considers the alleged universalistic approach to democracy as a transplanted model from Western to Africa. Taking stand on that this approach doesn’t take into consideration any African peculiarity, its opponents call for a wide scope of forms of democracy through which every culture can be represented. Several among them defend the idea that democracy must be rooted in the culture of each people. It is in this perspective that people such as Wiredu develops a plea for a non-party polity (Wiredu 1996,182-190); Wamba-dia-Wamba sustains the idea of palaver democracy (see: Boele van Hensbroek s.d., 216); Wamala explores the idea of African monarchical democracy (Wamala 2004), while Teffo defends the premise that indigenous cultures are holders of suitable traditions of democracy that must be retrieved (Teffo 2004, 444-445), while Gyekye explores both the coherence and democratic treats of traditional African thought (Gyekye 1988).

**IV-2. African Civil Society**

African civil society is a heterogeneous compound including organizations such as labor unions and student associations, but also a multitude of social actors such as human rights activists, gender protagonists, Churches, ethnic and cultural associations. This grouping came to light after the collapse of single party rule and thanks to the support of international organizations (Kabarhuza et al. 2003, 23-25).

The mission statement of African civil society can be resumed in three points: the concern for self-regulation of modern African society; the legitimization of African state, and issues regarding the participation of citizens in decision making spheres, equality and justice (Kabarhuza et al. 2003, 22-25). African civil society promoted major political changes in Mali (Traoré 1999), Cameroon (Gatshi 2001), and Democratic Republic of Congo (Houtart 2005, Kabarhuza et al. 2003), for example.

African civil society still committed to both the preservation of benefits of democracy and the conquest of new spaces concerning, for example, gender, ecology, peace and mediation of conflicts, cultural diversity and recognition. The multiplicity of organizations integrating this compound make difficult a global analysis of the philosophy underlying their respective action. In this respect, a case by case study can be considered as an opportune attitude (Houtart 2005).
African Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue

Cohesion and unity were essential for African independence fighters. As Appiah outlined on account of his own experience as a child in Ghana, during the struggle against colonialism, the myth of African unity— including the idea of national unity—was so powerful that nobody could think of diversity of African cultures. He notes: “I grew up knowing that I live in Asante and that the Asantehene was our king. I also grew up singing enthusiastically the Ghanaian national anthem (…) and knowing that Nkrumah was, first, our prime minister, then, our president. It did not occur to me as a child that the “we”, of which this “our” was the adjective, was fluid, ambiguous, obscure” (Appiah 1992, 158). This consciousness of the diversity constituting the “we” was even more occulted by the single party rule which, under the pretext of national unity and development, occulted and suppressed all kind of diversity (Kasanda 2013, 216-222).

For many years, the debate on African diversity focused on relationship between Europe and Africa, putting emphasis on the opposition between modern and traditional, progress and stagnation. Nowadays, this issue involves internal challenges of African communities, such as ethnic membership and national identity, power, human rights and gender. Many studies denounce the standardizing paradigm inherited from one party rule; while many others explore how complex is the notion of African identity as well as they develop a plea for the integration of Africa in the current world context which is characterized by issues such as global market, cosmopolitanism, global solidarity and intercultural dialogue. Scholars and writers such as Achebe (2000), Ngugi (1986), Mudimbe (1988), Appiah (1992; 2006), Wiredu (1996; 2003), Eze (1997), Amselle and Mbokolo (1999), and Bayart (1989), to mention a few, are illuminating in this respect.

Conclusion

This paper explored the nature, features and trends of African political philosophy. This philosophy is rooted in everyday life of African people, and it has as main objectives the well-being of African populations, both the nature and legitimization of power, as well as the search for a well-suited paradigm of social organization. Topics analyzed included the question of negro-African identity and solidarity, African revival and the building of modern African states. The struggle against colonization put forward ideas of African emancipation and cultural rehabilitation, particularly through discourses of negritude, African humanism, African socialism and Pan-Africanism. Standing on the changes which occurred at the end of the twentieth century, we examined new challenges including democracy, human rights, cultural diversity, gender, sustainable development and globalization. These challenges represent a long-term duty for African thinkers who are called to get out of their ivory tower and join the common world, assuming a permanent reflexive equilibrium between their philosophical intuitions and constraints of people’s daily life, in order to bring successfully to completion such a mission. The future of African depends on such a critical attitude.
References


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SYSTEMS AND LIFEWORLDS: A HABERMASIAN CRITIQUE OF MAJOR TRENDS IN CLASSICAL INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Ajay Verma*

Abstract: In the present paper I would give a brief exposition of the distinctions between lifeworld and systems as expounded by Habermas. In the backdrop of this distinction I would present a philosophical review of some of the epistemological and ontological theories propounded by the chief proponents of realist (Nyāya), idealist (Buddhist) and linguistic/grammarian (Bhartrhari) schools of thought in Indian philosophy. In this project I would be guided by an interest to discover if there were any schools of thought in classical India which had tenets supportive of a Lifeworld rather than a System.

My submission here is that any universal claim of linguistic understanding through tradition as argued by some major orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, can only be maintained if it is realized that the context of tradition as a focal point of possible truth and factual agreement could as well be at the locus of factual untruth and continued force. My further contention is that given Mimamsaka’s and Bhartrhari’s skepticism regarding the role of communicative rationality in the Habermasian sense of the term, there is no possibility of imaging a lifeworld under these systems. Thus the kind of social ontologies that could possibly emerge from the tenets of the above discussed schools of Indian philosophy could never be of the nature of the lifeworld since there is no possibility of communicative actions under the tenets of these thought systems. One of the foremost tasks of philosophers is to look for order in the way things are or suggest ways that may make a better order possible among things. Habermas takes up the same old cause of philosophy and looks afresh at the question of social order especially in the wake of a post-Heideggerian hermeneutical turn in answer to this question. But the question – how are things ordered? – is subsequent to the question – what is the actual nature of things? In general ‘what’ questions are always prior to ‘how’ questions since order of things (how) cannot be studied in isolation from our ontological presumptions (what) regarding those things. Similarly it is important to first study the ontological nature of society to theorize about the order of society. Habermas’ views on these issues have already been a subject of vast discussions among scholars, but Habermas’ theory of social ontology and its metaphysics is important not only from the socio-political point of view but also from the point of view of how it throws into relief the link between ontological presumptions and ethical beliefs within a particular philosophical system. In this regard Habermas’ distinction between Lifeworld and Systems is crucial. The distinction between lifeworld and systems is built upon a further distinction between instrumental or strategic actions on one hand and

*AJAY VERMA, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi. Email: averma@philosophy.du.ac.in
communicative actions on the other. In the present paper I would give a brief exposition of the distinctions between lifeworld and systems as expounded by Habermas. In the backdrop of this distinction I would present a philosophical review of some of the epistemological and ontological theories propounded by the chief proponents of realist (Nyāya), idealist (Buddhist) and linguistic/grammatician (Bhartrhari) schools of thought in Indian philosophy. In this project I would be guided by an interest to discover if there were any schools of thought in classical India which had tenets supportive of a Lifeworld rather than a System.

I. Habermas’ Conception of System and Lifeworld

That the things should be intelligible to us is not only a philosophical incumbency but a psychological need as well. If things make sense to us then our actions directed towards those things also make sense. That means to say that our actions depend upon how we look at the objects around us. This further implies that one of the ways to justify our actions could be to give a cognitive explanation of the world around us. But this is only the empirical part of the issue. Our judgments and cognitions are not value free. We have no direct value free pre-linguistic connection with the world. The ways things seem to us are also the ways we have chosen to see them. Our language provides us pre-determined choices regarding how we could see the world. Since we share the language with the community, we share our ways of acting towards the world as well. Thus actions are communicative just like language essentially is at least in its free speech use.

Habermas maintains that a correct understanding of meaning of an action is tantamount to correct grasp of the reasons for which it is performed. Further he argues that these reasons are embedded in the linguisticality of our being. Since language is a shared phenomenon the action and its meaning and reasons for which it is performed should in principle be accessible both to the interpreter and the agent, rather than being in the domain of agent alone. Thus in Habermas’ philosophy the problem of understanding the meaning of an action depends upon the understanding of the reasons for which it is performed all of which are subject to public domain. One could take it a step further from here and argue that the problem of how the meaning generating process becomes possible in language has an intimate connection with the question – how does knowledge become possible in language. Further fallout of this conception would be that our ideas regarding knowledge and language have an important bearing upon how we act and how we understand actions. If the problem of understanding actions rests upon problems of meaning and language then the arena of our inquiry into meaning of actions becomes much wider. We have to remember that Habermas is writing in Post-Heideggerian period and is greatly influenced by philosophical hermeneutical tradition of Heidegger and Gadamer. The gamut of language as we all know is too vast. We give command in language so do we denote and in the same act connotate. Above all we understand and articulate questions regarding language and subsequent answers to them also in language. Depending upon which aspect of language we give primacy over others our view regarding actions would also differ. Habermas gives primacy to what he calls pragmatic function of speech over its denotative and imperative roles. According to Habermas primary function of language is to bring interlocutors to a shared understanding and to

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facilitate an intersubjective consensus among them. Habermas argues that this function of language should always have priority over its function of denoting the way the world is. Habermas writes: “One simply would not know what it is to understand the meaning of a single linguistic expression if one did not know how one could make use of it in order to reach understanding with someone about something.”¹ There is teleological strand running within this conception of speech. When two or more persons enter into a dialogue then it is through the tracks and path thus revealed to them within the gamut of language that they discover a common ground to meet what Habermas calls ‘rationales Verständnis’ which means consensus reached on the basis of rationality. He uses the word ‘verständigung’ to denote the process of reaching the consensus. Thus when we participate in a dialogue, we do so with a view to reach a common ground on an issue. This could be viewed as the telos which propels the dialogue towards itself. Bringing out this teleological structure of dialogue, Habermas writes, “reaching understanding inhabits human-speech as its telos.”²

Unlike Heidegger and Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics which locates the possibility of dialogue in individual’s effective historical consciousness driven towards fusion of horizon, Habermas locates them in shared reason. Thus he maintains that the meaning of what we say and what we do is shared and public because meaning depends on reason and reason on Habermas’ account is shared and public. As we have seen in the preceding paragraphs that for Habermas meaning of action is founded upon the reasons adduced for it, accordingly under this scheme of things, when we make a free speech act, implicit and embedded in it are the following two different kinds of validity claims namely, epistemological claim to truth, and ethical claim to rightness. Validity claim to truth only means that whenever I make a proposition and claim it to be true, then what I am implicitly saying is that I have good enough conscious reasons to believe it to be true, and since reason is a share phenomenon I am prepared to convince the interlocutor with the same set of reasons. Similarly in an analogous way validity claim to rightness and truthfulness only means that when I make these claims I rationally subscribe to the norms underlying that statement. To put it simply, it only means that when I utter a moral statement in a dialogue, I am committed to provide rational justification for that norm.

The important point that one must note here is that in Habermasian scheme of things truth is viewed as depending upon reason and validity and not vice-versa. Another important point is that according to Habermas meaning is an intersubjective affair rather than an objective one. This indicates his hermeneutical legacy. Habermas in contrast to some of the realist theories of meaning suggests that meanings are not determined by the speaker’s relation to the external world but emerges from the relationship between things and words. But all in all one of the most important contributions of Habermas to the history of ideas is the link he has explicated between language and ethics. How we know or rather how we think we know has inevitable consequence upon how we look at our ethical and subsequently socio-political predicaments.

Apart from Habermas’ views on language we should also examine how he tries to link it with questions concerning ethics and polity. In this regard it is important to understand Habermas’ distinction between instrumental and communicative action. If we were to understand this distinction generally then we could understand it in terms of means and end relationship. Most of us would agree that discovering the goals and ends of our life is a long and arduous process and most of the times it is as long as it is important. Since all understanding including the knowledge of our ends in life is within the arena of language and dialogue, these goals cannot be extrinsic to or outside of linguisticity of our being. The discovery of these goals is actually a part of the dialogical process. But often at times it so happens that motives behind a dialogue are already defined and strategies to realize them are already operational in the dialogue process. In these cases the aim of the interlocutors is not to discover the shared goals, rather the aim is to coerce the others in the dialogue towards a pre-conceived end. Broadly speaking in a dialogue such actions where the end is already pre-conceived are called by Habermas as instrumental or strategic actions. In communicative actions on the other hand interlocutors participate in a dialogue with a view to discover shared goals and means such that the ends gradually emerge from the means. According to Habermas the way we look at other interlocutors in a dialogue shapes up our view towards the society. Habermas argues that depending upon our ethical outlook in terms of instrumental or communicative actions, two different kinds of social ontologies come into picture. The ontological conceptions of society resulting from instrumental and communicative actions are termed as ‘lifeworld’ and ‘system’ respectively by Habermas. Lifeworld according to Habermas is vast expanse of space posited with shared meanings and values in which communicative action of the interlocutors in a dialogue become possible. No lifeworld can have a definite, fully formed structure. It rather exists like an ongoing play (spiel) always evolving as it goes on. Its inner movement albeit communicative is its life, as it goes through changes, revisions and onward growth, all of which are necessarily piecemeal and gradual. In principle these changes could even be total though lifeworld itself is a unity of shared meanings and values but is itself not a totality. This is an important distinction because the structure of the lifeworld is such that the meanings and understandings emerging within it are thematized in individual instances of dialogue but it cannot be thematized all at once in a totality. Thus lifeworld has an inner bursting movement, but it never moves outside of itself and in that sense does not really have an outside of itself. What Habermas calls ‘system’ on the other hand is a repertory of reified social structures and established patterns of instrumental actions. As we have already discussed in cases of strategic actions, agents conceal their aims and try to steer the dialogue process towards a pre-conceived end. Such patterns of actions are institutionalized and reified in Systems. Further these actions are conceived and projected as actual or natural ways of looking at things. Thus systems work on projection of themselves as what Habermas calls a ‘block of quasi-natural reality’, as if these structures are beyond revision and human control.

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II. Language and Ethics in Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Grammarian School of Indian Philosophy

The philosophical systems of classical India are conventionally divided into two groups viz. orthodox (āstika) and heterodox (nāstika). Orthodox schools are named so because they believe in the scriptural authority of the Vedas. Vedas are mainly a set of injunctions which prescribe certain actions in order to achieve certain desired results. Mīmāṁsā school of Indian philosophy maintains that the scriptural authority of Vedas is binding because these are authorless (apauruṣey) texts. These texts could be viewed as a set of meaningful words and sentences that do not have an outside of themselves in a strictly hermeneutical sense because they are never written or intended by any author at any point of time. This means to say that the authority of Vedas and what is intended to be prescribed in them is non-contingent upon time and space and therefore absolute.

The only sure sign of life on earth is change which presupposes some activity. Activities presuppose a potent desire for change. Mīmāṁsakas thus would imagine the world as emerging from a matrix of desires, actions and their fruits. If we arrange the co-ordinates of this matrix in a chronological order it would appear like this – there are desires prompting us to perform actions which are followed by results or their fruits. Thus there are desires first, followed by action propelled by them with attainment of fruit as the ultimate result. Now if the human world is viewed as governed by this matrix, then we need to look at the starting point of the chain namely desire or inclination. This would also explain to us where the role of words comes into picture in the Mīmāṁsakas scheme of things. In other words the whole issue boils down to what triggers the inclination in us to produce a specific result. Answer to this question differs depending upon the other tenets of the particular thought system. For example, Naiyāyikas, the realist, pluralist school of Indian philosophy, would contend that inclination in the sense of a psychological response is originated in us depending upon the nature (svabhāva) of the object in question and how that object fits into an aggregate of other extraneous conditions which together trigger a specific psychological response in the human subject. Naiyāyikas recognize only three kinds of psychological responses namely like or dislike for the object or indifference towards it. Depending upon the psychological response the action of either procuring the object or avoiding it or letting it be ensues in the ethical subject. Another notable response in this regard comes from the Indian Grammarian Bhartrhari. According to him desires and inclinations as a part of in-depth grammar of our linguistic understanding of things is something genetically inherently given to us. Explaining it through an analogy of cuckoo bird, Bhartrhari states:

The whole world considers that to be the authority (in daily life). Even the activities of animals develop because of that. Just as some substances acquire the power to intoxicate and the like by mere maturity, without the help of any special effort, in the same way are intuitions produced in those that possess them. Who transforms the voice of the male cuckoo in spring? Who teaches living beings to build nests etc.? Who goads beasts and birds on to actions like eating, loving, hating, swimming etc. associated with particular species and pedigrees? This intuition is the result of Tradition (āgama) accompanied by
bhāvāna. The Tradition is differentiated in as much as it is proximate or remote.\textsuperscript{3}

Thus as evident from these verses human dispositions on Bhartrhari’s account are entirely a product of our overall linguistic constitution. All understanding is linguistic understanding and language has its own unalterable, pre-given grammar which conditions our thoughts and subsequently our actions. But through the passage of time the grammar ingrained in the tradition gets corrupted and so do our dispositions towards the world. Therefore getting the pure originary form of grammar back in place would put our actions in place too.

On Mimamsaka’s account on the other hand words are the trigger point of the whole chain. Vedic words are authorless and without a beginning in time and as such they have priority over anything that has a beginning and an end. Vedic words furthermore are essentially prescriptive in nature. If we view words in terms of actions and results then words can only have prescriptive role to play in such a worldview. The reflexive psychological mechanism of a human person is taken and given and natural and never put into question by the Mīmāṃsakas. Vedas also similarly could be viewed as a set of procedures conducive to the perfection of human desire principles. There is a bit of circularity also involved here. Vedas presuppose human desire principles and suggest themselves as an instrument towards their fulfillment at the same time onus of triggering the right thought towards the appropriate action towards the specific desired result lies with the Vedic word and not with the human subject. The first verse of Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā Sūtras lays bare the very aim of Mīmāṃsā enquiry. Literally translated this sūtra would mean “therefore an enquiry into duty.”\textsuperscript{5} (athāto dharma jijñāsa).

As indicated here, the primary aim of Mīmāṃsā enquiry seems to be to analyze the notion of duty and its concomitant obligation. Vedic sentences on Mīmāṃsakas account do not tell that so and so is the case but rather their function is to produce an obligation in the reader to act in certain ways so as to make something the case. But then how could words produce in us a sense of obligation and subsequently propel us to action? The problem becomes further complicated when words under consideration are neither spoken words nor the written ones. They are rather words not born out of human effort (apauruṣey). Notwithstanding they are supposed to have an intended meaning. An answer to this question is indicated if not explicitly answered in the fifth verse of Mīmāṃsā Sutrās, where Jaimini says: “The connection between a word and its meaning is natural. The (Vedic) injunctions are, therefore, the only means of knowing duty (dharma).” Further he writes: “Duty consists of a total obedience to all the injunctions that can be found in the Vedas. (codana laksano artho dharmah).”\textsuperscript{6}

As hinted in this sūtra the ethics of Mīmāṃsā rests on their theory of meaning. As noted in the earlier cited sūtra, the relationship between the word and its meaning is aputtikā which is generally translated as natural but also has a sense of pre-ordained, inborn or innate. The main purport of this conception is that the meaning in language is prior to human understanding. In other words it is not a

\textsuperscript{5}Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā Sutras verse I.1.1.
\textsuperscript{6}Ibid. I.1.5
result of some later implicit accord or a convention agreed upon by the users of the language as maintained by some Naiyāyikas. This insinuates an understanding of the relationship between the word and its meaning already suggested by Bhartrhari that the ways we use language and our ability to make connection with the meaning in language is prior to human understanding. Expression and communication is a language is a miniscule part of the total gamut and influence of language. The main and substantive part of linguistic understanding lies in the process of imbuing meaning and its dissemination in the reader or the listener. Thus just like for Bhartrhari language is the origin of all that exists, material or immaterial; for Mīmāmsakas too there is an organic link between language and human conduct. Human conduct has to be in strict correspondence with the structure of language if it has to qualify as ethical. Language on this account is merely a manifestation of an inborn capacity among language users which determinates the relationship between words and their meaning. Language therefore cannot be explained only as a means of achieving tasks like communication nor can the structure of language be viewed as a set of rules which regulate some pre-existing activity. Rather, the inherent, innate or inborn structure of language constitutes and governs our linguistic activity which in the case of Mīmāmsā is confined to producing obligation in the hearer to act or not to act in specific ways in adherence to dharma or duty. One of the important fallout of such view would be that under this scheme of things ethics has to be regarded as direct act-manifestation of structure of language. Conversely an action has to be in strict congruence with this structure if it has to qualify as ethical. One of the implications of such view would be that ethics as a mode of structure of language has to be viewed as having pre-determined, unalterable, self-sacrosanct structure. This also gives us a cue to understand why Vedic words are held to be unwritten or without an author. Author being herself a product of the very structures of language in use is thus as good as dead. Thus to sum up the discussion one could say that since Vedic words are regarded as eternal and infallible and since they have no author or arbiter, they have no purpose other extrinsic to themselves and also their obligatory force cannot be explained in any extraneous terms.

This idea could also be understood in terms of some later developments in the study of language. There is no denying to the fact that a human subject is born into a language. If we were to ask what could have come first, the intention to speak or the language with its predefined structure, we are more likely to believe that it is the latter. The most plausible reason for it would be that the language arranges and structures the world for us. We have no way to understand what we could mean by non-verbal comprehension. Furthermore, non-verbal comprehension even if it exists would be an empty world or a world that is vain and devoid of values. No intention to speak could emerge from such a world. Therefore it is more plausible to believe that language comes prior to our intention to speak. But as soon as we have decided upon priority of language over intention to speak we have another set of questions emerging from the other end. Some of these questions that concern us in the present context are as follows:

If the language is a priori, then our judgments about the world are a priori structured for us too. Now if this conclusion is followed seriously it would lead to host of unavoidable problems which as we would see later seem impossible to recover from. What I am trying to hint at is that both the realist schools of

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classical Indian philosophy, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, maintain that structure of language has a strict correspondence with the structure of the world and therefore to knowledge and actions. Whereas for Bhartrhari the two are organically suffused together into śabda Brahman (a priori linguistic principle), for Naiyāyikas and Mīmāmsakas the two are separate but reflect a strict structural unity. Given this presumption about language, simple ethical questions like how to act in a given situation? Or ethical commands or Vedic injunctions for that matter are also shaped within the same a priori structure and would thus require strictly one correct answer. But this plain looking outcome of the realist presumption is infested with a host of inextricably mixed problems. Ethics is about deciding right from wrong. It is about dilemmas and ambiguities. But the realist account of knowledge (their theory of knowledge) leaves a little scope for such ambiguities. Therefore if we assume that language reveals the world to us to its fullest extent and if we further believe that language has no ambiguities about itself, then the need for ethical considerations and judgment would be forever lost. If the meaning is fixed, then also there would be fixed ways of acting towards the world. In other words there would not be right or wrong ways of acting but only the correct or incorrect ones. As a matter of fact any perspective towards the study of language which advocates the fixity of meaning would do so in an endeavor to steer its overall philosophical program towards certain orthodoxy. But it does not require much philosophical reflection to understand that nature and scope of ethics as a sub-discipline of philosophy would lose much of its richness in its realist orthodox garb. Orthodox philosophies relying on scriptural authority of certain texts and tradition leave hardly any scope for ethical dilemmas. Ethical failure for such philosophies would be tantamount to cognitive failure in terms of grasping of actual linguistic meaning of the Vedic injunction or the authority of tradition.

After having an overview of grammarian and Mīmāṃsakas notion of ethics and how it relates to language, we could shift our attention to Bhartrhari’s notion of tradition as the storehouse of pure form of grammar. Bhartrhari while sharing above concern with Mīmāṃsakas resorts to the begininninglessness of the word as a safer haven for the defense of the authority of scriptural words. On his view, since there is no beginning of the word, they could be held to be uncaused and something that is uncaused and eternal lies outside the realm of intellect and thus the authority thereof is not liable to any reasoning or examination. But this is only half the answer to the actual problem. Even if the word is without a beginning and is necessarily immutable, it has its existential value only in so far as it has speakers, writers and readers and so far as this contingency is inevitable, there is always a possibility of the incorrect usage and coercive acceptance of that incorrect usage. Similarly correct grammar is also contingent upon user-community. How does one make sure that there are no deviations within the user-community? Further, how do we know whether the language we are using has correct grammar or not. Who points this out? Further, if our word usage is not correct then how or wherefrom do we know the correct grammar? Bhartrhari in answer to these problems points out that there are two communities in a society viz. user-community and the learned-community. The community of the learned knows both the incorrect grammar in use and the correct grammar. The onus is upon them to point out the incorrect usage wherever possible and the correct usage thereof as well. Bhartrhari calls this community of the learned as cultured people (śiśta). On Bhartrhari’s view, because of this group of cultured people and
the passing-on of knowledge or learning through them, a continuity of system is formed which he calls vyavasthā-nityatā. He writes: “Whether words be eternal or otherwise, their beginning is not known. As in the case of living beings, there is what is called continuity of tradition (vyavasthā-nityatā).” 7 The element of unbroken continuity in tradition is an important point that Bhartrhari invokes in support of the authority of tradition. According to him: “Nobody can violate, on the basis of reasoning, those paths of dharma which have come down without a break, because they are accepted in the world.” 8 So tradition on this account being characterized by continuous uninterrupted flow has to be accepted because it has always been accepted by people without a break in time. But is this a good enough reason to undermine reason vis-à-vis authority of tradition. Bhartrhari offers arguments against the limitations or reasoning as a tool to understand our ethical predicaments. In sharp contrast to Naiyāyikas belief Bhartrhari maintains: “It is extremely difficult to establish by reasoning the nature of objects, because their properties differ according to difference in circumstances, place and time.” 9 Therefore reasoning cannot yield to us any uniform, universal understanding about the objects in the world and therefore no corresponding knowledge regarding how to act towards those objects. Not only this: “Whatever is inferred with great effort by clever reasoners is explained otherwise by the cleverer ones.” 10

To the contrary knowledge attained through tradition like skills is only further and further enhanced with the passage of time. It is never contradicted or disproved and does not know an end in time even as a theoretical possibility. Bhartrhari states: “The experts’ knowledge of the genuineness of precious stones and coins, uncommunicable to others, is born of practice and not of reasoning.” 11 Therefore Bhartrhari concludes: “One who has recourse to Tradition which shines uninterruptedly like the ‘I’ consciousness cannot be diverted therefrom by mere reasoning.” 12 Whether this last sentence actually follows from the previous ones or not, it is nonetheless a strong claim. What Bhartrhari seems to mean here is that tradition is an a priori element in all our judgments like ‘I’ consciousness where all judgments have to belong in order to have unity of apperception. Reasoning on the other hand being contingent upon particular conditions and circumstances can never supersede the authority of tradition. Thus vyavasthā-nityatā or unbroken flow of tradition ensures the existence of the original beginningless pure form of grammar and knowledge of that alone on Bhartrhari’s account can ensure a correct linguistic understanding of the Vedas. It should be pointed out here that reasons adduced by Mimamsakas in favor of authority of tradition are not entirely of the same kind as Bhartrhari. Mimamsaka’s insistence on the exclusive authority of the Vedas with regard to dharma is based on his belief in human inability to know independently what is right or wrong. According to him, human beings have sense perception as the

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7 Ibid. verse 28.
8 Ibid. verse 31.
9 Ibid verse 32.
10 Ibid verse 34.
11 Ibid verse 35.
12 Ibid verse 41.
most authoritative source of knowledge but most of the judgments that concern our ethical predicaments are extra-sensory. For instance our senses do not tell us what would be the right course of action in a given situation because an ordinary human being cannot look into the future instances. “In particular there is no direct knowledge of what effect an action will have at a future time – perhaps after death – hence, of its value to the agent, i.e. whether it is ultimately conducive to heaven or prosperity.” (Ślokavarttika, Pratyakṣa, 26-32). Most of the arguments adduced by Mīmāṃsā writers are indirect in nature. According to them we should believe in the authority of the Vedic words because of the sense of conviction with which they were originally received never diminishes while all other means of knowledge are questionable. Conversely, Vedic judgments are not negated by human judgments based on their reason, conscience or sentiments because we know that as human beings we are fallible in our use of these faculties. Vedic sentences or tradition on the other hand has an appearance of impersonal objectivity. Their credibility is enhanced by their lack of contingencies that attaches to other judgments. Vedic words are in a sense immediately there as seemingly timeless commands not belonging to a particular individual or group of people but as a part of the timeless historicity of our being.

Thus to sum up there are three main strands of ideas regarding the word and its meaning found among the Classical Indian schools of philosophy. First suggestion regarding this comes from Bhartrhari according to whom language has a purely natural form which is prior to us but due to corrupting influence of time (kāla), we need the help of tradition to get back to the original form. Thus meaning generating process under this scheme is far from dialogical. Second suggestion comes from Mīmāṃsakas who believe that the job of the words is not to describe the way the world is but rather to produce right inclination in the subject in consonance with dharma which is already inspirited in the words of the Vedas. Here again relation between the word and meaning is not a subject of human negotiations. It is already preordained therefore the role of reason again is not come to consensus regarding what kind of world we want to be but rather its role is merely philological and scholastic. The Nyāya School present an interesting case in this regard. According to them we live in an un-liberated state because we do not have knowledge of the actual nature of things. When we are confused about or ignorant of the actual nature of things then we act towards them in wrong way which further results in results unintended by the doers. This finally results in human misery and bondage. Therefore we must enquire into the actual nature of things. This way overall the Nyaya School is much more positive and optimistic about the philosophical and logical role of reason. They imagine a world with three co-ordinates of language, knowledge and the objects. These three co-ordinates have a direct congruence with other. Therefore to know the actual nature of things we should go into an enquiry into the language because that is our only window to the world. This school looks closest in spirit to the role of reason envisaged by Habermas among the three schools we have examined so far. But Naiyayikas further argue that all the objects in the world have an essential nature (svabhāva). They present themselves along with their actual nature. This could subsequently mean that the world has an essential structure too. But if this is so then the task of the philosopher is reduced to giving us a correct picture of the world. Therefore their task is not to argue about what kind of world we want to rather live in but rather what kind of world we are actually living in.
Thus the hermeneutical gap between the language and the world that post-Heideggerian hermeneutics assumes is not assumed and available in Nyāya scheme of things.

Further, purity of linguistic understanding along with the uninterrupted flow of tradition where it has to be located, leads to many questions. The idea of Vyavasthānityātā that Bhartrhari has presented to us looks monolithic, sacrosanct and too self-referential. Any such theory would hold only on the assumption that “there is indeed a single mainstream tradition; that all valid works participate in it; that history forms an unbroken continuum free of decisive rupture conflict and contradiction and that the prejudices that we (who?) have inherited from tradition are always to be cherished. It assumes that in other words, history is a place where ‘we’ can always and everywhere be at home; that the work of the past would always deepen rather than say decimate our present self-understanding; and that alien is always secretly familiar.” History for Bhartrhari “is not a place for struggle, discontinuity and exclusion but a continuing “chain”, an ever flowing river, almost one can say a club of like-minded.13 Furthermore, in Grammarian’s inquiry seems to be triggered by the same old concern that propels most of the philosophers of language, namely the possible and often observed misunderstanding in language. Bhartrhari seems to think that it happens because through the passage of time we tend to lose our grasp over the pure and pristine form of grammar usage (vyākarana) and we must consult or learn the original primitive use of grammatical rules from the cultured few to prevent it.

But Bhartrhari if looked at closely turns to ontology in order to avoid any theorization of language which builds upon viewing the world in terms of objects that language merely serves to name. He finds an alternative to this objectification by postulating a prior correspondence or rather an organic conceptual unity between the language potency or language principle and the world which is absolutely prior to any understanding of or in language. But the point one should not fail to notice here is that in the act of establishing what is prior to the world of objects and to the human understanding of that world, Bhartrhari irrevocably reifies language. Bhartrhari while treating language as completely an objective transcendental principle, rather than as a product of interaction among people which is both logically and factually the presupposition of language, chooses to gloss over certain problems that any such view of language might involve. As Ricoeur quotes Marx in his Rule of the Metaphor, “language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse” with other people14. He further states - “Language is only the locus for the articulation of an experience which supports it and… everything consequently does not arrive in language but only comes to language.”15

One should note here that Bhartrhari’s postulation of language principle as prior or transcendental to specific relations in the human community glosses over the fact that one’s access to language and the content of one’s discourse are themselves shaped by existing relations of power as suggested by Habermas.

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Thus, my main observation regarding Bhartrhari’s notion of Vāk or Mimamsaka’s notion of apauruśeyatva as the ultimate linguistic a priori is that there seems to be here an omission to ask who historically has been entitled to participate in what he calls continuity of tradition (vyavasthā-nityatā) or beginningless authority of Vedic words which locates any ontological discourse including the ethical, and whether its content justifies ideologically particular interests in the historical world. Further, the point that Bhartrhari and Mimāmsakas seem to be making with regard to authority of Vedas vis-à-vis timeless flow of tradition can be understood with the help of the following passage from Gadamer’s *Truth and Method*:

> We stand always within a tradition, and this is no objectifying process, i.e. we do not conceive of what tradition says as something other, something alien. It is always a part of us, a model or exemplar, a recognition of ourselves, which our later historical judgments would hardly see as a kind of knowledge, but as a simplest passage of tradition.\(^{16}\)

Therefore one of the reasons for granting supremacy to tradition over other means of knowledge is that it can never be an object of reflection. Our language being already structured through tradition the influence of the latter over the former cannot be extricated, it can though be explicated. On such orthodox account of tradition, we are always a participant as long as we move within a natural language and we cannot step outside it as a reflective partner. There is therefore no general criterion ever available to us which would allow us to determine when we are subject to false consciousness of a pseudo-normal understanding under the influence of unexamined tradition and consider something as a difficulty that could be resolved by rational means through what Habermas calls communicative action. Therefore a modern reader of Bhartrhari and Jaimini would be at a loss to understand as to how they preclude the possibility of conscious or even subliminal distortions within the apparently smooth surface of tradition which could prevent us from a reasoned out understanding of the real and the actual. The so called passage or ‘continuity of tradition’ (vyavasthā-nityatā) may already be guided by conscious attempts to set it adrift towards a pre-conceived end. To diagnose and eradicate such possibilities one needs to act as an observer outside the passage of tradition as suggested by Habermas in his theory of communicative action. My submission here in this context is that any universal claim of linguistic understanding through tradition as we saw above is argued by some major orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, can only be maintained if it is realized that the context of tradition as a focal point of possible truth and factual agreement could as well be at the locus of factual untruth and continued force. My further contention is that given the skepticism regarding the role of reason vis-à-vis Vedic tradition in Mimāmsā and Bhartrhari’s philosophy, there is no possibility of imaging a lifeworld under these systems. Even in Nyaya philosophy which shows a certain level of commitment towards role of reason, the hermeneutical gap between the language and the shared expression is not available. Nyaya philosophy presupposes that all the objects in the world are

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available for understanding along with their immutable essence. If the nature of world is already defined for us then the task assigned to reason would be more cognitive rather than communicative in nature in the Habermasian sense of the term. Thus the kind of social ontologies that could possibly emerge from the tenets of the above discussed schools of Indian philosophy could never be of the nature of the lifeworld since there is no possibility of communicative actions under the tenets of these thought systems.

One might wonder at this point – so what if there does not seem to be much scope for communicative action and lifeworld in orthodox Indian thought systems. My submission in response to such queries would be that the task of a historian is not only to study history as a series of discreet moments as events big or small, significant or not so significant in themselves. The task of a historian also involves to look at events in time not only for their impact and penetration in time but also for their lateral or horizontal continuity in time. One needs to look for events in time that are not always so explicit in nature. One of the very distinctive features of Indian society and polity is its diversity. Religions and ethnic diversity has provided richness of its culture on the one hand and has also provided it various challenges to grapple with on the other. A strict sense of hierarchy that has always prevailed in Indian society is amongst one such issues. Social roles based on caste and gender and different stations in life have always been viewed as essentially self-enclosed and un-negotiable. ‘Brahmin-ness’ (uppermost bastion in Hindu hierarchy) is considered a jāti (word interestingly used both in the sense of caste as well as essence/category) residing in the person belonging to that caste according to Nyāya system. One of the most revered Hindu scriptures like Mahabharata has an anecdote apart from several others where education is denied to a young talented boy named Eklavya because he does not belong to the Kshatriya caste which is decided on the basis of one’s worth rather than her worth. Such notions and perceptions have survived in Indian society several decades after independence. By presenting an analytic study of orthodox Indian thought systems, my purpose is to draw the attention of scholars of Indian philosophy to look for the epistemic links between Indian past and present and to enquire further into epistemological reasons for the genesis of this hierarchy and its tenacity to continue to remain a part of Indian society even today. The importance of this issue can be gauged from the fact that it was an important point of contention even between Gandhi who declared himself to be a Sanatani Hindu and several social reformist of that time including Dr. B. R. Ambedkar and Narayana Guru. In an interesting debate between Narayana Guru and Gandhi sitting under a banyan tree in Kerala Narayana Guru challenged Gandhi’s adherence and support to Varna hierarchy in Hinduism. While Gandhi was of the opinion that there are inherent differences amongst human beings therefore fourfold hierarchy of Varna in Hinduism is justified. Following passage from well known publication on Modern Indian History would be helpful:

A conversation between Gandhiji and Narayana Guru is significant. Gandhiji, in an obvious reference to Chaturvarna and the inherent differences in quality between man and man, observed that all leaves of the same tree are not identical in shape and texture. To this Narayana Guru pointed out that the difference is only superficial, but not in essence: the juice of all leaves of a
particular tree would be the same in content. It was he who gave the call —
‘one religion, one caste and one God for mankind’…”17

It becomes clear from analogy used by Gandhi in the above passage, that even in modern times notions like caste get their life sap from some of the essentialist epistemological propensities, which have their roots somewhere in orthodox Indian thought systems. It is also interesting to see how and why Ambedkar chose Buddhism discarding his Hindu identity by saying – “Even though I was born in the Hindu religion, I will not die in the Hindu religion”18. Buddhism through the ages has presented a challenge to the essentialism represented by Indian orthodox systems through their notion of dependent origination. Buddhism reduces the notion of essences to mere notions, surmises about identity of an object which are contextual, relative and extraneously dependent. Within such framework of causality no definite essence can be granted to any object concerned. It could be noted here that the biggest philosophical support to caste system comes from Purusha Sukta of Rig Veda where the cause of entire human race is surmised to come from Purusha whose different parts of the body lend essences to different varnas amongst humans. Thus human identity in terms of its origins comes from its course whose essence continues to be in the effect. Buddhism challenges such notions of essence and identity and creates a possibility of more flexible epistemological postures for more flexible notions of identity. One could also note here that almost all of the published works on history of Indian philosophy are accounts of metaphysics and epistemology of those systems. Accounts of ethics propounded by the same very schools are published in separate volumes. No significant efforts have been spared towards showing any continuity or link between these two spheres or study by scholars of Indian philosophy. With several breakthrough now available explicating the link between epistemology, metaphysics and ethics presented by western social scientists, a new space for study of some of the ancient philosophical ideas presented in different parts of the world now seems available. This paper is a humble attempt at hinting at such possibility. I do not though claim absolute originality here in terms of my scholarship on Habermas. Some scholars on Habermas have already attempted to contextualize Habermasian scholarship to particular societies and polities of the world. Important amongst them could be the attempts made by Tom Bailey19, Peter Losonczi20 among others. But these scholars too have only attempted to give a Habermasian analysis of the current socio-political situations which differs widely in terms of methodology and main focus of the problematic. My overall proposal in this paper is that explication of epistemological core of some of social problems that continue to haunt Indian polity today could provide the social scientists important clues to new proposals regarding solutions of these problems.

18 http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00ambedkar/txt_ambedkar_conversion.html

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AN EXAMINATION ON THE RECEPTION OF JOSEPH CONRAD IN MODERN JAPAN

Hiromasa Wakita*

Abstract: In this article, I will examine the reception of Conrad’s works in modern Japan. Based on various writings and records of the reception from the 1910s to the 1940s, I will trace the Japanese reception of Conrad’s works. The overview will reveal that there were certain characteristics in the reception of Conrad throughout modern Japan: there were many people who read Conrad’s works as English language texts in high schools and universities, but there were few people who considered seriously the importance of their social or political implications during the 1920s and the early 1940s. Many scholars and novelists in modern Japan could not mention or notice the dark side of Japanese colonialism or imperialism through reading Conrad’s works. In fact, his “political” novels such as Nostromo, Secret Agent and Under Western Eyes, were not also translated by the end of the Second World War. Finally, I will demonstrate the limitations of the reception in modern Japan as shown in Japanese Conradians’ attitudes towards the novelist.  

The aim of this essay is to discuss the reception of Joseph Conrad in Japan. About a century has passed since Conrad was first introduced to Japan, and there have been many translations of his works. Even in the first decade of the twenty-first century, three Japanese translations of Heart of Darkness were published, and today’s novelists like Haruki Murakami pay much attention to the Polish-born English novelist. In view of the situation, however, there are very few academic studies on the reception of Joseph Conrad in this country.  

In this essay, based on various writings and records of the reception, tracing the Japanese reception of Conrad’s works from the 1900s to the 1940s, we will reveal that there were certain characteristics in the reception of Conrad throughout modern Japan. There were many people who read Conrad’s works as English language texts in high schools and universities, and as mere sea novels for youth. Yet, there were few people who considered seriously the importance of their social or political implications during the 1920s and the 1940s. In fact, his “political” novels such as Nostromo, Secret Agent and Under Western Eyes, were not translated by the end of the Second World War. An exceptional case, however, is Manabu Maruyama, an English teacher at the High Normal School in Hiroshima: he pointed out the importance of Conrad’s works in a book in 1944. This fact indicates a unique reception of Conrad in modern Japan. We will survey

*HIROMASA WAKITA, lecturer, Department of English Literature, Faculty of Literature, Tsurubunka University at Yamanashi. Specialization: Comparative Literature. Email: wakita.hiromasa@gmail.com.

1 The literacy of Japanese people is never inferior to that of Western people. So, in the future, the United Kingdom will continue to be amazed by our [Japanese] English like they are by Conrad’s English. (“Editor’s note,” a 22)

2 The literacy of Japanese people is never inferior to that of Western people. So, in the future, the United Kingdom will continue to be amazed by our [Japanese] English like they are by Conrad’s English. (“Editor’s note,” a 22)
Maruyama’s career from the 1920s to the 1940s. Finally, we will demonstrate the limitations of the reception in modern Japan as shown in Japanese Conradians’ attitudes towards the novelist.

I. Towards the Sea: Conrad and the Sea in Modern Japan

Conrad was known as a famous author of English sea literature in the late 1900s in Japan, although the readers of Conrad’s works were restricted to scholars and novelists at that time. Soseki Natsume (1867-1916), for instance, introduced Conrad’s several works (“Youth”, “Typhoon”, Nigger of the “Narcissus”, and Heart of Darkness) in a newspaper article in 1908, which was one of the first well-organized introductions about Conrad in Japan. In the article, Natsume praised Conrad’s works, focusing on the sea Conrad described, and said that Conrad was “so zealous to describe the seascape as a magnificent view that he could not depict characters vividly in his works.” And he went so far as to say that “he should have devoted himself to describing the great power of the sea like Turner’s seascape paintings” (Natsume 335). It is clear that Natsume focused not on the characters but on the land/seascape of nature as a particular aesthetic image. At the same time, he did not mention any of the socio-political problems behind “the land/seascapes of nature” in Heart of Darkness.

By the late 1910s Conrad had been widely recognized in Japan as a contemporary English novelist with a dramatic life (born in Poland he had become a mariner before he started to write novels in English, his third language, etc.). For example, Izumi Yanagita (1894-1969), a famous historian about Meiji era, remembered that in 1918:

I was eager to buy many English novels at the Maruzen bookshop. I remember reading books written by Conrad, Wells, Galsworthy, Bennett. They were “the contemporary English novelists” at the time. (Yanagita 594)

In 1924 Conrad and his works gained the attention of the Japanese literary world because of his death. Newspapers published the news of his death, and literary magazines such as Eigo Seinen (The Rising Generation) and Shin Bungei (New Literature) published memorial issues of Joseph Conrad in that year, in which contributors praised Conrad as a maestro of English sea literature that evoked various images of the sea and tropical areas which people did not know much about. From the 1910s to the 1920s, Conrad became well-known in Japan as a famous contemporary English novelist. Yukio Haruyama (1902-1994), a poet and a famous editor, for instance, contributed an article about Conrad to the magazine entitled Bungei Jidai (Literary Times) in 1928, which outlined the reception of Conrad in France during the 1920s. Haruyama noted how Conrad’s works were popular in France. As an example, he presented the case of André Gide, who had had contact with Conrad and had translated Conrad’s works. In addition, Haruyama referred to the existence of a privately-published signed 50-

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3Haruyama Yukio was famous as an introducer of the latest western modernism. His knowledge of the western literature was superior to any other critics and scholars between the late 1920s and the 1930s. There were many of his insightful essays on Joyce, T. S. Eliot, Proust, and Gide, which influenced many young Japanese artists.
copy-limited edition of Conrad’s works. Haruyama was the only person to mention these limited books in Japan. His article shows his high regard for Conrad. If so, why did not Haruyama pay as much attention to Conrad’s works as Gide, and why did not he share common consciousness of a resistance to colonialism with Gide?

When Haruyama published an essay in 1929, he wrote that “when I read a letter from a friend who lives in Taiwan, it always evokes a tropical image of a house with a veranda like a scene of Conrad’s work” (Haruyama 23). In *Almayer’s Folly* and *Lord Jim*, for instance, a veranda is a symbolic place where both Almayer and Jim confess their desires, guilt and despair. For Haruyama, however, the veranda was nothing more than a tropical image of Taiwan, which he had not yet visited. Even though Haruyama had known of a close relation between Conrad and Gide and was deeply familiar with Modernism movement, he did not mention or was not able to notice the dark side of Japanese colonialism or imperialism through reading Conrad’s works. These comments on Conrad’s works were typical in the reception of Conrad from the late 1920s to the 1940s. Few people could discuss the problems of Japanese colonialism by reading Conrad’s works, while Gide criticized French colonialism. In 1933, for instance, Tetsutaro Yoshimura, a young critic, wrote that “I can understand the situation of British colonialism through reading Kipling’s works” (Yoshimura 11). Then he wrote:

> I think that the tropical scenes of Conrad’s works are very different from those of other western novels. The sea Conrad described does not represent freedom and joy. … I feel his sea stories very strange, so I am convinced that his works are very different from other western sea stories. (Yoshimura 11)

While Yoshimura was aware of the strangeness or uniqueness of Conrad’s works, he was so puzzled by Conrad’s sea stories that it was difficult for him to explain clearly the characteristics of Conrad’s works. Even in the early 1930s, people who read Conrad’s works recognized just a limited aspect of his works. In fact, Japanese scholars, critics and novelists did not refer directly to a close relation between Gide and Conrad, that is, how *Heart of Darkness* exerted great influence over Gide’s *Voyage au Congo*, although Gide’s books enjoyed a large number of readers in Japan during the 1930s. It seems that Conrad’s works did not have a huge impact on Japanese literature and did not lead to deep connections with Japanese novelists, such as the literary connection between Shoyo Tsubouchi and Shakespeare, that between Hideo Kobayashi and Rimbaud, and that between Sei Ito and Joyce.

II. Conrad, a High school, and Navy in Hiroshima: As an Object of English Lesson from the 1930s to the End of the War

By the 1930s, however, Conrad’s works had earned many readers in high schools and universities because his works had been used often in school as English textbooks from the 1930s to the 1940s. Kenzaburo Ohashi, a scholar of American literature, wrote that when he was a student at the Tokyo University of Foreign Languages in the 1930s, he read one of Conrad’s short novels in a class. In fact, in 1930, Conrad was ranked eighth as English textbooks in high schools (Erikawa
76). In 1935, Yaichi Aizu (1881-1956), a poet, Japanese art scholar, and high school English teacher, taught high school students with “Youth” as a textbook to learn English. Saburo Shiroyama (1927-2007), a novelist, wrote a memoir of his youth in the late 1940s, when his private tutor gave him Conrad’s “Youth” to practice English in order to pass an entrance examination of a university.

Although there were people who continued to read Conrad’s works in Tokyo, his works may have got more and earnest readers in Hiroshima than in Tokyo, because at two schools in Hiroshima (the High Normal School of Hiroshima and the Imperial Naval Academy) Conrad’s works were selected as English textbooks during the 1930s. 4i

In 1932, for instance, Manabu Maruyama (1904-1970), an English teacher of the High Normal School, chose Conrad’s works as English textbooks. Maruyama was born in Kumamoto Prefecture in 1904. He entered the High Normal School in 1922 and graduated in 1925. Then, he was inducted by the army for two years. After that, he taught English at a junior high school in Kumamoto until 1929. Then he started to study English literature at the Hiroshima University of Literature and Science as one of its inaugural students in 1929. On graduating from the university in 1932, he was hired as an English teacher at the High Normal School of Hiroshima. Maruyama, interested in Conrad and his works since the 1920s, confessed that his actual experience of the sea in youth led him to an interest in reading Conrad’s works. According to his memoir, his voyage across the Pacific Ocean in 1923, connected him with Conrad.

At night with glittering stars, on the Pacific Ocean, I was much excited to hear sea stories, which an old sailor told on the deck of the ship. Thanks to the experience of the voyage, I got interested in the sea and enthusiastic about English sea novels such as Conrad’s and Maugham’s at the time of the normal school. Moreover, as I became an English teacher, I adopted their works as English textbooks. (Maruyama 146)

This is a valuable document for pinpointing a relation between Conrad’s works and a young Japanese scholar. His passion for Conrad’s works continued during his university years. When he graduated from the university in 1932, he wrote a thesis about Conrad’s works.

However, his study of Conrad at the university was not related to his actual experience of the sea in high school years because it is called a certain taxonomic style. He did not research the contents of Conrad’s works. When he published his first essay in 1934 “on the shade and shadow in Conrad’s works,” summarizing the thesis written in 1932, he did not mention the sea with glittering stars; instead, he attempted to show how “shadow” and “shade” in Conrad’s works reveals “the uniqueness of Conrad’s prose style” (Maruyama, c 53). In this essay, he focused on the language itself, because his purpose of research might be called a kind of stylistics or lexicology, which listed usage examples of “shadow” and “darkness” in Conrad’s works. He pointed out that “in almost all Conrad’s works, the word ‘shadows’ is often used, but few studies proved the fact by statistical approaches” (Maruyama, c 50). Referring to OED, he investigated the frequency of the usage of “shade” and “shadow” compared with that in several Conrad’s works. Then he

4i I have written on the reception of Conrad’s works in Hiroshima in more detail elsewhere: see Wakita, “Conrad and Modern Japan.”
wrote that “Conrad tended to use the meaning of ‘shade’ as adjective usage” (Maruyama, c 53).

As a scholar, Maruyama stressed that literally scholars must be a neutral introducer to classify scientifically many literary methods, as if a teacher was explaining literary theories in a lecture without his own opinions. He emphasized the importance of not “being subjective” but “being neutral” and of “being scientific” in the literary studies (Maruyama, 34-35). He thought that an English scholar must clearly distinguish a study on the English language from literary criticism. He preferred “objective methods on literature” as a kind of linguistics (lexicology, stylistic, syntax, etc.) to subjective methods like subjective methods of reading literature.

According to the memoir of one of his students, however, Maruyama often had conversations with his students in an attempt to stimulate students’ interests in Conrad’s works. Maruyama’s passion for Conrad led his students privately to publish a book entitled Conrad Kenkyu in 1935. In that book, an editor said that “owing to a lot of advice of Professor Maruyama, we could complete this magazine” (“Editor’s Note” 152). It was clear that his students published the magazine under the direction of Maruyama, and Maruyama’s approach considerably influenced the articles in the magazine. Thus, there were several articles on stylistics and lexicology of Conrad’s works such as “On the Style of Prose of Joseph Conrad” and “On the Words of Conrad.”

Maruyama’s students who wanted to become English teacher at high school or junior high school perceived Conrad’s works as examples to learn English. These students’ approach is similar to that of Maruyama’s 1934 essay. One student, for instance, wrote that “Conrad used nouns and adjectives more frequently than verbs and pronouns” and that “Conrad had a tendency to use long phrases in his works” (Maki 23), while he pointed out “126 nouns, 156 adjectives and 66 verbs in Nigger of the ‘Narcissus’” (Maki 24).

Like Maruyama, his students paid attention not to the contents but to the characteristics of words and phrases in Conrad’s works by employing statistical approaches. In doing so, they did not show their own personal interpretation of Conrad’s works. One student stated that “I am not going to say my feelings about Conrad’s works” (Masuyama 28).

5 Maruyama published his first book entitled Bungaku kenkyuho (A Study of Methods in Literature) in 1934. Conrad’s works were referred to more frequently than those of other novelists in order to explain the literary methods. In this book, he referred to Heart of Darkness as a travel novel. Although Maruyama’s comment on Heart of Darkness was very short, it was among a few articles on Heart of Darkness in the 1930s in Japan.

6 While Maruyama had studied philological aspects of Conrad’s works since the 1920s, he was an ethnologist, too. This means that he was much interested both in Conrad’s works and in ethnology from the 1920s to the 1940s. In fact, while he was an English teacher in the High Normal School, he had been eager to collect folklores about the coastal regions of Hiroshima since the 1920s. He was one of the early ethnologists in Hiroshima. Besides, he was in contact with Yanagita Kunio, and then took part in Minkan Densho (The Magazine of the Folk Tale) edited by Yanagita. After the Second World War, Maruyama was famous as not so much a scholar of English literature as an ethnographer. Unfortunately, Maruyama never wrote about the relation between his studies on English and his ethnology, or did not write any sensational diary like Malinowski in field works. He, however, can be placed in the border between a scholar of English and an ethnologist.
Their methods could be categorized as philology and stylistics, which were popular and traditional fields in the Normal School of Hiroshima. Chiaki Higashida (1910-1992), a professor of the Imperial Naval Academy near the High Normal School since the mid-1930s, recollected that philology and stylistics were studied actively in the High Normal School under the influence of Tadao Yamamoto, who was a professor at the High Normal School, a senior of Higashida at the Imperial University of Tokyo, and had also been a co-worker of Maruyama since the 1930s. Higashida wrote that “Mr. Yamamoto was very much interested in stylistics, so I often participated in the activities of a reading club in the High Normal School” (Higashida, c.35).

It is interesting that Higashida himself also had studied stylistics at the Imperial University of Tokyo. According to Higashida’s memoir, he had been interested in D. H. Lawrence, Conrad, and especially in stylistics since the early 1930s. At the time, D. H. Lawrence drew the attention of people and Higashida published a philological essay entitled “On the Prose Style of D. H. Lawrence” in 1937, when he became professor at the Naval Academy. Later in 1943, Higashida published an essay entitled “On the Early Prose of Joseph Conrad.”

In his essay, based on objective facts, Higashida wrote that “the study of stylistics reveals personal characteristics of the author” (Higashida, b. 57). Thus, “Conrad’s works were good samples for stylistics because he was very much interested in creating general appropriate expressions of English, which were not influenced by the theme he chose” (Higashida, b. 56). Higashida also explained that “Conrad had tendencies to repeat several words and phrases as having the same meaning. The repetition gives emotive impression in his works” (Higashida, b. 62), quoting several long passages from the scenes of the south sea and southern islands in Conrad’s works (Almayer’s Folly, An Outcast of the Islands, “Typhoon” and Lord Jim). Finally, Higashida pointed out that “this repetition shows the passion with which Conrad was trying to express all the delicate nuances in English” (Higashida, b. 62).

When he published “Nostromo no bunsho” (“On the Prose of Nostromo”) in 1946, just one year after the end of the Second World War, Higashida focused on the usage of adjectives and abstract nouns in Nostromo and Chance, because he thought that the use of those words were one of the characteristics of Conrad’s prose. He concluded that “Conrad succeeded in creating impressive prose by adopting a lot of abstract nouns with multiple meanings.” (Higashida 41)

Both essays focused only on the linguistic aspects such as words and phrases like Maruyama’s first essay about Conrad’s works in 1934. Higashida insisted that “stylistics can discover the most sophisticated mode of a national language, and confirm the value of its expressions in literature which excellent authors created in their mother tongue” (Ichikawa 36), but he proceeded to discuss a case of foreign languages as follows:

If we start to study stylistics on foreign languages, we might firstly refer to authors who have peculiar prose style. In that sense, Conrad’s works are

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7 The High Normal School was established in order to train English teachers of junior and senior high schools, who were required both to translate English correctly and to explain English grammar adequately. Aesthetic reading was not required; pragmatic skills of English were essential to them.
suitable for a study. . . . Particularly, his early works show a unique English style. We find that he did not write English fluently in his early works, but the more he tried to write his works in English, the more he created an original style of English. (Ichikawa 36)

It was important for Higashida to emphasize Conrad’s English as non-native during the Second World War. When he used Lord Jim as an English textbook at the Naval Academy in 1941, he wrote in its introduction that the novelist acquired honor in English literature although “Conrad was born in Poland,” and emphasized that “he started to learn English at the age of 20,” and “English was his third language” (Higashida, b. 33-34). He asserted that Conrad was an outsider in English literature, and that his works were not categorized as pure English literature, even if his works were written in English. Higashida suggested in the introduction that Conrad was equated with Japanese naval students in learning English and that Conrad’s works were the most appropriate textbooks to study English at the Naval Academy. In fact, Higashida deleted the second part of Lord Jim from the English textbook, which was one of the most mysterious, strange and demonic in Conrad’s works. Thus, Lord Jim was transformed from a dangerous story into a simple sea voyage story. On the one hand, the reception of Conrad’s works at the Naval Academy was a unique case, given the reception of other western literature in modern Japan. The reception displayed an adverse situation of Japanese scholars of English in the early 1940s because those scholars including Higashida and Maruyama always faced a necessity to justify their English language education to those who opposed to it. Exceptionally the Naval Academy, however, had encouraged students to study English, because the Navy had inevitably required a lot of information about the British Navy and the United States Navy to win the war. Young English scholars like Kenzaburo Ohashi, for instance, continued to be employed by the Navy. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the Naval Academy was the best and safest institution to teach and study English literature including Conrad’s works in the early 1940s. Higashida claimed:

Fortunately, until the end of the Second World War, the Naval Academy allowed us to continue to study English literature. So we did not feel ashamed for teaching and studying English. (Higashida, c. 35)

During the war, Higashida taught English with Lord Jim as an English textbook; moreover, he read a paper entitled “On Joseph Conrad” in 1941 at a seminar of the Naval Academy in order to discuss western literature. Unfortunately, Higashida never recorded on the seminar in detail, but it is clear that he played a major role in the reception of Conrad not only in Hiroshima but also in Japan as a whole during the war.

III. Between the Sea in Conrad’s Works and Imperial Japan

In a conversation with Shinobu Orikuchi (1887-1953), a famous folklorist, poet and novelist, Kunio Yanagita (1875-1962) said that he was interested in “a role of ship in Japanese culture,” (Yanagita 215); then he pointed out that there had been

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8The seminar was called “Kinyo Kai” (Friday Group) in the naval academy.
much fewer Japanese folk tales about the sea than about the land. Orikuchi agreed with Yanagita and said that “many old poems on the subject of the sea did not sing joy, happiness or familiarity” and “Japanese people had a tendency to avoid talking about the sea” (Yanagita 215). Unfortunately, Orikuchi did not describe the conversation in more detail.

Yanagita had been very much interested in Japanese sea culture for a long time. He asserted that the sea had influenced strongly Japanese culture since ancient times. In his essay, “Kaijo no Mich” (“The Road of the Sea”) written in 1961, Yanagita claimed that ancient people in south Asia had sailed for the islands of Japan: he called the route “the roads of the sea” and regarded it as the sources of Japanese original culture. When Yanagita wrote an essay entitled “Kaijo Bunka” (“On a Culture of Shipboard”) in the magazine Kaiyo (The Ocean) in 1934, he emphasized how both the sea and the ship strongly influenced Japanese cultures and that a history of the ship in Japan would be a very important theme to consider the culture.9

Kaiyo, which was a conservative magazine to encourage the amity and unity of Japanese mercantile mariners, published various articles about the sea including current sea information, sea ethnographies like Yanagita’s essay, and Japanese sea poetry; yet, it did not include sea novels. It is unclear why sea novels were never published in the magazine, although a writer in Kaiyo pointed out that it was important to create original Japanese sea fictions for “all Japanese people” (Nakamura 67) as well as to translate famous western sea novels.

Instead of original Japanese sea fictions, some essays in Conrad’s The Mirror of the Sea, in which he wrote a lot of seascapes and shipboard affairs, were translated in Kaiyo, as if these essays would compensate for the lack of Japanese sea novels in the magazine. They seem even to provide rich samples of the sea cultures Yanagita discussed. In an introduction to the translation, the translator emphasized that “The Mirror of the Sea was suitable work to learn about the sea” (Tsuchida 42). The fact that Kaiyo included the translation of some parts of The Mirror of the Sea shows that Conrad’s works had considerable effect on Japanese modern sea literature. This would prove a lack of ideas about Japanese sea cultures as Yanagita claimed them. Yet, when Higashida annotated Lord Jim at the Naval Academy in 1941, Imperial Japan designated July 20 as “Umi no Kinbeni” (the Memorial Day of the Sea) to enlighten people on the importance of maritime affairs. According to the government, July 20 was a historic day for Japanese mercantile service, because the Meiji Emperor came back to Yokohama from Aomori on 20 July 1876 not by a naval ship but by a passenger ship named Meiji Maru. For this reason, the government declared that the tour symbolized the completion of Japanese modern mercantile system.

The founder of the Memorial Day was Shozo Murata (1878-1957), the telecommunication minister, who had been a famous president of the Osaka Marine Company since the early 1930s. When the Japanese navy needed quickly many ships for the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, he took the initiative in integrating Japanese mercantile companies into one group to offer mercantile ships for the Navy. As a result, he took office as the minister of the state in 1940, and then he was installed as a senior adviser of the army in 1942. As a powerful supporter and leader of both the Imperial Navy and the mercantile marine, Murata

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was a key person who could handle the relationships between the Navy and the mercantile companies.

During the war, Murata continued to claim an importance to maintain a trading region on the sea because he was worried that people were less interested in the sea than in the land such as Manchuria. Murata came up with the idea of “the Memorial Day of the Sea,” which would give a good chance for the people to realize the importance of the sea as the necessary territory of the Imperial Japan. His idea was successful because many magazines had special features on the Memorial Day in July 1941.¹⁰ *King*, a bestseller literary magazine, for instance, published various articles about the sea such as “Across the Pacific Ocean,” “Japan is the Number-one Fishing Industry in the World” “The Current Affairs Related to Ships,” “The Pacific, Our pond.”¹¹ Unlike *Kaiyo* in 1934, Conrad’s works were never published in *King*. The articles in *King* focused on socio-political matters, and referred to hostile relations between the Imperial Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom across the Pacific. Those articles criticized mainly the policy of the United States and the United Kingdom.

At the beginning of the 1940s, the sea and the south islands were not only recognized as romantic or fictional topoi like Haruyama wrote in the 1930s but also became the most important territory for the forthcoming war against the United States. In *King*, an editorial article entitled “The Pacific Ocean Was Our Pond,” for instance, insisted that “basically all the Pacific Ocean belonged to the Eastern people. Our ancestors were moving freely around the Pacific Ocean like a pond. Therefore, it is quite right that we, the Eastern people, must regain the Pacific Ocean, although nowadays the United States occupies half of the Pacific Ocean.” (“Taiheiyo” 110) In the same way, a naval officer writing in *King* suggested a possibility of war against the United States and claimed that the imperial Japan must keep the territory of the sea and expand it against the United States.

As a result of growing concern about the ocean in the 1940s, however, scholars did not ignore English sea novels. When Masanobu Oda (1903-1945), a scholar of English literature wrote an essay entitled “The Sea and the Idea of British Culture” in 1941, he argued that Conrad was fascinated by the adventure spirit of the mariners because “Conrad indicated that the awe of the spirit on the sea represented the soul itself of the old British Empire” (Oda 140). Then, Oda explained that the sea in Conrad’s works shows not so much allegory about human existentialism as a socio-political idea of the sea in the British Empire. Oda concluded that “when I wrote the essay, I always thought about the islands of Japan. I wonder how many people who walk around Ginza know how far the sea is from the area. And there would be much more people who think that Japan is always saved by kamikaze historically” (Oda 140).

Moreover, in July 1941, *Kokubungaku*, one of the most famous journals on Japanese literature, featured Japanese sea literature from ancient to modern times. In the magazine, Togoro Koike, a famous scholar of the Edo era, wrote an essay on the idea of the sea in Edo literature. He claimed that the reason for the failure

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¹⁰ For example, *Shin Seinen* (New Youth), *Jitawa Yomimono* (The true magazine), *Oru Yomimono* (All Reading).
of pre-modern Japanese literature to create masterpieces of the sea was because of sakoku (seclusion policy) throughout the Edo period. Then he wrote:

Someone like Theodor Jozef Konrad Krozeniowski (Conrad’s real name) did not appear in the Edo period. In addition, modern Japan has not been able to produce good sea literature. (Koike 66)

In addition, we can guess that a single modern Japanese sea novel comparable to Conrad’s or Melville’s had not appeared through the history of modern Japanese literature. Yet, it is interesting that his comment suggested that Japanese literature compensated for its lack of sea literature with Conrad’s works. In a sense, although Conrad wrote sea novels in English, the works had been received as a standard reference for Japanese sea literature even in 1941, and Conrad was so famous that even a scholar of Edo literature knew the original name of the Polish-born novelist’s in 1941.

In the same year, Mamoru Osawa, a scholar of English literature, translated Almayer’s Folly into Japanese. He wrote in his introduction to the translation:

British readers might understand Almayer’s Folly only as a sort of a simple exotic story. The book, however, gives us, Asian people, new perspectives different from those of British people. In this sense, we have a closer connection with Conrad than British people, even if he used English to write novels and became famous in England. These years, we have occupied Kainan Island and Amon, and furthermore Shinnangun Islands are absorbed into the territory of the Imperial Japan. Now the imperial Japan is expanding its territory near Borneo, which is a scene in Almayer’s Folly. . . . Meanwhile, I had been impressed deeply by the big change over a span of six years. When I was translated the book in 1933, I felt myself playing in a fairyland of Almayer’s Folly. But now, I am very surprised at the reality of the book. This is the time to introduce the book in an appropriate spotlight. I believe that a number of young people will be rapt in the book. (Osawa 256)

Osawa stressed that Imperial Japan could create a new value different from that of the west by reading Conrad’s works, although he did not make it clear what that value was. He thought that Almayer’s Folly could eventually give readers real images of the southern areas (Nanyo in Japanese) and the sea in the 1940s.

Conrad’s works were not a kind of fairy tales of southern islands like Haruyama and Yoshida imagined in the 1930s. Haruyama himself, however, also paid attention to an importance of Japanese sea literature. When he published an essay in 1939 on the future of the land and the sea literature in Japan, he emphasized that Japanese sea literature must produce a new tradition, and must not write simple picturesque images but observe “transportation, intelligence and business on the colonized sea” like “Conrad’s and Kipling’s works”(Haruyama, c. 23). In this essay, Haruyama valued English colonial literature rather than French one because the former seemed to him to be more wholesome than the latter. Thus English colonial and sea literature did not give rise to any doubt about colonialism as the works of Andre Gide, which criticized the occupations of Congo and other areas under the western control. For Haruyama, Japanese colonial literature must not criticize an organic integration of the inland (Naichit) and overseas territories (Gaich) because both authors and readers must have “a common recognition about colonized areas of the Imperial Japan” (Haruyama, c.
24). In 1941, Mitsusuke Yonekubo, a leader of a union, translated a Conrad’s sea novel *Nigger of the “Narcissus.”* Yonekubo, who had been a mariner and writer from the 1910s to the 1920s, wrote in the preface that he emphasized the importance of ruling the sea as the territory to all Japanese people. In the 1940s, Yonekubo and Haruyama argued that Conrad’s works were instructive for the creation of a Japanese colonial or sea literature, while they ignored or could not realize how Gide, who criticized western imperialism and colonialism, had been significantly influenced by Conrad’s works. Eventually, modern Japanese literary figures such as Yonekubo and Haruyama, who had not been able to notice politically dangerous aspects of Conrad’s works, had seemingly grasped Conrad’s works as useful textbooks to understand about south Asia and the south and to rule them, just as Higashida used Conrad’s works as English textbooks at the Naval Academy in the 1940s.

IV. On a Limitation of Reading “Conrad” in Modern Japan

It is interesting that the situation of Maruyama was completely different from that of Higashida, Haruyama, and others from the late 1930s to the 1940s because he spent most of his time in the Army. Maruyama was conscripted by the Army in 1937. He was dispatched to China right away and went into battle at the front. In 1941 he was discharged from the military, but was re-conscripted from 1943 to 1945 as an officer of the 16th Western Troops of Kumanoto. In 1944, as a captain of the Imperial Army, he published a book entitled *Eikokujin No Toakan (A British Idea about East Asia)*, which introduced British history of colonialism and criticized its violent rule over Asia with reference to works of Somerset Maugham, R. L. Stevenson, Lafcadio Hearn (aka, Yakumo Koizumi) and Conrad.

Maruyama wrote that “Conrad tried to indicate something unknowable in the dark world. But Conrad knew enough to be unable to write the unknowable in his works because he was a thorough realist unlike Stevenson’s romanticism” (Maruyama, b 98-99). What Maruyama called “realist” was different from the general meaning of the word as is seen in Hardy, because Maruyama’s idea of realism did not tend to focus on sociopolitical problems. He claimed that Conrad was such a realist that he was not interested in “the mechanism and discipline of western society” but in “human destiny” as a kind of philosophy: “The sea and strange lands Conrad wrote about reflected human destiny abstractly” and “he could be called a fatalist” (Maruyama, b 101). And he added, “Conrad liked the storm-swept sea because it is a mixture of love and fear. Moreover, he preferred to write about Asian people who had wildness and mystique” (Maruyama, b 107). It was important for Maruyama to focus on Conrad’s sea as an allegory of fatality or philosophical problems. He avoided criticizing Conrad’s prejudice against “Asian people.”

Even if Maruyama had been reading many Conrad’s works since the 1930s, he did not get to understand the discourse to connect Conrad’s works with colonialism and imperialism of modern Japan. He, as a result, explained that Conrad’s sea and strange lands were based on a kind of romanticism, as did other Japanese Conradians in the 1920s and in the 1930s.

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12See, Yonekubo, *Nashisasu go no kokudo*, 2-3
13This was the second conscription. The first conscription was in 1926.
He certainly claimed that Conrad talked about “the crimes of the civilization of the West.” At the same time, he disregarded the fact that there had been a lot of violation of colonialism and imperialism behind “the scene of the sea and strange lands of Conrad’s works” and thus he could not draw precisely a figure of Conrad as a critic of the West. “Conrad was neither a cosmopolitan nor a simple orientalist like Lafcadio Hearn.” (Maruyama, b 340) Maruyama’s comments on Conrad were ambiguous throughout the book. The reception of Maruyama shows not simply the limitations of his recognition of Conrad’s sea, but the limitations of a typical mode of the reception of Conrad in modern Japan. In 1973, for instance, about 30 years after the Second World War, Mitsuharu Kaneko, a famous poet and painter, wrote a book about his south Asian trip in the mid-1930s.

The south sea as light green tiles was very much different from the Japanese ocean. I did not want to swim in the sea because I felt it malicious at the bottom. There was no doubt that Conrad, who was born in Ukraine and researched the area, might have had the same feeling about the sea, too. The ocean is on the right and the trees on the left in the beach. This landscape bothered me. (Kaneko 136)

The sea drawn by Kaneko could be connected with the receptions of Conrad from the 1910s to the early 1940s: authors from Natsume to Haruyama and Kaneko accepted the sea Conrad depicted as simple pastoral or romantic areas rather than socio-political territories among imperial countries.

There has been a feature in the reception of Conrad in modern Japan, in which many people have read Conrad’s works but few have discussed earnestly and seriously the political aspects of the works. When Apocalypse Now, Francis Ford Coppola’s film adaptation of Heart of Darkness, was released in Japan in 1980, Shohei Ooka (1909-1988), a novelist, a solider surviving in a fierce battlefield of Second World War in Leyte island, Philippine, was very interested in the movie because he had read Heart of Darkness translated by Yoshio Nakano (1903-1985) in 1941 and other Conrad’s works in English. As Ooka was a friend of Nakano’s, he asked Nakano by phone about the circumstances of translating Heart of Darkness. Nakano replied: “I don’t remember the details of the situation at the time” because “it was a long time ago.” Then, Nakano promised that if he could discover some documents about the translation, he would call back Ooka soon. Yet, Ooka answered immediately “No, thank you” (Ooka 58).

Why did he refuse Nakano’s offer? Although Ooka, who was a translator of Stendhal’s works, was famous for his strong inquiring mind about western literature, he showed less interest in the reception of Heart of Darkness in Japan. This attitude of Ooka, however, was not a rare case but similar to that of other Japanese Conradians. In addition, Nakano never recorded the situation of the translation in 1941, either. Translators had a tendency to avoid talking about the reception of Conrad. When the Russo-Japanese war started in 1904, the editor of Eigo Seinen announced that the serialization of “Tomorrow” with footnotes was replaced with “Youth”, because “Youth” was more appropriate than “Tomorrow” during the war time. It was clear that the editor had become nervous about the

14See, Saito Hajime. Teikoku nihon no eibungaku. 39-60.
war. After that, “Tomorrow” never appeared in the magazine, but in 1941 “Tomorrow” was serialized in the naval bulletin called Sui Ko Sya Kiji. It was translated by Professor Higashida for one year. Why did Higashida choose that gloomy work to translate? After the war, Higashida became the first president of the Stylistics Association in Japan. However, he never left any detailed records on the reception of Conrad during the Second World War. The translation of “Tomorrow” in the bulletin is not recorded in his bibliography. Maruyama never talked about the relation between the reception and the war, either.

Among those who played major roles in the reception of Conrad in modern Japan, no one has gone toward the heart of darkness of Conrad’s works. The memories of the reception have been buried in oblivion. Surely there are not many records of the reception of Conrad in modern Japan. Then, do we have no connection with the genealogy of the reception of Conrad? We must not forget that we are the very part of the history of the reception of Joseph Conrad.

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TRANSLATING SHE KING, TOWARDS A HOLISTIC APPROACH

Yanchun Zhao *

Abstract: Through the translations of William Jones and Ezra Pound et al., She King or Poems, has become a supermeme in English and American literatures. However, their translations only make an imperfect reflex of the Chinese art due to their neglect of proper form and content. This paper, based on the analysis of their translations, argues what makes a poem a poem is not semantic content alone. Form and content make an inseparable dyad, and form itself is a sign, signifying the entity of poetry. Sir John Denham’s dictum: “Not Language into Language but Poesie into Poesie” is a basic requirement for verse translation. However, an analysis of their rhymed versions shows that translation of “poesie into poesie” is not yet enough. A translation should be faithful in style as well, so “style into style” is another criterion. Still, we have to consider the real value of a classic, hence the criterion of “classic into classic”. So besides the consideration of semantic content, poesie into poesie, style into style, and classic into classic are necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for a holistic translation. In verse translation, there are no fixed principles but a very flexible maxim, that is, rendering the original as it is into a foreign language text, that is, a translation should be as close as is possible to the original with the consideration of the above criteria, a guarantee of the proposed holistic approach.

I. Introduction

She King or Poems, one of earliest Chinese classics known to the Western world through its translations, is a collection of 305 earliest poems in Chinese history, about 2500 years ago; it is a tetrad consisting of Airs of the States, Psalms Minor, Psalms Major and Chants. Airs of the States is a treasure of 160 folk songs, namely airs collected from the 15 vassal states of Chough, Psalms Major and Psalms Minor include 74 and 31 psalms respectively, sung by nobles at court or at table, and Chants include 40 chants sung to gods or ancestors during sacrifice.

She King unrolls a panorama of Chinese life at that time, i.e. 6th century BC. Some of these folk songs describe the love and hatred, aspirations and frustrations of people from different classes of the society, some report social events, warfare, and state affairs, and some depict the wonder and harmony of nature. It shows a repository of flora and fauna: about a hundred kinds of plants and trees, ninety kinds of animals and insects, and it gives an exhibition of arts and crafts, namely all kinds of musical instruments, metals, arms and munitions of war, buildings, clothing, food, and so on. These objects are used as metaphors or they consist in a milieu of the heroes and heroines acting on the historical stage, contributing to the literary value of the creations.

*Dr. YANCHUN ZHAO, Professor and Director of Foreign Language, Literature & Culture Center, Tianjin Foreign Studies University. Email: zhaoyanchun@hotmail.com
She King has done well, as Confucius said, “to inspire, to reveal, to unite, and to admonish.” Given the diversity of the poems and their literary value, She King is a very valuable document for those who wish to seek insight into Chinese civilization, “the most literary, the most artistic, the longest established civilization that exists,” as John Turner (1976, p. 6) said.

The artistic impact of She King goes on from generation to generation. So its charm can still be felt even today; actually it has never faded. It lives on and reproduces. On the one hand, the pattern of four-character or tetrasyllabic verse has been used until today; on the other, it has evolved into many subgenres: pentasyllabic verse, hexasyllabic verse, septasyllabic verse, and other types of songs. The images and ideas represented in these poems are still fresh, as fresh as rosebuds, and many lines have become proverbs like “Of your hands I take hold/I’ll stay with you till old,” “One day I don’t see him/Is like three years I’m sick,” “The reeds sway, green and green/The white dew becomes frost.” Ask anyone if s/he knows “Of your hands I take hold,” and s/he will reply with the second line “I’ll stay with you till old.”

She King has been a supermeme in Chinese literature and is not confined to China. As such it is a gift to the world. It is influential indeed, as well as an inalienable part of world literature, even though its translations are far from ideal. For a better understanding of the Chinese art, we need to scrutinize these translations to expose their inadequacies, and find a better approach to its expression in English and/or other languages.

II. An Imperfect Translation, a Warping Mirror

She King began to influence the West in the eighteenth century when Sir William Jones (1746-1794) pioneered the translation of fragments of She King into English. Then came James Legge, C. F. R. Allen, and William Jennings in the next century and L. Cranmer-Byng, Helen Waddell, Louis S. Hammond, Ezra Pound and Arthur Waley in the next.

Jones’ translation, although not faithful in form or content, opened a window on China and exerted considerable influence on English poets of the nineteenth century such as Byron, Shelley, and Tennyson (De Pinto, 1946). Ezra Pound was the most influential and controversial of all these trail blazers. Despite his blatant manipulation and errors, his translation is imbued with vigor, succinctness and poignancy and contributed to the Imagist Movement he launched; a fresh breath through American literature. From Jones and Pound we can see how English and American literature has been tinged with a Chinese hue.

However, this hue is not the whole thing of the Chinese art, only an imperfect reflex of the source hue, because the translations themselves are imperfect.

Some early translators such as Sir William Jones and James Legge, probably unaware of what translation is all about or for other reasons, gave two versions, free verse and rhymed verse. Irrespective of the semantic content, their free verse translations, word for word translation from the original in most cases, are not equivalent to the original in terms of genre because the songs in She King are metrical, regular in meter and rhyme. Their rhymed verse translations are better, if not closer, in form but the meaning is, more often than not, distorted or lost. In translating poems, it is almost impossible to keep both form and meaning without
sacrificing the integral beauty. Poetry is what is lost in translation, Robert Frost jeered.

In the following, we shall analyze Jones’ free verse and rhymed verse translations and examine others’ in the next section as supporting evidences for the necessity of a holistic approach to translation. Now let us look at Jones’ “A Chinese Ode” translated in 1799:

Behold yon reach of the River KI;
Its green reeds, how luxuriant, how luxuriant!
Thus is our Prince adorned with virtues;
As a carver, as a filer, of ivory,
As a cutter, as a polisher, of gems.
O how elate, how sagacious! O how dauntless and composed!
How worthy of fame! How worthy of reverence!
We have a Prince adorned with virtues,
Whom to the end of time we cannot forget.

Jones’ free verse version (we have found only this fragment) can be seen as a literal translation, very close to the original in diction and layout, and very poetic owing to the tonal emphasis fashioned by the reduplications or parallelisms. But it is inadequate in two aspects. In form, the original is in rhyme though irregular in rhyming scheme, and it is tetrasyllabic except the last line of each stanza, while this translation is not rhymed and is lengthy with irregular lines, varying from nine to fifteen syllables. In content, the original depicts a gentleman or lord as gallant, refined (Like ivory polished/Like precious stone finished), and cheerful, while the translation mistakes him as “our Prince” and appoints him to be a kind of smith “as a carver, as a filer, of ivory/As a cutter, as a polisher, of gems”. “Prince” and “carver” etc. are incongruous or grotesque, if not totally impossible. So, we can see Jones’ free verse translation is unfaithful either in form or content due to his misinterpretation of the semantic content of the original, and most probably, inadequate understanding of translation. Now, let us look at his rhymed version:

Behold, where yon blue riv’let glides
Along the laughing dale;
Light reeds bedeck its verdant sides,
And frolic in the gale.

So shines our Prince! In bright array
The Virtues around him wait;
And sweetly smil’d th’ auspicious day,
That rais’d Him o’er our State.

As pliant hands in shapes refin’d
Rich iv’ry carve and smoothe,
His laws thus mold each ductile mind,
And every passion soothe.

As gems are taught by patient art
In sparkling ranks to beam,
With manners thus he forms the heart,
And spreads a gen’ral gleam.
What soft, yet awful, dignity!
What meek, yet manly grace!
What sweetness dances in his eye,
And blossoms in his face!

So shines our Prince! A sky-born crowd
Of Virtues around him blaze:
Ne'er shall Oblivion’s murky cloud
Obscure his deathless praise.

Jones’ rhymed version is audacious, so audacious as has betrayed the original almost throughout. It can be seen as a belle infidèle termed by Gilles Ménage. The original consists of three stanzas, nine lines each, and four characters or syllables each line while the translation is composed of six stanzas, four lines each, and eight syllables (tetrameter) and six syllables (trimeter) in alternate lines, so it is a great deviance in layout from the original. In addition, the original is rhymed but irregular in rhyming scheme while the original is in elegant alternate rhyme, i.e. aabb. What about the content? It is a far cry from the original. Take the first stanza for example. One cannot find in the original any clue to the information expressed in the last three lines. If the first line of the first stanza alludes to the original, then the following five stanzas have almost nothing to do with it, not correspondent either in thematic structure or semantic content.

If this translation is a dazzling beauty, it is not the beauty portrayed by the author. It is a rewriting, a raping and rapturing rewriting, fitting in with the Horace Model. Jones was just paraphrasing or imitating the original in John Dryden’s terms (Fan, 1981); this translation is not analogous to the original either in form or content, either.

From the above analysis, we can see Jones fell short of his effort to represent the original in either free verse or rhymed verse translation. An imperfect translation is a warping mirror of the original. So it is not ill-grounded to assert that Chinese literature has been warpingly mirrored to the west. Isn’t it necessary to see what the original is like? Self-evident. But other translators were hardly better. The inadequacies of some other translators will be analysed in the next section while we discuss the holistic approach to translation.

III. Towards a Holistic Approach

III.1 The necessity of Proper Form and Proper Content
Rendering Poems into rhyme with regular meter while keeping the content is a great challenge to translators. Arthur Waley gave it up, as he said “if one uses rhyme, it is impossible to sacrifice sense to sound” (Waley, 1941, p. 1). He makes sense if we consider Jones’ translation. Out of this understanding and probably due to the complexity of factors involved, Waley neglected the essential formal features and tried to keep the semantic content. However, what makes a poem a poem is not semantic content, or not semantic content alone.

Form and content, or sound and sense in Waley’s terms, make an inseparable dyad, and the form itself is a sign, signifying the entity of poetry. So what is neglected by Waley should not be neglected at all. According to Aristotle, form is active while stuff, i.e. content, is passive, and in the eyes of Russian formalists,
form is content, and this form is even more important than the semantic content of a text because form is what makes something art to begin with, so in order to understand a work of art as a work of art (rather than as an ornamented communicative act) one must focus on its form (Shklovsky, 1990). It is true if we consider the nature of a sign, a disembodied being. Form, be it of Eidos, of logic, of language, or of poetry, is one with different realizations or reincarnations. Anyhow, the beauty of form is a salient feature of poetry or it is what poetry relies on. Of course, form without content is unimaginable. A good poem satisfies both form and content, and more specifically, it is in the tension between form and content, namely the mutual haulage between form and content. Therefore, a translator’s disregard of poetic form can be regarded as a misunderstanding of verse translation, a fundamental mistake. In short, translating a poem into meaning without its poetic form is inadequate, if not meaningless.

It is easy to understand that translation of poems is not a matter of “language into language” but a matter of “poesie into poesie”. Probably, James Legge realized the importance of meter and rhyme, so like Jones he gave a second version after publishing his first draft of free verse. But can he stand Robert Frost’s satire and Arthur Waley’s assertion? Or is he faithful at all? Let us see his two versions of the first stanza of the first poem in Poems:

Kwan-kwan go the ospreys,
On the islet in the river.
The modest, retiring, virtuous, young lady: --
For our prince a good mate she.

The original text follows this schema: four four-character or tetrasyllabic lines each stanza with the rhyming scheme of aaba. Legge’s first version does not represent or represent its poetic form. So we can conclude that it is not faithful in form. However meaningful the content is, the whole translation is inadequate, because it is not what the original is. Poetry is what it is, in contrast with prose. Legge’s version is nothing but prose in poetic lines.

Now we may focus on its content irrespective of the form. Is it faithful in semantic content? What does “Kwan-kwan” mean? What part of speech is it? Few readers know or can infer from the context that it is a transliteration of the Chinese onomatopoeic word “guanguan”, the wooing sound produced by grebes or crown grebes, to be specific. So it cannot be a successful translation. And accordingly, “ospreys” should be another mistranslation. The osprey (Pandion haliaetus), sometimes known as the sea hawk, fish eagle, river hawk or fish hawk, is a diurnal, fish eating bird of prey, a large raptor. This contrasts sharply with the loving bird called crown grebe, which is analogous to a wooing young man or young woman. What about “our prince”? Does the original say it is “our prince”? The original says “junzi”. It is a polysemous word, which means 1) lord, 2) gentleman, and 3) mate or husband. The original poem is a love song, of a girl being pursued by someone, so the best interpretation of this someone should be a pursuer, accordingly “junzi” here is the closest in meaning to the third one, namely mate. Every prince can be a mate, but not every mate can be a prince. In short, for the optimum function or potential of the text, the third acceptance is the best choice, which can be interpreted as “young man”, “boy”, “lad” and so on. What about the style? The original is terse, with four characters or syllables each
line. But the translation is verbose, twice as long as the original while irregular, varying from line to line. The wordiest of the wordy is Legge’s translation of “yaotiao” into “modest, retiring, virtuous, young”, but it misses the mark. The words put together do not make an equivalent to the original “yaotiao”. In conclusion, considering the content and style, Legge’s free verse version should not be judged as an ideal translation.

Legge’s second version, namely the rhymed verse translation came in 1876:

Hark! From the Islet in the stream the voice
Of the fish hawks that o’er their nest rejoice!
From them our thoughts to that young lady go,
Modest and virtuous, loath herself to show,
Where could be found, to share our prince’s state
So fair, so virtuous, and so fit a mate?

Like Jones’ translation we have analyzed, it is a rewriting, or an imitation in John Dryden’s terms! You might say it is his own versification based on the hints or clues from the original. First, let us compare it with the original in terms of form. The original is a four line stanza with the rhyming scheme of aaba while the translation is a six line stanza of three couplets, aabbccdd; the original is tetrasyllabic while the translation is iambic pentameter, that is to say, the original is composed of 16 syllables while the translation is of 60 syllables, a vast difference. If form is necessary to a poem, this translation has a different form from the original. As Shakespeare said, brevity is beauty. If the original is a slim girl, the translation is a humpty-dumpty. Because it is a humpty-dumpty, you can easily see its proud flesh: “that o’er their nest rejoice”, “From them our thoughts to that young lady go”, “loath herself to show” and “to share our prince’s state” are additions, redundant indeed, not to mention the misinterpretations like “osprey”. It is not only redundant but also vulgar, because the worldliness of “to share our prince’s state” detracts from the purity of love. Besides, the textuality is different because the author, unlike that of the original, comes onto the stage, exclaiming “Hark!” and showing his presence by saying “our thoughts” and “our prince’s sate”, thus adulterating the original. In short, although the poetic form is represented in a way, the content and style deviate from the original.

Based on the above analysis, we can understand Frost’s irony and Waley’s assertion are not without reason. Arthur Waley’s version came out in 1937:

“Fair, fair,” cry the ospreys
On the island in the river.
Lovely is this noble lady,
Fit bride for our lord.

Really, it is fresh. The meaning is well conveyed although “osprey”, “noble lady”, “fit bride” and “lord” are not good candidates, if not wrong interpretations. Judging from the text and context, there should be no “noble lady” or “our lord” or “fit bride”. It is a folk song limning the pursuit of, or yearning for, a girl by a young man. Fresh as it is, it is not equivalent to the original. On the one hand, the lines are irregular, varying from five to eight syllables; on the other, there is no rhyme or rhyming scheme, hence a loss of musical effect. Judging by Ezra Pound’s criteria of Logopeia (beauty of meaning), Phanopeia (beauty of form)
and Melopeia (beauty of sound), Waley’s version satisfies only one, i.e. Logopeia, though still discounted. Again, it is a far cry from the original. In this case, sense is not sacrificed to sound, but it is still sacrificed. So form should not be seen as a necessary detraction of sense.

Then comes Ezra Pound, one of the greatest figures in the history of translation from Chinese into English. Ironically, Ezra Pound knew very little Chinese. He did not translate from the original but from Ernest Francisco Fenollosa’s notes, namely word to word explanations of the original verse, perhaps with reference to James Legge’s translation. Let us look at the stanza he translated in 1954:

“Hid! Hid!” the fish-hawk saith
by isle in Ho the fish-hawk saith:
“Dark and clear, Dark and clear,
So shall be the prince’s fere.”

It is dressed in poetic form though the lines are irregular, not analogous to the original, which is four characters a line, no more, no less. What about the semantic content? One can hardly find any similar sense between his version and the previous ones except for the last line and the word fish-hawk. What does this version convey? It’s really hard to understand. Why does the fish hawk say “Hid”? How is it related to other lines or the context? Why does it say “Dark and clear, Dark and clear, So shall be the prince’s fere”? This translation is not a coherent piece; few, if any, can figure out a possible logical relation. Actually, the original does not convey such information. If we try to find the cause for his absurdity, we may infer from his translation that Pound strung the words together from Fenollosa’s notes or his English explanation of individual words or characters (equivalent roughly to morphemes). Of course, he strung them artistically, making the piece a rhyme. The onomatopoeic word “guan” in the first line refers to the wooing sound produced by the mating birds called crown grebes, but Pound misunderstood it as “to close”, which may have something to do with “to hide”—an effect of closing can be seen as something being hid. Accordingly, Pound used the inflected word form “hid”. And because “guanguan” is a reduplication of the sound “guan”, Pound, out of his misunderstanding, repeated the word “hid”. Similarly, the word “yaotiao”, which is formed with two characters or morphemes, means “gentle” or “quiet”; when “yao” and “tiao” are separated from each other, the former may mean “dark” or “dim” and the latter may mean “fair” or “clear”, hence Pound’s diction: “Dark and clear, Dark and clear”. Now let us look at the word “Ho” in the second line. It is a transcription from the Chinese word pronounced “he”, i.e. “Ho” in the translation, which means “river” or “the Yellow River”. But very few western readers can associate it with the common noun “river” or the proper noun “the Yellow River”. Pound may have copied Fenollosa’s notes without understanding what the words really mean in the original text. In addition, he changed the texture or layout of the original. The first two lines in the original make a metaphor, in which the cooing of the grebes is compared to the wooing of the hero and heroine in the next two lines. However, he made the protagonists invisible. As a matter of fact, starting with a metaphor whereby to usher in protagonists is the schema of Poems. So, although Pound’s translation is in poetic form, it is not faithful to the original in
either form or content. If it can be judged as a poem or even a good poem, it has little or even nothing to do with _Poems_.

Now we have fully realized the implication of Sir John Denham’s dictum: “Not Language into Language but Poesie into Poesie” (Bassnett, 1980). However, the analysis of Legge’s and Pound’s rhymed versions shows that the only requirement of “poesie into poesie” is not enough. A translation should be faithful in style as well, so “style into style” is another criterion. Still, we have to consider the real value of a classic. A classic can stand the test of Old Time. It refuses to be adapted or rewritten, for example, “grebe”, a loving bird in the Chinese setting of flora and fauna, should always be “grebe”; never should it be “osprey”, nor should “prince” or “lord” come to stage if they have no part to play in the original. So the ultimate criterion comes: not only style into style but also classic into classic.

Of course, “classic into classic” is a dream, but it is a dream worth pursuing. If interlingual communication, as described by I. A. Richards (1953) is “very probably the most complex type of event yet produced in the evolution of the cosmos” (p. 250), then translation, especially verse translation, is many times as complex as normal interlingual communication because the interfaces between form and meaning, including subinterfaces between semantics and pragmatics, between content and style and so on should be properly addressed. In the process of translation, one is always at risk, prone to fall flat, as Sheng Rui (c. 371-c. 438), a Buddhist translator and critic, said, “Just like having broken through the passes, one finds a great abyss; if no _deus ex machina_ comes to help, he will fall.” (cited in Chen Fukang, 2000, P. 21) In this pursuit, if a translator is born with a deep insight and equipped with proper expertise, he may succeed, enjoying the kick.

### III.2 How to be Holistic?

What are the principles to follow in verse translation? There are no fixed principles but a very flexible maxim, that is, rendering the original as it is into a foreign language text as close as is possible to the original. This method can be summarized in Peter Newmark’s terms, namely, as literal as is possible, as free as is necessary (Newmark, 1988). To be literal is a guarantee for faithfulness: literal in terms of words and their compositions, therefore it includes form, meter and rhyme in most cases; to be free is an attempt to break the bonds of language to approximate the original from a roundabout way. Literal or free, it is for the holistic effect of the translation. The act or process of translating can be revealed as a system of checks and balances, in which anything can be vetoed according to the right weight of the elements involved. In the following, we shall see how the tetrasyllabic or four character scheme of the original is vetoed.

It is not difficult to understand that the meter or rhyme of a translation is only an analogy to that of the original because pronunciation and intonation are specific to a language and are dependent on it. For example, in English “thyme” and “prime” are in rhyme, but [taim] and [praim] are inherent to the words respectively, in other words, they have no counterparts in the original. Nor does meter have a counterpart in the original because stress or intonation is specific to a language. If a translator has no sense of adaptation, he may fall as well. Arthur Cooper (1971), trying to re-present the four-character meter of the original, translated the first stanza of the poem in question into tetrasyllabic lines, a brave act.
However, it fails to keep the charm of the original as result of being stuck to the tetrasyllabic. A Chinese tetrasyllabic line is not an English tetrasyllabic line because Chinese is different from English. As a matter of fact, in Chinese we do not count syllables but characters, or in other words, a Chinese word is not analyzed into syllables, so the so-called tetrasyllabic is only an analogy. Of course, Cooper can translate that way, and it is recommendable if the meaning or form is not sacrificed. But, obviously, Cooper’s version is not in rhyme, and the semantic content is inadequate, having lost the wooing sound and courtship as is conveyed by the original, and it is unclear who is shy; it seems to be “our Shepard”. Besides, who is our Shepard? So Cooper’s version, though analogous to the original in meter, is not ideal as a whole. A translation should be holistic, as close to the original as is possible, though dialectically.

It dawns on us that it is improper to translate the tetrasyllabic lines of the original into tetrasyllabic lines in English due to the different parameterizations of Chinese and English. Chinese is hypotactic, with few cohesive devices like prepositions, conjunctions and articles while English is paratactic, rich with such devices. So it is reasonable to adopt the hexasyllabic pattern, as has been tried and carried out all throughout by the author. As for rhyming scheme, aaba, abab or aabb is advisable because rhyme is to be used by analogy. Based on the above analyses and reflections, I attempt to give my hexasyllabic version, an iambic trimeter, tailored with the golden mean, as is shown below:

Do-do, the grebes do coo
At shoal amid the stream;
The lad is keen to woo
The lass, a virtuous dream.

It is not necessary for one to comment on his own work because it is here for you to see, to hear, and to feel, and of course, to criticize. She King or Poems (Zhao Yanchun, forthcoming) as a whole falls in with this pattern, that is, iambic trimeter with its translator attempting to render the classic into a classic. Of course, a translator, bewitched with the wonder of translation, always expects later translations to do better, coming up with something incorporating both proper form and proper content.

All the same, this translation can be seen as a sample fulfilled with the proposed holistic approach. During the process of translation, the tetrasyllabic of the original is vetoed to accommodate the hexasyllabic or iambic trimeter of the translation, and the rhyming scheme aaba of the original is represented with abab in the translation. In short, the form is realized by analogy. In respect of content, the metaphor is kept intact, in which the configuration of grebes cooing is used as the vehicle and the wooing of the lass by the lad is the tenor, on the other hand, the protagonists are vividly sketched, who are playing against the background where grebes coo at shoal amid the stream. In a word, the content is not sacrificed.
to the form; as a whole, the translation is approximate to the original, a dialectic fact.

IV. Conclusion

She King as part of world literature is known to westerners through translations. However, very few of its translations up to now are faithful either in form or content. Therefore, it is necessary to scrutinize the previous translations to see how the beauty of She King is lost or distorted in the process of translation.

We have analyzed the influential translations of She King to show that they failed to represent the original as it is or closely as it is, hence a warped reflection of the Chinese art. And based on the analysis, we have realized that a successful translation is dependent on a correct understanding of what translation is and an appropriate method to represent the original to the largest extent so as to keep its artistic value. Accordingly, we have provided a set of step-by-step criteria for classic verse translation, i.e., poesie into poesie, style into style, and classic into classic, and thereby attempt to put forward a holistic approach to translation of classics or translation in general.

References


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BOOK REVIEWS


The book under review is presented into six consecutive sections each containing four chapters, and a critical estimate of the main achievement of the book is added as the last chapter. The author’s scheme of laying down a document map for each of the chapters of the book enhances its academic worth. The author is originally a philosopher and is well versed in Indian and Western traditions: evident from his discussion which covers a wide range of traditional and contemporary issues of philosophy. His book comprises a complete treatment on the questions of language, being and cognition. The reality for the book is that which we know, and we know only the intelligible being that is the being of the language and the meaning, the signifier and the signified, the expresser and the expressed that are universal in nature. Individuals are known by implication/inference as the ontic substratum of intelligible beings. Since the book accepts the infusion thesis the two, the signifier and signified, are non-different. Naked signified isolated from language is unthinkable. However, if it is any that may be use for the mystics but is of no philosophical use. The world of our knowledge is the world of Philosophy and the world of philosophy is the world of language and, hence, the analysis and interpretation of the language as its author takes is the analysis and interpretation of cognition as well. The author takes that the cognitive aspect of spirit that we know is confined to knowledge and on that basis we infer the ontic aspect of it by implication as the substratum of the former. Thus, the book approaches the whole field of human knowledge only through the analysis of language. The purpose of the analysis of cognition infused by language is to free intellect and human thinking from allegiances and infatuation with the ontic world based on inference, supposition and faith. Thus, as I observe, the philosophy discussed herein enriches our philosophical understanding and is relevant for promoting research in the field of philosophy of language and analysis.

After Independence several books have been written on Indian Philosophy that deal seriously about the metaphysical issues with a epistemology to prove them convincing on the basis of proofs and reasoning and an axiology to justify and make the metaphysical speculation purposive as way of life (Sādhanā). On the other hand books are written on the dialectical reasoning to prove that all the metaphysical and epistemological reasoning fail to prove what they intend to prove. The work under review is, perhaps, the first one after Indian Independence that deals with Indian philosophy without intermingling it with metaphysical and religious allegiances. It provides with not only a philosophical outlook of popular philosophical trends but also presents a critique of cognition in the light of recent advancement in the field. It is really a work of perpetual importance for analyzing the cognition as it flashes by language.

The author is a Sanskrit scholar of repute and has exhaustively used the original texts like Asñādhyāyā of Pāṇini, Vārtika of Kātyāyana, Mahābhāṣya of Patanjali, Pradāpa of Kaiyāna, all the three parts of Vākyapadāya and Dāpikā of Bhartṛhari, and commentaries of Helāraja (on IIIrd part), Punyāraja (on IIInd part) and Nāgeśa Bhañña of Sphoñavāda. Māmānsā Ślokavārtika of Kumārila Bhañña,
Nyāyamanjarā of Jayanta Bhañña, Bramasātrabhāṣya and Upaniśadbhāṣya of Śankarācārya, and texts and commentaries of Buddhism and Jainism and have been nicely utilized. He has referred to the Scholarly works of K. A. S. Iyer, G. S. Shastri, K. Subba Rao, Kunjihuni Raja, Asoka Akalujkar, R. C. Pandey, Radhika Herzberger, H. G. Coward, Jonathan Ganeri, and many more based on original Sanskrit texts of language and grammar. He is seen equally versed in the philosophical trends of the West and has meaningfully attempted to observe the issues of language in contemporary perspective.

The book opens up an intensive chapter on philosophy and its public utility; discussing the multi-dimensional nature of philosophy, the author provides with a clear platform to a reader to easily comprehend the main tenets and vast scope of philosophy. The Author’s discussion on the utility of philosophy is very impressive and updated. He points out that philosophy is a system of reflective activity not only on the situation of human cognition and experience but also on the human aspirations. The author has rightly said that all problems are at thought level, and therefore there is possibility of their analysis, clarification and removal by philosophical reflections. Had problem been an external beyond our limit it would neither be known nor be removed by reflection. They flash and therefore can be analyzed, clarified and removed my thinking and reflecting on them only. Getting wisdom against ignorance is the primary problem that makes the public utility of philosophical reflection highly important.

A thorough philosophical discussion on the different theories of language, its nature and power, autonomy, infusion of language and cognition, language and communication as sharing and responding, meaning of moral language and many more were still to come from Comparative perspective. The Philosophers of the East and West have attempted to free philosophy from metaphysical captive; but to free it from the metaphysical infatuation and allegiances is very rare. The cognitive holistic approach of the book provides with a view of philosophy free from the metaphysical assumptions; it conceives that language, independently of the ontic entities and our allegiances to them, expresses intelligible beings to which our knowledge and philosophical reflection are confined. I must thank to Professor Tiwari for this new trend of philosophy that I found very interesting and profound; it talks about concentrating on the flashes of consciousness, analyzing them as they flash and interpreting them for making them understandably clear in an analytic scheme. For him, the language is power; it expresses itself and its meaning independently of any other thing-in-itself and their allegiances. The author’s argument about analysis of language appropriately is the analysis of cognition is really highly relevant for furthering philosophy of language in our time.

The book discusses two major views about language that are 1. There is power in language as we find in Rhetorics and heterodox and orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. Some of them accept three and some others only two of the powers in words because of which they convey different kinds of meaning that are –popular, intended and non-intended and 2. The language itself is power that expresses all meanings. The author views the problems undertaken by him on the basis of the later perspective for which language is expresser. The primacy of language as the only power to which all cognitive activities, philosophical thinking and reflections are confined distinguishes this work from all those metaphysical expositions that try to determine meaning in a model and take

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language as merely a tool for interpreting the meaning. He appreciates the Wittgensteinian view of language game model but very soon criticizes it for the reason that it gives primacy to use and intention as meaning and accepts that word and sentences are dead. On the basis of a simple logic that meaning is not given and the language is only given to us for analysis, interpretation and determination of meaning as the author thinks can be worked out in a reflective theory only when it is infused by language. Isolated from language, no meaning, no cognition is possible or even if possible it hardly concerns with a reflective discipline like philosophy that occupies with the analysis of cognition.

Since meaning in the model theorists is always free rather than transcendent to language, an attempt to free it from language finds language as dead and then exercising game-theory to determine meaning through a dead entity is just a waste of interest; a philosophical move having no efficiency to explain successfully either or both of the positions—language determines meaning and vice-versa. Such an attempt is nothing but to strengthen in a more disguised way the same mistake once committed by metaphysician and even so only for showing the insufficiency of model-theories of meaning. “All cognition is determinate” this observation of the author in the book under review may not be acceptable to many who do not give primacy to language in a philosophical reflection but I cannot deny the merit of the stand of the author for giving all primacy to language in a cognitive enterprise.

The author views all events concerning even past and future become the object of knowledge only when they flash in present by language. We know and become self-consciousness of those events only when they flash. They may be given beforehand but they become object of reflection only when they flash in present. Even the memory also flashes in present and that is why it becomes the object of our cognition. That which flashes is a being for the author. He identifies those beings as intelligible objects we know; they are philosophical beings. It is justified to think that if philosophy is a cognitive activity par excellence then objects of philosophical reflections must be the intelligible beings of which one can be aware of and are of awareness in nature. The autonomy of language has got a proper shape with the hands of the author of the book under review. The earlier popular theories discuss the autonomy of the user in the name of autonomy of language without a justification as to how the user's autonomy is the autonomy of language. I found a very different version of autonomy thesis based on language as expression because of it as power; it is fit to express itself its own nature and its meaning indifferently and independently of metaphysical/psychological/religious/ontic entities and our allegiances to them. This basic view serves as the thread of discussions in almost all chapters of the book.

The author is a distinguished philosopher widely known for his works concerning philosophy-proper. One can obviously observe and the author himself accepts well the Bhartṛharian impact on him. He is very pointed in his exposition of three outlooks concerning the nature of language: 1. The Reference theory; 2. The Representation theory; 3. The Expressive theory and attaches primacy to the last theory. Chapters on Jain view on the limit of language and indescribability of reality, and Buddhist’s meaning of religious experiences are fresh and, perhaps for the first time in contemporary history, the author has pointedly argued for and against the representative theory of language in the chapter.
The dichotomy of analytic-synthetic, factual and descriptive have been most crucial problem in the history of philosophy and almost all contemporary philosophers have given divided views on these issues; they have provided a theory for which the propositions concerning the analytic/factual are valid and the synthetic/descriptive are out of the measure of validity, they have emotive-meaning for some and prescriptive for others. This remotely divides the statements into ‘is’ and ‘ought’, and while doing so they are not seen serious in their move, because of which they try to do with only a limited sort of statements that fit to their compass of meaning-testability and a large number of sentence of human behavior/conduct are underestimated and suffer subordination and disregard. This led the later theories to leave the issue in abeyance and concentrate on good reasoning for the meaning as we find in Toulmin and J. O. Urmson.

The author attempts the issue of the meaningfulness of all sorts of statements on the basis of the basic argument of action oriented formation and expressive nature of language according to which it is naturally fit to express some or the other action. In most languages the verb is given primacy, and the nominal words are interpreted to be derived from the verbal forms as we find specifically in Sanskrit. If this is so, the ‘is and ought model’ of dividing and deciding meaning is a misguided attempt that overlooks the nature and purpose of language. Ought sentences are very much verifiable on the basis of function they perform in our day-to-day life. They express the meaning of accomplished and of non-accomplished character. As well, the later comprises those to be verified later and those to be verified by proofs based on the functions performed on that basis, by analogy and other sources. Thus, the criteria of meaning according to the author can in no way be confined to the availability of referents in the empirical world. Language expresses equally the meaning of finished and non-finished character. Hence the meaning of language is independent from the external existence or the corresponding entity in the experience. The validity of proposition as correspondence picks out only factual sort of propositions as meaningfulness, but all other varieties of propositions, primarily actions-centered, fall outside the compass of this criterion. The author’s observation of meaning and truth of moral sentences is quite proper and fit for giving incentive to the explanation and further investigation concerning the meaning of moral language.

Generally, we in philosophical enterprises talk about validity. The author emphasizes the difference of verity and validity of knowledge and accepts the former as foundational to the latter enterprise of the logical skill of verifying criteria. One can deny, but there is no ground to disagree with his position, that Logical skill cannot move to any position without the verity as the incentive and object of verifying skill. The analysis of Sphoña in Chapter II is an excellent exposition of Bhartrhari’s philosophy of Vākyapadāya and his commentators like Helārāja, Punyarāja, Nāgēśa Bhaṅgā, Konōa Bhaṅgā, and others. The book for the first time pointedly specifies Sphoña as a philosophical being and clarifies that it is a cognitive entity, an intelligible being that cannot be confused as mystical entity, metaphorical or metaphysical substance. It as such is the flash that flashes meaning non-differently. It is philosophical being that is expressed and hence the flash of consciousness we know, analyze and interpret. A philosophical being cannot be confused to be a transcendental metaphysical entity; it is directly known as it flashes. The author clarifies nicely in Chapter I and then

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in Chapter XIII that reality has no particular frame of existence, and therefore it can authentically be analyzed as it is presented by or figures in by language. Language presents a reality sometimes as dynamic, sometimes as static, some other times nominative denoted by nouns, and other times as action denoted by verbs. The reality in-itself cannot undergo change in different capacities, either of agent, object, process, etc., or finished and non-finished forms are known thus, because the language presents them so.

For the first time here in this book, we find an exhaustive and threadbare analysis of three major theories about language in the same book. These are: Sphota Theory of language, Autonomy Theory of language, and Indivisibility Theory of language. One cannot miss that while discussing the different contrasting views from the western and Indian perspectives, the author maintains a unity of conclusion which naturally follows from his exposition throughout all chapters. A through presentation in, for, and against the controversy between the wordlists/constructionists and the holists deserves appreciation. The author pointedly concludes in favor of his preferred cognitive Holistic Theory of language. Section two ‘analysis of word and its meaning’ presents a thorough analysis of words-of accomplished and of non-accomplished character, measures by which meanings are known in a sequence, means of learning the meanings (śaktigraha), word-meanings: universal, individual, potency of language and the related issues. His discussion on the rival theories of cause of identical cognition and difference between the knowledge and its objects, between knowledge and no-knowledge, verity and valid knowledge are conclusively discussed from a broad perspective, ultimately favoring the preferred theory that all knowledge is determinate. Isolated from language no knowledge, no idea or thought, even the concept of ‘indeterminate’ is possible.

The concept of sentence as the signifier, non-difference of the signifier and signified, and the different theories of verbal cognition popular in the east and west are presented in Section Three of the book. The discussion culminates in a view of the non-differences of language and thought. Tiwari’s argument against theorists view regarding language and thought as independent from each other of which the thought is original and the language comes forward when the thought needs to be communicated is difficult to accept but I observe the author’s view very sound if the relation between the two independents is taken natural fitness of the former. If, otherwise, then explanation of accomplishment of communication will require so many devices with no satisfactory outcome. The author provides a view that language is not confined to articulations. In the author’s active theory of language articulated or written marks are devices by which the language as concept or thought is manifested. Our proximity with thoughts are revealed by language only when the later is manifested through articulated garbs. The relation between the thought and the language yields a natural fitness of the later to express meaning: it is like the natural fitness of eyes and other senses to perceive those things for which they are naturally designed. The eyes cannot perceive the objects of ears, and similarly this is the case with the other senses. Similarly the word horse, dog, man, etc., and the sentences having their own identity are naturally fit to express their meanings and not the meanings of the others. Taking the infusion thesis of language and thought only brings to light the view that philosophy can be taken as a cognitive activity par excellence. Language then is a foundational being which reveals meaning. The author’s view is highly contested.

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by those who take both language and meaning as independent, and considering language as confined to articulated sounds or written marks.

Language as thought cannot be confused as abstracted being but a flashed or expressed being. In this regard he criticizes the view of proposition as abstraction, and on the same logic he reviews knowledge as a set of propositions and finally concludes the discussion from the view of language as of an awareness in character. A critique of metaphysical, epistemological and other popular approaches to reality, specially Advaita Vedanta, Buddhism, Jain, some medieval and contemporary thinkers is presented by the author. This foundational basis culminates in a purely philosophical vision of reality set against aphilosopohical views of reality as it is, in itself and different from, positivistic/empiricists measures as well. One of the most striking features of the book is again its treatment of the most intriguing problem of verbal cognition. A critical analysis of Māmānsā and Nyāya views is presented in detail. It highlights the intricacies between Sphoña and Pratibhā. Analysis of the theories of Ābhīhitānyaya and Anvītābhidhāna, points of their conflict, and a solution from the perspective of the indivisibility thesis of language, is precise and interesting. The merit of this discussion lies in the author revealing the problematic issues of his own views and a response to them.

The discussion in Chapter XIV on the most controversial problem of ‘Ontic non-being (Abhava) vs. Philosophical being’ is unique in the history of philosophy. Though the author has got inspiration and theme from the Jātisamuddeśaṇa of Bhartṛhari, his presentation of the issue brings the material on Abhāva as being of non-being and that is quite afresh and inspiring. On the basis of understanding and analysis of cognition, the author discusses being of negation like being of being as a cognitive/philosophical being; it is a being that flashes when we articulate ‘non-being’ and this flashing is the intelligible-being that can be analyzed and made understandable. About the reality of non-being or negation, the author is, perhaps, the beginner philosopher who finds out that ontic non-being is the annihilation of external existence. But the intelligible being of non-being cannot be denied because it likes being figured positively and is a being itself expressed by the language ‘non-being’. Had there not been existence there would have been no possibility of negative sentences and hence the existence of non-being. His investigation into reality and the reality of negation not only provides incentive for further research on the non-being but also provides a cognitive ground for the distinction between non-being and being. Through logic the author proposes external Non-being as a philosophical being, an intelligible being and, thus, the sentences expressing non-being are not formed out of the sentence about being by adding ‘not’ or ‘non’ in the assertive sentences as the western language philosophers think. They are sentences that express meaning ‘negation’ independently of the assertive sentences.

By presenting a critique of epistemological theories of knowledge and the cognitive view of it, the author analyses and interprets the limit of epistemological approach to reality and pointedly makes the distinction of cognition of reality as flashes and the epistemological approach to reality. After progressing through the chapters of his book, I was confronted with a response to the question ‘why do we not concentrate on epistemology for the issues pertaining to the knowledge of the objects, their nature and proving their existence, etc., which is traditionally accepted as the trusted means fit for
knowing and proving their cognition and that why do we concentrate only on analyzing the cognition as it flashes in the cognizer for subordinating the epistemology as insufficient or that is, why we write the obituary of epistemology’.

I must thank the author for including Section V which discusses issues of highly philosophical importance. Epistemology has its limitation to the objective proving of objects outside and may be extended to the subjective as well; but these two approaches limit the reality to the subjective and objective outlooks only. The two theorists refute and brutally criticize each other. The author elucidates how they are captive of a model of logical thinking which deprives one from knowing the nature of the thought-object that flashes and gives us incentive to epistemic reasoning for also proving the object in that flashes. This flashing is the cognitive /foundational being, and the epistemic devices are applied for proving it and its outside impositions as external or ontic things. These flashes are a constant content of analytic scheme and of epistemic devices of proving and justifying skill as well. Any device or skill including epistemology is possible only when their constant content is flashed beforehand. This is perhaps the reason that the ancient texts, except those belonging to systems of Indian philosophy which are outlined later, do not give primacy to epistemology. I very quickly add that cognition, for the author, flashes in present and is foundational to the logical skill. The book consists of original and mature ideas, reviews of popular theories; uniqueness of its reflecting analysis and thus provides a broader spectrum of understanding useful for all those who are interested to know the subtlest contributions and developments in the field. It is perhaps for the first time that the issue of the language and the logic of its translation is discussed in a way which not only characterizes but also evaluates the nature of the translated version - not as copy but as expression of the constant content of the text in a different garb. The garb of the text and that of the translation are different but their content is constant and thus, analysis and translation are accepted as cognitive activities and hence not different in content from the text

Section VI addresses the chapters on Language and Grammar, Language and Culture, Language and Communication and lastly the rules of interpretation of the hermeneutics of the west, and the Indian view of Mâmânsâ and Vyâkaraṇa. The issues are discussed purely from the point of view of language and cognition without being captive of intermixing with the ontic and religious mode of interpretation. Thus, the author’s approach in these chapters is very interesting and fresh. The cognitive holistic philosophy discussed in the book gives importance to indivisibility of cognition; a philosophy that gives primacy to action in life and verb in the language. It follows the same thread in interpreting the text as well. The action is the constant content of the expressions comprising injunctions, commandments and prohibitions. Explanatory sentences have also meaning attached to the action which can be praise or abuse. This method of interpretation is supported by scholars, keeping the reader free from the unnecessary burden and tension of knowing all the geography, history, sociology, political and environmental situations associated with the time which belongs to the text. It accepts that an interpreter is a cultivated wise person and, without altering the text that is action, he is free to interpret the text as per the demands time and an awareness of responsibility to the wisdom and welfare of the subject.

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In the last chapter, the author concludes the whole discussion from a contemporary perspective. He pointedly argues the reasons of failure of the popular theories in the proper estimation of the nature of language, being and cognition. His conclusion limits philosophical reflection to the intelligible beings, who are the object proper of analysis, interpretation and further reflection for determination, clarity and wisdom of the meaning of language we use for communication. There are several statements discussed widely in the book that form the main thesis of the book. Since, I think, them philosophically important, I am putting some striking thoughts very regular in the discussion of all the chapters, and the author has introduced them in the very introduction of the book:

-Language is expresser, a complete unit that expresses its own nature first from which its meaning is expressed non-differently (p. XXVII). It in Sanskrit is ‘Śabda’ comprising of garbs as manifester and the thought-content (concept) that flashes through their instrumentation (p. XXVII).
-Language expresses not only being of being but the being of non-being also. (p. 145)
-The Language and the meaning are intelligible/ Philosophical beings of awareness in nature (p. XXVII).
-The Relation between the language and meaning is the natural fitness of the former (p. XXVII).
-Our cognition is based on and is confined to the intelligible beings the language expresses. (p. XXVIII).
-Language and thought are non-different (p. 236-251).
-Reality is that the language reveals (p. 471).
-All words and sentences are concepts (p. XXV).
-There is difference between concept and the flashing of the concept (p. XXIX).
-The concepts may be given or formed but they are known only when they flash (p.465).
-The flashing is always in the present. This means that the objects/concepts belonging even to past and future events are known only in present because they flash only in present; the present is only cognized (p. XXIX).
-The cognition the language reveals is always disinterested and becomes interested when imposed on our allegiances (p. XXX).
-Cognition is always determinate and veridical (p. XXIX, 340).

It is not easy to digest, and one can wonder how the knowledge expressed by language is disinterested and becomes interested when inflicted or imposed on the interests of our allegiances. Prof. Tiwari, while discussing the issues on language in the chapter on ‘language and the possibility of disinterested knowledge’, is intensively concerned with the spiritual purpose of language. He takes spirit as light which is knowledge, and reveals the difference between it and cognition. Though he thinks that philosophical reflections are confined to the flashes we know, he accepts things-in-themselves as the ontic substratum of the flashes. Thus, it seems apparent that the basic search throughout the book is to discover spiritual freedom through the analysis and interpretation of language. The author is of the firm view that since language infuses cognition, the analysis and interpretation of language at the same time are that of the cognition as well. The attempt of philosophers who discuss Autonomy of language on the basis of its use is intended to free the language from captive to meaning. But going through the Tiwari’s exposition of the Autonomy theory of language I found a different logic being that our knowledge is confined to the language and to what it expresses, and it expresses intelligible beings independently of itself. This is perhaps for the
first time that one can find a discussion that may attract its readers towards a change in the outlook of philosophical reflections and investigations into philosophy.

There appear a few typographical errors in some of the pages of the book. However, symmetrical arrangement of the points of the chapters, divisions of sections and the chapters falling under them, printing and finally the get up of the book are attractive. Initially, I was inspired to go through the book after reading the comments of the scholars of repute of our time given on the back flap of the book. While reading, I was invigorated with the originality of thought, excellent analysis, philosophical exposition and style of powerful analysis of the problems undertaken by its author to the extent that I started writing my review of the book. The comprehensive discussion on the problems of language, being and cognition presented in a contemporary perspective, I am sure, is a landmark in Philosophical studies from the cognitive holistic perspective. It is also an excellent incentive and excitement to scholars, students and the general readers interested to go deep into the refreshing and precise discussion on the issues of language, meaning and cognition. It is in brief, a philosophy proper without intermixing any metaphysical, religious entities or their allegiances. This comparative presentation of the issues at full length in the book - as warranted by the advancements in philosophical thinking of the east and west - is an inspiration for further research and examinations in the field.

VEDIKA MATI HURDOYAL-CHEKHORI, Head, School of Indological Studies, Mahatma Gandhi Institute, Moka, Mauritius. vedika.hurdoval@gmail.com.

One puzzling phenomenon in modern political science and political theory is that as democracy has become ubiquitous in many parts of the world and democratic values have become increasingly accepted as universal human values, the term "democracy" has become almost a cliché, losing its definitional political meaning. This is especially so among East Asians who have yet to establish (full) democracy, despite their strong desire for it, and those who have attained it only recently through bloody fights against authoritarian forces. A remarkable study that raises the question: are Asian societies essentially autocratic or are they compatible with modern democracy? If the latter, how can their symbiosis be best understood?

Rejecting the incompatibility thesis, Sungmoon Kim, associate professor of political theory at City University of Hong Kong, calls into question presumed Asian preferences for thick communitarianism (neglectful of individual liberty and social pluralism) and public meritocracy (neglectful of popular accountability), and attempts to single out particular aspects of Asian political concepts, looking particularly at Confucianism, and explores Confucian democracy, which he sees as a more "Asian-based" model in his new book *Confucian democracy in East Asia: Theory and Practice*. The book is a deep, subtle, and beautifully written examination of two contested concepts, democracy and Confucianism. The result is a rich and provocative work that successfully bridges theory and practice.

Democracy was no less foreign a concept to Europe for most of history. Understanding the plasticity of democracy seems like a more important issue than the debate about which mode of democracy is best. Confucian Democracy in East Asia is motivated by the conviction that democracy, properly understood, is desperately needed in East Asia, where political regimes remain authoritarian or only partially democratic.

In this regard, this book shares the faith in democracy enabling a viable and flourishing social and political life for its citizens, with the additional aim of articulating the societal conditions of democracy, originally of Western provenance, under which democracy would work best in East Asian—historically Confucian—societies, accommodating other social goods and values that are not necessarily democratic.

The central thesis of this book is that in East Asian societies democracy would be most politically effective and culturally relevant if it were rooted in and operates on the “Confucian habits and mores” with which East Asians are still deeply saturated, sometimes without their awareness—in other words, if democracy were a *Confucian democracy*.

As Sungmoon Kim shows in this important book, Even though Confucian democracy sounds foreign or even anachronistic to many East Asians, many of whom attribute their sufferings following the “west impact” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to Confucianism, particularly its failure to modernize the state and society, Confucian democracy is hardly a novel idea among East Asian political scientists and political theorists and Western academics active in East Asia. In fact, in the course of refuting Samuel Huntington’s provocative claim that “Confucian democracy” is a contradiction in
terms, and Francis Fukuyama’s end of history thesis that liberal democracy is the only morally and politically legitimate universal value in the post-Cold War era, scholars from East Asia have actively searched for Confucian democracy as the viable political alternative to Western liberal democracy.

Although the debate remains ongoing as to whether Confucian democracy is possible both in theory and in practice, and if possible what it should look like, a Confucianism worth defending in the complex, multicultural East Asia of today both can and must incorporate a robust form of democracy.

This book, as the author indicates, constructs a mode of public reason (and reasoning) that is morally palatable to East Asians who are still saturated in Confucian customs by re-appropriating Confucian familialism, and using this perspective to theorize on Confucian democratic welfarism and political meritocracy.

Kim bases his careful analysis on a wealth of scholastic arguments about classical Confucianism. He also draws upon political theories and conducts a detailed case study on South Korea, a country both steeped in long-standing Confucian tradition and practicing modern democracy, and examines the theory’s practicality in Korea’s increasingly individualized, pluralized, and multicultural society by looking at cases of freedom of expression, freedom of association, insult law, and immigration policy.

Through deep and subtle examination, the book makes a case that Western concepts of liberal democracy may have difficulty in East Asian culture since Confucianism and liberal individualism-predicated democracy are contested concepts. But it doesn’t mean democracy cannot be achieved in East Asian countries within different frameworks. To some extent, Kim’s work has provided an admirable vision to inspire political theorists with more angles to explore democracy.

Kim’s aim is to articulate a philosophically credible and politically realistic vision of what Confucian democracy can be in twenty-first-century East Asia. Besides succeeding at that task, Kim reminds us that there are many unexplored possibilities for aligning distinctive identity-conferring beliefs with democratic and liberal political ideals.

It could also remind many political theorists as well as Western governments not to make biased judgments on democratic issues, since the ways to democracy are not limited within Western concepts. It defends the idea that a Confucian civil democracy, though not rooted in Western culture and tradition, can also provide universal freedom, well-protected citizenship and democratic governance.

There is no disagreement here with the conviction that Confucian democracy can offer an important pluralist corrective to global value monism and cultural universalism from the perspective of East Asian particularism (if not parochialism).

It is a must-read for anyone who is interested in the future possibilities of democracy, the development of Confucianism in political studies, comparative philosophers and political theorists.

Dr. FENGQING ZHU, Associate Professor, Harbin Institute of Technology, P. R. China. Email: zhufq54@163.com

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