GUEST EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION

Huimin Jin *

It is widely received, if it is not running the risk of becoming a cliché as David Held et al. suspect (Held, 1999: 1), that globalization is not only what we are nowadays but also a theory or perspective with which to look at and deal with such a what-we-are-nowadays. However, to the questions of what globalization is by definition, and what we are experiencing from it, and therefore what theory or perspective it may be, none of the answers is cogent and convincing to date, they are but one argument after/against another. There are two existing approaches to globalization: the modernity and postmodernity. The former holds that globalization is an extension or a diffusion of the modern Western universal values and systems to the East. As suggested by Marxist critics such as Wallerstein, Harvey or Amin, globalization is no more than a global expansion of (Western) capitalism, a flow of (Western) capital and ideology without boundaries. The latter argues that globalization does not signify a triumph of modernity across the world but quite the opposite. A failure of this modernity project, when it meets other cultures or civilizations as perceived by Huntington, Giddens, and the like, and at its best, in the terminology of Roland Robertson (Robertson, 1992: 173-174), it finally becomes a “glocalization.” The theory of Global dialogism is neither the model of modernity nor that of postmodernity, but rather an alternative, which tries to integrate and therefore transcend the previous two approaches. Globalization is simultaneously Westernization or Americanization, de-Westernization or de-Americanization, process and counter-process. Globalization is a dynamic dialogue between the West and the East, between the North and the South. More concisely, globalization is a dialogue.

The concept of dialogue is no simpler than the question of globalization, about which arguments are as varied as those concerning globalization. There are two existing paradigms of dialogue studies: the modernist one and postmodernist

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one. The modernist paradigm believes in the correspondence between word and thing, or the intention and the intended, according to which a dialogue should be a rational imperative that one must and is capable of following. The postmodernist counterpart is skeptical that a successful dialogue may be made, as dialogue primarily belongs to discourse, conception, and text. Thereby it is inter-discourse or inter-text, always looping around signifiers, with no reference to thing or intention. Developing from both of them, my dialogism further contends: First, dialogue has two dimensions: the discursive, which can be shared and communicated, and the real, which cannot be known and represented. Second, a dialogue on a discursive level does not imply a consensus which is reached via discourse. Rather it is a dynamic link or relation among all the people involved in the dialogue. What makes a dialogue ever changing and unpredictable is the interlocutor’s material existence, which is ceaselessly self-driven in its own right. Third, difference is not ontological but conceptual, and in this respect, any claim to difference or to being recognized as different is intended to join a dialogue and thus have a better position in this dialogue. Therefore, difference, at the level of discourse, is part of dialogue. In an increasingly connected as well as conflicted world, we need discursive dialogue, upon which we could even expect a world law for all countries. However, we need to respect those entities (otherness, the unconscious, or whatever you wish to name) which cannot be put into dialogue. We should realize that discursive dialogue will never fully represent the existence of the interlocutors - whether they are the stronger or the weaker side.

The concept of dialogue is no simpler than the question of globalization, about which arguments are as varied as those concerning globalization. There are two existing paradigms of dialogue studies: the modern and postmodern. The modern paradigm believes in the correspondence between word and thing, or the intention and the intended, according to which a dialogue should be a rational imperative that one must and is capable of following. The postmodern counterpart is skeptical that a successful dialogue may be made, as dialogue primarily belongs to discourse, conception, and text. Thereby it is inter-discourse or inter-text, always looping around signifiers, with no reference to thing or intention. First, dialogue has two dimensions: the discursive, which can be shared and communicated, and the real, which cannot be known and represented. Second, a dialogue on a discursive level does not imply a consensus which is reached via discourse. Rather it is a dynamic link or relation among all the people involved in the dialogue. What makes a dialogue ever changing and unpredictable is the
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“Intercultural dialogue has emerged in the first decade of the twenty first century as a major means for managing diversity and strengthening democracy.” (Besley and Peters, 2012: 2) As the world becomes increasingly globalized, the need for different countries’ governments and systems to cooperate to achieve global objectives through dialogue has become irreversible. “In recent years the world has experienced remarkable contrast between strong adverse economic, social, and environmental trends, and the weakness of the international system of governance to manage them. These adverse trends include, among others, the global effects of the North-Atlantic financial crisis, the threats generated by climate change, and the growing income inequality that affects a large number of countries. In the face of these challenges, the response of the international communities has been weak.” (Ocampo, 2016: 3) Clashes and wars among civilizations, states and even stateless people are as old as the humanity itself. “…the international relations (IR) concern the relationships among the world’s governments. However, these relationships cannot be understood in isolation. They are closely connected with other actors (such as international organizations, multinational corporations, and individuals), with other social structures and processes (including economics, culture, and domestic politics), and with geographical and historical influences. These elements together power the central trend in IR today—globalization.” (Pevehouse and Goldstein, 2016: 3) One of the most important purposes of global dialogism is to reduce the tensions, manage the conflicts between different civilizations, socio-political systems and international relations, and enhance mutual understanding and cooperation.

This special edition of *JET* will discuss “Global Dialogism & International Relations.” In this issue, Huimin Jin’s article categorizes cultural studies into two modes: the “modernity” cultural studies and the “post-modernity” cultural studies.
It analyses their advantages and disadvantages respectively, suggesting as the third mode that “globality” cultural studies transcend the previous two: the tenet of which is a philosophy of global dialogism that sublates (aufheben) both modernity and postmodernity at one time. Sanjay Lal reveals that notions of individual sovereignty, universal rights, and the duty to follow one’s own conscience are central to the philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. He argues that an underlying harmony in Gandhi’s philosophy is evident among such classic liberal and communitarian values given his overall views on self-realization. This demonstrates the value of Gandhi’s insights for contemporary philosophical debates between liberals and communitarians. According to Davis Florick and Maorong Jiang’s article, the Korean Peninsula has been polarized for nearly a century. Offering North Korea a package, which recognizes the North’s nuclear program and addresses some of its other strategic concerns, while bringing the “Hermit Kingdom” into the international community, presents the best, feasible option to change the course of the region. Such a shift from Washington, deeply rooted in its reengagement with China, can be achieved through courageous and decisive leadership, coupled with an appropriate planning construct. The purpose of Saito Hajime’s article is to examine John Hersey’s book Hiroshima and the occupational policy of General Headquarters (GHQ). For the author, a controversy over the use of this work as a textbook arose among Japanese university teachers of English: Rintaro Fukuhara and Takashi Nozaki exemplified these opinions. Their contrasting views on the text suggest the ways in which intellectuals or academics can or cannot cope under the pressure of a hegemonic cultural power.

References


TOWARDS GLOBAL DIALOGISM:
TRANSCENDING ‘CULTURAL IMPERIALISM’ AND ITS CRITICS

Huimin Jin

Abstract: Cultural studies have developed from a domestic stage into the present international platform, and a new theoretical framework is accordingly demanded. In other words, international cultural studies should have its own theoretical platform corresponding to its internationality. Based mainly upon the dispute around ‘cultural imperialism,’ this article categorizes cultural studies into two modes: ‘modernity’ cultural studies and ‘post-modernity’ cultural studies. It analyzes their advantages and disadvantages respectively, suggesting the third mode of ‘globality’ cultural studies transcends the previous two: the tenet of which is a philosophy of global dialogism that sublates (aufheben) both modernity and postmodernity at one time.

I. Globalization as a New Philosophy

The term globalization is commonly used to characterize a variety of social and cultural phenomena such as: the heightened speed, volume, and facility of interactions among people across borders and irrespective of distance or geographical barriers; the intensifying interconnectedness and interdependence of local, regional, and national economies, and ecologies; the growth of international relations and expansion of transnational politics; the emergence of world culture in music, cinema, television, and other forms of popular culture; the expansion of networks both licit and illicit (e.g., criminal, terrorist) that exist independent of state or polity; and the rise of individuals identifying themselves as citizens, not of any specific nation, but as citizens of the world. This is what McLuhan (1962)

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referred to as, the global village. Globalization, however, has another meaning which has increasingly come to be recognized as a second, higher (or meta) level of meaning: referring not simply to the object of study commonly associated with the term, but also, and more importantly, to a perspective to be employed: an approach to studying the types of contemporary social and cultural phenomena outlined above. Put another way, the process of globalization has quite naturally given rise to a philosophy of globalization: Globalization can therefore be understood as a new philosophical category, one that transcends the binary opposition of modernity and postmodernity. Globalization encompasses modernity as well as postmodernity, and to be precise, globalization includes the two of them simultaneously, not as individual entities, but as part of a dialectical system involving a complex, dynamic relationship between opposing forces, resulting in a new synthesis. This is a vital change, if not a revolution, in the spatialisation (Shields, 1991) of cultures and hence of importance to anyone concerned with the concepts of space and culture. Philosophy, as Weltanschauung, is always part of the world image, and a philosophy of globalization, geographically related, can then be considered part of the spatialisation of globalization, and may well be considered central to that spatialisation. In this exploration of the topic, I present a Chinese perspective and assessment of the canonical understandings of this development over the last two decades.

This epochal proposition, which should have been developed by philosophers, is nevertheless, now alluded to us by sociologists. In the concluding chapter of The Consequences of Modernity, Anthony Giddens summarizes “One of the fundamental consequences of modernity … is globalisation. This is more than a diffusion of Western institutions across the world, in which other cultures are crushed. Globalisation - which is a process of uneven development that fragments as it coordinates - introduces new forms of world interdependence, in which, once again, there are no ‘others’ … Is modernity peculiarly Western from the standpoint of its globalising tendencies? No. It cannot be, since we are speaking here of emergent forms of world interdependence and planetary consciousness.” (Giddens, 1990: 175) Giddens does not deny the modernity aspect of globalization, that is, the imperial project spread to the whole world by Western institutions. He tends more, however, to see the failure of this grand project in its process of implementation and the interdependence between nations/states resulted from this failure - different from Giddens. We call this the
‘postmodernity’ dimension of globalization, and this is in a way what he states elsewhere that globalization will result in a “runaway world” (Giddens, 2002: xxxi).

As regards globalization as ‘postmodernity’, John Tomlinson’s radically playful stance is likely to appall any scholar if he or she is seriously minded. In his groundbreaking monograph Cultural Imperialism (first published in 1991), Tomlinson seems to have an abundance of confidence to exterminate, once and for all, the view of globalization as ‘modernity’:

Globalisation may be distinguished from imperialism in that it is a far less coherent or culturally directed process. For all that it is ambiguous between economic and political senses; the idea of imperialism contains, at least, the notion of a purposeful project: the intended spread of a social system from one centre of power across the globe. The idea of ‘globalisation’ suggests interconnection and interdependency of all global areas which happens in a far less purposeful way. It happens as the result of economic and cultural practices which do not, of themselves, aim at global integration, but which nonetheless produce it. More importantly, the effects of globalisation are to weaken the cultural coherence of all individual nation-states, including the economically powerful ones - ‘the imperialist powers’ of a previous era. (Tomlinson, 2001: 175)

Tomlinson, however, cannot prove to us, even minimally, that globalization, regardless of its consequences, is simply a spontaneous process without any motivator. This would not be the case, unless globalization has nothing to do with human beings as agents. Obviously, Tomlinson’s mistake is to disregard the intentions to globalize with the consequences of globalization. He seems to be ignorant of the fact that ‘intention’ is subjective while ‘consequence’ is objective. Since globalization is driven by human beings with intentions, the ‘modernity’ aspect of it cannot be denied. Giddens’ term “runaway world,” if compared with Tomlinson’s radicalism, would be far better to describe globalization, because it not only verifies that someone is trying to control (intentionally) but at the same time sees that he or she fails to control the world (consequently).

Borrowing a Japanese term, dochakuka, Roland Robertson calls globalization “glocalization,” a condensed form of global localization (Robertson, 1992: 173-174), by which he means that globalization is a process of interaction
between the global and the local. “Its central dynamic involves the twofold process of the particularization of the universal and the universalization of the particular.” (Ibid: 177-178) Robertson’s approach to globalization, as we know it, is mainly from the perspectives of religion, ideology or in general, culture, and as such is more philosophically pertinent. In the context of globalization, we cannot speak only of the local, nor can we replace the local with the global, the dialectic of which indicates a philosophical question of universality and particularity appearing in any specific instance.

Comparably with Robertson’s glocalization, Mimi Sheller and John Urry see that “All the world seems to be on the move” (Sheller and Urry, 2006: 207; also see Urry, 2000) and then propose a “Mobilities Paradigm” for the traditionally ‘static’ social sciences they identify. This paradigm, as they present it, is “aimed at going beyond the imagery of ‘terrains’ as spatially fixed geographical containers for social processes, and calling into question scalar logics such as local/global as descriptors of regional extent.” (Ibid: 209) However, it is not “simply a claim that nation-state sovereignty has been replaced by a single system of mobile power, of ‘empire’: a ‘smooth world’, deterritorialized and decentred, without a centre of power, with no fixed boundaries or barriers” (Ibid: 209) as imagined by Hardt and Negri (2000). The philosophical implication of this paradigm of sociology is to break a sedentarism loosely derived from the philosopher Heidegger, who locates dwelling (wohnen) place “as the fundamental basis of human identity and experience and as the basic units of social research human identity.” (Sheller and Urry, 2006: 208-209) Simply put, the subject, or more broadly, the modernity, which is based upon ‘place.’ is coming to its demise. In a global context of, say, ‘mobilities,’ or the ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman, 2000), or, in a glocalization ‘on the move’ as said previously, a sociologist can no longer speak only of the local, nor can s/he replace the local with the global, the dialectic of which indicates a philosophical question of universality and particularity reified in any specific instance.

To be brief, globalization in the vision of the current sociological studies which have already outlined for us a complete philosophical map of the complicated relationship between modernity and postmodernity. Modernity is the philosophy of subjectivity since Descartes; while postmodernity is the concept of intersubjectivity raised by Husserl after his realization of the drawback of egoism in his philosophy of subjectivity. It is also the concept of communicative rationality later developed by Habermas. Whether adopting the term
‘postmodernity’ or not, any theory critical towards the philosophy of a modern subject can be viewed, in a way, as a consciousness of ‘postmodernity,’ which attempts to transcend modernity. Postmodernity used to be mistaken as a form of nihilism by Giddens, and Habermas, among many others; but in its reality, it is nothing but a radical Husserlianism. Derrida, for example, reminds us how all those items we term as consciousness, language and culture, are structures in the framework of reason that has obscured the truth we are seeking and hence they are to be “suspended” for “phenomenological reduction”. Postmodernity, therefore, is a renewed form of epistemology and a redirected way of reflectivity that sweep up the fog of modernity. If postmodernity appears to be a total abandonment of reason and its corresponding truth because of its harsh critique of the latter, globalization as a new philosophy, then, would maintain subjectivity, rationality, universality and the ultimate of modernity, but at the same time explore their limitations by taking into consideration such issues as Other, body, particularity, singularity and process. Alternatively, to put it differently, globalization does not simply identify itself with modernity, nor does it with postmodernity; rather, it stands on the endless opposition or antagonism between them, on an articulation that is forever unsettled. Lack of either dimension, it will not be called ‘globalization’, and we will not be able to correctly understand globalization, a new object to us, and all the phenomena that have happened in the era of globalization.

II. ‘Globality’ Cultural Studies in the Era of Globalization

The British history of cultural studies, if dated back to 1958, when Williams published his Culture and Society, has passed through half a century. Cultural studies in the beginning was a British domestic enterprise, devoted to targeting its domestic cultural and political problems, such as mass media, popular culture, youth sub-culture, and consumer society, etc., within which Marxism, ideology, hegemony, resistance and articulation were its key words, or, one might say, the soul of cultural studies. Approximately since the 1990’s, the topics of cultural studies have been rapidly internationalized. Stuart Hall began to talk about identity, hybridity, new ethnicity, Britishness, and globalization, though he also mentioned them from time to time in his earlier years. An inspection of the conceptual history of David Morley’s media studies will show that in the 1980’s the terms he was most interested in are “nationwide” (audience), “family”
(television), and “domestic” (viewing context). While since 1990’s, then, he has changed his topics into such ones like “global media, electronic landscapes, and cultural boundaries,” “home territories” and “cosmopolitics” that are particular to or brought to the foreground by globalization. More strikingly, in recent years, such buzzwords like “global culture,” “global citizen,” and “global public space” have painted the globality of cultural studies with a blaze of colors and signified for it a rampant spring.

The publication of *The International Journal of Cultural Studies* (since 1998), and the global flourishing of the university courses and departments in the name of ‘cultural studies’ across the world, some of which are, especially, under the advertising banner of “international cultural studies,” have all included cultural studies into the context of globalization *institutionally*.

A sharp voice has been raised by a group of authors in their collaborative book *Globalizing Cultural Studies* (McCarthy et al., 2007) with a strong motive to put an end to “that traditional British, sub-cultural models of cultural studies,” “both methodological and interpretive.” They are jubilant to see these models “have been exhausted, rendered archaic by the monumental, shifting of global conditions and multiple diasporic figurations that exist in the contemporary moment” (Denzin, 2007: XII) and are now moving steadily to the fore.

All signs, to mention above just a few, indicate that cultural studies have *consciously* entered a global stage. However, this does not necessarily mean that cultural studies have already acquired a clear and proper ‘consciousness of globality.’ No one will deny that future cultural studies will definitely be global, which, however, is at the same time a requirement at a deeper level. Cultural studies in the global age, advancing with time, must have ‘globalization’ or ‘globality’ as a philosophical concept to be its new theory, new mind and new horizon. If it did not evolve it would remain a ‘modernity’ cultural study or a ‘postmodernity’ cultural study, rather than the “global cultural studies” or the “globality” cultural studies which will synthesise and then transcend both modernity and postmodernity philosophically.

Taking the debate over ‘cultural imperialism’ as an example, we are to expound hereafter what is the ‘modernity’ cultural studies and the ‘postmodernity’ cultural studies respectively, and to investigate wherein their particular problems rest. Lastly, with the philosophically-renewed concept of ‘globality,’ which we would foreground as *global dialogism*, we will re-observe the phenomenon of cultural flows referred by the dispute of ‘cultural imperialism’,
which doesn’t just start from today, nay, we may even say, from the remote time of Plato or Confucius. Culture has never stopped its flowing. Culture is always clashing, dividing, merging, and looking for new heterogeneities to assume. No national culture today is born independent, and even nation itself is not of one single origin. Globalization has brought this continuing problematic story before us with new urgency.

III. ‘Postmodernity’ Cultural Studies Do Not Acknowledge ‘Cultural Imperialism’

Let us now first examine the ‘postmodernity’ cultural studies, its representations and problems. Tomlinson’s *Cultural Imperialism* would be considered a model instance if we can categorize it into ‘postmodernity’ cultural studies. It is systemic, profound and logical, inflicting great casualties upon its adversaries. Since then, it seems, ‘cultural imperialism’ has collapsed and never returned to the fore of cultural theory. The ‘cultural imperialism’ thesis refers to such an argument that a culture, Western culture of course, or American culture, has completely conquered and reorganized another culture – the weaker culture, to be sure, especially the Third World culture, into a certain unitary ‘imperial’ culture. To fight against this, Tomlinson has resorted to many kinds of weapons, among which, the most powerful one is the interactive theory between text and reader that comes from philosophical hermeneutics or reception aesthetics.

Tomlinson does not hide himself from the phenomenon of how American culture represented by Disney cartoons, Hollywood movies, McDonald fast food and the Levi jeans have conquered other cultures via export. No one denies this; yet Tomlinson turns away and raises this question: “But the key question is, does this presence represent cultural imperialism?” For him, “Clearly the sheer presence *alone* does not”, because “A text does not become culturally significant until it is read. Until it is read, it has the same status as imported blank paper: a material and economic significance, but not a directly cultural significance. At this level of analysis, then, reading the imperialism text becomes the crucial issue in judging cultural imperialism.” (Tomlinson, 2001: 42) From the reception theory as understood by Tomlinson, the so called ‘cultural imperialist’ texts signify nothing at all before they are read; even if they signify, their significance is not the original one after they have been read. The cultural significance of a text is, therefore, a later creation by the reader.

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Tomlinson chooses the effect study of the TV serial *Dallas* carried out by Tamar Liebes and Elihu Katz to support his denial of “cultural imperialism”. According to Liebes and Katz, “The name of *Dallas* in the 1980s became a metaphor for the conquest of the world by an American television serial. *Dallas* signifies an international congregation of viewers (one of the largest in history), gathered once weekly to follow the saga of the Ewing dynasty - its interpersonal relations and business affairs.” (Liebes and Katz, 1993: 5) Such effect of *Dallas* is usually viewed as a unique event of cultural imperialism, a delivering and reception of the ‘cultural meaning’ of American imperialism. In view of the theorists of ‘cultural imperialism,’ such is its trajectory: “hegemony is prepackaged in Los Angeles, shipped out to the global village, and unwrapped in innocent minds.” (Ibid: xi) Liebes and Katz aim to interrogate the argument of ‘cultural imperialism’ with their investigations of audiences’ actual responses. To Tomlinson’s great delight, their empirical studies show that: “Audiences are more active and critical, their responses more complex and reflective, and their cultural values more resistant to manipulation and ‘invasion’ than many critical media theorists have assumed.” (Tomlinson, 2001: 49-50) Indeed, the effect research of Liebes and Katz proves that “Decoding is an interaction between the culture of the viewers and the culture of the producer.” (Liebes and Katz, 1993: x) This therefore subverts the hypothesis, as quoted above, of ‘cultural imperialism’ regarding the meaning of the texts made by the theorists of ‘cultural imperialism,’ that is, viewing it as a linear process of transportation.

Yet Tomlinson has forgotten, or he may not realize, that the philosophical hermeneutics or the reception aesthetics belong to Husserl’s phenomenology; they are *postmodern*, but not simply ‘postmodern.’ Meaning is a consequence of the interaction between the text and the reader, not just coming from the side of reader. Those who have ever read Gadamer, Hans Robert Jaus or Wolfgang Iser know they would not make such a misunderstanding of ‘no sense.’ Even within the ‘postmodern’ theories, Derrida’s deconstruction, for example, there is no such assertion that ‘anything goes’ with the meaning of text; only the “Tomlinsonian Postmodern” is an exception.

We will let it pass if this is but one example. What is worse, however, is that such an argument which denies ‘cultural imperialism’ through a hermeneutic reading has almost become a dominant view in the field of media research by way of Tomlinson’s seemingly persuasive and forceful argumentation. There appears thus a vision that the discourse of ‘cultural imperialism’ is beheaded: its bleeding
head hung high on the city wall, against the chilly wind, openly declaring the inviolable justice and rule of ‘postmodernity’ cultural studies.

We are greatly astonished to see that in recent years, in Germany, where there is a long tradition of phenomenology, there are such scholars that follow the extremeness and shallowness of Tomlinson to strengthen and push forward the postmodern understanding of global culture. Ulrich Beck, Professor of Sociology at the University of Munich, in one of his newly published article (Beck, 2003: 16-29), states that “the concept of Americanization is based on a national understanding of globalization’ which he criticizes as a form of ‘methodological nationalism.’ As an alternative program, he suggests globalization must be understood as “cosmopolitanization” that is “capable of reflecting a newly transnational world.” According to his etymological study, cosmopolitan, the core of cosmopolitanization is formed from two roots: cosmos and polis. The former meaning ‘nature’ and the latter ‘city/state’. The combined word ‘cosmopolitan’ shows that every human being is rooted by birth in two worlds: one is nature, and the other is the limited, like city, boundary, ethnicity and religion. The principle of globalization as ‘cosmopolitanization’ is not “either/or”, but “this-as-well-as-that”. “Cosmopolitanism generates a logic of non-exclusive oppositions,” as such: “nature is associated with society, the object is a part of subjectivity, otherness of the other is included in one’s own self-identity and self-definition, and the logic of exclusive oppositions is rejected” and replaced by the “inclusive oppositions.” Therefore, all oppositions are included in a larger framework, which is “nature”, or “cosmos”, or “universe”, or “oneness”, or “absolute.”

For fear of being mistaken as “re-garmented universalism,” Beck adds the term “rooted” before “cosmopolitanism”, in order to emphasise this “universe’s acceptance of difference, opposition, individuality and locality.” Because of his emphasis on “universe,” on the universe’ controlling the versatile, the plural, and the various, Beck does not allow us to imagine globalization as an inter-relationship between nations. Previously nations have been seen as independent units, for example, the concept of “interconnectedness” by the

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1Hereafter all quotations from Ulrich Beck, unless otherwise noted, are from this article which can be read as a manifesto of his theory of “cosmopolitanism”, though there is a largely extended discussion of it in his The Cosmopolitan Vision (Beck, 2006) that should not be neglected.
British sociologist David Held, not to mention the word “international” that we have long been used to: they must be discarded altogether.

Yet what is difficult for Beck is, first, such a ‘universe’ is but an ‘imaginative community,’ even if it does exist, it must be constructed by the imagination of ‘rooted’ individuals. It will not do unless it is local, historical, national and ideological, thus that is difficult for it to be pure and objective, enjoying the identification of the whole body of the individuals.

This means, secondly, in its ultimate sense, the individual cannot be forsaken simply because any consciousness, for instance, the consciousness of ‘universe’, must first be lodged physically: consciousness is the consciousness of the individual, without whom, who is to imagine the ‘universe’? Even when in the future, the world may achieve the Great Sameness, a utopia created by Laozi, an ancient Chinese sage, the individuality and uniqueness of the individual will not disappear in such a world of sameness.

Via the ‘cosmopolitanism’ re-interpreted with new loadings, Beck denies Americanization based on the unitary thinking of nation, which would also be a refusal to ‘cultural imperialism,’ an invention of, for him, same way of thinking. Thirdly, however, as ‘cosmopolitanism’ still assumes the existence of the contradiction and opposition between nations and locals, if they are not equal and well-matched in strength, there must be one side which is more advantageous over the other side or other sides, be it Gramsci’s soft “hegemony” or Lenin’s violent “dictatorship,” there then abides the existence of ‘cultural/imperialism.’ This is not at all false. Americanization or ‘cultural imperialism’ is based on the premise of a national understanding of globalization. This premise, nevertheless, cannot be erased unless the national contradictions and conflicts arising from global communication are ignored, unless the individual, as well as human being, is eliminated, then can we return the ‘universe’ that is primal, chaotic and without distinction between the heaven and the earth. In the era of globalization, the abiding efficiency of ‘cultural imperialism’ lies in its assumption of the irremovability of nation and local in global communication. Furthermore, it assumes the eternal existence of the individual. The “transnationality” of “the second modernization” cannot end the “nationality” of “the first modernization”, at least at present, as well as in the foreseeable future. ’Modernity’ will pass through ‘postmodernity’ and enter “globality”; it will surely reorient itself in its adaptation to the postmodern condition.

It must be noted that although Beck’s “cosmopolitanism” is, allegedly, still
to accept opposition, difference, nationality and individual, yet because he includes them into the category of a *cosmos*, a ‘universe’ making all these the so-called inclusive oppositions, such opposite elements have lost their original meanings and are no longer themselves. As observed by scholars (see Tabak 2015: 407-408), Beck’s *methodological cosmopolitanism* does not recognize, as an end of history, the nation-state and modernity, which will finally give way to the cosmopolitan. The many types of *cosmopolitanism*, Beck’s included, believe there is “one world” (*cosmos*). For them, differences between nations are only differences between the different views of different cultures within the same universe. While a nationalist speaks from “somewhere”, a cosmopolitan speaks from “nowhere” in particular. With Beck, another expression for *cosmopolitanism* is “transnationality.” Same as with that in the ‘*cosmos*,’ although in the logic of ‘transnationality’ there still exists nationality. Yet because there is no longer the “one-to-one-correspondence” between these nations, they have to instead talk to the ‘universe,’ which means the former talk-to-each-other is now elevated to a simultaneous talk to the ‘universe.’ They surpass their nationalities and dialogue with the ‘universe,’ accepting its norms and restrictions. They talk to each other, no problem, but all the each-others are to transcend themselves, so that they, all the “each-others,” would be universalised. The “trans-nationalization” is then nothing but a de-nationalization, the ‘cosmopolitanization’ a de-politicization, consigning, with the introduction of something transcendent, the nation and the polis to oblivion. According to Beck, even “as soon as the euro was introduced,” or even “To the extent that Europe exists, there is no longer any such thing as Germany, or France, or Italy, or Britain, and so on.”(Beck, 2005: xi) “The premise for cosmopolitanism here…” Beck contends, “is that the national is ceasing to be the national.” To logically go a bit further, for Beck, since “nation” or “state” has disappeared, where can Americanization be, and where can ‘cultural imperialism’ exist? In the era of globalization, there is no such an agent like America to carry out Americanization, and no ‘nation’ to implement ‘cultural imperialism’!

At this point, we may say that Beck is quite ‘postmodern,’ though he may not be in favor of such labeling. With a usual approach in postmodern philosophy that he puts the “subject” of modernity into a “structure,” more precisely, Derrida’s “structure without centre,” and erases its “subjectivity,” its suppression and integration of others, sociologically then he abolishes Americanization and ‘cultural imperialism.’ A ‘structure,’ as we know it, is always of transcendent: transcending all the individuals through structuring this individual with another.
another individual, which is, but, said to be the structure, and the former is then no longer an individual, but an integrated part of the structure, or vice versa for the latter. Nevertheless, please do not forget, the transcending one is always another, ever-making one journey further away! In a structure, all are against all as individuals or subjects. They structure and deconstruct each other. No individual or subject can survive a structure! By the way, it is not too late to add, among the various reasons for Tomlinson to abolish ‘cultural imperialism,’ there is also such a postmodern doing. However, it is not so structurally and transcendently as Beck does, to remove “nation”, “nation-state”, “individual” and “subject” so that there will be “no way/no one” to “Americanize” and “no way/no one” to carry out ‘cultural imperialism.’

If it is by the transcendent refusal to the philosophical “subject” and the sociological “nation” that Beck removes Americanization and ‘cultural imperialism,’ what would be puzzling is that Rainer Winter, a leading cultural theorist in the German-speaking world, removes “cultural imperialism” through the immanent affirmation of “subject,” “individual,” and “context.” Overall, this is the affirmation of what I would call ‘situational hermeneutics,’ which is in an opposite direction to Beck’s. Since they hold different “Roads…” how can the same destination be reached? It must be remembered that such “Roads” are not those trivial “methods.”

In his article (Winter, 2003: 206-221)² to refute the view that popular culture dominated by the USA will result in the cultural standardisation and stereotypisation, as well as the disappearance of the uniqueness of the local culture, Winter quotes broadly from many cultural resources. Especially with Rambo and Dallas, his own investigation of the spread and reception of hip hop music enthusiastically promoted by American culture industry as examples, he proves that such global media products have not led to the situations mentioned above. On the contrary, he agrees with the famous observation of Arjun Appadurai: “the consumption of the mass media throughout the world often provokes resistance, irony, selectivity, and in general, agency.” (Appadurai, 1996: 7)³. Winter firmly believes that to consume is to enter “the processes of de-territorialization, syncretization and hybridization,” and to accept is “to

²Hereafter all quotations from Rainer Winter, unless otherwise noted, are from this article.
³Appadurai also warns that: “This is not to suggest that consumers are free agents, living happily in a world of safe malls, free lunches, and quick fixes.” (Appadurai, 1996: 7).

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appropriate, to express, to produce and to practice.” What interests Winter is that the consumption and reception of the so-called texts of ‘cultural imperialism’ appears to be an active counter-process, a process of subjecting all the subjections from them.

Such is the “dialectics of globalization,” or as he said in the co-authored Introduction to the collection mentioned above, the “cultural consequence of globalization” is “Starting from the phenomenon of Americanization,” and followed by the “cultural consequence of globalization” (Natan Sznaider and Rainer Winter, 2003: 3). With this, Winter and other cultural sociologists have already given comprehensive and persuasive argumentation through huge amounts of field work. I believe, however, a further examination should be done, that is, to theoretically lay bare - we need to get into the whys and wherefores - that: how can cultural imperialism, if there is such a thing at the very beginning, result in such unexpected outcomes? Where can the power that is capable of resisting ‘cultural imperialism’ come from? Winter in his article does not answer such questions. Through a careful reading, however, we seem to be able to infer: first, the consumer is a subject or individual, or an ‘individual subject,’ who has his/her own interests and intellects. Secondly, the consumer has his/her own “context” or “local,” and such “context” and “local” are not merely the outside environment for his/her actions, but have long been internalized as the consumer’s most authentic life being as an “individual subject.” Thirdly, the consumer has his/her own coding system, more importantly; his/her own daily life practice. To sum up, the consumer must be recognized as an individual. From this fundamental sense, Winter draws the conclusion from his ethnographic investigations that through the hip hop series of products, hip hoppers “define their own personal individual identity and hence, for individualization [italicised mine]. What is understood for Winter is that only by being an ‘individual,’ can the consumer individualize media commodities.

Regarding Beck’s removal of ‘cultural imperialism’ with ‘cosmopolitanism,’ we can say without hesitation that his model is ‘postmodernity’ cultural studies, because he has deconstructed the idea of the ‘individual subject,’ which is at the core of modern values. As for Winter and the peers he has quoted from, and Tomlinson in part because he sometimes stands in this “situational hermeneutics,” we cannot not generalize them together. Respectively, scholars like Winter adopt different perspectives for the consumers and producers of text messages: to look for the power to transform, to resist or to overthrow the texts of
‘cultural imperialism.’ They recognize the ‘modernity’ of the consumers. They look at the consumers as the in-self and for-self “individual” or “cultural individual”. But with the cultural imperialists, who are producers of “imperialist texts” and should be treated as “individual subjects” as well, Winter and the critics on his side are silent. Instead, they are keen to postmodernize put them into “intersubjectivity” or “trans-subjectivity.” This perhaps works with Beck who already has the similar term “transnationality” and thus de-subjectivizes them. For Winter and his supporters, as long as ‘cultural imperialism’ is treated the way the consumer is treated, it will definitely lead to the recognition of ‘modernity’ cultural studies.

IV. Where There Is ‘Modernity’ Cultural Studies, There Is ‘Cultural Imperialism’

We do not believe that scholars like Winter would have overlooked that cultural imperialists should also be treated as ‘individual subjects.’ Quite the opposite, they should have known it very well. Nevertheless, the problem just lies in that if they have considered this, their theory of anti-‘cultural imperialism’ would face the possibility of collapsing. However, we must not ignore a completeness of the fact for the sake of an imagined completeness of a theory. For cultural studies in the era of globalization, we cannot rashly give up its ‘modernity’ model; instead, there are enough reasons why we cannot totally negate it.

For the ‘modernity’ cultural studies, what is straightforward is that as long as we recognize the global encoders and the local decoders both as limited ‘cultural individuals,’ recognize their respective existence as nations (born as such, etymologically), there must exist Americanization or ‘cultural imperialism.’ Beck tries to disintegrate “city/state” with “nature” and to remove “nationality” with “transnationality.” However, those on the side of the ‘modernity’ cultural studies can often successfully point out the vanity of nature, transnationality, and all the other theories under the banner of universalism. Marxists insist that the social existence determines the social consciousness and the economic foundation the upper structure. In spite of many complicated links among them, be it G. V. Plekhanov’s “social psychology” or Williams’ “culture,” none can change the last determination of the former over the latter. Therefore, any theory or proposition that is trying to surpass a certain social existence and economic foundation is at a deeper level and a reflection of the social existence and economic foundation from which it comes. It is ideology. Classical Marxists long ago exposed the
hypocrisy of the bourgeoisie in its “liberty, equality and fraternity.” Today, in the era of globalization, the “specters of Marx” (Derrida), whether in the Third World like China and India or the First World like Britain, France, and Germany, are proving that the so-called universal culture propagandized by America or the West is nothing more than American-ness or Western-ness, or in one word, *locality*. To put it further, they are proving that there exists no ‘global value’ but ‘global interests’ and that ‘global value’ is always deployed as a chessman in the game of *global strategies*. This is no secret and no one is ignorant of or does not understand the principle of “the supremacy of the national interests,” “international” diplomacy is far from “internationalism,” it is nothing but the maximization of the nation’s interests in its negotiation with other countries. Jesus says that where your treasure is, where your heart will be; and we will say that where your treasure is, where your point of speaking will be. All circles around interests and the discourse is no exception.

At this point, we might point out that Nietzsche and the 20th century postmodern theorists who aligned themselves with Marx temporarily, have long ago destroyed the distinctions between “interpretation” and “fact,” “discourse” and “truth,” “narrative” and “history,” “signifier” and “signified,” “culture” and “nature,” etc. They find that the disconnection and contradiction between them are innate and therefore cannot be overcome. Foucault, among them, evidences historically that “discourse” is in essence “power,” the “will to power,” the “will to life,” and does not necessarily correspond with “truth.” According to the old Schopenhauer, the *Vorstellung* is but that of the *Wille* itself. Schopenhauer’s *Vorstellung* is revived by Foucault’s “discourse.” After all, it is desire that speaks; it speaks via a “discourse.”

The relationship between British cultural studies and postmodernism has always been ambiguous. In the deconstruction of high culture, the insistence on the difference and hybridity, the critical attitude towards *Occidentalism*, and the rejection of the concept of “culture industry,” etc., it seems that British cultural studies and postmodernism understand and appreciate each other. However, the difference in their starting points covered by the same aim must also be noted: the theoretical resource for post/structuralism, the core of postmodernism, is Saussure’s semiotics, especially its potential to deconstruct subjectivity, in which the signifier only points to another signifier, and the signifying activity, is but a floating chain made up of pure signifiers. Therefore the so-called *speaking subject* becomes that being spoken - spoken by the signifiers, by culture, by
tradition, etc.; it is the spokesperson - speaking for others and cannot speak itself or speak about itself. In modern philosophy, as with Kant, the ‘subjectivity’ of the subject comes from its determination of the object. The postmodern theorists turn this around, and the subject is now determined by the object and stops being the subject. To acknowledge or not the subjectivity forms the most fundamental watershed in philosophy between modernity and postmodernity. While for British cultural studies, it is not always so (because of its utilitarian attitude toward theory and the resulting lack of notice of the inner coherence of theory). In its research on the media audience that is pertinent to “cultural imperialism,” the most important theoretical support is its insistence on the subjectivity, concretely, its treatment of the media audience as the discourse subject, and more importantly, the individual subject. David Morley, who is well known for his active audience theory, early in the 1970s pointed out that “we must not see the audience as an undifferentiated mass but as a complex structure, made up of a number of overlapping subgroups, each with its own history and cultural traditions.” (Morley, 1974: 8) He demands an investigation of the audience’s “position in the class structure”, their “regional situation”, “ethnic origin”, “age” and “sex”, which are the primary factors in sociology (Ibid: 8-9). This also means that he needs a more concrete concept of “audiences.” Directly influenced by Hall and indirectly by Althusser, the young Morley then does not quite agree to treat the audience further as respective individuals. In his later researches on the “Nationwide audience” and “family TV,” however, he actually synthesizes the sociological analysis with individual analysis. More importantly, he ontologizes the reception context of the audience, that is, the ontological existence of the audience. Hall is strongly against private readings, yet when he says “different groups and classes of people will bring different explanatory frameworks to bear.” (Morley, 1973b: 12) he has already treated the audience as social individual or individual collective. In Morley’s researches on the media audience, in Hall’s theory of encoding/decoding, in their treatment of the audience as “subject”, we may assert that British cultural studies belongs to the ‘modernity’ cultural studies.

If we move the audience theory of the early (1970s) British cultural studies from its domestic context into an observation of the global media, like what Winter suggests, i.e., putting cultural studies into a sociology of hybridity formations (2003), it would be definitely anti-‘cultural imperialism.’ Such ‘appropriation’ of or ‘resistance’ to ‘cultural imperialism’ is quite different from
Beck and Tomlinson’s ‘postmodernity’ cultural studies, which are based on the deconstruction of ‘subjectivity.’ Hall has never given up the “structure” of Althusser. For him, all negotiated and oppositional or resistant decoding in mass communication are under the constraint of the ‘communicative structure’ in one way or another. “Production and reception of the television message are, not...identical, but they are related: they are differentiated moments within the totality formed by the communicative process as a whole.” (Hall, 1973a: 3) In his later investigation of “global mass culture,” Hall still holds to his early idea concerning the “structure”. He finds that on the one hand, “it is centered in the West and it always speaks English” and on the other, such English is no longer the “Queen’s English” or “highbrow English”, it becomes “an international language which is quite a different thing.” English is now scattered. Furthermore, “It is a homogenizing form of cultural representation, enormously absorptive of things, as it were, but the homogenization is never absolutely complete, and it does not work for completeness.” (1991a: 28) Hall also calls this structure, the “structure” of Althusser’s, as Gramsci’s “hegemony”; true, “hegemony” exists and tries to enclose all within itself, yet “hegemony” can never be completed (1991b: 68). Similarly, for Hall, as Winter (2003: 218) has noticed, though Hall on the one hand does not think that the global flows of sign, information and images can produce a standardized culture, and on the other, he sees a new homogenization emerging through the global process of commercialization. Obviously, not far back from the ‘structure’ hegemony, or “the new dialectics of global culture” (1991a: 19), another expression of Hall, there shines Hall’s firm belief in the philosophy of modernity’s ‘subjectivity’. Different from Althusser, Hall puts into this borrowed ‘structure’ difference, contradiction, struggle and therefore the endless opening of the structure - with modernity he ‘deconstructs’ the postmodern-orientated structure/deconstruction. It is Hall’s prediction that among all the new forms of globalization, there abides the antagonism between

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4In a chapter on Stuart Hall, Angela McRobbie has the saying “structure in dominance of globalization” (McRobbie, 2005: 29), which is apparently a rewrite of “a complex structure in dominance” coming from Hall’s early essay Encoding/Decoding (Hall, 1981:128). This shows that she has noticed Hall’s application of his early theoretical framework in TV studies into his globalization studies.
control and anti-control – “That old dialectic is not at an end. Globalization does not finish it off.” (1991a: 39) The reason for this is the eternal existence of the controller and the anti-controller as “rooted” individual. Unless the ‘individual’ and ‘subject’ are uprooted, the ‘modernity’ cultural studies will stick to its theory of resistance and struggle.

Hall’s “structure” view of cultural communication sets the direction of British cultural studies, that is, the ‘modernity’ cultural studies. It also specifically sets up the agenda for Morley’s ‘active audiences.’ However, let us then lay aside Hall for a moment and talk about Morley. True, Morley’s conception “active audiences,” if translated to the global media, will become a theory against ‘cultural imperialism’. However, there remain two problems. The first is its antagonism towards ‘cultural imperialism’ is from effect, not from intention. Because, like audiences, the motivators of ‘cultural imperialism’ are local, individual and subjective, for whom, we cannot imagine an action of ‘cultural imperialism’ without the intention of ‘cultural imperialism.’ This not only violates the proposition that human are rational animals but also betrays the fact, be it historical or contemporary. In consequence, the theory of ‘active audiences’ must admit the capitalist intention of ‘culture industry’ at the domestic level, and the cultural strategy of ‘capital imperialism’ at the international level, to be a cultural strategy motivated by interests. In other words, ‘active audiences’ can neither replace ‘culture industry’ nor deny ‘cultural imperialism.’

Secondly, perhaps what is more theoretically fundamental, active audiences must put “individual” and “subject” advocated by it into the framework of ‘inter-subjectivity.’ As long as the encoders are also viewed as subjects, reception is surely to be an ‘inter-subjective’ event. As long as a subject enters ‘inter-subjectivity,’ the dialogical process with another subject, it will surely be more or less modified. Moreover, this is beyond one’s intention because the presence of another subject or just one other will objectively change the existing environment of the subject. The environment is life-ontological. Semiotically, the ‘inter-textuality’ provides the ‘text’ with a ‘context’ and the autonomy of the text is thus broken, that is, the text is not what it was. The same relationship exists between the encoders’ global texts and the decoders’ local texts: because of the global encoders, the local decoders will be no longer as local as it was before.

Let us now come back to Hall. More thoughtful and sophisticated than Morley, Hall includes ‘cultural imperialism’ and the antagonism towards it, as well as the dialectic movement between the global and the local once and for all.
TOWARDS GLOBAL DIALOGISM

into the dynamic concept of “structure.” He foresees the future culture, exampled by modern music, as “the aesthetics of the hybrid, the aesthetics of the crossover, the aesthetics of the diaspora, the aesthetics of creolization.” (Hall, 1991a: 38-39) Hall’s cultural studies of the global culture, in its insistence and implement of the principle of subjectivity, belongs to modernity philosophy. We are delighted to see that with the concept of ‘structure,’ Hall has elaborated modernity’s insight regarding global culture all down to its extreme. Within the framework of modernity, he has predicted the final bankruptcy of the project of cultural imperialism, which has surpassed modernity and has postmodern propensity. Yet this postmodernity is surely different from that of French post/structuralism.

For globalization in a larger space, however, Hall’s vision might be a little narrow. In the process of colonization, which is, among others, one form of modernization, Hall sees hybrid culture appearing in ex-colonies and ex-suzerain states. How about other countries and regions, especially those on different paths to modernization? This limited vision, the postcolonial vision, will bring and has already brought certain blindness to the future cultural forms; for instance, can hybridity only be treated as a finished form rather than an ever-hybridizing process? It might be so in ex-colonies, and in America, the biggest ex-colony, partly so. Yet in suzerain states it might not be so, and in countries like China and Japan, Hall’s “hybrid” may have totally different meanings. What is helpful for us, however, is that Hall has strongly indicated a globalization theory surpassing modernity and postmodernity. We are grateful to Hall!

We must go beyond the “modernity” cultural studies; Hall has already made this attempt. We must go beyond the “postmodernity” cultural studies as well, the obvious limitations of which have already been represented by Beck and Tomlinson. We need learn from both their blindness and insight and explore the possibility of a new theoretical stage.

V. Conclusion: Towards Global Dialogism

Globalization is internally modernity and postmodernity, that is, it simultaneously surpasses modernity and postmodernity and is therefore possible to become a new philosophical perspective or further, theory. Robertson’s “glocalization”, Beck’s “cosmopolitanism” and Tomlinson’s critique of “cultural imperialism” are all valuable efforts to conceptualize this new era - I greatly appreciate their efforts. As a response to them, I will try to make clear my differences: first, I insist on the

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modernity perspective within globalization; I agree with Hall’s insistence on contradiction and struggle; second, consequently, any postmodern moment must be constrained by modernity; third, inevitably, I will not see the complete disappearance of the individual and subject in postmodernity globalization. For me, the individual and the subject will change but will not wholly give up themselves in the dialogue, in the ‘inter-subjectivity’ with another subject. Fourth, we therefore cannot presuppose anything like “universe” beyond ourselves as nationals or “citizens”. As subject cannot be eliminated, “nation” cannot be eliminated, and “place” cannot be of “no sense” at all (Meyrowitz, 1985), “inter-nationality” and “inter-locality” (Jin, 2007: 276-280) then cannot be replaced by “cosmopolitanism” or ‘glocalization’ with the intention of the global as a whole. In the era of globalization, every nationality or every culture has its say - we cannot decide for them what and how to speak - which involves another more complicated philosophical issue: can we hold a dialogue without premise? A simple answer for this: as long as the individual cannot be totally symbolized (Lacan), ideologized (Althusser) and colonized (Spivak), we have to admit and confess a dialogue without premise. In contemporary theories, such an idea sounds very absurd, yet for Confucius 2500 years ago, that already was a basic principle in inter-personal communication. Confucius does not care about the so-called ‘grand’ premise. He just knows to empty himself for the other to come in. (Jin, 2008)

Let other be other, and let myself be other as well, let both of them as limited and concrete subjects, move ‘inter-subjectivity’ towards ‘inter-otherness’ and ontological ‘inter-culturality.’ Only by so doing, can cultural studies in the era of globalization support a ‘dialogue’ in its real sense: the consequence of which is for each interlocutor an incessant self-surpassing, self-negation and self-reconstruction. Incessant because the interlocutor always retains his or her inner being which cannot be fully expressed. The interlocutor on one side can never become the one on the other side no matter after how many rounds of dialogue have taken place.

We will conclude with global dialogism, in which, first, the interlocutor as an other is its foundation; second, the ‘global’ is not the premise of dialogue, it is even not the target, it is, nevertheless, a result that can be and/or cannot be anticipated, because the ‘global’ as such is based on the other. It is a transition from ‘inter-otherness’ into ‘inter-subjectivity.’ It is mutual exploration and negotiation of the inter-subjectivity between others, during which there is no
premise prior to the dialogic process designed by either side. Thirdly, however, as long as the **other** enters dialogue, it stops being the **absolute other** because dialogue bestows upon the **absolute other** a subjective dimension. The definition of ‘subjectivity,’ as we know, is the ability to form the object and simultaneously be trans/formed by the object. By the way, one of the key meanings of ‘inter-subjectivity’ is the admission of the mutual transformation between subjects. Back to the beginning of this article, as **global dialogism**, globalization embraces both modernity and postmodernity, and a synthesis of which then transcends both. ‘Globalization’ as such is a new philosophy. If another name is needed, then **global dialogism** will be the choice.

As to the question of whether future cultural studies will make **global dialogism** its theoretical foundation, we cannot be sure of it, since a predetermined answer is contrary to the spirit of **global dialogism**. At the moment, we can affirm that in solving those serious problems arising from ‘cultural imperialism’ in this global age, **global dialogism** can at least simultaneously avoid “universe” (**cosmopolitanism**) and “holism” (**glocalization**) dubious of supporting cultural imperialism, and total ignorance of ‘cultural imperialism’ resulting from over-emphasis on the agency of the audience. We may also expect to re-interpret, after Hall, “inter-culturality,” especially its various new possibilities in the future.

Finally, it is paramount that we maintain the distinction between **global dialogism** and the “dialogism” of Mikhail Bakhtin. For Bakhtin, “dialogism” is essentially an outgrowth of poetic or literary theory, one that concerns the relation between double or multiple voices, and texts. If you wish, it may be thought of as “a philosophy of language” (Clark and Holquist, 1984: 212. [my emphasis]), or, applied to “relationships between distinct cultural and ideological units,” and “conflicts between nations or religions.” (de Man, 1989: 109) In this regard, it is a toolbox for cultural analysis, functioning much like **global dialogism**, as demonstrated above. However, according to Bakhtin’s dialogism, it is only at the discursive level that dialogue may be achieved. It is then reasonable for Julia Kristeva and Tzvetan Todorov to develop Bakhtin’s dialogism into their term “intertextuality” which “belongs to discourse.” (Todorov, 1984: 61) As Todorov quoted from Bakhtin, “Dialogical relations are (semantic) relations between all the utterances within verbal communication” (Quoted in Todorov, 1984: 61. [My emphasis]). Although Bakhtin does not overlook the author or creator of the utterance, and therefore “the dialogical reaction endows with personhood the
utterance to which it reacts” (quoted in Todorov, 1984: 61), Todorov insists, “this does not mean, […] that the utterance gives expression to the inimitable individuality of its author. The utterance at hand is perceived rather as the manifestation of a conception of the world, while the absent one as that of another conception; the dialogue takes place between the two.” (Todorov, 1984: 61) Bakhtin’s concept of Exotropy, or, “outsideness” (Morson and Emerson, 1989: 52), radical as it may be, and as much as it may lead us “from the intralinguistic to intracultural relationships,” (de Man, 1989: 109) remains dialogical and therefore discursive. In sum, the dialogue, in terms of Bakhtin’s dialogism, is discursive, which appears only between discourses, conceptions, or in Saussure’s terminology, signifiers. While Bakhtin’s dialogism is basically linguistic and epistemological, global dialogism goes beyond perception, signification, interpretation, and is based upon a life-ontology. It is a philosophical approach in which voices or texts involved in dialogue are understood as individual subjects which are constituted not only by discourses, and ideology, as Althusser would have it, but also by their material existence, and their “reel” as Lacan would remind us, and which can never be fully penetrated by discourses. To repeat, global dialogism is based on both modernity and postmodernity, both subjectivity and intersubjectivity, on their dynamic relations, and ultimately, their dialectical synthesis.

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GANDHI’S SYNTHESIS OF LIBERAL AND COMMUNITARIAN VALUES: ITS BASIS AND INSIGHTS

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Abstract: It is well known that notions of individual sovereignty, universal rights, and the duty to follow one's own conscience are central to the philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. The importance Gandhi places on community, tradition, and fulfilling duties particular to one's place in life is no less noticeable in his writings. That such is the case may indicate an uneasy tension among different elements in Gandhian philosophy (especially from the perspective of the Western political philosophical tradition). In what follows I argue that an underlying harmony in Gandhi’s philosophy can be noticed among such classic liberal and communitarian values given his overall views on self-realization. I will then show the value Gandhi’s understanding has for contemporary philosophical debates between liberals and communitarians.

It is well known that notions of individual sovereignty, universal rights, and the duty to follow one’s own conscience are central to the philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. The importance Gandhi places on community, tradition, and fulfilling duties particular to one’s place in life is no less noticeable in his writings. That such is the case may indicate an uneasy tension among different elements in Gandhian philosophy (especially from the perspective of Western political/philosophical traditions). In what follows I argue that an underlying harmony in Gandhi’s philosophy can be noticed among such classic liberal and communitarian values given his overall views on self-realization. I will then show the value Gandhi’s understanding has for contemporary philosophical debates between liberals and communitarians.

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I. Gandhi’s Advocacy of Liberal and Communitarian Principles

There is consensus among scholars of Gandhi’s philosophy that the Mahatma embraces both communitarian and liberal elements as crucial to his overall thought. Nicholas Gier writes: “Gandhi’s passionate belief in the unity of world religions includes the integration of all cultures, accepting each on their own terms. At the same time, however, he would have insisted with equal passion that each and every person must be treated with equality and respect.” (Gier, 2008: 128) Gier further states that for Gandhi, “Liberal filial piety would consist in teaching children loyalty and deference, but also self-reliance, freedom of thought, and independence.” (Ibid: 135) In describing Gandhi’s views on education, Douglas Allen notes “His education emphasizes empathy, mutual understanding, cooperation, and tolerance, but it does not advocate uncritical absolute tolerance and passive acceptance.” (Ibid: 51) On the Mahatma’s religious ethics, Joseph Prabhu remarks: “While (Gandhi) certainly values the self-discipline involved in Kantian self-legislation, had he been presented with a Kantian view, Gandhi would almost certainly have criticized its atomistic and insulated character—the sense that self-legislation is to be carried out free of social ties and local belonging.” (Ibid: 170-171)

The above comments reflect three varied aspects of Gandhi’s philosophy. Consider his support of a caste system and his opposition to allowing the “untouchables” to have separate elections. There is also his insistence that all religious beliefs which conflict with the dictates of reason be rejected, and his indictment of modern civilization for eschewing religion. We should include as well his belief in the presence of Truth that all should accept in a genuine realist sense even though it can only be understood in light of one’s own individual situation as among these varied aspects. Such seemingly antithetical beliefs result from the fact that essential to Gandhian thought is both the notion that we have an independent (seemingly atomistic) self, separate from our particular aims and attachments, and that the proper view of ourselves is relational—that is it is through our relations with each other that we realize who we are supposed to be. In the following, I will seek to explicate Gandhi’s basis for thinking that both views are correct as well as indispensable for developing a correct political system. By doing so, I will show the relevance and implications Gandhi’s understandings have for modern-day debates among liberal and communitarian political theorists. My aim is to show that both perceived communitarian and
liberal notions are crucial to Gandhian thought and are combined in a way indicative of Gandhi’s overall unique political philosophy. Thus, I will try to add greater substance to the “reformed liberal” label Gier gives Gandhi while discussing more of the Mahatma’s overall philosophical commitments—in particular, his avowed identification with classic Hindu philosophy. Unlike Gier, I think there is ample room in Hindu philosophical tradition to make sense of Gandhi as a reformed liberal. This follows given the central traditional Hindu emphasis on a Universal Self. A Self, in other words, all should realize that is continuous with all. At the conclusion of this paper, I will explore possible takeaways Gandhi offers for us in our dealings with tensions that stem from differences between liberal and communitarian understandings.

II. A Consideration of Key Conceptual Matters

Before I proceed with my specific arguments and elaborations, it is worth addressing problems that may result from different conceptual understandings of central terms and issues put forth. I do not wish to imply that it is either the Western liberal tradition or pre-modern communal understandings that are responsible for the distinctive Gandhian conception of the self crucial to my arguments. Furthermore, I understand that more than one interpretation of Gandhi’s views on religious conversion and caste has emerged from the vast corpus of his writings. I am convinced that my arguments however do not require much by way of specific commitments on such matters but rather rely on essential and key components of Gandhi’s discussions of them. It is implications of these parts of Gandhi’s views that I hold are of great value in dealing with present day conflicts stemming from differences between liberal and communitarian understandings. Whether I succeed will be left to the reader.

III. Liberal and Communitarian Disputes: A General Overview

The tensions between liberal and communitarian perspectives on the right society are quite familiar and seemingly incommensurable. Since the early 1980s, debates between so-called Rawlsian neo-Kantian “individualists” and Hegelian inspired “communitarians”, like Michael Sandel, have maintained a prominent place in Western political philosophy. These debates have involved methodological and normative questions concerning such issues as how the self comes into being (or
how our identities are formed). and what the basis is for forming a genuine community. Different philosophical views on these types of issues are manifest in contemporary disagreements (both within and outside of academic philosophy) that relate to the viability of expecting universal adherence to a given code of human rights, and the appropriateness of the state advancing particular notions of the good. Thus, for example, even though it is widely agreed in Western societies that all children have an equal right to an education, arguments over whether parents should be allowed to have their children taught only in the family’s native tongue and traditions necessarily involve different understandings on the importance of shared cultural identity and group pluralism. These, in turn, are matters that relate to ontological questions of how a self comes into being and what the necessary limits are to forming genuine community. Different metaphysical assumptions of the self often lie at the heart of such discords. It has been well noted that liberal perspectives, with their talk of equality, freedom, and rights, are predicated on a conception of an individualized, separate, and atomistic self. Communitarian thinkers, in contrast, have emphasized a self that grows in relation to others within a community and forms an identity only as part of a larger group. Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit write: “Both communitarian and individualist theories begin with the image of the individual. But the former claims that there are social attachments which determine the self, and thus individuals are constituted by the community of which they are a part. In that sense the individualist image of the self is ontologically false.”

Sandel’s notion of the individualist “unencumbered self” serves to advocate this argument. Sandel postulates the image of a person with “constitutive ends”, those ends which constitute who the person is. We must consider people’s aims and values if we want to understand who they are. We cannot analyze their behavior as if they were abstract entities, as if their values existed somewhere in the distance, “outside”, so to speak. This is a critique of the image of the person put forward by the individualists, who tend to distinguish between who one is and the values one has. Thus, while individualists think in terms of the priority of the self over its aims, communitarians regard this distinction and this priority as artificial, even impossible. (Avineri and de-Shalit, 1993: 3) Gandhi’s overall thinking as it pertains to matters of community, constitutive ends, and the ontological status of self enables him to harmonize the seemingly incommensurable outlooks of communitarians and individualists in a distinctively promising way. Gandhian thought offers insights by which we can proceed to
resolve tensions, specific to our time and place, which arise from differences between individualist and communitarian ways of seeing who we are.

IV. Gandhian Insights at Work

We should consider Gandhi’s approach to the conflicts which arose in (and still confront) Indian society involving religious pluralism and the presence of caste structure. To a very significant extent, these conflicts can be seen as real world manifestations of differences between individualist and communitarian presuppositions. Take, for example, conflicts that have arisen from the religious missionary zeal in India to bring locals “to the one truth” which is believed to be needed by all. The attitudes of missionaries in such cases is unmistakably parallel to the much criticized individualist mind-set that one set of codes should command the agreement and assent of all people given a supposed universal human nature. Additionally, the stratification by caste which has characterized Indian society has helped make that society clearly embody the communitarian’s point that the groups we belong to (which determine our social attachments) are not primarily ones we voluntarily join. Exploring the acceptability of this kind of stratification goes to the core of the communitarian’s point of view.

V. Gandhi’s Takes on Religious Conversion and Castes

In expounding on the distinction in Gandhian thought between “positive” and “negative” religious conversion, Rajmohan Ramanathapillai gives an illustration of Gandhi’s ability to successfully harmonize individualist and communitarian elements. (Ramanathapillai, 2010: 40-49) It should be noted that the criticisms Gandhi levels against those religious missionaries he sees to be engaged in negative proselytization are significantly identical to some of the ones communitarians level against liberal understandings. It is no less notable that the criteria Gandhi uses in determining whether missionary work is “positive” include standard liberal values like self-autonomy, truth, equality, and freedom from state interference. As Ramanathapillai chronicles, two of Gandhi’s chief objections to how missionaries went about their work were based on the value of cultural identity and the meaninglessness of performing rituals mechanically with no deeper understanding of their significance. While discussing his criticisms of how missionaries interacted with the animist, aboriginal tribes in the Konda Hills...
of India, Gandhi compares the native people’s culture to indigenous plants. (Gandh, 1999: 83) Ramanathapillai elaborates: “Like medicinal plants rooted in native soil, people have an organic relationship with culture and its faith, and this organic wholeness nurtures them, protecting them from crisis and healing their wounds. Negative conversion pulls plants from the soil and puts them in the alien soil of the conqueror. Consequently, not only is the wound between converts and their family and culture ripped open, their cultural identity is destroyed for future generations. For Gandhi, this is ‘irreligious and immoral’.” (Ibid: 45)

Gandhi’s point here contains shades of a modern day criticism of the Enlightenment Project (which is typically seen as a natural outgrowth of individualist political philosophy). Joseph Raz summarizes the point of these critics: “The Enlightenment, they say, has thrown out the baby with the bath water. In recognizing that morality overcomes people’s partiality to themselves, the Enlightenment has—those critics claim—created a monster: a universalized individual who is stripped of everything that makes people human, and is reduced to a sheer abstraction. The Enlightenment project is the morality of this abstract individual, and like abstract individuals, it is barren of any content.” (Raz, 2010: 586)

If we substitute “missionary religion” (the kind Gandhi has in mind) for “Enlightenment” and “religious truth” for “morality” in the above passage, we can see the concerns referred to therein, not only parallel, but are virtually identical to those expressed in Gandhian thought. Assuming that the objectivity of reality means religious claims should have genuine meaning to us, even when they are abstracted from the individual cultures we identify with, seems to leave us with a religion that would be barren of significant content (in most places anyway) while damaging a needed and specific sense of identification.

Gandhi’s point here relates to another major criticism he levels against missionary activity that again parallels a qualm expressed by critics of political liberalism. Gandhi is critical of religious conversion bereft of real inner understanding, on the part of converts, of the beliefs and practices that they now profess and have adopted. He states, “Real conversion springs from the heart and at the prompting of God…” (Gandhi, 1961: 75) As Ramanathapillai also notes, “Gandhi argued that when people are not ready for spiritual change, or when they don’t have a complete understanding of what they are changing into, a conversion is meaningless.” (Ibid: 41) In other words, Gandhi saw that simply being baptized and not undergoing a genuine inner transformation has no true religious
Similarly, it has been argued that by focusing solely on codes of non-discrimination and equal rights (external, ritualistic aspects) and not emphasizing the development of civic virtues, liberal societies are ultimately unable to realize a real sensitivity to the issues and needs of diverse people. In other words, simply outlawing overt discriminatory practices and ensuring procedural fairness is upheld is insufficient for creating a society in which all feel valued. Raz states, “the precepts of multiculturalism cannot be derived from traditional liberal rights…” (Ibid: 591) It is Gandhi’s emphasis, however, on such cherished liberal values as self-autonomy, conforming to an objective understanding of truth, and the equality of all that enables him to see some religious conversions as positive. Ramanathapillai writes further: “Positive conversion for Gandhi is self-realization, which requires individuals to examine themselves and spiritually mature without external impediments or interventions. Positive conversions are nonviolent conversions in which prospective converts enjoy the religious autonomy to choose a right spiritual path that is suitable to their nature. Gandhi argues that positive conversion, nurtured by true religious free will does not thrive because of contact through duress; or because of (the) colonizer’s religion policies; or because people are manipulated and mislead...Gandhi is unyielding on this subject that spiritual discoveries are personal....” (Ibid: 45)

Additionally, Gandhi’s emphasis on a realist conception of truth as well as on equality allows him to accept some religious conversions. Gandhi holds that all of our activities should aim toward realizing Truth. This follows from his belief in a Universal Self (which is equivalent to Truth) whose actualization is life’s purpose. Also Gandhi believes that we are all duty bound to practice nonviolence, and that only nonviolence can lead us to Truth. Furthermore, for Gandhi Truth can only be fully realized in a way that is both non-coercive and collective. Thus realizing Truth can be seen as both our shared final end and a goal which necessitates individual autonomy. Indeed it seems clear that Gandhi would say all of us are actually striving for Truth in our varied actions regardless of how aware we may be of this goal. He states, “As a matter of fact we are all…seeking to know the Unknown.” (Gandhi, 1955, 12) This provides Gandhi a basis by which to agree with liberal/individualist assumption of a universal human nature, as well as accept the communitarian emphasis on constitutive ends and shared values. It is however considerations of humility, not the perceived cultural bias of realist
conceptions of truth which enable him to maintain sensitivity toward cultural understandings different from his own. Gandhi states: “Seekers after Truth could only see as through a glass, darkly, so far as inward sight was concerned. It would, therefore, be sheer presumption on their part to ‘convert’ others to their own faith. God had as many ways of approaching Him as there were human beings.” (Ibid: 12)

Since, given our limits as embodied individuals, we can only grasp Truth partially, we must be open to the partial truths of others to advance our own understandings (and thus better reach our ultimate end—Self-realization). Thus, it is insight gained from specific religious teachings (taught within a community) that concerns the limitations of physical existence which gives Gandhi a basis for cultural sensitivity and thus the classic liberal value of equality.

Furthermore, because none of us can have a full grasp of Truth, yet none of us is without at least some partial understanding of it, we must avoid feelings of superiority regarding the ways and understandings of others. When we consider historical facts of religions mutually influencing and borrowing from one another, such an attitude seems only natural. All of those we encounter can help us further our own grasp of things. Hence, a basis emerges in Gandhian thought for both emphasizing the cherished liberal value of equality and joining in the liberal repudiation of dogmatism. It is only when such an attitude of identification with and humility toward others (given that we are all after the same thing ultimately and also our own limitations) underlies our feelings of a shared human nature and equality can religious conversion be acceptable for Gandhi. This kind of positive religious conversion is also compatible with standard liberal values by affirming the self’s individual sovereignty. After all it is the individual who should be allowed to decide which religious path is best for him given facts particular to his own empirical existence. Ramanathapillai writes: “Positive conversion is nonviolent; it helps people who are ready for conversion to identify and embrace new spiritual paths appropriate to their nature. Gandhi called such conversion a form of self-realization; converts come to the point of conversion only through the power of self-knowledge…. (Verma, 1970: 76), (Positive) conversion is a personal and spiritual self-realization, which is antithetical to institutionalized mass conversion…. (Ibid: 40) Thus even though, as we have seen, concerns of cultural identity are paramount to Gandhi (in keeping with the spirit of
communitarianism) it is ultimately considerations for a sovereign, seemingly atomistic, self that take priority in deciding the acceptability of religious conversion.

This kind of dual basis can also be seen in Gandhi’s justification of caste divisions (varnashrama) within society. On the one hand, Gandhi bases his justification on universal duty and common human needs. Additionally, he claims that problems with caste divisions have arisen because of departures from the classic liberal value of equality. On the other hand, he argues in favor of the caste system on the basis of what is best for each individual given his/her unique place in a community. Notably, Gandhi refers to the observance of an ideal caste structure as giving place to “equality in diversity”. (Ibid: 47) Consider the following passages (which I have tried to keep as succinct as possible without sacrificing critical meaning): The law (of caste) is the law of one’s being, which one has to fulfil…Varna (caste) is intimately, if not indissolubly, connected with birth, and the observance of the law of Varna means following on the part of us all the hereditary and traditional calling of our forefathers in a spirit of duty… The performance of one’s hereditary function is done as a matter of duty…Thus, the function of a Brahmana (member of the priestly caste) is to study and teach the science of spiritual truth. He performs the function, as he cannot do otherwise, as it is the law of his being…

Varna (caste) is determined by birth, but can be retained only by observing its obligations. One born of Brahmana (priestly caste) parents will be called a Brahmana, but if his life fails to reveal the attributes of a Brahmana then he cannot be called a Brahmana. On the other hand, one who is born not a Brahmana but reveals in his conduct the attributes of Brahmana will be regarded as a Brahmana…. Varna thus conceived is no man-made institution but the law of life universally governing the human family. Fulfilment of the law would make life livable, would spread peace and content, end all clashes and conflicts, put an end to starvation and pauperization, solve the problem of population and even end disease and suffering…. Though the law of Varna is a special discovery of some Hindu seer, it has universal application. Every religion has some distinguishing characteristic, but if it expresses a principle or law, it out to have universal application…The world may ignore it today but it will have to accept it in the time to come. I would define the law briefly thus: The law of Varna means that everyone shall follow as a matter of duty (Dharma) the hereditary calling of his forefathers, insofar as it is not inconsistent with fundamental ethics.
The four Varnas have been compared to the four members of the body. If they are members of one body, how can one be superior or inferior to another? (Our) body politic, the body of humanity, would go to pieces, if it were to perpetuate the canker of superiority or inferiority. It is this canker that is at the root of the various ills of our time. It should not be difficult for even the meanest understanding to see that these wars and strife could not be ended except by the observance of the law of Varna. For it ordains that everyone shall fulfill the law of one’s being by doing in a spirit of service that to which one is born. (Ibid: 40)

It should not go unnoticed that Gandhi bases the value of equality in his argument above on an understanding of the community as an ontologically basic and whole unit (like an individual body). It additionally bears mentioning that in the same booklet in which the above passages are found, Gandhi also states “But this duty of labor cannot be imposed on anybody.” (Ibid: 47) This is the case even though (as we will see below) for Gandhi, it seems, unless a person has truly matured enough to realize his/her specific duty of labor (independently from social expectations), it is best for them to follow their ancestral path. Thus, we again see Gandhi’s sensitivity to liberal values like freedom from external interferences. Furthermore, if we discount the importance he gives to hereditary in the above passages but interpret his points to mean that all of us are bound by the moral law to do that which we can most uniquely do best for society (however this is determined); then Gandhi’s defense of a caste system does not seem so outlandish. Ultimately, he is agreeing with the standard liberal view that the same basic duties are universally binding on us all. It is how we go about performing the duty of service to our community (which no one can escape) that varies given aspects specific to ourselves as individuals.

VI. The Take away for Liberal/ communitarian Debates

At times the above discussion may leave one with the impression that Gandhi, like many of us, is simply trying to have his philosophical cake and eat it too when it comes to what he thinks is correct on specific issues. In other words, he is unable to give up important values that are exclusively prominent in both liberal and communitarian camps and winds up putting forth ideas that cannot stand as a consistent whole. However, if we more closely look at his rationale, in the context of his overall philosophy, for taking the above seemingly at odds positions much insight can be gained for us as we deal with tensions that arise for us that relate to
debates between liberals and communitarians. Consider, for instance, Gandhi’s reply to a correspondent critical of his “continually harping on conscience.” (Gandhi, 1961, 123-ff) The correspondent writes: “I find youngsters and grown-up people talking utter nonsense under the cover of conscience. What is more, youngsters have become imprudent and grown-up people unscrupulous; can you not prevent this mischief? If you cannot, please withdraw the word from use and stop the drivel that is being said in the name of that sacred but much abused word. Pray tell us who has a conscience? Do all have it? Do cats have a conscience, when they hunt to death poor mice.” (Ibid: Vol. I :262) We can see here the correspondent put forth, what amounts to, a version of the famous “liberty equals license” criticism that has often been brought up against liberal political philosophy. Ultimately, critics have charged that granting freedom to form and pursue one’s own life plans (as Mill famously proscribes) ultimately leads to morally negligible results. (Richards, 2001) The point here is that freedom to do as one pleases (and thus act in a way that is aligned with one’s conscience) inevitably implies freedom from appropriate moral restraint. In Gandhi’s informative reply he states:

I must confess the (correspondent’s) charge is not without substance…Every virtue has been known to be abused by the wicked. But we do not on that account do away with virtue. We can but erect safeguards against abuse. When people cease to think for themselves and have everything regulated for them, it becomes necessary at times to assert the right of individuals to act in defiance of public opinion. When individuals so act, they claim to have acted in obedience to their conscience. I entirely agree with the correspondent that youngsters as a rule must not pretend to have a conscience. It is a quality or state acquired by laborious training. Willfulness is not conscience…. (Gandhi, 1983: 454)

The extent to which Gandhi’s reply sheds light on his overall philosophy can be gleaned when we consider his words here in conjunction with some of his other beliefs. As Douglas Allen and Glynn Richards (among others) have discussed at great length, Gandhi believes that religion should be a significant part of a child’s education and that children should be educated in the traditional language of their given community. (Gandhi, 1961: 262) Thus, for Gandhi not only is the right of conscience a valuable individual right that cannot be exercised by youngsters, but
such individuals should be educated in a manner in line with communitarian values. Therefore, we can infer that on Gandhi’s scheme (not unlike Mill’s) individuals must first reach a real level of maturity before they can be entrusted with the use of certain central liberal rights and freedoms (like the right of conscience). This conclusion is also implied by Gandhi in regards to the freedom of religion. After all, before conversion can be legitimate for Gandhi the convert must first be ready for it by examining himself and spiritually maturing. Furthermore, it is not a stretch of credulity to think that Gandhi would believe that only those who have undergone such self-examination and maturation are worthy of having the freedom to leave the vocation of their ancestors (while still engaging in tasks they are uniquely suited for). Even most fully realizing an attitude of equality toward all (as opposed to mindlessly accepting equality as a platitude) would, for Gandhi, require a very real level of spiritual maturity. The spiritually mature individual is one, Gandhi says, who can identify with all that exists and “love the meanest of creation as oneself.” (Richards, 2001) This kind of person would most clearly exude an attitude of equality toward all.

Given this conclusion, it becomes easier to see Gandhi’s basis for conjointly advocating central liberal and communitarian values in his overall philosophy. Since the rights, freedoms, and values cherished by liberals must first be earned by the individual (in much the same way as Gandhi held India must earn its own independence), the ideal state for Gandhi cannot be one which has the primary role of indiscriminately preserving core liberal freedoms for all. Instead, the state should first focus on developing citizens who can be worthy of such freedoms. We must become worthy of acquiring liberal rights, freedoms, and values in order to fully gain self-realization. The only way one can become worthy of these rights and freedoms is by first learning the truths emphasized in a way that is specific to traditions of his particular community. All communities, at their core, emphasize some real (yet partial) understandings of Truth. These are the ones any given individual is in the position of grasping the most clearly. It is only after such truths have been adequately absorbed can one go beyond them to more fully pursue self-realization (which requires exercising cherished liberal rights and freedoms). Given these points, we can see that for Gandhi the state must not abandon the furthering of communitarian concepts in favor of rights and freedoms but rather regard doing so as necessary in order for its citizens, and thus by extension the state itself, to truly realize independence (swaraj). It is only once we (as individual members of a society) have this independence can it make sense
for us to be entrusted with the awesome duties possessing rights entails. Gandhi remarked to the U.N. Committee working to draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “All rights to be deserved and preserved come from duty well done. From this fundamental statement perhaps it is easy enough to define the duties of man and woman and correlate every right to some corresponding duty to be performed. Every other right can be shown to be a usurpation hardly worth fighting for.” (Gandhi, 1983: 454) It is clear that for Gandhi our duties can only be learned as members of particular communities. Thus it is incumbent on state institutions to advance and preserve these communities for citizens to genuinely possess rights—Gandhi sees no other way that liberty can be tempered with virtue.

VII. A Consideration of Some Problems

Before concluding, it is worthwhile to consider some problems which may present by my account of Gandhi’s way of harmonizing liberal and communitarian elements in his philosophy. If, as I have argued, for Gandhi liberal values can be legitimately possessed only after they have been earned, the unmistakable implication seems to be that those who have not put forth the requisite effort have no duty to honor liberal values. Thus those in a community where no one has matured to the point of deserving, say, personal autonomy would have no obligation to respect the autonomy of someone who wishes to leave it. The one seeking to leave, after all, cannot be considered legitimately autonomous. Likewise, those born into a community whose members have not developed in a genuine egalitarian sense would seem to not be morally required to think of others as being equal. Thus instead of a problem like how liberty can co-exist with virtue, for Gandhi issues like how cultural sensitivity can be expected to always co-exist with freedoms and treatment, all are entitled to present problems. How, for example, can Gandhi’s philosophy criticize certain traditional Islamic cultures in which religious conversion is met with the death penalty?

In dealing with such problems, the best I hope to do here is offer a general strategy by which they can be resolved. We should remember that for Gandhi the practice of nonviolence (broadly understood) applies to all and is the only way we can realize Truth (which he sees as everyone’s ultimate aim). When we deny freedoms to others (and thus not uphold core liberal values) we are invariably

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inflicting violence (however indirectly) on them. Thus, for Gandhi we are ultimately harming ourselves. Given these points, it seems that Gandhi would hold that we are duty bound to honor core liberal values in our treatment of others when they are entailed by the practice of nonviolence. In other words, adopting nonviolent practices necessarily involves upholding certain liberal values as a by-product. The duty to honor such values in our relations, however, is different from what we can expect from others (e.g. liberally conceived rights we believe we are entitled to). Gandhi, as I have shown, believes we must first properly mature before we can legitimately receive these. It then seems reasonable to conclude Gandhi draws a distinction between our duty to respect the rights of others (regardless of how worthy they may be of them) and the rights which we can properly demand others recognize in their dealings with us. Such a distinction is clearly in line with the willingness Gandhi says a nonviolent activist (satyagrahi) should have to endure but never inflict suffering. (Gandhi, 2000: 10) Thus, just as Gandhi holds our duty to be nonviolent to others does not mean we have a duty to avoid the violent behavior of others, he would say our duty to respect certain rights of others does not, in itself, mean we are entitled to others respecting those rights when interacting with us.

Conclusion

We can see that for Gandhi the true shortcoming of the liberal enterprise has been its failure to help instill in citizens a basis by which liberal rights, freedoms, and values can be understood and thus accepted. Such a basis can only come from understanding ethical duties which make sense to us as members of particular communities. Ultimately, for Gandhi, value neutrality cannot extend to the foundations that underlie the rights, freedoms, and values on which a society is created. This follows since the means for grasping these foundations will remain necessarily varied.

References


GANDHI’S SYNTHESIS OF LIBERAL AND COMMUNITARIAN VALUES


TRANSFORMING UNITED STATES–DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA RELATIONS: IDENTIFYING TRADE SPACE IN PURSUIT OF CHANGE

Davis Florick and Maorong Jiang*

Abstract: For nearly a century the Korean Peninsula has been polarized. While across much of the world Cold War divisions have since eroded: militarization on the peninsula has allowed stratification to persist. Unfortunately, to compound matters further, the senior leadership in Pyongyang has pursued a nuclear weapons program in an effort to ensure regime survival. To escape the current dynamics in the region requires bold action through a change in policy. In particular, The United States has the resources and standing to alter the regional landscape. Offering North Korea a package which recognizes the North’s nuclear program and addresses some of its other strategic concerns, while bringing the “Hermit Kingdom” into the international community, presents the best, feasible option to change the course of the region. Such a shift from Washington, deeply rooted in its reengagement with China, can be achieved through courageous and decisive leadership, coupled with an appropriate planning construct.

I. Introduction

The relationship between the United States (US) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been one of the most acrimonious in the international system for over half a century. Despite the fact that the US is one of the largest states and the DPRK one of the smallest in size, North Korea seems almost comfortable challenging international norms and US perceptions of what is appropriate action. This willingness to test fate and risk conflict is due in large part to the Cold War and its legacy. Interestingly, “the US and the Soviets only

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once fought directly and openly during the Cold War, when Soviet MiG-15 jets clashed with North American F-86 Sabres over North Korea and the Manchurian borderlands” (Burleigh, 2013: 131). The Korean War, both the manner in which it was fought and how it was concluded, has set forth the direction of the dynamics on the Korean Peninsula from the 1950’s to the present day. In doing so, this conflict greatly cemented the ongoing stratification of Northeast Asia. Consequently, over the last sixty years, the roles of the US, People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russian Federation (Russia), and Japan on the Korean Peninsula have made them unwitting bedfellows in a never-ending saga. Two of the last vestiges of the Cold War, the Korean War armistice and demilitarized zone (DMZ), were widely regarded as temporary solutions in the 1950s. Tragically, legacies of the Cold War divide have since ballooned into an institutionalized mental and physical barrier that national leadership in both the US and DPRK must find a way to break away from. Today, the DMZ threshold has been trumped by the far more politically cumbersome North Korean nuclear weapons program. “Bismarck’s nineteenth-century aphorism surely applies: ‘We live in a wondrous time, in which the strong is weak because of his scruples and the weak grows strong because of his audacity’” (Kissinger, 2014: 230). North Korean unpredictability has caused tremendous challenges not only for the US but also for the entire region. With that being said, a growing disconnect in the PRC-DPRK relationship has created a trade space for US-DPRK dialogue. Bold and decisive action on the part of Washington is warranted to escape the current dynamics on the peninsula. It is high time that the US present North Korea with a proposal that would legitimize the North’s nuclear program while drawing the DPRK into the international community. Over the long term this may very well present the best opportunity to stabilize the North’s nuclear program. What separates this proposal from previous attempts at engagement is a combination of new geopolitical dynamics, both cross and mutual-benefit, and a fundamental transformation in Washington’s willingness to take decisive action against Pyongyang if a deal cannot be reached. At this juncture it is prudent to define cross-benefit; which is value in the aggregate elements of the agreement as opposed to mutual-benefit, which is the value all parties find in one element. With an understanding of the historical and current situations on the peninsula, an accord based upon cross-benefit and positive reinforcement that paves the way for future cooperation offers the best chance for US-DPRK engagement.
II. Historical Perspective

Before discussing the parameters of a potential agreement, one needs to identify some of the underlying factors that have brought Northeast Asia to where it is today. The Korean Peninsula has long been one of the principle gateways in the Asia-Pacific region. One of the first instances of foreign aggression in the area was Japan’s invasion in 1592. An attempt to create a bridgehead for conquests throughout Asia, this war marked the first true case of Japanese attempts at external conquest. “Counting the reserves at the campaign headquarters at Nagoya, over a quarter of a million men were involved” (Morton and Olenik, 2005: 110) in this pivotal moment in Northeast Asian history. China would come to Korea’s aid in that conflict, a defeat for Japan, and again after nearly three hundred years during the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894, a struggle initiated by Japan’s meddling in Korean domestic politics. Just a few years later, Russia found itself driving south in pursuit of a warm water port and other territorial gains in the Asia-Pacific region. Moscow’s expedition led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 where the waters off of the peninsula saw significant action. Fifty years later, in the early Cold War, the Korean Peninsula reentered the international conscience as the US, PRC, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) all became embroiled in the Korean War. Marked by three significant military conflicts in a little over a century, the peninsula’s recent history has made it an inflection point in the strategic designs of a number of states. Its role as a conduit in the region has left it torn apart with the great powers supporting multiple parties vying for control over the entire peninsula.

Both Koreas, but particularly the North, have used great power patronage as leverage to ensure regime survival. Throughout the Cold War years, Kim Il-sung used the PRC and USSR against one another. “In a tradition practiced by Koreans throughout their history, Kim went to extraordinary lengths to gain and maintain as much independence as possible” (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014: 15). The easier observation from this system is that Kim Il-sung successfully created a bidding war between the two great poles of communism that allowed North Korea to receive preferential trade agreements and technological assistance. However, a second, albeit less intuitive, development was the freedom this policy afforded Pyongyang in disassociating itself from sensitive programs emanating from its communist brethren. “Kim Il-sung needed Soviet aid, but at the same time did not fully support the de-Stalinization that took place in Moscow after the Soviet
leader’s death. Similarly, the Cultural Revolution in China in the 1960s pushed a radical direction that not even Kim was comfortable with” (Cha, 2012: 39). This back and forth enabled North Korea to remain always at arm’s length from its Soviet and Chinese colleagues. Periodically, when Kim Il-sung recognized a gap in the Japan-South Korea-US trilateral partnership, he would seek negotiations. This practice helped benefit North Korea economically and only further signified to its communist patrons that Pyongyang had other options. Unfortunately for the DPRK, the fall of the Soviet Union coincided with a thawing in relations between China and South Korea. To enable greater engagement with Seoul, Beijing sacrificed its relationship with Pyongyang. It took the Kim family regime considerable effort and time to find a way to replicate the patronage competition that had supported it throughout the Cold War. In the absence of a friendly great power, North Korea’s structural fragility became rapidly apparent. “From 1990 to 1991, Soviet exports to North Korea fell by 75 percent. While the country starved, the authorities extolled the virtue of eating two meals a day. They tried to hide the disaster. That the famine was three years old before word leaked out of its extent was a testament to North Korea’s totalitarian controls” (Rubin, 2014: 108-9). When the DPRK was fraught with famine in the 1990s, it was reduced to relying on overseas development assistance and charitable donations from states such as Japan, the PRC, the ROK, and the US. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, North Korea has been forced to search for the means and mechanisms to modernize its patronage system to meet twenty-first century geopolitical realities. Rather than feeding off competing communist states, the DPRK is now employing a range of diplomatic tools to leverage assistance from China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the US. Arguably, the bipolar balance North Korea sought to strike during the Cold War has been replaced by a multipolar system with at least five states finding themselves driven to support the Kim family. Despite tremendous economic failings, astronomical military investments, and a deplorable human rights record, the Kim dynasty continues to survive by applying the time-honored skill of leveraging the international political environment.

Following the geopolitical transformation that transpired with the fall of the Soviet Union and the North’s economic collapse, Pyongyang has become focused on ensuring regime survival. The regime has sought to offset the patronage system with fresh instruments intended to blackmail other states into providing tacit support. For a variety of reasons, the Kim family regime has concentrated on nuclear weapons as the primary mode to achieve this goal. In particular, as other
legitimizing mechanisms erode, the state’s threat of nuclear reprisals in the event of a foreign attempt to force regime change has become the single greatest pillar keeping Kim Jong-un in power. “Kim Yong Nam, president of the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly and the regime’s second most powerful figure – citing the legacy and philosophy of regime founder Kim Il Sung – declared, ‘The reckless knife-wielding of imperialists and reactionaries should be countered with the gun barrel to the end’” (Rubin, 2014: 133). The use of political coercion – through the nuclear weapon program – has ensured regime survival but at considerable cost. Viewed as a pariah state throughout much of the international community, Pyongyang has fulfilled its own prophecy. Isolated from much of the rest of the world, North Korea’s prospects for economic recovery and a renaissance in the North are bleak at best. With few friends left, the Kim family rules a state that is on virtual life support, prolonged largely by the threat of nuclear retaliation. Indeed, some may argue that the DPRK’s very survival is now dependent on nuclear weapons – a self-fulfilling prophecy if there ever was one and one which unfortunately, makes it all the less likely that North Korea will relinquish its nuclear weapon program any time soon. Regardless, the dark cloud this capability has created will help prolong the regime’s existence but could also ensure its perpetual stagnation in addition to regional instability.

III. DPRK-PRC Divide – A Long Time Coming

Given the current row in DPRK-PRC relations, one would be remiss to not review some of the previous fissures in this partnership predicated on pragmatism. “Despite the professed unique relationship, there is no love lost between the two” (Cha, 2012: 316). Indeed, China courted North Korea because of balance of power dynamics in the Northeast Asia trilateral relationship of communist states. Three phases can be tracked in the history of DPRK-PRC relations. First, early Cold War relations were characterized by Mao Zedong’s willingness to compete with the Soviet Union over influence in North Korea. Second, at the end of Mao’s reign and once Deng Xiaoping emerged, there is a marked period of considerable distance between Beijing and Pyongyang. Third, sometime after the onset of famine in the 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership made the concerted decision that a North Korean collapse would not serve its interests, and, therefore, Beijing has worked to keep the DPRK solvent ever since. This history is certainly contrary to the perception in many circles in the US; however, it helps
to explain the recent falling out between China and North Korea. Dating back to
the Korean War, “[Mao] thought any project to conquer South Korea should be
deferred until the completion of the Chinese civil war through the conquest of
Taiwan. However ambiguous American statements were, Kim Il-sung was
convinced that the United States was unlikely to accept two Communist military
conquests. He was therefore impatient to achieve his objectives in South Korea”
(Kissinger, 2013:123) first. The ensuing conflict cost the lives of hundreds of
thousands of Chinese and, more importantly, significantly diluted Mao’s policy
options on a host of other issues. Amongst a number of China’s grievances with
North Korea, this episode stands out as one of the most egregious. Long ago these
incidents collectively weighed down Beijing-Pyongyang relations. Mao could not
fully abandon Kim Il-sung for public relations reasons, but he never trusted his
North Korean counterpart after the war on the peninsula. The break in
PRC-USSR relations followed by the heightened PRC-US cooperation changed
PRC-DPRK dynamics considerably. In the absence of any real relationship with
Moscow, Beijing did not have the same motivating factors in courting Pyongyang.
As a result, the distance between the two grew. China served as a venue for North
Korean officials to negotiate with foreign parties as the US for instance
participated in dialogues with Pyongyang from Beijing, but, paradoxically,
contact between the PRC and DPRK was quite limited. Specifically, while some
trade elements persisted, any defense relationship that existed previously
underwent considerable erosion. This period is also marked by China’s
willingness to engage with South Korea. “The 1986 Asian Games, held in Seoul,
were deftly used by South Korea as a tool of engagement with Beijing. It not only
ensured Beijing’s participation in Seoul’s Olympics two years later, it also
precipitated a boost in trade volume in 1985-86 to over $1.5 billion” (Cha, 2012:
324). Cooperation with South Korea led directly to the forfeiture of North
Korea’s special status. The diplomatic shift in Beijing’s Korean Peninsula
orientation is representative of the larger Cold War policy shifts during this
period.

Beijing’s attitude of indifference toward Pyongyang in the post-Cold War
world is more indicative of leadership views. Specifically, Chinese leaders have
provided North Korea with only enough support so that it remains a viable entity,
but little else. Ultimately, Beijing has in general three great fears regarding Korea
that motivate its continued support for the Kim family regime. First, the DPRK
can threaten the PRC with a flood of refugees into a region that is already
economically vulnerable. Second, Beijing is concerned with ethnic Korean separatist views in Liaoning and Jilin provinces, both of which border North Korea. Third, there is always the concern, particularly from conservative elements, that a reunified Korea will be pro-US. These three motivations are largely responsible for China’s ongoing support for North Korea. Additionally, Beijing feels compelled, at times, to work with Pyongyang because it sees the DPRK as a potential conduit for market access. In 2009, a senior level committee chaired by Wen Jiabao “passed an ‘implementation strategy’ for development of the country’s rust belt – the northeastern region that had formerly contained many of the nation’s important heavy industry factories but was now, in the country’s improved economic circumstances, lagging far behind. A key part of the plans for Jilin Province was access to the North Korean port of Rajin” (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014: 446). These plans have since floundered for a myriad of reasons, but they highlight China’s recognition of North Korea’s value, albeit limited, due to geography. This is not a relationship based upon positive aspects, but rather it is driven by Chinese senior leadership fears and pragmatism. What separates the most recent period is not DPRK-PRC animosity but the severity and degree to which the North has been willing to push the issue – in effect embarrassing China.

IV. Current Situation…Opportunity

The Kim family regime has made its nuclear weapons program the hallmark of a state loathed the world over for its flaunting of internationally accepted norms of behavior. Under the protection of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the government has had the freedom of action to oppress its people and coerce neighboring states with the use of blackmail and extortion tactics. Despite conventional forces in a state of almost perpetual decay, the DPRK has had the freedom of action to conduct skirmishes with the ROK without fear of reprisal. This blatant disregard for accepted international norms and the lack of a response in kind largely stems from its nuclear arsenal. “In early October 2003, barely a month after the first round of six-party talks ended, Pyongyang announced that it was changing the purpose of reprocessing the spent fuel rods from civilian needs to building a ‘nuclear deterrent’” (Ibid: 398). The threat of an apocalyptic conflict, a twenty-first century employment of the nuclear brinksmanship concept, has created an asymmetric scenario in Northeast Asia. Therefore, North Korea has
transformed nuclear weapons into the ultimate insurance policy. In doing so, it is increasingly less likely Pyongyang will forfeit its lone tool for regime survival any time soon.

Even more troubling, beyond just a defensive tool, Pyongyang’s nuclear weapon capacity has become a compelling instrument of offensive coercion. Simply possessing a WMD capability proven to have the range to strike South Korea has emboldened Pyongyang into taking aggressive actions against Seoul. On “March 26, 2010, [North Korea] sank the South Korean corvette ROKS Cheonan (PCC-772) on South Korea’s side of the Koreas’ de-facto maritime boundary, killing forty-six sailors; and on November 23, 2010, shelled South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island, killing two marines and two civilians” (deLisle and Goldstein, 2015: 189-90). As it further enhances delivery systems, North Korea will be able to elevate the deterrence value of its nuclear program. Someday soon it will pose a distinct threat to neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, and possibly even the US homeland. The danger in the modernization of the North’s delivery systems is that it may further empower the regime to take even more provocative action beyond just shelling South Korean islands, torpedoing South Korean submarines, and conducting missile tests over Japanese territory. The unconventional challenge Pyongyang symbolizes has afforded it the operational space needed to adopt provocative domestic and foreign policies beyond any international standard of acceptability.

North Korea’s domestic policy record, enabled by its defense strategy, has become one of the great human tragedies of the modern era. At the most basic level of human existence throughout history, “physical circumscription – what is called ‘caging,’ the bounding of territories by impassable mountains, deserts, or waterways – allowed rulers to exercise coercive power over populations and prevented enslaved or subordinated individuals from running away” (Fukuyama, 2014: 10). If this sounds familiar, it is because this is the world North Koreans face today. Rather than exist on its own merit and positive qualities, the regime has survived on the generosity and pragmatism of its neighbors – particularly China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Faced with a prospect of a failed state, key stakeholders in Northeast Asia have provided Pyongyang with the basic, normal goods needed to ensure the functions of the bureaucracy. Sadly, while the efforts of others have kept the DPRK afloat, philanthropic work to date has not been enough to avoid rampant disenfranchisement and hardship for the vast majority of North Koreans. With the economic collapse of the early 1990s
came an increased willingness on the part of ordinary citizens to accept greater risks in order to achieve basic levels of sustenance. “Some people brave harassment and shooting to cross the border into China to earn hard currency (many North Koreans, especially black-market traders, cross again and again into China). Some children in the North live feral: they are known as kotjebi, or ‘fluttering swallows’, and roam in packs. When they cannot steal in the markets, they eat dead dogs and rotten food” (“Food and Stability” para 7). Driven to desperation by the failings of their government, the North Korean people represent the real casualties of their government’s failed policies.

Rather than change course, however, the government has responded with draconian measures that would be more befitting a medieval demagogue. In North Korea today, rule by law exists where “law represents commands issued by the ruler but is not binding on the ruler himself” (Fukuyama, 2014: 24). Despite both international assistance and condemnation, political prisons have been foundational to the state’s ability to maintain domestic stability since the dawn of the DPRK. “The most notorious prisons are the kwantiso – which translates as ‘control and management place.’ These are in fact a colony of labor camps that stretch for miles in the northernmost mountains of the country. Satellite intelligence suggests they house up to 200,000 people. Emulating the Soviet gulag, Kim Il-sung set up the camps shortly after taking power” (Demick, 2010: 174-5). Tragically, the number of inmates has swelled in recent years as Pyongyang has cast an ever-widening net in the hopes of maintaining totalitarian control. The main targets include “those who try to flee the country; Christians and those promoting other ‘subversive’ beliefs; and political prisoners” ("Humanity" para 3). Essentially, the Kim family has created the ultimate police state where even the smallest or most benign infraction can lead to grave consequences. Sadly, Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and the quandary surrounding the aid program have functioned as a shield against any meaningful foreign action intended to alter the North’s human rights record.

The use of state-sanctioned terror is not limited to intimidating ordinary North Koreans. Since Kim Jong-un’s accession, after the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, the senior leadership has gone through significant turnover. “Jang Sung Taek, the uncle and political guardian to Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s young dictator, had been in disgrace before. Purged and banished to a steel mill around 1978, and quietly cast out again in 2003-04. This time he is gone for good, executed for ‘such an unpardonable thrice-cursed treason’ as opposing Mr. Kim’s
succession and planning a coup” (“North Korean Intrigue” para 1). No one exemplifies the lack of job security in the DPRK bureaucracy better than Mr. Taek – who was sentenced and executed in one day. “Since succeeding his father, Kim Jong-il, the second anniversary of whose death was marked this week, [Kim Jong-un] has shuffled or removed about 100 senior officials. Of the seven men who escorted Kim’s hearse, only two (both in their 80s) remain in power” (“North Korean Intrigue” para 3). The leadership overhaul in North Korea has become an opportunity for Kim Jong-un to put his signature on policies and procedures. Especially when it comes to foreign policy, the third generation Kim has simply altered techniques his predecessors practiced. North Korea-China relations have had an on-again-off-again dynamic for decades – something that in many ways remains a mystery to US analysts. “The Chinese government never really got on with his father, Kim Jong Il. But at least he did not execute China’s main interlocutor, as Kim Jong-un did, when in December 2013 he disposed of Jang Song Taek. In office, the younger Kim has never been invited to China. But Park Geun-hye, South Korea’s president, is welcome there and gets on famously with Xi Jinping” (“Birthday Blues” para 5). Concurrent with the execution of Mr. Taek, a man regarded to have a good working relationship with the CCP, North Korea has initiated an anti-China propaganda campaign. Using racially tinged and provocative language, the government has used state-run media as a tool for distancing itself from Beijing. Beyond the regularly frenetic pace of China-North Korea relations, the radical changes taking place today are undoubtedly a part of Kim Jong-un’s efforts to separate himself from his father’s holdovers in the senior government. However, a geopolitical element is at play that harkens as far back as the early Cold War days. Kim Jong-un now seems poised to strike a new equilibrium in the DPRK’s foreign policy, something reminiscent of his father and, especially, his grandfather. Case in point, the worsening of ties with China has occurred at the same time as improvements in the North’s approach to Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the US. The current break in DPRK-PRC relations is likely to be only temporary, but the degree of the row this time around does open the door for changes in Northeast Asian political dynamics before Pyongyang rebalances.

North Korea has fed off of both China-Japan and Japan-South Korea tensions by developing a relationship with Tokyo. In a geopolitical context, few things antagonize both Chinese and South Koreans more than Japan. Territorial disputes in the Pacific, anger over historical wrongs, and a pervasive fear of resurgent
Japanese militarism cause great consternation in both Beijing and Seoul. Pyongyang understands the lightning rod that Tokyo represents, and the DPRK has used it to reassert itself in the region. Japan’s willingness to develop a trade relationship in exchange for North Korea coming clean on kidnapping incidents, which date back to the 1970’s, creates the opportunity for a host of future engagements. It should be noted that this sort of dialogue has happened before and, as always, the linchpin will be the kidnapping issue. “Japan’s government has identified 17 citizens snatched at the height of the cold war—yet the real number may be much higher (about 880, according to estimates by Japan’s National Police Agency). North Korea admits kidnapping 13 and has released five; it says the rest are dead” (“Stakes Upped” para 3). Whether or not Pyongyang releases all its information and how the Japanese public responds will determine where the Japan-North Korea relationship goes. Regardless, the message North Korea is sending to both China and South Korea by engaging Japan is worth the effort. Returning back to the Cold War era, the lull in China-North Korea relations has made resurgence in the North Korea-Russia relationship possible. The DPRK was able to leverage the PRC-USSR split consistently to receive preferential treatment for decades. During the twilight years of the Soviet Union and the early Russian Federation periods, Pyongyang-Moscow relations were extremely tense. However, as China-North Korea cooperation has begun to fray, Pyongyang has sought to reengage with Moscow. “Russia keeps supplying oil, and Mr. Kim has an invitation to make his first foreign trip as leader to Moscow in May [2015]” (“Birthday Blues” para 7). Similarly, for Moscow’s part, it is only too willing to open up economic cooperation with the North. Given that Vladivostok, its most southern port on the Pacific, is frozen six months out of the year, the Kremlin would greatly benefit from being able to move goods further south for trade purposes. Consequently, the possibility of special economic zones (SEZ) in North Korea, particularly at the warm water port of Rajin, potentially represents a great boon for the economy of the Russian Far East. It is worth noting that “the Russian national shipping business in the Far East region was reduced by almost 10 times over the past 10 years [dating to 2002]” (Pesterev, 2012: 94). It should go without saying that access to a close, warm water port could substantially improve the economic outlook for the region. While a facility at Rajin is now in its infancy, continued North Korea-Russia cooperation at the site is by no means guaranteed. Moving forward, Russia’s economic struggles and the China-North Korea relationship will both significantly contribute to the
prospects for a North Korea-Russia partnership.

Engaging South Korea is a useful tool for the North, particularly because public pressure on Seoul plays such an important role in the ROK’s politics. At the Asian Games held in October 2014, three high-ranking North Korean officials paid a visit to Incheon. “The trio came with only a day’s notice and had, it appears, no particular message. Still, they were warmly welcomed by the South’s unification minister for lunch and tea; Mr. Hwang in turn conveyed Mr. Kim’s ‘heartfelt greetings’ to President Park Geun-hye. They also met Ms. Park’s national security adviser, Kim Kwan-jin, and the prime minister, Chung Hong-won” (“The Koreas” para 3). In recent months, Pyongyang has sought to establish a new dialogue with Seoul, seemingly with the objective of restarting economic cooperation. Working directly with South Korea helps the North break away from its reliance on China. Just as important, over the decades the Kim family regime has learned that once the negotiation process begins, it is easier for the North to walk away than it is for the South Korean leadership to do so. The lack of public accountability in Pyongyang, particularly when compared to Seoul, allows Kim Jong-un to pursue an aggressive negotiation position. With that being said, economic cooperation now gives North Korea freedom to further distance itself from China at a critical time during the leadership transition. The current political climate has caused an interesting challenge for US decision makers. Future opportunities will be discussed later, but, for now, it is important to document the roller coaster of the last few years. After all, the ebbs and flows of the US-DPRK relationship have led to the current climate. In the recent past, North Korea has intermittently sought to increase tensions in the region in an effort to draw US attention. Conducting missile and nuclear tests, releasing especially incendiary propaganda, and so on have become tools used to attract the attention of the US and regional media. Invariably Washington is then forced to answer questions and address concerns over Pyongyang’s behavior. As an example, “On March 17, 2009, North Korean authorities detained two journalists working for Al Gore’s Current TV who had crossed illegally into their country. A kangaroo court sentenced both young women to twelve years in prison with hard labor. It was traditional hostage diplomacy. Bill Clinton traveled to Pyongyang to appeal for their release” (Rubin, 2014: 129). Therein lies the DPRK’s standard playbook for garnering international awareness. Recently, North Korea has pushed the limit even further on what is internationally considered to be tolerable behavior. Highlights including the likely cyber intrusion into Sony and the threat
of a nuclear test have caused alarm but have not forced Washington policy makers into engagement with Pyongyang. The current Obama Administration application of sanctions seems to have addressed regional concerns as an offset to North Korea’s aggression while also placing the onus back on Kim Jong-un. The question now is, will the DPRK seek to further ratchet up tension, or will it back down for the time being? More than likely, how the North’s other geopolitical dynamics play out, particularly the China-North Korea relationship, will drive the character and frequency of North Korea-US engagement.

V. Blueprint for Cooperation…the Carrot

In this time of tremendous change in North Korea and the region, the US has an opportunity to alter politics fundamentally in Northeast Asia in a monumental fashion. As documented previously, Kim Jong-un’s efforts to turn over the senior leadership have led to shifts in the North’s domestic and foreign policies. In 2013, “it was announced that over a dozen economic-development zones around the country would be established—the kind of zones, inviting foreign investment, which set China’s economy alight in the late 1970s. Astonishingly, the government has also praised an experiment in family-based farming, seeming to hint at a loosening of the strictures of collectivised agriculture” (“Better Tomorrow” para 2). Realigning could make the DPRK’s position stronger in the short term; however, it could just as easily make Pyongyang’s situation less tenable over the long term. The vitriol toward China in particular may present a challenge down the road if and when the North has to rely on its old friend. However, for now and the foreseeable future, a void exists that Washington policy makers can fill in order to change the strategic outlook on the peninsula. Using an intermediary at first, the Obama Administration will then need to move to direct, bilateral talks with Kim Jong-un’s regime. Offering a mutually-beneficial relationship that outlines areas of cooperation and positive reinforcements which both parties will find advantageous is a means to pressure the North into reaching a decision on engagement. As an aside, negative reinforcements—how the US can respond if cooperation fails—will be discussed later. Taken as a whole, it cannot be emphasized enough that this proposal offers a comprehensive package that creates cross-benefit advantages. At the root of the agreement lies a simultaneous effort to address a number of North Korean grievances while forcing Kim Jong-un to give on some important areas, such as SEZ’s and
notification of major exercises and force movements. An accord that lays out such a holistic blueprint for partnership is the only way to redefine North Korea-US dynamics. The initial proposal to the North must be appropriately crafted to address a number of Pyongyang’s major issues. More than likely, Kim Jong-un, his senior officials, and his negotiating team will attempt to hold out for better stakes. However, an offer that could catch the North by surprise due to its value in their eyes carries along with it the potential to make the DPRK more pliable. It is important to remember that this proposal features overarching concepts that serve as the basis for developing transparency and confidence on a bilateral basis, both today and in the future predicated on follow-on agreements. Consequently, over the long term, this arrangement will be the foundation for future cooperative opportunities. Provided below are initial proposals for both parties:

- **United States offers**
  - Negative security guarantee
  - Acknowledgement of the North’s right to retain nuclear weapons
  - Increased energy and food aid
  - North Korean visits to US civilian and military nuclear facilities
  - Notifications of significant US troop movements and strategic exercises
  - Visas to North Korean visitors to the US

- **North Korea offers**
  - Establishment of at least two SEZ’s
  - Fully detailed current whereabouts of kidnapping victims
  - Regular US and/or international observers access to nuclear sites
  - Notification of significant troop movements and strategic tests
  - Increased visas to US visitors to North Korea
  - Process to document and draw down political prisons

These concepts will serve as a starting point for negotiations in the short term and additional cooperative opportunities in the long term. The primary focus is on developing transparency and confidence building measures (TCBM) that begin to create trust and goodwill between both state parties. Across the spectrum of defense, economics, and societal disciplines, the proposal offers a holistic approach to reducing mistrust and misunderstanding. Specific details including quantity of food aid, the composition of observer teams, and the number of visas to be granted on both sides are items that can be worked out in negotiations and
periodically revisited as appropriate. Ultimately, the challenge for US policy makers will be their willingness to expend political capital on such a move. However, “if adoption of American principles of governance is made the central condition for progress in all other areas of the relationship, deadlock in inevitable. At that point, both sides are obliged to balance the claims of national security against the imperatives of their principles of governance” (Kissinger, 2014: 453). To avoid this downward spiral, conviction and courage will need to be in no short supply, but some of the risk can be alleviated by other mechanisms in place designed to promote dialogue on the part of North Korea.

VI. Blueprint for Cooperation…the Stick

During any negotiation, both parties must have clearly defined overarching goals and metrics designed to achieve their respective ends. Dialogue between North Korea and the US is no different. Historically, “Not only did diplomacy fail to fulfill American goals, but it actually sabotaged them. Pyongyang never engaged sincerely; rather, successive North Korean leaders used diplomacy to distract the West while pursuing their nuclear aims unimpeded” (Rubin, 2014: 132). Especially given the history of diplomacy between these two states, it is paramount that Washington policy makers and their negotiators in the field identify red flags that would signal Pyongyang’s failure during both negotiations and implementation. Beyond indicators, there must be a willingness to respond forcefully in the event of North Korean recalcitrance. Given the Obama Administration’s willingness to engage Pyongyang above and beyond previous administrations’ efforts, as demonstrated by the proposal just outlined, there must also be clearly articulated costs. To Kim Jong-un and his senior aides, this willingness to step away shows seriousness in the US approach to negotiations that has not existed previously. To the American public and international community, a changed negotiating stance reinforces the notion that the administration will not be plagued by the same constraints as its predecessors. Specifically, for Washington’s regional allies and partners, the negative reinforcements imbedded throughout the negotiations and implementation periods are fundamental to maintaining the assurance relationship. Initially, the overall character of the negative reinforcements will surely cause problems during negotiations as the North Koreans will attempt to characterize these measures as threats. However, it is vital for the credibility of the American team that such
tools be explicitly stated as a means to deter recalcitrance and non-compliance. During the negotiating period, the metrics used to monitor North Korean intentions and the steps the US must be willing to take in order to respond appropriately will go a long way in scoping and shaping the path negotiations take. The list below articulates the sorts of tactics that the Kim family regime has previously exercised to change the course of negotiations in their favor. Observables must be designed to track Pyongyang’s actions to monitor for several movements: 1. Shifting priorities – Negotiators seek value in the area of defense and then suddenly shift toward making demands in the economic domain, or vice versa; 2. Day-to-day changes in positions – One day North Koreans will happily accept a proposal and the next day it will not be good enough; and 3. Bombastic rhetoric to the media and elsewhere – DPRK officials will make declarations to the press to portray the dialogue in a certain light.

The US delegation must be able to measure and assess the North Korean negotiators’ actions and respond to the employment of provocations in a clearly recognizable manner. Proportionality must also be incorporated in determining the US response, but acting disproportionately at a time and place of Washington’s choosing can also be utilized to generate leverage depending upon the direction dialogue takes. Recognizing when North Korean deception and stalling tactics, such as the three examples previously provided, occur and being able to respond to them decisively will catch the North Koreans by surprise, thereby negating the effectiveness of Pyongyang’s strategy. The list of response options provided below, by no means an all-encompassing list, has been prioritized in ascending order with the last being the most severe:

1. US negotiators must be willing to walk out of talks
2. US aid, and potentially allied aid, must be cut in full from North Korea
3. US must support Japanese and South Korean nuclear weapon acquisition.

These measures are intended to be severe. “We must make clear to North Korea that there will be real-world consequences for its deeds, not just angry words” (Schoen and Kaylan, 2014: 288). There must be a clear understanding in Pyongyang that if North Korea is not willing to negotiate with the US, given the package offered, then there is a price to be paid. Even after employing such measures, the US delegation should always leave the door open to resume dialogue. However, Washington officials must also clearly demonstrate that

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recalcitrance will not be tolerated. Doing so will place greater pressure on the North and builds an environment more conducive to forthright and constructive dialogue. This will be an extremely difficult chore, but if the Obama Administration effectively demonstrates its resolve, it is more likely that diplomacy will be successful. Once negotiations have concluded, compliance will remain a pressing issue. The challenge for the US in particular is not to let concerns over North Korean trustworthiness dominate the experience. Washington should continually monitor the situation, but excessive verification risks pushing Pyongyang into a corner. For this reason, there are a number of key metrics designed to be minimally intrusive that should serve as warning signs.

The list provided below has been selected, in no particular order, based upon the degree of irreversibility North Korean actions might have:

- Closing of one or more SEZ’s
- Details on previously undisclosed kidnapping victims come to light
- Observers are denied access to nuclear facilities
- Military notifications are no longer being provided (this would have to occur multiple times over a lengthy period)
- The number of approved visas radically decreases
- The volume of political prisoners increases (monitored via overhead imagery).

Utilizing the observables given above will enable the US to track North Korean compliance without it becoming an overly cumbersome process. If Kim Jong-un oversteps on these metrics, the Obama Administration will need to evaluate the degree of noncompliance and then select potential response options accordingly. The list of response options provided below has been prioritized in ascending order with the last being the most severe:

1. Cease notifications on troop movements and exercises
2. Place a strategic pause on site visits to US nuclear facilities
3. Cut in full US aid, and potentially allied aid, from North Korea

These measures will effectively demonstrate Washington’s resolve to Pyongyang and other interested parties. Most importantly, in the worst case scenario, assurance mechanisms are in place to work with Seoul and Tokyo in
demonstrating US resolve. Regardless, previous agreements such as the 1994
Agreed Framework have failed because of a lack of enforcement mechanisms.
While it is difficult to compel North Korea into action, the recommended
measures previously provided offer a more severe set of consequences in the
event Kim Jong-un chooses to break his word. “We must remember that the North
Korean regime is dangerous in part because it is weak – economically especially”
(Schoen and Kaylan, 2014: 288), but that it can be influenced if US political
resolve is sufficient. While cooperation is preferable, these actions provide
Washington with a series of options throughout the course of this process that will
clearly and decisively message Pyongyang.

VII. Planning Negotiations

At this juncture, it is necessary to lay out a few of the basic procedural and
administrative details of the talks. Identifying questions such as how, where,
when, and so on will help inform later elements of this discussion. Given the
inherent openness of US culture, diplomats from Washington will have a unique
problem set to deal with. Keeping the dialogue from leaking will really be
incumbent on both delegations. “Transparency is an essential objective, but
historic opportunities for building a more peaceful international order have
imperatives as well” (Kissinger, 2012 236). Framing the negotiations in the
proper light will make the prospects for success all the more likely. The Obama
Administration will have to endow itself with tremendous professional acumen to
maintain the covert nature of the negotiations. A third party intermediary,
someone from outside the region, is important at the start to pass messages while
also not to draw the attention of other Northeast Asian actors. For instance, when
seeking to reengage with China during the Cold War, “the White House chose a
nonaligned friend of China (Pakistan), [and] a member of the Warsaw Pact known
for its quest for independence from Moscow (Romania)” (Kissinger On China
225). In a similar vein, finding a third party without strong relationships with any
of the states in Northeast Asia will be important. Meeting location(s), frequency,
and overall quantity should be determined based on the likelihood that the
negotiations will be noticed by other parties. Ideally, a remote location in either
North Korea or the US or even an isolated place in a third country would be best
to avoid the intrusive nature of twenty-first century media. Part of the intent with
how the agreement has been structured is to offer Pyongyang an excellent
package immediately, albeit with a strong negative element, in the hope that the proposal will be easily accepted. In this light, the negotiating process could take place in one series of meetings over a period of weeks. This would reduce some of the risks associated with frequent travel. It should go without saying that, at least on the US side, the very knowledge of negotiations must be kept to a very small group of officials – perhaps limited to the National Security Council (NSC) and a few members of the NSC staff. The element of surprise will be key in preventing political opponents in the US, North Korea, and around the world from hijacking the talks.

Looking at the failures of the Six Party Talks reinforces the necessity of having a clear and concise plan for this series of negotiations. In the run up to the last round of talks in 2008, “two days before the start of the session North Korea issued a statement saying that it would not recognize Japan as a participant in protest against Tokyo's refusal to provide energy aid. In reaction to Lee Myung-bak's tougher stance, North Korea expelled half of the South Koreans from the Kaesong industrial park and tightly restricted access to the site” (“Nuclear Talks” para 3). Diversionary tactics by North Korea and complications from other participants helped turn the Six Party Talks into a quagmire. It further engendered hostilities between the participants and created unnecessary stumbling blocks. The concept was and continues to be, sound, but in practice it lacks accountability mechanisms. Instead of using the Six Party Talks as a blueprint, Sino-US reengagement during the Nixon Administration offers a clear and concise model by which to conduct negotiations. Through the normal bureaucratic channels, the State Department was given the opportunity to reengage with China. When talks between the two parties in Warsaw broke down, the administration chose to bypass the traditional offices of responsibility. The National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, was given direct authority to negotiate. He used the services of a third state, Pakistan, to pass messages to Mao and the CCP senior leadership. When the time came to meet with senior Chinese officials, Kissinger again used Pakistan, this time as a means to evade the watchful gaze of the press and other US government officials. He met with Zhou Enlai to set basic parameters for the relationship, but, more importantly, to organize the groundwork necessary for President Nixon’s official visit. In the end the final outcome of the talks, the Shanghai Communique, was an affirmation of the ground-breaking nature of the engagement. “The unorthodox format [of the Communique] solved both sides’ problems. Each could reaffirm its fundamental
convictions, which would reassure domestic audiences and uneasy allies. The contrast would highlight the agreements being reached, and the positive conclusions would be far more credible” (Kissinger, 2012: 269). The clandestine nature and storied success of this enterprise makes it invaluable for policy makers today as it presents a blueprint for how to negotiate and what the final outcome might look like. In trying to reengage with the Kim family regime, it is vital that matters be handled in the most discreet manner possible. This not only removes the negatives associated with outside influences, but it also offers plausible deniability if North Korea leaks news of the talks. In the end, the US-PRC engagement plan is the best available example of how dialogue of this nature should be conducted.

VIII. Why Would North Korea Accept?

The DPRK’s decision making process has often been characterized as an enigma. American and European analysts, pundits, government officials, academics, and so on have made careers from crying over how unpredictable the North Korean leadership is. In many respects, these individuals are correct. Kim Il-sung emphasized self-reliance as both a domestic and foreign policy tool:

During the Cold War, nothing epitomized the North Korean’s view that they were the true defenders of Korean ethnic identity and nationalism more than Kim Il-sung’s ideology of juche. In the North Korean context [juche] meant that as a small country surrounded by ravenous large powers, it had to practice juche, or ‘self-reliance’ and independence, in its internal and external policies. (Cha, 2012: 37)

In a sense juche promoted closed-door decision making as a diplomatic tool. And yet it evolved into much more than that “the ideology became a source of strength and control for the regime because it borrowed Korean notions of Confucianism” (Ibid: 40). This reduced the need-to-know perception that so often is endemic in American and European cultures, thereby adding to the mystery of North Korean decision making. Early in Kim Il-sung’s tenure, this combination of self-reliance and closed-door policy-crafting approach was probably a function of cultural background as well as the development of the Korean communist party as a secluded, underground movement. This is in sharp contrast to Western,
particularly American, views on openness and transparency – a free press and the functional utility of information in reducing tensions. However, what was once simply a result of developmental differences has become something more akin to a negotiating tool.

The Kim family has leveraged eccentricity and mystery in its decision making behavior to bewilder and confuse foreign counterparts. Within the context of day-to-day diplomatic activities, the changing positions – shifting ground – that characterize the DPRK officials have a way of frustrating foreign negotiators and policy makers. Simultaneously, Pyongyang’s brazen actions, like conducting military tests in the lead up to or during negotiations, generate additional pressure on the foreign diplomats to get a deal done. “Although it [North Korea] brings little except its military muscle to the table, it succeeds in focusing the world’s attention on its demands, and it consistently wins substantial concessions from Japan and the other Western allies” (Hayes, 2013: 69). Within the confines of a negotiating window, these various tools work to create an environment where foreign parties allow themselves to be coerced into increasing the value of their proposals in a sort of one-sided bidding war. The pattern of deliberately raising tensions and then frustrating counterparts at the negotiating table has become the modus operandi of North Korean officials for years.

So, what makes this time any different? Well, in a word – China. In analyzing Kim Jong-un’s actions, it is becoming increasingly clear that he wants to separate himself from Beijing. His grandfather, Kim Il-sung, was able to assert his autonomy intermittently during his reign. It should be noted, though, that in some ways such moments were actually easier back then because of Cold War animosities within the communist orbit. However, at the tail end of Kim Il-sung’s tenure, but particularly during Kim Jong-il’s reign, Russia’s failings made reliance on China a paramount concern. “China’s aid, and North Korea’s reliance on it, has increased dramatically since 2002” (Cha, 2012: 340). Periodically Kim Jong-il would seek to lash out against his CCP counterparts, yet at some point in time North Korea would always have to rebuild its relationship with China. Beijing allowed this process to take place because it would gain from each row. However, at some juncture a tipping point will be reached; a moment when China’s demands in exchange for a return to normalcy are simply too high for North Korea. The execution of Mr. Taek, for example, has led to a monumental souring in DPRK-PRC relations and may very well prove to be that inflection point. The chasm that has been created between Beijing and Pyongyang...
stemming from this event has provided a great opportunity for Washington. The fallout surrounding this episode has presented a once in a lifetime moment for DPRK-US relations. North Korean efforts to reach out to both Japan and Russia are clearly attempts to prod and shun China. Yet, the more profound step for Pyongyang would be to improve relations with Washington. A similar story unfolded at the end of the Cold War when Russia sought to develop a relationship with South Korea.

Kim Il-sung also made efforts to achieve a breakthrough in ties with the United States. On May 24, 1994, the day after [Anatoly] Dobrynin’s secret meeting with [South Korean President] Roh in Seoul, Kim delivered an important policy speech to a formal meeting of the North’s legislature. Departing from his unyielding stand against the acceptance of US military forces on the peninsula, Kim declared, ‘If the United States cannot withdraw all her troops from South Korea at once, she will be able to do so by stages.’ In case Washington was not paying attention, Pyongyang used the tenth meeting of American and North Korean political counselors in Beijing on May 30 to pass along the text of Kim’s speech. (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014: 174)

A similar inflection point in North Korean foreign policy might be in the offing today. Neither Japan nor Russia can offer the DPRK the degree of value from cooperation that the US can. Likewise, even engaging South Korea presents limited value given the current political climate around Park Geun-hye. Her approval ratings have plummeted to such an extent that the political process in Seoul has reached a state of near-paralysis. Direct, bilateral dialogue with the US would grant North Korea a level of policy autonomy it has not enjoyed, quite possibly, in its history. This step would afford Kim Jong-un the opportunity to return to the policy approach of his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, during the Cold War – multiple powers vying for the North’s favor. Broadly speaking, this is the most impactful message that can emerge from a Pyongyang-Washington breakthrough. Specifically though, the DPRK would greatly benefit from a myriad of the aspects of this proposal – most importantly the US legitimizing Pyongyang’s nuclear program. Countries such as China, India, and Pakistan have all met, at the very least, public condemnation from the US when news of their nuclear program became public. Washington is always reluctant to accept new members to the nuclear club. However, after a new state is added, there is an eventual return to the status quo. An example of this process and perhaps a template for work on North Korea is the US-India civilian nuclear energy
agreement. The ideal outcome, in the North’s view, is a situation similar to the arrangement that the United States negotiated with India. That is, an agreement in which North Korea is willing to come back under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and monitoring, but it is also assured of a civilian nuclear energy element. Most important, they would want to control a portion of their nuclear programs outside of international inspection, which, in their eyes, could then serve as their nuclear deterrent. (Cha, 2012: 302).

In this vein, accepting Pyongyang’s right to possess nuclear weapons is a major public relations victory for the North but has a limited impact abroad. The negative pressure the program has garnered the Kim’s throughout the years would suddenly be greatly relieved by this move. Just as significant, it gives Kim Jong-un a seat at the table of nuclear states and elevates his prestige – no small victory for a man in his thirties. Considering that legitimacy for its hallmark weapons program has been Pyongyang’s seminal policy objective for decades, this offer would radically transform and empower Kim Jong-un’s standing, both at home and abroad. Arguably just as important is the negative security guarantee Washington would include in the deal. Twenty-first century international relations are largely based upon international norms of behavior and the integrity of the system. Offering the North, essentially, a promise that the US would not invade the country – barring Pyongyang going on the offensive first – changes the whole approach for North Korea. At this point, it should be noted that this idea was presented to Pyongyang as part of the Six Party Talks. Interestingly, during those negotiations, when this proposal was floated, the Russians requested a pause in the multilateral meetings for a DPRK-Russia bilateral where “the Russians explained, that the Soviet Union tried unsuccessfully to get from the United States [a negative security guarantee] throughout the Cold War. Therefore, it was their [the Russian negotiators’] estimation that the United States was quite serious about reaching a denuclearization deal” (Ibid: 369). Returning to the present, in conjunction with the nuclear aspect of the proposal, the pressure to invest in conventional weapon systems and maintain the current force structure will have suddenly diminished for Kim Jong-un. Even if only a fraction of his defense spending can be diverted to other parts of the state system, he can begin to change the face and structure of North Korea. In a country as destitute as the DPRK, every little bit helps. Offering Kim Jong-un’s regime additional TCBM’s in the form of US nuclear site visits and various notifications are additional mechanisms to reduce tensions in Northeast Asia. Being able to see US nuclear facilities

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allows the North opportunities to understand better various options for the direction its nuclear program could take. There are differences in personnel quality, procedures, and so on among the US, Russia, and China – and these visits would give North Korean experts the chance to observe how Americans approach the nuclear profession. “Presence on the spot provides access, knowledge, and credibility that are simply not available to those working in bilateral embassies or offices in capitals” (Hill, 2013: 288). Certainly, it is a learning experience that all could benefit from. Specific details in terms of the background(s) and quantity of observers can be negotiated at a later date, but the program in its entirety will help minimize suspicions between the two states. Likewise, notifying Pyongyang of major US military activities and movements reduces the risk of misunderstanding. It further increases the value and credibility of accepting both the nuclear program and the negative security guarantee by reducing the likelihood of a surprise attack. Taken collectively, all of these mechanisms would help improve strategic stability and give Kim Jong-un a feasible alternative to the current stalemate.

The US proposal also incorporates other elements, aid and access to US institutions, offering the North a chance to develop both human and physical capital. From a North Korean perspective, food aid is a tool to improve the physical well-being of the people. Granted, aid goes to the military first, but there is a trickle-down effect. Also, with the changes in the strategic environment, as previously discussed, the possibility arises that the historical tendencies of North Korean officials might change. Likewise, energy aid is a valuable asset in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of North Korean industry and raising the value of the state’s physical capital. This is something Pyongyang had been very keen on before. In previous negotiations, “the North Koreans asked to be compensated for the energy they would be giving up (assuming the nuclear program was peaceful) by shutting down their working reactor and stopping work on the two larger ones… the North Koreans asked for heavy oil” (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014: 275). So clearly an interest exists in acquiring energy support. In keeping with the human capital aspect of the US proposal, allowing more Koreans to travel to the US – for a variety of reasons – has significant benefits for Pyongyang. It goes without saying that the Kim Jong-un regime would carefully select people it would allow to travel to the US. However, particularly when it comes to receiving a college education, even if only a handful of students are able to come, that is still an opportunity to facilitate a cadre of talented individuals that...
did not exist in the North previously. As Kim Jong-un looks to overhaul the leadership, bringing in people with a slightly different perspective may work to his advantage. Investing in the North’s human and physical capital is an area where Pyongyang can make minor course corrections intended to improve standards of living without losing his state’s identity. Ultimately, the offer on the table gives North Korea a great deal of what it has always wanted without mortgaging the government’s future. This is to say, the economic and social elements, coupled with the TCBM’s that the US is asking the North to work on are things that do not change the basic elements of the state. Experiments with economic zones have already taken place in the DPRK but have failed to really take off largely because of a lack of commitment from various parties – not because of a perceived threat to the regime. The issue of accounting for kidnapping victims has been a festering wound for over a decade and has repeatedly prevented North Korea-Japan cooperation: “some have been allowed to return to Japan with their families, others are unaccounted for and the North continues to be less than forthright about their cases,” (Morton and Olenik, 2005: 237) while more still have not been allowed to return permanently. It would be better to just release all the information at once and release the victims in order to move on, rather than allow it to continue to dominate the bilateral dialogue. Another difficult subject for the DPRK is the political prisons that have swelled in the last two and a half decades because of the economic collapse. If the economy improves, and that is a major factor in this deal, then the role of political prisons might very well be minimized, if not diminished. This issue will not go away over night, but the nature of these facilities might very well change. The other elements that the North is expected to bring to the table are important but are TCBM’s that can, largely, be contained. They are not issues that will expose the broader population to the outside world and as such are relatively safe for the regime. The basic justification for North Korea remains that cross-benefit value exists across many of the proposed elements of the agreement, thereby creating a largely positive agreement for Pyongyang. Each of the twelve points may not represent an advantage for the North, but enough elements pose benefits that the Kim family regime is liable to find the broader accord palatable. From Kim Jong-un’s perspective, this deal gives him strategic flexibility and significant prestige without substantially altering his regime’s status.
In a strategic sense, for the US this deal is clearly about changing the geopolitical dynamics in Northeast Asia in Washington’s favor. For sixty years, whenever Pyongyang has decided to flail, the region has been trapped in a temporary paralysis. Even after the end of the Cold War, Northeast Asia is one of the few places where mid-twentieth century dynamics, including stratification, persist. “The dangers stem from the overall desperate nature of the regime, given their isolation, opaque dictatorship, and tendency to communicate with the world through violence rather than through diplomacy” (Cha, 2012: 234). What makes this agreement important and palatable for US officials are not the specific details: They are relatively minor. Rather, if TCBM’s can be instituted that decrease tensions in the region then Washington will have reached a notable success in its history of involvement in Northeast Asia. Broadening US policy options around the world, as a result of improved stability on the Korean Peninsula, is in the best interests of the US Administration and should be its seminal goal. Today, decision makers in Washington have to deal with a multitude of complicated foreign policy issues. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provides a concise sampling of some of these concerns:

The technology-enabled 21st century operational environment offers new tools for state and non-state adversaries such as terrorists to pursue asymmetric approaches, exploiting where we are weakest. In the coming years, countries such as China will continue seeking to counter U.S. strengths using anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) approaches and by employing other new cyber and space control technologies. Additionally, these and other states continue to develop sophisticated integrated air defenses that can restrict access and freedom of maneuver in waters and airspace beyond territorial limits. Growing numbers of accurate conventional ballistic and cruise missile threats represent an additional, cost-imposing challenge to U.S. and partner naval forces and land installations. (QDR 6-7)

Crisis in the East China Sea, South China Sea, Afghanistan, and the Ukraine, just to name a few, can dominate a day’s schedule. Furthermore, these are some of the hot spots of the moment – they do not reflect systemic problems, including the Korean Peninsula, but also Israel, Palestine, South Asia, and the Persian Gulf. On
a daily basis, all of these potential areas of conflict place great strains on planning and policy making. Add in other issues, both domestic and foreign, that require the administration’s time, and suddenly the ability to expend sufficient time on the Korean Peninsula looks increasingly less likely. Take into account the current fiscal realities in Washington and resource constraints can rapidly eviscerate policy options. In this environment, breaking the deadlock in Northeast Asia changes dynamics for Washington decision makers at a particularly important period given the US rebalance regarding the Asia-Pacific region. Specifically, a change in regional dynamics would allow US policy makers to corral the regional focus more directly on territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. Currently China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States are locked in a never-ending cycle of relationship ebbs and flows. For instance, to send a message to China over the East China Sea matter, the Japanese have reached out to North Korea. Likewise, to demonstrate that both states have territorial disputes with Japan, and as a show of unity, Seoul and Beijing have sought to strengthen ties: “Nothing brings China and South Korea together quite like Japanese imperial history. Its most recent manifestation is China’s decision to erect a statue in the north-eastern city of Harbin to honour the Korean assassin of a Japanese colonial leader. South Korea’s president, Park Geun-hye, suggested the idea to President Xi Jinping during a visit to China in June” (“Regional History” para 1). A degree of this maneuvering will persist no matter the standing of North Korea; however, reducing the tensions in the region – implicitly improving relations amongst the Northeast Asian states – will mitigate some of the posturing that has taken place. From a Washington policy maker’s vantage point, this will allow the US to place a greater focus on territorial issues that are still in their infancy rather than dwell obsessively on the Korean Peninsula.

With respect to specific details in the proposal, this accord is designed to promote cross and mutual-benefit. Some elements are mutually beneficial in so far as they pose advantages for both states, the SEZs being a prime example. However, cross-benefit also exists where one aspect of the accord may benefit the US and another will benefit North Korea. This comprehensive approach to creating value establishes an environment wherein both North Korea and the US will find advantages to cooperation. Once the terms of the deal are announced, the first matter that will assuredly draw attention is the acceptance of Pyongyang’s right to a nuclear weapon program. The fact of the matter remains that if a state is determined to break with international norms of behavior,
compelling that state to change policy direction is profoundly difficult. Short of military confrontation, options to bring a state back into the fold are limited. With that being said, it is important to note that even when the bitterest of enemies, India and Pakistan, fought during the Kargil War, neither of them used the nuclear weapons which both possessed. In actuality, nuclear weapons produce a high degree of restraint between rivals who possess them…interdependence raises the cost of a breakdown in any relationship and obliges states to cooperate in order to prevent this [a nuclear exchange] from happening. The potential cost of going to war is so great in a nuclear weapons environment that states are compelled to cooperate in order to avoid it. (Basrur, 2013: 180)

Additionally, the threat of international condemnation and definitive response(s) are largely believed to have deterred a launch during the India-Pakistan conflict. Likewise, it has always been understood by all key stakeholders that a second Korean War might very well lead to a nuclear exchange. For instance, traditionally North Korea’s conventional superiority meant that the US and South Korea might well utilize nuclear capabilities as a deterrent. Indeed, part of the explanation for why conflict has not reignited on the Peninsula has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. Whether Pyongyang possesses such capabilities really only further complicates matters for strategic planners but does not change many of the basic challenges. Namely, the threat posed by the North’s conventional forces and their proximity to regional population centers is an additional planning factor that must be considered, but nothing more. In any event, the North Korean nuclear program, while an operational obstacle, is not going away any time soon. “Its small Yongbyon reactor, which appears to have been restarted after a long pause, can make about one bomb’s worth of plutonium a year. From its past operations North Korea may also have stockpiled enough plutonium for anything from six to 18 weapons, according to a 2012 study by the Institute for Science and International Security” (“Bad or Mad” para 11). Ceteris paribus, it would be better to gain the benefits of accepting the programs’ legitimacy rather than continuing to hold out in the vain hope that Kim Jong-un will abandon its nuclear capabilities. The use of TCBM’s will help diminish the American leadership’s concerns over North Korean military capabilities. As Cha noted in 2012, “The lack of information about North Korea is deadly serious. With the sudden death of its dictator [Kim Jong-il], the state is in the process of handing power over to an inexperienced young man of whom we did not even have a picture until late 2010” (Cha,2012: 16-7). To begin,
improving modes of dialogue and allowing observers at nuclear facilities are key to reducing misperceptions and misunderstandings in the region. “In November 2010 the North Koreans invited Siegfried Hecker, a Stanford professor who once ran America’s Los Alamos National Laboratory, to Yongbyon, the site of its plutonium nuclear reactor. They showed him a facility for enriching uranium which they said would serve a civilian purpose. Dr Hecker’s first look through the windows was ‘stunning’” (“Bad or Mad” para 4). The high quality of the facility far exceeded expectations, but more importantly the event showed that the North found utility in permitting some observations. Just as important, allowing observers to the DPRK’s nuclear facilities not only helps reduce concerns over quality control but also offers a better assessment of the production rate. The composition of the observer teams can be addressed in both bilaterally and internally, but the simple action of conducting such missions presents wide ranging political and technical value. In addition, providing notifications for major troop movements and strategic exercises helps US planners in developing contingency plans and expedites the process for US diplomats and military officials in working with their counterparts across the region. Japanese and South Korean officials will have an easier task when it comes to managing public perception of their overall level of preparedness if the North is willing to improve its warning/notification mechanisms. These are all things that can help US policy makers in their planning and diplomatic relations both with North Korea and with other states in the region.

When dealing with isolated states, the US has often sought to develop connections that help bring the nation in question into the global community. This process occurred throughout the Cold War and, as a tactic, American officials have been determined to leverage it with increasing regularity since the fall of the Soviet Union. The use of SEZ’s in North Korea, even on a limited basis, begins the process of bringing certain elements of the Korean infrastructure into the globalized market. In point of fact, Pyongyang “has announced a further 19 SEZs since 2013, small hubs of between two and four square kilometres for everything from tourism (Chinese occasionally holiday in the North) and software development, to fertiliser- and rice-production,” (“Spring Release” para 9) which suggests a greater acceptance toward opening up the country. While Washington will have to allow Kim Jong-un a wide berth to manage the growth of these areas, even the slightest progress is better in comparison to the closed-door, self-reliant economic policy that has prevailed over the DPRK’s history. Given the closed
nature of North Korean society, even the smallest opening could help curtail problems which are the result of years of Northern isolation: “a visiting NGO hoping to improve yields on a collective farm had to dust off agricultural techniques that had not been used in the south for decades. To help its electrical equipment cope with the north’s wild swings in current, it had to order a voltage stabiliser not seen in the south since the 1980s” (“Parallel Worlds” para 10). In a similar vein, allowing increased tourism to and from North Korea can help tear down some of the cultural barriers that have developed. Again, this process will be slow in development, but once it starts, it can prove beneficial over the long term. The notion of entering the international system is extremely sensitive for North Korea; however, recent actions on the part of Kim Jong-un, including engaging with regional neighbors and exploring the use of SEZs suggests a new willingness to function in the international community. What makes this accord particularly valuable is that it offers the North an opportunity to engage abroad in ways it can control, which is a truly valuable negotiating chip for the US.

Just as America often seeks to bring closed societies into the global community, it also strives to represent the interests of the disenfranchised around the world. The success of this noble pursuit may be debated, but time and again Americans have gone to great lengths to help raise living standards for those beyond their borders. Addressing the kidnappings issue, providing food aid, and exerting influence on the matter of political prisons contribute to making this a holistic agreement that serves US interests as much as it does North Korea’s. The US already has an established history of helping the DPRK people. In the case of North Korea’s, “On May 3, 1994, a family who had escaped from the North held a news conference to describe a famine so severe that children could no longer hold their heads up and elderly people died in the fields. As 5 or 10 percent of the country’s population – perhaps more than a million – perished” (Rubin 109), Washington provided food aid to its bitter enemy. Given Pyongyang’s long-held views on human rights, any progress here will require great compromise elsewhere. However, to improve the lives of North Koreans that have suffered for far too long, what this proposal requires of the Obama Administration is worth it. Not only in human value, but in political utility, bringing closure on the kidnapping matter is also a benefit for North Korea-Japan relations that will enable their bilateral partnership to move forward. Reenergizing the food aid program will greatly boost the livelihoods of many North Koreans given the likely trickle-down effect that will take place. However, the most important and
most difficult to issue that must be addressed are the political prisons – a tragedy that simply cannot be ignored any longer. “The gulag's captives are not told of their crimes, though torture usually produces a ‘confession’—which might admit to defacing an image of the ‘Great Leader’ or listening to a foreign broadcast. There is no defence, trial, judge or sentence, though most inmates remain in the camps for life, unless they escape” (“North Korea’s Gulag” para 2). The desire to address these issues is nothing new for many Americans. This agreement simply elevates philanthropic pursuits and reprioritizes Washington’s focus on helping raise standards of living for many in the North. These steps are vitally important to bringing along US domestic support for the accord.

X. Tackling the Role of Other States

Previous attempts to improve US-North Korea relations have too often been weighed down by the involvement of other states in the region. China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea all have equities that should be acknowledged. Yet, for a myriad of reasons, their direct participation in previous talks and the roles they were expected to play in the proposals that followed have contributed to the failure of many past agreements. In previous talks, the US “was inevitably curtailed by allied complaints, or neutralized by Chinese backdoor support to Pyongyang” (Cha, 2012: 257). With so many different public constituencies at play, this difficulty should really come as no surprise. To bypass the quagmire that can become multilateral negotiations, the Obama Administration will have to make a few difficult decisions. If, when, and to what degree Beijing, Moscow, Seoul, and Tokyo are informed of the talks should really be left to the President and his inner circle.

As has previously been mentioned, the clandestine element of these negotiations will be critical in ensuring their success; however, to avoid unnecessary problems later, it will be important for Washington to engage in some degree of international messaging. From the outset, though, it would be disingenuous to suggest that this sort of approach to negotiating is not practiced by others: “In January 2001…DPRK first vice foreign minister Kang Sok Ju had flown to Singapore for a secret meeting with Hidenao Nakagawa, a former top aide to then Japanese prime minister Yoshiro Mori” (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014: 359). More than likely, the administrations in both Japan and South Korea should be made aware that US-DPRK talks will take place just days before the event.
itself. Ideally the President or Secretary of State should provide this information in person to avoid exponentially increasing the circle with knowledge of the negotiations. It must be stressed to both parties that this attempt at engagement is backed up by increased assurance mechanisms for both states. Not only is there a possibility that both may receive US support in developing their own nuclear weapon programs, but other cooperative defense agreements can be discussed as their need and value materialize. In many respects the bottom line for both Seoul and Tokyo is that Pyongyang-Washington engagement not only does have minimal impact for Japan and South Korea, but might lead to increased cooperation for both with respect to the US. When and how to notify China and Russia should be done by North Korea before talks or made as a joint decision during negotiations. Given current geopolitical dynamics, it would be pragmatic to notify Beijing before Moscow, but simultaneous notifications certainly have merit. Regardless, doing so after negotiations have begun gives these two states an incredibly short window with which to derail engagement. Taken as a collective, the notification process will be a delicate yet vital matter moving forward once the US and North Korea have come to an accord. Beyond just the act of notifying the various states, it is appropriate to recognize the likely responses from each of the four nations previously mentioned. China will probably be the most concerned about improved US-North Korea relations; however, that may not be readily apparent at first. The complexities of Chinese policy on North Korea was perhaps best summarized by David Lampton: China sees its main challenges with respect to the DPRK as maintaining complex balances and stability between North and South Korea, not promoting the welfare of Pyongyang’s subjects (despite famines and human rights abuses); maintaining balance among the major powers entrenched on or near the peninsula (Japan, Russia, China, and the United States); and maintaining balance and stability along its own border with North Korea, where its northeastern provinces have important economic and border security interests. (Lampton, 2014: 130)

The Xi Jinping Administration will more than likely avoid making too many public statements on the matter because it is not likely to view improved US-North Korea ties as an improvement from its perspective. Greater North Korean autonomy and a more stable Northeast Asia will lead to a greater focus placed on events elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region. Given ongoing tensions in both the East and South China Seas, Beijing may regard increased focus on its coastal territorial disputes as a negative. From a different perspective, on the
positive side, improved US-North Korea relations actually make China’s problems with North Korean immigration and separatist sentiment among its ethnic Korean population less significant. A more stable DPRK will help reduce the inflow of refugees into Liaoning and Jilin provinces in northeast China, thereby improving civil governance in the area. In general, these developments will help curtail some of the separatist concerns CCP officials have over the ethnic Korean minority. So, while at first US-North Korea cooperation may seem to work in China’s detriment, over the long run it will actually serve work in Beijing’s favor. Japanese government and public opinion on the proposal will be largely positive, except for concerns over North Korea’s nuclear program. “Ever since North Korea in 1998 fired a missile across it [Japan], landing in the Pacific Ocean, [distance] is no longer a sanctuary, but [now Japan is] an integral part of mainland Asia military space” (Kaplan Revenge of Geography 116) making the one-time luxury of island isolation no more. If current dynamics on the Korean Peninsula persist, and without major policy shifts change is unlikely, the DPRK will probably continue to invest in and strengthen its nuclear arsenal. As Pyongyang’s delivery systems continue to improve in both quantity and quality, in parallel with its weapons of mass destruction program, the risk to Tokyo only increases. To respond to the North Korean threat Japan and the US have already made great strides in improving their combined missile defense systems. Technical exchanges outlaid in some of the TCBMs in this agreement and potential follow-on opportunities for engagement will further support the underpinnings of current and future collaborative defense programs between Japan and the US. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, if North Korea walks away from this agreement, Japan will receive US support in pursuing a nuclear weapon program of its own in addition to further augmenting its conventional forces. After all, “North Korea’s missile tests over Japan [in recent decades], together with her ongoing provocative use of submarines to probe the defenses of Japan and South Korea, must make Japan consider a more proactive defense strategy even if Beijing stands opposed to any signs of Japanese rearmament” (Hayes, 2013: 57). Whether it choose that path, the Abe Administration will at least have the support of Washington. The assurance mechanisms included in this proposal intended to address Japan’s legitimate concerns will help change the defense landscape in Tokyo’s advantage over the long term.

From a positive viewpoint, improving North Korean stability is better for Japan in every respect – be it defense, economics, or social. The accord bolsters
regional stability and may even open up markets for Japanese firms. Problematic for Tokyo, “anti-Japanese sentiment in China is simmering, fuelled by disputes over islands in the East China Sea. Mr. Abe, a conservative nationalist, has not managed to defuse this. Ventures in China involving Japanese FDI often fail” (“Taiwan” para 7). In light of this conundrum, access to low cost labor in North Korea, even on a limited basis, represents an offset for Japanese firms that have suffered from China-Japan tensions of late. More important though, Kim Jong-un’s willingness to provide a complete account of kidnapping victims’ whereabouts will help bring closure to a horrific chapter in Japan’s history. From a geopolitical standpoint the agreement, as previously mentioned, helps refocus regional states on territorial disputes. In particular, Japan can leverage progress on North Korea to refocus its partners’ attention on the Diaoyudao Island issue. The nuclear matter, in light of all the aforementioned benefits, may not appear as dire as once thought. Given Washington’s demonstrated willingness to support Tokyo on matters of self-defense already, there should be little cause for alarm. Taken as a whole, this deal improves strategic stability, which enables greater attention on the East China Sea. Clearly the proposed US-North Korea agreement is a great benefit for Japan.

Russia is something of an outlier in this examination, if only because its relationship with North Korea has been very frenetic in recent years. Presumably, Russia’s biggest concern is the perception that improved US-North Korea relations only further contain Russia. Given Moscow’s weakening economic position, trumping this issue may not be so difficult. “Russia’s ultimate dream is to run gas pipelines through northern Korea to the energy-hungry economies in the ROK, Japan, and other parts of East Asia, and to reconnect the Trans-Siberian Railway to enable cargo transport from Europe to Asia” (Cha, 2012: 359). Therefore, incentive already exists for a stable Northeast Asia. Three specific factors could very easily work to further alleviate Russian suspicions. First, Russia’s growing cooperation with Japan and South Korea already serves as a means to circumvent the mercurial North Korea. Second, Washington can go a long way in alleviating Russian fears by approaching them on the issue of missile defense in the Asia-Pacific. The opportunity to reduce concerns over the North Korean nuclear program could potentially lead to a change in the missile defense posture of the US and its allies and partners in the region. While particular systems will still need to remain in place, there can at least be a dialogue in shifting or clarifying the focus. This is probably a small concession, and it is a
long way off, but just broaching the subject could have utility for the US and Russia. Third, Vladivostok freezes for nearly six months out of the year, so a warmer water port in North Korea that Russia would have access to could be a huge boon for the economy in the Russian Far East. These three offsets can help reduce the Kremlin’s concerns over Pyongyang-Washington engagement. It is important to remember that “when the foreign minister of the ROK was in Beijing, he [NPC head Wu Bangguo] said he had three nightmares: (1) a nuclear DPRK; (2) war; and (3) DPRK collapse” (Lampton, 2014: 130). In this light, clearly South Korea has the most to gain from North Korea-US engagement. There will certainly be concerns about US unilateralism and what an agreement might mean for the DPRK’s long term prospects. However, for a variety of reasons, this proposal works in the South’s favor. From an economic standpoint, opening markets in the North at least carries with it the possibility of slowly bringing the DPRK economy to a subsistence level. A functioning economy in North Korea is vital if unification is ever to occur; it will make the task for policy-makers in Seoul much easier. Even the smallest economic successes in the North will lead to a direct loosening of the economic burden on Seoul. Furthermore, from a social standpoint, any chance to bring Pyongyang into the international system will ease the human costs of unification. In the short term, the greatest benefit to South Korea lies in the defense element(s) of this proposal. The TCBM’s will promote regional stability, which will improve day-to-day economic functions in the ROK. Principally, without the looming threat of North Korean provocations, the South will be in a better position to attract foreign business. The benefits to Seoul of Pyongyang-Washington cooperation are incalculable.

One would be remiss without a further amplification of the assurance aspects for South Korea built into the proposed accord. If a second Korean War were to erupt today “artillery at the rate of hundreds of thousands of rounds per hour would rain on the city of Seoul and its unwitting population of 24 million. Over 700,000 troops, 2,000 tanks, and mechanized forces would advance southward rapidly, trying to penetrate ROK defensive positions and cover the fifty miles or so to overtake Soul” (Cha, 2012: 212). Even clearer than in the case of Japan the threat North Korea poses to its southern neighbor is stark. From a conventional standpoint alone the Kim family regime has the ability to impose significant costs on South Korea before the North would be defeated. Add in the threat posed by Pyongyang’s missile systems and its nuclear capability and the risks posed to the
government in Seoul suddenly increase exponentially. Rather than demand the North eliminate its nuclear capability, which still does not address its conventional strength, it is prudent to work toward developing TCBMs that reduce the possibility for misperception and misunderstanding; while simultaneously improving goodwill and cooperation. As measures designed to promote stability take effect there is no prohibition on further ROK-US defense cooperation. While it may be prudent to place greater emphasis on DPRK concerns for certain programs, collaborative efforts can continue. Regardless, over the long term the introduction of TCBMs is the best way to address the danger of North Korean volatility. And, in the event that Pyongyang is non-compliant then Washington will have already stated its willingness to support Seoul in developing a domestic nuclear capability. This new asset will greatly alter Kim Jong-un’s decision calculus, while giving the administration in Seoul greater leverage and a stronger deterrence posture. Collectively, the proposed accord addresses a number of assurance and deterrence challenges that are vital for South Korean policy makers.

XI. Paving the Way for Future Cooperation

What separates this proposal from so many other attempts at engagement with North Korea in the past lies in how the nuclear question is addressed. The emphasis of previous agreements was forcing Pyongyang to relinquish its nuclear weapon program. “The trouble is, the outside world has almost run out of the normal options for curbing the North’s nuclear ambitions: there are not many more sanctions it can impose. Efforts to stop the nuclear programme have ‘pretty much failed’ ” (“Nuclear Test” para 7). The intrusiveness of prior accords helped reinforce negative assumptions on the part of all participants. Concerns bred suspicions, followed by mistrust, and, ultimately, accusations whenever there was so much as a hint of noncompliance. And while it can be argued that US officials were more willing to accept a greater degree of DPRK noncompliance than vice versa, the American media’s ability to excite public opinion certainly limits options for US decision makers. Washington officials are simply unable to look the other way when the strategic picture outweighs minor operational missteps. By accepting North Korea’s right to hold nuclear weapons, a great deal of the negative reinforcement of passed agreements can be largely mitigated. The positive structure of the accord serves as a mechanism to promote further
cooperation. “Macro-level trends such as Pyongyang’s inability to access international capital and costly military competition with South Korea and the United States hindered the growth of the North Korean economy and locked the regime into a costly military contest that diverted resources away from productive applications” (Habib, 2011: 49) and placed them squarely in this predicament. With the exception of the political prison issue, the focus of this agreement is about breaking through this downward spiral and moving forward. The various aspects of the proposal seek to build ties rather than focus on mechanisms of control. Furthermore, the embedded TCBM’s offer the opportunity to build communication and confidence on a bilateral basis. This is vital in reducing the long term tensions that have been permitted to build up due to a lack of communication. In parallel, economic engagements in particular offer tangible benefits to cooperation. Significant increases in Pyongyang’s revenue stream will encourage more joint ventures as it will reduce the North’s reliance on other states – namely China. The open-ended and mutually beneficial characteristics of this proposal serve as advocacy tools for further cooperation.

XII. Implications for Other States Aspiring to Acquire Nuclear Weapons

The one question that will always come up when a new state acquires nuclear weapons is, how does this impact the decision calculus for other aspiring nuclear weapon states? Very simply, there is no easy answer to this question. Leadership in each state across the globe observe, analyze, and evaluate things differently. However, that does not preclude the ability to make general assumptions about the impact formal US recognition of North Korea’s nuclear program might have on others. With that being said, we already know aspiring and current nuclear weapon states maintain working networks designed to share information and assist others seeking the same capability. “Another expert impressed by North Korea’s nuclear advances was Abdul Qadeer Khan, the godfather of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. He heaps scorn on Libya’s efforts but reserves praise for the North Koreans. They showed him the ‘perfect nuclear weapon,’ he wrote, ‘technologically more advanced than ours’ (“Bad or Mad” para 5). So, while the political equation certainly matters, the North is already part of a nuclear community that passes technical information to a variety of actors. Ultimately, how Washington policy makers portray the international impact of the nuclear aspect of the accord will significantly shape how the agreement in its entirety is
perceived by senior leaders abroad. For the purposes of this discussion, the interplay between US strategic messaging and how that is received globally is critical to understanding the impact of this agreement.

How the Obama Administration couches acceptance of the North Korean nuclear program will greatly drive and shape the lessons other states will take away from the DPRK experience. In that vein, Washington must make a series of public statements to set the tone. After President Obama’s first presidential election victory, “the president moved quickly on the several foreign policy initiatives he had talked about during the campaign” (Gates, 2014: 326), so there is a precedent for him to be fleet afoot if the opportunity presents itself. By framing the debate quickly, the administration can curtail some of the speculation and ensure that its viewpoint is the first to be heard. While debate on the North Korean nuclear program and how the international community responds to it will be endless, the US can use this as an opportunity to refine its own policies on nuclear proliferation. Ultimately, this is an opportunity for the Obama Administration to not only articulate its decision calculus with respect to North Korea, but make this event a seminal moment for US nuclear proliferation policy. US officials must clearly spell out four points when discussing the issues surrounding the decision to accept Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. First, North Korea is in a unique geopolitical situation because of its proximity to both China and Russia. Previous strategic assessments regarding military options have always caused anxiety in Washington because they “ran the risk of escalating to all-out war on the peninsula” (Cha, 2012: 253). Geographical facts precluded a military option, because the risks of escalation and a broadening of the conflict were simply too high. When considering ongoing tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, the risk that misinterpretation and misunderstanding could lead to a mushrooming of the conflict would trump the utility of a military option. The volatility of the wider region made the risk of escalation simply too great to entertain a military option. That being said, the same strategic concerns do not hamper the US in other regions where the issue of nuclear proliferation might arise.

Second, US decision makers saw the TCBM’s included in the agreement as a mechanism for strengthening strategic stability in the future. Nuclear weapon states are held to a higher standard as more is expected of them in order to curtail catastrophic incidents. The ability to observe North Korea’s nuclear program and Pyongyang’s agreement to provide advance notification of other major military
activities demonstrates an increased willingness to participate in the international community. Regarding observation missions, the US and DPRK, as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, had previously agreed to an inspection regime. The flaw was that “Washington [agreed] to permit special inspections to be postponed until the delivery of key nuclear components of the promised light-water reactors” (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014: 277). Tying inspections to something the US might have difficulty in delivering, seems problematic now, but the lesson to be learned in this is to link inspections to something that can be done immediately – like legitimizing the nuclear program. Such action bypasses the political hurdles in Washington, specifically Congressional approval. Returning to the proposal discussed here, Kim Jong-un’s acceptance of these elements of the proposal, nuclear inspections and the like, will be crucial steps in making the nuclear program palatable. Accepting Pyongyang’s weapons of mass destruction are contingent on its continued work to maintain and bolster the TCBM regime.

Third, while Washington is elated at the mutually beneficial opportunities of this accord, had Pyongyang chosen the engagement path sooner – perhaps even decades ago – the hardships the North Korean people have had to endure could have been prevented. The Kim regime chose to reject international norms of behavior to pursue policies bent on the development of nuclear weapons. This decision led to ostracism across much of the international community and greatly contributed to North Korea’s economic collapse. The trials and tribulations of the DPRK’s people can be blamed, in large part, on the government’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. “If South Koreans want to remind themselves of the progress they have enjoyed, they need only look north, where men on average measure up to 8cm less and die 12 years sooner” (“Parallel Worlds” para 10). The twenty-first century, globalized world is predicated on norms of behavior. Utility in holding nuclear weapons is fast eroding. As the Pyongyang case clearly demonstrates, the pursuit of nuclear weapons will be met with economic hardship that could have been avoided.

Fourth, just as with the negative actions to be taken if North Korea is noncompliant, the US must articulate that aspiring nuclear weapon states will be met with even more stringent penalties. Deterrence will come in the form of civil, defense, and economic options. From the civil perspective, the international community, led by the US, will reduce, and potentially indefinitely suspend, overseas development assistance to the state in question. Washington will seek to develop defense agreements with other regional states in the event a military
option is required. “If diplomacy is to work, both allies and adversaries must believe that the United States is willing to use force” (Rubin, 2014: 263). Economic sanctions will also be put in place to further weaken the prospective state’s ability to afford its nuclear program. These actions, particularly when outlined together, will message a renewed resolve in US policy against nuclear proliferation.

The actions outlined above will greatly shape how the US decision to accept the DPRK’s nuclear program is perceived across the globe. With that being said, there are three primary themes that other states will probably come to recognize out of Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and how Washington responded. First, if a state is determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, it is very difficult to deter. Regarding the 1994 Agreed Framework, “Pyongyang almost immediately began violating its agreement, and the Clinton team simply looked the other way in order to avoid disrupting engagement” (Ibid: 266). Realistically though, given the strategic environment at the time, what else could the Clinton Administration have done? Second, once a weapon has successfully been tested the international community will gradually lose resolve in its attempts to dissuade nuclear weapons development. Third, moving past this issue will come at some juncture. All things considered, if the US does not actively seek to frame the debate on its rationale, the interpretation of this agreement by other states will have a negative impact on Washington moving forward. Regardless, these three observations will significantly impact policy decisions in other states seeking to pursue nuclear weapons. Arguably the most significant lesson to be learned from the North Korea experience is that if a government can manage domestic opinion and the geopolitical environment is right, it is almost impossible to deter it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Sadly, there are some advantages in this regard for “North Korea, the last remaining hermit kingdom in the world” (Mahbubani, 2013: 33). Over the years the Kim family regime has potentially been able to manage domestic opinion better than any state in the planet. Its constant war-footing and closed society allows the government almost limitless power when it comes to decision making. This enabled Pyongyang to undertake the necessary steps to develop a nuclear capability without fear of domestic upheaval. What separates North Korea from, for instance, Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s rule is that geopolitical dynamics prevented foreign military action against the North. An ongoing example that bears striking similarities to North Korea is Iran; where the theocratic regime has successfully managed public opinion and thwarted any
possible foreign military option to date. When strict domestic control is joined by the inability of foreign military action, deterring a perspective nuclear weapon state is virtually impossible.

Once it becomes clear that a state possesses nuclear weapons the window of opportunity to deter acquisition is shut, leaving little hope for relinquishment. To be clear, once completed, the domestic costs associated with ending a nuclear weapon program are even higher than they were during the research and development phase. The opportunity cost of acquiring the capability makes it almost impossible to justify forfeiture. With that being said, the desirability of any military option decreases exponentially once it has been successfully tested. In the case of both North Korea and Iran, it is widely believed that “the regime(s) might consider nuclear retaliation against the United States directly” (Davis and Pfaltzgraff, 2013: 125) if attacked. In virtually every scenario, the risks of a detonation are simply too great to take military action. Essentially, nuclear states achieve the basic goal of acquisition – regime security from foreign aggression. Unfortunately, the resolve of the global order to compel a state to relinquish its weapons is, to put it mildly, fickle. With the understanding that deterrence has failed the international community will often, gradually, reengage with the state in question. This pattern has been seen in cases such as China, India, and Pakistan. In a rather extraordinary twist of irony “after 9/11, the United States gave Pakistan more than $100 million to secretly bolster the security and fail-safe mechanisms around its bombs” (Rashid, 2013: 61). This is but one example where there may not be a return to pre-acquisition engagement, but penalties strong enough to force forfeiture will abate as the geopolitical landscape shifts. Regardless, the penalties for violating international norms of behavior slowly erode as pragmatism wins out. While the post-acquisition success of a nuclear weapon state is largely contingent on a host of factors that have nothing to do with the new capability, it is encouraging for states seeking weapons of mass destruction. Potentially, the most impactful lesson to be learned from the North Korea experience is that even penalties associated with this issue are never, truly permanent.

XIII. Alternative to Cooperation – China’s Changing Foreign Policy

The early twenty-first century has come as an inflection point in Chinese political life. Both record economic growth and political resolution of continental disputes

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have contributed to a shifting focus in public and bureaucratic circles. For many Chinese, it is no longer enough to emphasize domestic economic growth. As years of double digit growth fade into memory many are looking to find other potential sources of economic growth. In parallel, there is a growing sense that the defense spending that has come with economic success gives China better foreign policy options. Many Chinese would argue that the days of having to accept foreign designs for their homeland have come to an end. “As a stronger China seeks to defend what it views as its territorial and maritime interests, it threatens the security of its neighbors, who grow increasingly wary of China’s long-term intentions” (deLisle and Goldstein, 2015: 205). This alteration in Chinese foreign policy has changed the face of Beijing and created an entirely new geopolitical environment in the Asia-Pacific region. Today, the most recognizable epicenters of confrontation are in the East and South China Seas. Recent history over the last two centuries saw a rolling back of Chinese dominion across much of its periphery. The island chains to its east and south are no different. European colonialism and Japanese imperialism led to Chinese losses across the region. Given the natural resources believed to exist under the ocean floor and the two seas’ role as vital shipping lanes, control of the various island chains in the area is critically important. “But it will not tolerate a coalition of smaller powers allied with the United States against it; that, given the Chinese historical experience of the past two hundred years, is unacceptable” (Kaplan, 2013: 167). Beijing has taken to provocative military action in an attempt to force countries like Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam to withdraw their territorial claims. Domineering actions on the part of the Chinese have not gone unnoticed. Many countries in the Asia-Pacific region are developing intraregional defense partnerships, while also turning to states like the US and Russia for assistance. As the Xi Administration continues to take an assertive stance on territorial disputes, the response from China’s neighbors will only become more abrasive. Into this volatile mix North Korea sits almost completely alone. Having discussed the DPRK’s geopolitical position throughout this document, the main point of emphasis at this juncture is its limited options. If engagements with Japan, Russia, and South Korea prove unrewarding – and there are ample reasons to suggest that they might – and if North Korea cannot develop a partnership with the US, then it will suddenly be back in the same place it has been for over two decades. Pyongyang will once again be reliant on Beijing for its continued existence. “From time to time, China does put the hammer down on its troublesome ally”
(Schoen and Kaylan 28). Given Kim Jong-un’s attempts to distance himself from his patron it would not be unreasonable to suggest that China would want to take a more assertive role in North Korea as well.

XIV. Conclusion

At the present time there is an opportunity for meaningful US-North Korea engagement. The deterioration in China-North Korea relations has led to a series of changes in the DPRK senior leadership – in both human and policy perspectives. To date, these shifts can be seen in Pyongyang’s sudden attempts at engagement with Moscow, Seoul, and Tokyo. And, perhaps most notably, the circumstances surrounding the execution of Jang Sung Taek could not have more thoroughly demonstrated Kim Jong-un’s desire to separate himself from Beijing. Into this transformative time, Washington can interject with a bold and daring engagement strategy. By participating in direct talks with the North, Obama Administration officials can circumvent some of the cancerous obstacles that come with multilateralism. Even more noteworthy, making acceptance of the North’s nuclear program and a negative security guarantee the hallmarks of this proposal represent a substantive policy shift in the US. The proposal outlined here and the manner with which the entire process associated with it could be executed, outlines a way forward thinking approach in resolving the most pressing issues in the region. “During World War II, General George Marshall once told his wife, ‘I cannot afford the luxury of sentiment, mine must be cold logic. Sentiment is for others’” (Gates 594). The ultimate goal for the US in embarking on this path is strengthening regional, and consequently strategic, stability – something both noble and attainable with a little bravery and decisiveness.

References


EMBRACING HIROSHIMA

Saito Hajime*

Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to examine an episode in John Hersey’s book Hiroshima (1946) and the occupational policy of General Headquarters (GHQ), the organization which administered the defeated land of Japan during the Occupied Era (1945-1952). It is John Dower and his readers that should be interested in the episode because in his seminal work, Embracing Defeat (1999), Dower touches on Hiroshima in terms of the GHQ’s censorship of Japanese writings about the atomic bombs dropped on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. What matters most in terms of the episode is that in 1951 the GHQ allowed copies of Hiroshima to be imported from the United States to be sold in Japan. In the same year some of Japan’s university professors were invited to teach it in their English classes. A controversy over the use of this work as a textbook arose among Japanese university teachers of English, and Rintaro Fukuhara and Takashi Nozaki exemplified these opinions. Their contrasting views on the text suggest the ways in which intellectuals or academics can or cannot cope under the pressure of a hegemonic cultural power. 1

The purpose of this paper is to show an episode that John Dower, the author of Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (1999), should be interested in. It examines John Hersey’s famous non-fiction book Hiroshima (1946), as well as the occupational policy of the General Headquarters (GHQ’s)

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1Part of this paper is based on the manuscript of my presentation entitled “Not to read Hiroshima: Rintaro Fukuhara, Takashi Nozaki and John Hersey’s Hiroshima,” in a conference entitled Transpacific Literatures / Literary Studies in (post) Imperial Japan, at University of Tsukuba (Tokyo Campus), March 13, 2013. This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 24320055.
in censoring any atomic bomb related writings published in Occupied Japan (1945-1952). Most importantly, the episode shows the ways in which Japanese academics negotiated with, if not directly resisted, the power of the GHQ and of the United States. Their reactions to the GHQ give us insights into the effects of censorship on intellectuals as well as academic freedom during occupation.

I. Hiroshima in 1951, Japan

In Chapter 14 of *Embracing Defeat*, “Censored Democracy: Policing the New Taboos,” Dower discusses “a new taboo” against the atomic bombs that the US Army dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki:

Writing about the atomic-bomb experience was not explicitly proscribed, and in the year or so following the surrender, especially in local publications in the Hiroshima area, a number of writers were able to publish prose and poetry on the subject. At the same time, however, survivors such as Nagai Takashi found their early writings suppressed, many bomb-related writings were severely cut, and the most moving English-language publication on the subject – John Hersey’s *Hiroshima*, a sparse portrait of six survivors that made a profound impression when published in *The New Yorker* in August 1946 – though mentioned in the media, could not be published in translation until 1949. (Dower, 1999: 414)

It seems unnecessary to talk much about Hersey’s *Hiroshima*. This famous reportage holds a secure place in the history of the twentieth century American journalism. In 1993, Bart Barnes wrote an obituary to Hersey (1917 - 1993) in *The Washington Post* that “it was in *Hiroshima* that Mr. Hersey produced a literary classic and made publishing history with a non-polemical description of the atomic blast in the Japanese city of Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945” (Barns 1993). The most important phrase is “a non-polemical description,” suggesting that Hersey focused not on who dropped the first atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima but on how six people experienced the terrible explosion and survived it. Due to this “non-polemical description,” “as a book *Hiroshima* sold 118,000 copies in hardcover and more than 3.4 million in paperback” (ibid.), and the GHQ permitted the Japanese translation of the book to be published in 1949. No Japanese readers of the book could find such a straightforward description that,
for example, the US Army dropped the Fat Man on Hiroshima City and killed tens of thousands of civilians there. A simple question lingers here. In 1949, did Japanese people welcome and accept (or embrace) Hersey’s “non-polemical description” of the atomic blast that destroyed Hiroshima city? The Hiroshima controversy that I will discuss in what follows can be a key to answering the question.

II. To Read Hiroshima or not to Read It

In 1951, The Rising Generation (Eigo Seinen), one of the most influential monthly magazine in the field of English Studies in Japan, ran a short article entitled “Hiroshima is Being Sold in Japan” (“Hiroshima no kokunai hanbai”). John Hersey’s Hiroshima is now being sold by Hosei University Press (Fujimicho, Chiyoda Ward, Tokyo), which is a special case. The original publisher Knopf volunteers to sell the book with no care for commercial concerns – a copy of it costs $1.75 [US dollars], but it is sold in Japan for 200 hundred yen – because the original publisher would like to support the ‘No more Hiroshimas’ movement and to make a contribution to the peace of the world. It is said that bulk orders of the book for textbook, for instance, will be further considered in terms of price. (The Rising Generation, June 1951, 45)

It is too naïve to believe in Alfred Knopf’s spirit of volunteerism or the publisher’s “support” for peace movements. The phrase “which is a special case”

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2 The Rising Generation, or Eigo Seinen (most of the articles are written in Japanese), has a 115 years history (from 1898 to 2009 in print; to 2013 in web), and has long been regarded as a kind of the official report of English and American literary studies, English linguistics and English education in the twentieth century Japanese society. The Web Eigo Seinen ceased to exist in March 2013.

3 Hosei University Press (Hosei Diagaku Shuppan Kyoku) was founded in 1948, and it is this publisher that published the first Japanese translation of Hiroshima in 1949 that was in truth the publisher’s first publication. Since then, Hosei UP has published innumerable academic translations of European and Anglo-American philosophies and literatures.

4 In 1951, one dollar was equal to 360 yen. Undoubtedly, Knopf and Hosei UP sold Hiroshima at a bargain price.

5 Except for Hersey 1946, Barnes 1993 and Dower 1999, all the quotations in this paper are translated from Japanese texts into English by the author of the paper.

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strongly suggests the presence of an organization that made the selling of copies of *Hiroshima* “special.” A certain organization directly or indirectly controlled the event, and it is safe to conclude that GHQ, the organization that had allowed a Japanese translation to be published in 1949, making copies of *Hiroshima* to be available for Japanese students in 1951 - so that they were invited to read a “non-polemical description” about Hiroshima and the atomic bomb. They could gratify their desire to know about what happened, but they could hardly think about who was responsible for the bombing. The important fact is that the proliferation of the book *Hiroshima* within Japanese society brought about a controversy. Two months later, the same *Eigo Seine* ran another short article entitled “*Hiroshima* Chosen as Textbook” (“*Hiroshima* kyokasho ni”).

We have already reported here that John Hersey’s *Hiroshima* was made available in Japan. The news is that the book was chosen as a textbook in eight universities including the University of Hiroshima. *Asahi Shimbun* (May 23) reported university teachers’ contrasting opinions on this issue. Professor Takashi Nozaki (Chuo University⁶) chose *Hiroshima* and told the newspaper that “I would like to teach living American English and with this book in hand I would also like to ponder on peace.” Professor Rintaro Fukuhara (Tokyo University of Education⁷), who rejected it, told: “it takes almost one year to teach it in our classes, and many of my colleagues told me that it was terrible to teach, in each class hour, the fact that people were killed in air raids.” (*The Rising Generation*, August 1951, 45)

It is here I introduce Nozaki and Fukuhara, who are less known in and outside Japan, in order to address what matters in this quotation. Nozaki (1917 – 1995) was born in Hirosaki, a city in the Aomori Prefecture, in the northern part of the mainland of Japan, Honshu. He studied English Literature at Tokyo Imperial University in 1941. He started his academic career in Hirosaki but soon moved to Tokyo. He taught English literature in Chuo University (1950); Tokyo

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⁶Established in 1885, the university has been long (and still is) regarded as one of the most popular and famous private universities in the Tokyo area.

⁷Tokyo Higher Normal School was founded in 1872 as a kind of the *École normale supérieure* in order to train high school and university teachers. The name of the school has changed three times: Tokyo University of Science and Literature (1929); Tokyo University of Education (1949); University of Tsukuba (1973 - present).
Metropolitan University\textsuperscript{8} (1971-1981); Teikyo University (1981-1995)\textsuperscript{9}. In his life he has been a prolific translator of American literature: his translations include Fitzgerald’s \textit{The Great Gatsby}, Hemingway’s \textit{The Old Man and the Sea}, Richard Right’s \textit{Black Boy}, John Barth’s \textit{The Sot-Weed Factor}, to name a few.\textsuperscript{10}

His fame as a translator still owes much to his hugely successful 1964 translation of J. D. Salinger’s \textit{The Catcher in the Rye} (1951) in which Nozaki boldly used 1960’s Japanese slangs: about 250 million copies had been sold until Haruki Murakami’s 2007 translation replaced Nozaki’s.\textsuperscript{11} He has devoted his life to university education and translation of the famous (and less famous) twentieth century American literary works. Fukuhara (1895 – 1981) is no less famous than Nozaki both in and outside the field of English literary studies and education in the twentieth century Japan. Born in the village of Kamimura, in the western part of Hiroshima Prefecture, he entered Tokyo Higher Normal School to learn English in 1912. He was so excellent that he was invited by the editors of \textit{The Rising Generation (Eigo Seinen)} to write essays and ultimately to be its editor-in-chief. In 1921, he became an associate professor of his old school. In 1929, the Japanese Government sent him to England, and he studied in London and Cambridge Universities (1929-1931). In 1939, he became a professor of the same school. In 1946, he became the President of Japan Association of English Literature (1946–1953). In 1949, he became the head of the Department of Literature in Tokyo University of Science and Literature (1949-1953). In 1964, he was named as a member of the Japan Art Academy. In 1968, he was named a Person of Cultural Merit. His literary and occasional essays and academic studies (on Thomas Gray and Charles Lamb, for instance) are collected in \textit{Collected Works} in 12 volumes (1969-1970) and in posthumously published \textit{Collected Essays} in 8 volumes (1983).\textsuperscript{12} The fact that many of his writings were collected

\textsuperscript{8}Tokyo Metropolitan University (Tokyo Toritsu Daigaku) was established in 1949 and was closed in 2011 by the Metropolis of Tokyo (succeeded by Shuto Daigaku Tokyo [the English name is Tokyo Metropolitan University]).

\textsuperscript{9}Established in 1966, this private university is one of the largest universities located in the Tokyo a.

\textsuperscript{10}In terms of Nozaki’s biography, I have referred to Koizumi (ed.) 1990, Ueda et al (eds.) 2001 and an obituary in \textit{Asahi Shimbun} May 17, 1995.

\textsuperscript{11}See Chujo 2003.

\textsuperscript{12}In terms of Fukuhara’s biography, I have referred to Saito (ed.) 1985.
and published during his life and immediately after his death amply proves that Japanese society has needed him during the Cold War era. With the knowledge of Nozaki and Fukuhara, let me touch on the implications of the fact that the former accepted Hiroshima and the latter did not.

III. Nozaki’s Choice of Hiroshima

I have no clear answer as to why he chose it, mainly because there is no study of the ways in which he thought on a book bearing the name of Hiroshima city that was given by the former enemy whom destroyed the city.\(^{13}\) A clue to this question can be found in Nozaki’s study on Ernest Hemingway (1960).\(^{14}\) In the last chapter entitled “Beyond Hemingway” (“Hemingway wo koete”), he showed his social concerns about “the horrifying development of nuclear weapons, the recent appearance of artificial satellite, the fear of ‘death ash’, the fear of the World War III, and our expectation of the meeting of the leaders of the Big Two” (Nozaki, 91). He continued to argue that some of contemporary American writers who were inclined to represent the experiences of ordinary people could hardly find something new to express (ibid.), and he concluded that Hemingway avoided “issues concerning society and humanity in The Old Man and the Sea (1954)” so that Nozaki hoped “a new generation of writers - Irwin Shaw, Norman Mailer, Saul Below, William Styron, Ralph Ellison, J. D. Salinger – to inherit Hemingway and to go beyond him” (ibid, 94). Nozaki so earnestly hoped “a new generations of writers” to be read in Japan that he translated some of them (Ellison and Salinger, for instance). He didn’t prefer literature to society.

It is undeniably the fact that Nozaki chose the “non-polemical” Hiroshima that was deemed safe by GHQ, but Nozaki’s views on literature and society in his 1960 study shows that he was not a kind of scholar-translator who would easily like to love pureness of literature and to dislike social issues in the nuclear age. In other words, he chose Hiroshima; but it is still possible to assume that he read the text with his students in order to “ponder on” (or examine) the nature of peace or Pax Americana.

\(^{13}\)There is no detailed study of the cultural and political significance of Nozaki’s translation (including the hugely successful 1964 translation of The Catcher in the Rye) in the last quarter of the twentieth century, either.

\(^{14}\)To my knowledge, this is the only academic study that he has published in his life.
IV. Fukuhara’s Rejection

Fukuhara’s rejection of *Hiroshima* can be justified in what follows. First of all, he was right when he said to *Asahi Shimbun* that it took at least one year to teach the book. Until recently, many of Japanese university teachers of English have often told their students to translate only one or two pages of the whole textbook into Japanese in each class (90 minutes long) and the teachers have spent most of the time to correct the student’s translation so as not to help students discuss it but to help them become a kind of translators like Nozaki. In Fukuhara’s view, a book with 118 pages was not a good choice for his Japanese students who could not read faster than native speakers of English. Secondly, it is important to note that every reader of the book has to read a series of descriptions of the victims by the atomic bomb, one of which is as follows. After “a tremendous flash of light” (Hersey 1946, 8), the Reverend Kiyoshi Tanimoto, one of the six survivors on whom Hersey focused, saw in the street where he rumbled on,

[...] a squad of soldiers who had been burrowing into the hillside opposite, making one of the thousands of dugouts in which the Japanese apparently intended to resist invasion, hill by hill, life for life; the soldiers were coming out of the hole, where they have been safe, and blood was running from their heads, chests, and backs. They were silent and dazed. (ibid: 9-10)

With these words, Fukuhara and his colleagues, many of whom lived in Tokyo, might have remembered a series of air raids on the city that culminated in the Great Tokyo Air Raid (March 10, 1945) in which lives of 100,000 people are reported to have been lost; some of the survivors of the raid saved their lives in the “dugouts” that they had made by themselves. Although Fukuhara was not directly wounded by the air raids, he saw a part of his study room in his university bombed and burnt. When Fukuhara told the *Asahi Shimbun* that “it was terrible to teach, in each class hour, the fact that people were killed in air raids,” he was honest enough to show his anger against those who told him to choose a book that could help the Japanese readers remember the terrible experiences that they actually had.

I would like to add another explanation of Fukuhara’s rejection that he didn’t tell in the *Asahi Shimbun* interview. The third reason has much to do with his
indifference toward the atomic bomb and with his isolationism. As I have argued elsewhere in detail\(^\text{15}\), he has written so little about the atomic bomb that USA dropped on Hiroshima. In fact, he has written only a few words about it in his 1945 Diary (Showa 20 nen no Nikki), and he has written only three short essays in The Rising Generation (Eigo Seinen) in which he wrote briefly about the damages that University of Hiroshima suffered and about his hope for its swift reconstruction. They are all of what he has written about Hiroshima and the atomic blast. Let me touch on his 1945 Diary. On 7 August, he noted that “yesterday, Hiroshima was attacked with a new-type bomb” (Fukuhara 1959, 84). On August 8\(^\text{th}\), he noted that Mr. Furusawa, a bureaucrat of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told him “the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima resulted in immense harm” (ibid. 85). On August 11\(^\text{th}\), he showed sympathy with a Hiroshima-born lieutenant commander named Sato who lost all communication with his families in Hiroshima (ibid. 90). On 21 August, Fukuhara noted that Shin’ichiro Tomoaga, one of his colleagues and a Nobel Prize laureate (physics in 1965), told him that the bomb that “the US Army dropped on Hiroshima was undoubtedly an atomic bomb” (Fukuhara 1962, 97). This is the last reference to Hiroshima and the atomic bomb, although he continued to write his diary until October 20 in 1945.

In this regard, Fukuhara’s 1955 essay entitled “A Retired Professor Has Free Time” (“Teinen kyoju kanka ari”) deserves attention. This essay contains his 1952 lecture entitled “English Literature as Political Literature” (“Seiji bungaku to shite no igirisu Bungaku) that he made to the audience of the University of Hiroshima. The main topics of his speech were his idea that in England political consciousness permeated literature and literature was no less concerned with politics (Fukuhara 1955: 457), and his comparison between English political literature and the counterpart in Meiji Japan (ibid: 457-8). Surprisingly, he talked about literature and politics in the Meiji Japan but didn’t say a word about the most important political issue in Hiroshima -- the explosion of the atomic bomb. It can be said that he was so traumatized by the destruction that an atomic bomb brought about that he lost his words to express it. It is no wonder that Fukuhara didn’t like to choose Hersey’s Hiroshima in 1951.\(^\text{16}\) His 1957 essay entitled “My

\(^{15}\text{See Saito 2014.}\)

\(^{16}\text{Contrary to Fukuhara, Stephen Spender, an English poet, began his 1957 Hiroshima lecture entitled “Problems of Modern Poetry” as follows: “It is impossible to speak in Hiroshima about modern poetry without saying something about the atomic bomb falling}\)
Peace Movement” (“Watashi no heiwa shugi”) is also noteworthy here. It is full of his antagonistic view of anti-nuclear war movements that were active in 1950’s, movements that were initiated by the Lucky Dragon No 5 Incident (Daigo Fukuryu Maru Jiken) in 1954 -- a Japanese tuna ship was contaminated with nuclear fallouts from USA’s Castle Bravo experiments in Bikini Atoll and a crewman died due to excessive exposure to radiation -- and the incident raised a series of anti-nuclear movements that did swiftly spread nationwide in 1955.

One important point in this essay is that he was antipathetic toward any type of peace movements or anti-nuclear demonstrations. He was afraid of peace movements backed by communists because a dangerous communist hero would appear and finally control people (Fukuhara, 1957: 193). He was also indifferent toward peace movements with religious backgrounds: in fact he touched on a non-communist peace movement, one of whose members was his female acquaintance who believed in Quakerism, but he immediately made clear that he was unwilling to join it (Ibid: 194). He explained the reason why he was indifferent to peace movements that surrounded him.

I might possibly be dependent on others in order to live a life by myself, but I desperately need independence and as a consequence I prepare myself for being alone. It can hardly be helped that I am influenced by others while I am unaware, but I do not want to be influenced by any propaganda. I do not want others to govern my thought, either. (Ibid: 196)

He was an anti-communist, an isolationist and, in short a bigot who preferred literature to politics. This rigidity of his mind and attitude can be understood as one of the reasons of his popularity during 1960’s and 70’s; some of Japanese people felt exhausted in the middle of the age of politics (before and after 1968) and needed something that had nothing to do with politics. An irony is that it is his non-political individualism and isolationism that helped him to reject one of GHQ’s indirect but powerful interventions to the education of Japanese universities in the Occupied Japan.

on Hiroshima – partly because we are here and partly because in a way it illustrates very well the main problem of modern life and modern destruction which I want to discuss this afternoon in connection with modern poetry.” (Spender, 1958: 119)
Conclusion

As a traumatized isolationist, Fukuhara didn’t come to read *Hiroshima* in his English classes. His rejection of the book can be understood as his antagonistic attitude toward USA and its occupational policy, but it is important to remember the fact that his students lost their chance of carefully reading the text and the context that GHQ introduced it to the Occupied Japan. A younger scholar of American literature, Nozaki chose it in his classes, although none of us know about whether or not he was truly welcome to read the text and to appreciate its message. Further researches on Nozaki and other teachers and scholars who read *Hiroshima* are urgently needed in order to write an alternative history of Japanese scholars of English and American literature who indirectly resisted against the cultural policy of USA. None of those lived in the Occupied Japan should easily embrace *Hiroshima*, and we should never do it. All they had to do then and we have to do now is to read and analyze it.

References


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Spender, Stephen. 1958. “Problems of Modern Poetry,” in Hiroshima Studies in English Language and Literature (Eigo eibungaku kenkyu). 5:2, pp.119-132. Print. (Note: Spender made a lecture of the same title to the audience of the University of Hiroshima in 1957, and its transcription was published by the university’s journal in the next year.)

BOOK REVIEW


Quiet: The Power of Introverts in a World That Can’t Stop Talking, as the title of the book indicates, presents a penetrating response to a cultural prejudice—the unjustified privilege of extrovert over introvert—in our society, in particular in professional lives today. As Cain indicates, “we live with a value system that I call the Extrovert ideal—the Omni-present belief that the ideal self is gregarious, alpha, and comfortable in the spotlight. …We like to think that we value individuality, but too often we admire one type of individual—the kind who’s comfortable ‘putting himself out there.’”(p.4) We attribute to such a self the values of competence, confidence, and competitiveness. “Sure, we allow technically gifted loners who launch companies in garages to have any personality they please, but they are the exceptions, not the rule, and our tolerance extends mainly to those who get fabulously wealthy or hold the promise of doing so.”(Ibid). Glory belongs to the extroverts that is our cultural motto! “But we make a grave mistake to embrace the Extrovert Ideal so unthinkingly.”(p.5).

“Neither E=mc² nor Paradise Lost was dashed off by party animal.”(pp.5-6). The same can be said of those greatest works in art, literature and other fields of humanities studies. To believe that socialization is the best source of creativity and great discovery is a great mistake. A greater error is to believe it to be the only source of creativity and authentic discovery. To identify the strength of the mind with an outgoing personality is a sheer blunt. “Our culture made a virtue of living as extroverts. We discouraged inner journey, the quest for a center. So we lost our center and have to find it again.”(p.264). Think of this: Isaac New Tewton, Albert Einstein, W.B.Yeats, Frédéric Chopin, Marcel Proust, J.M.Barrie, George Orwell, Theodor Geisel, Charless Schulz, Steven Spielberg, Larry Page, and J.K.Roling are all introverts. How about René Descartes, Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Ludwig van Beethoven, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Jürgen Hagerman and various others who are the the greatest thinkers of Western culture and civilization? They are all introverts. Also, Charles Schab, Bill Gate, Brenda Barnes, Sala Lee, James Copeland, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, these world renown enterprisers are all introverts! (p.53). Therefore, the Extrovert Ideal
in our cultural today is seriously flawed and one-sided, if not outright absurd. Needless to say, socialization and communication are important for us today. Still, solitude is a goldmine, rich though quiet and calm. The French writer Victor Hugo said: volcano enlightens, but morning sun enlightens better. Chinese Daoism teaches: water is plain and quiet, but water nurtures life and existence; the supreme good is akin to water. Creativity, discovery, and the strength of of mind bring about glory, but themselves come from quiet, but deep source. Therefore, proper solitude is both important and necessary for great thinkers. By this token, Cain’s response to the prejudice of Extrovert Ideal in *Quiet: The Power of Introverts in a World That Can’t Stop Talking* not only raises important an important question, but is pregnant with penetrating insights.

“What is so magical about solitude?” First of all, it creates personal space for deliberate practice. Drawing from the psychologist Anders Ericsson, Cain points out: “It is only when you’re alone that you can engage in Deliberate Practice.”(p.81). “Deliberate Practice is best conduct alone for several reasons. It takes intense concentration, and other people can be distracting. It require deep motivation, often self-generated. But most important, it involves working on the task that’s most challenging to your personally.”(Ibid.) “When you practice deliberately, you identify the tasks or knowledge that are just out of your reach, strive to upgraded your performance, monitoring your progress, and revise accordingly.”(Ibid) Noteworthy, Chinese Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism all teach that only when one is quietest and upmost calm, one’s mind is the best and one can use one’s mind best and upmost. For example, the Chinese philosophical classics, *Dao DeJing* teaches: “Attain complete vacuity/ maintain steadfast quietude/all things come into being.”(*Dao DeJing*, ch.16). That is to say, only when one maintains steadfast quietude, one can discover the profoundest truth of nature or the profoundest truth of nature will reveal itself to one. Thus, *Dao DeJing* asks: Can you concentrate your energy and embracing the One without being distracted? (ibid, ch.10).Moreover, solitude and quietude is important because it is necessary to create not only personal space for Deliberate Practice, but also freedom of thought. And “if personal space is vital for creativity, so is freedom from ‘peer pressure.’”(p.86).

There can be no true thought without freedom. But non-freedom of thought can be many kinds. One of them is due in no a small measure to the so-called “peer pressure”, which itself can be of various forms. As Cain points out, “Psychologists usually offer three explanations for the failure of group
brainstorming. The first is social loafing: in a group, some individuals tend to sit back and let others do the work. The second is production blocking: only when one person can talk or produce idea at once, while other group members are forced to sit passively. And the third is evaluation apprehension, meaning the fear of looking stupid in front of other peers.”(p. 89). Of course, here, it is not that group brainstorming is not important; collective work is not important; peer exchange is not important; one’s ability to articulate and present one’s thought to one’s peers is not important. Instead, it is that having freedom from pressures of one’s peer is also important. It is that there can be no creative thoughts without individual creativity; there can be no individual creativity without individual freedom in creating; there can be no individual freedom in creating without individual space and freedom to think individually. Therefore, proper solitude is important because it provides the necessary individual space and freedom to think individually and therefore freely.

Some comparative studies of the intellectual performance of problem-solving also point to the non-justifiability of privileging extroverts over introverts. “Extroverts get better grades than introverts during elementary school, but introverts outperform extroverts in high school and college. At the university level, introverts predicts academic performance better than cognitive ability. One study tested 141 college students’ knowledge of twenty different subjects, from art to astronomy to statistics, and found that introverts knew more than extroverts about every single one of them. Introverts receive disproportionate numbers of graduate degrees, National Merit Scholarship finalist positions, and Phi Beta Kappa keys. They outperform extroverts on the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal test, an assessment of critical thinking widely used by business for hiring and promotion. They’ve been shown to excel at something psychology call ‘insightful problem solving.’”(pp.168-9). Needless to say, what is said above is not to promote a kind of reverse prejudice—that is, to privilege introverts over extroverts. Rather, it is to lead us to see that introverts and extroverts each have their respective strengths and they think differently. So far as introverts persons are concerned, they at least can have several virtues.

First, they are highly, at least more likely, disciplined in their desires and emotions. Introverts persons are like to be more self-controlled not merely in their speech and how they appear in front of others, but also in how not to let their desires and emotions to drive them in action. Thus, for example, they are less reward sensitive than extrovert persons.
Second, they often think more carefully. “Introvert seem to think more carefully than extroverts, as the psychologist Gerald Matthew described in his work. …Introverts think before they act, digest information thoroughly, stay on task longer, give up less easily, and work more accurately. Introverts and extroverts also direct their attention differently: if you leave them to their devices, the introverts tend to sit around wondering about things, imagining things, recalling events from their past, and make plans for future. The extroverts are more likely to focus on what’s happening around them.”(Ibid, p.168).

Third, they are often more persistent. Because of their thoughtfulness, introverts persons generally think through their endeavors and as a result, they tend to be more persistent in what they pursue. Moreover, “Introverts sometimes outperform extroverts even on social tasks that require persistence.”(Ibid, p.169). “‘It is not that I am so smart,’ said Einstein, who was a consummate introvert. ‘It is that I stay with problems longer.’”(Ibid.).

Fourth, in connection with the above, introverts from times to time are more consistent in their endeavors too. This should not be surprised because as indicated above, introverts often think through their endeavors before they act. Therefore, they generally are able to withstand more contingencies than extroverts. Needless to say, the more one is thoughtful in one’s endeavor, the more likely one is consistent in one’s endeavors.

Fifth, contrary to the appearances, introverts are more confident in their endeavors. Again, this is due in no small measure to the fact that introverts are more thoughtful in their endeavors. Introverts persons generally believe in what they are doing, and therefore have strong confidence in what their endeavors.

All the same, we owe Caim gratitude for such an insightful, instructive book. We should not identify strength with outward going, and characters with easy-going in social occasions. Volcano enlightens, but morning sun enlightens better. Fire is glorious, but water nurtures life. The loud awakes the world, the quiet moves the world. That much we know, and that much we ought to know.

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