INTRODUCTION: THE BOUNDARY OF OUR NATION CAN BE MEASURED ONLY BY THE SUN: COSMOPOLITANISM AND HUMANITY

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OURS IS an age of globalization in which our nation is not only the country in which we are born, grow up, and live, but also the entire earth itself; in which “each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities — the local community of our birth, and the community of human argument and aspiration that ‘is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun’” (Nussbaum, 1997, 6). It is one in which, in Kant’s words, “The peoples of the earth has thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the earth is felt all over it [the earth]” (Kant, 1972, 142). Ours is an age in which concepts such as basic human rights and crimes against humanity are among those that express most characteristically the spirit of the time. In short, ours is an age of cosmopolitanism. The ideal of cosmopolitanism is that the time will dawn when “the first form of moral affiliation for the citizen should be her affiliation with rational humanity” (Nussbaum, 1997, 5); an important legal norm on the earth is the norm of humanity. Cosmopolitanism affirms the Kantian motto: out of the crooked timber of humanity, nothing straight can be built. It rekindles the light of the Confucian ideal of Tian Xia Gui Ren (天下歸仁)—that is, the world will be united by the norm of humanity.

As Thomas Pogge indicates, like all other “isms”, cosmopolitanism represents an intellectual position. Notwithstanding, cosmopolitanism is more than “an attitude of enlightened morality that does not place ‘love of country’ ahead of ‘love of mankind’” or “a normative philosophy for carrying the universalistic norms of discourse ethics beyond the confines of the nation-state” (Benhabib, 2006, 17-8). It embodies the enlightening and liberating force of global justice in our time. It evolves an enduring reality of global humanity in our time whose footsteps we hear in the rolling thunder of globalization, the advancing storm of modernization and the heavy rain of democratization. It betokens a supreme horizon of timeless truth that stares at us, challenges us, and drives us in our time.

The liberating energy and potency of cosmopolitanism and global humanity is comprehensive, multi-faced, and of full-range. Metaphysically, the titillating vision of our cosmopolitan citizenship presses us hard with the question of our metaphysical identity. It invites us to revise our concept of metaphysical substance and essence. It reminds us of the truth that our humanity identity is not only part of our practical identity, but also part of our metaphysical identity — that is, part of our metaphysical self. It renews the question of the universal human nature. Humanism may be merely a discredited brand-name in Western philosophy today. Yet, the ideal of cosmopolitanism reminds us of the truth that not only there is such a thing called “humanity”, but also it is part of our metaphysical identity. It is the formal essence of
each of us as a human being and the formal, structural dimension of each of us as a substance. By this token, humanity is not the other (of our self) coming to us, but inherent within us and part of our self, as the Confucian master Mencius would emphasize. It is not a guest knocking at the door of our existence, but part of us as the owner of our existence. When Confucius advised us to set our will on humanity (志於仁) and when Mencius warned us of the truth that if one lose one’ humanity, one would be an outcast, both masters emphasized humanity as part of our metaphysical and practical identity. At the same time, metaphysically, while cosmopolitanism does not press us to revise our concept of the relation between identity and space, it does press us to revisit our concept of space, which we often associate with our practical identity.

Ethically, the ideal of cosmopolitanism brings a new dimension to the ethical life, indicating a new horizon beyond the limit of the nation-state under which the concepts of a good, happy life and of self-realization acquire new meanings. It indicates that as Christine Korsgaard argues, our own humanity is “the source of all reasons and values” (Korsgaard, 1996, 122). Cosmopolitan justice dictates that “we must treat our humanity identity as a form of practical, normative identity” (Ibid, 132). This does not mean that we should adopt the communist concept of a worthy and happy life as one living exclusively for the purpose of the thorough liberation of the whole humankind in the world. Instead, cosmopolitanism challenges us to revise our concepts of a good, happy life, of ethical affiliation, and of ethical obligation and duty. As Thomas Pogge indicates, cosmopolitanism challenges us to ask this ethical question: In their ordinary conduct, more than they do now, ought individual and collective human agents to reduce the difference between the concern they show for the interests of their near and dear and the concern they show for the interests of distant strangers? Meanwhile, cosmopolitanism also brings us to a situation of possible ethical conflicts. For example, as we are informed by Jürgen Habermas, at times, a person as dual citizen — that is, both a national citizen and a world citizen — must struggle to reconcile his/her two-fold ethical-moral obligation: the national and the cosmopolitan. A citizen may be in a situation in which conflicts exist between meeting the normative standard expectation as a citizen of a particular nation and meeting the normative standard and expectation of a cosmopolitan citizen. That being said, cosmopolitanism brings about a new perspective of value and meaning. With regard to the ethical question of a good, worthy, and happy life, cosmopolitanism challenges our concept of home and belonging, e.g., what is our homeland?

Cognitively, cosmopolitanism rekindles the flame of universal truth, justice, and reason without realism or objectivism. It presses us with the idea of globalism without naturalism. It challenges one to reflect, evaluate, and adjudicate conflicts of cognitive paradigms and to map one’s way out of multiculturalism. It makes us see the dangers of provincialism, dogmatism, solipsism, and relativism. Noteworthy, conceptually, there can be no the cosmopolitan without the universal. Thus, cosmopolitanism presupposes universal truth, justice, and reason. By this token, in our age when the shtick of realism wears thin and the color of objectivism fades, how to defend the concepts of universal truth, justice, and reason? That is the question!
Politically, cosmopolitanism anchors political discourse of the globe on the concepts of global justice, universal human rights, and as I would like to add here, global humanity. It raises the questions of the limits of national sovereignty, and cultural rights. For example, with regard to crimes against humanity and violation of basic human rights, Habermas writes, “Cosmopolitan law must be institutionalized in such a way that it is binding on the individual governments” (Habermas, 1998, 179). As it is well-known, in Kantian vision of a cosmopolitan order, national sovereignty is inviolable. As Habermas indicates, this Kantian position is not sustainable before global human rights politics. Then, how best to define the limit of national sovereignty? Philosophers including Thomas Nagel are misgiving about the concept of global justice for various reasons. For example, Nagel holds that because a world state does not exist, we are in no associative relations with persons who are not citizens of our own country and therefore no obligations of justice towards them. Others such as Karl Schmitt resist strongly the idea of global humanity, crying out that the concept of humanity is nothing but an ideological instrument (Ibid., 1988, 188).

A striking feature of present cosmopolitanism is its concept that a cosmopolitan order is a legal order, not merely a moral order, wherein those who commit such crimes as crimes against humanity will be legally held responsible and punished legally; accordingly, cosmopolitan norms of justice such as the norm of basic human rights are juridical. Present cosmopolitanism gives stock value to such concepts as crime against humanity today and is a philosophy of a globally legal order. In the concept of “crimes against humanity,” humanity is conceived to be the object to which certain given crimes introduce injuries and damages. In the concept of “crimes against humanity”, humanity is conceived as a legal subject. And as Seyla Benhabib notes, “a crime, as distinct from a moral injury, cannot be defined independently of posited law and a positive legal order” (Benhabib, 2006, 14). Thus, cosmopolitanism, which entertains such concepts as “crimes against humanity”, presupposes the existence of cosmopolitan law that is juridical.

The concept of cosmopolitan law that is juridical immediately invites questions. For some philosophers, a conceptual problem arises immediately. For them, in order to make sense of cosmopolitan laws that are juridical, we must revise our concept of the positivity of law. For others, both practical and normative issues exist. For them, once the assumption of the existence of cosmopolitan law is established, the question has naturally arisen of how to establish cosmopolitan law amid the absence of a world-state. As Robert Post indicates, two difficulties arise here. First, “law must be binding, not merely advisory” (Post, 2006, 2). By this token, how to have global administrative institutions of laws such as courts or police “apart from discrete states”? (Ibid.). Second, how to have cosmopolitan law amid the absence of a world state and by “divided democratically self-governing peoples” on the earth today? (Ibid.). For example, how to constitutionalize international laws as Habermas proposes in the absence of a world state? How to have a world constitution which Habermas champions in the absence of a world state? Noteworthy, Pogge, Nagel and various other philosophers all consider the state or nation-state to be the enacting condition for justice in terms of law. Thus, while advocating global justice and cosmopolitanism,
Pogge wonders how legal cosmopolitanism is possible without a world state. Nagel is suspicious of the concept of global justice in terms of law. Habermas’ reconstruction of the Kantian project struggles to separate constitution from the state.

In light of the above, cosmopolitanism introduces fathomless pressures on our senses of metaphysical security, cognitive certainty, ethical clarity, and political rationality. The task of philosophical reflection of cosmopolitanism today is multifaceted. The burden of crucial evaluation of cosmopolitanism is heavy. The road of creative construction of a cosmopolitan project is long. No wonder, various questions have been raised in the philosophical discourse of cosmopolitanism today. Some are conceptual. Some are normative. And some are pragmatic. The authors of the papers in this volume recognize the challenge of cosmopolitanism as described above and rise to address some relevant issues of the subject-matter from various angles. In particular, they focus mainly on those conceptual problems of cosmopolitanism.

Pogge takes the lead in the discussion of cosmopolitanism in this volume. Today, one can hardly discuss the subject-matter of cosmopolitanism without mentioning Pogge. Pogge is not only one of the most distinguished and influential global thinkers today, but also an authoritative and enlightening voice leading the present philosophical discourse of cosmopolitanism. In as early as 1992, Pogge provoked great debate among philosophers with an extremely influential, often-cited article published in the journal Ethics, under the title “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty”. In 2002, he fueled the philosophical discourse of cosmopolitanism again with his illuminating book, World Poverty and Human Rights, which remains one of the most influential books and one of the most cited texts for decades. The subtitle of World Poverty and Human Rights is “Cosmopolitan Responsibility and Reforms.” His 2010 book, Politics as Usual: What lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric, introduces further new sentiment and energy to present discourse of global justice and cosmopolitanism. His numerous presentations in worldwide on global ethics, global justice and cosmopolitanism are instrumental to the global discourse of global justice and cosmopolitanism. His volume in Chinese language, Kant, Rawls, and Global Justice (2010), testifies to the intellectual influence which his thoughts on the subject-matter of global justice and cosmopolitanism bear on the Far East. His essay in this volume, “Cosmopolitanism: A Path to Peace and Justice”, is an updated and revised version of his book chapter, “Cosmopolitanism”, in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, co-edited by Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas Pogge, and published by Blackwell Publishing.

In “Cosmopolitanism: A Path to Peace and Justice”, Pogge explores the meaning of the idea of cosmopolitanism. First, he traces the historical root of the European expression of “cosmopolitanism” back to its Greek origin. He points out that in its linguistic origin, “cosmopolitan” connotes openness and inclusiveness. “Persons are called cosmopolitans, or cosmopolitan, when they are understanding and respectful of foreign cultures, travel widely and can interact well with people from many societies. And cities or gatherings are called cosmopolitan when they bring together persons and groups with diverse ethnicities, languages, cultures, religions, or lifestyles.” Accordingly, “cosmopolitanism is an intellectual position” that teaches openness and inclusiveness. He then discusses four types of cosmopolitanism: legal
cosmopolitanism, monistic cosmopolitanism, social justice cosmopolitanism, and ethical cosmopolitanism. Legal cosmopolitanism is “distinctive by advocating a cosmopolitan institutional order”. For Pogge, the Achilles’ heel of legal cosmopolitanism is its concept of a world state. And the undesirability of a world state makes legal cosmopolitanism a “fringe” position. By this token, Pogge does not identify Kant’s position as one form of legal cosmopolitanism, for Kant has obviously resisted the concept of a world state.

Pogge endorses what he calls “social-justice cosmopolitanism”. As he sees it, social-justice cosmopolitanism is a form of moral cosmopolitanism. It advocates “cosmopolitan moral standards or moral criteria [of social justice] — or assessing, respectively, human agents and their conducts, social institutions and states of the world.” According to Pogge, a cosmopolitan concept of social justice “makes certain widely sharable demands on the design of any institutional order — for example, that it must not produce massive human rights deficits or huge socioeconomic inequalities that are foreseeably avoidable.” Another feature is social-justice cosmopolitanism is that it is centered on the principle of human rights, that is, a cosmopolitan concept of social justice is centered on the idea of basic human rights. For this reason, Pogge associates Kantian cosmopolitanism or its reconstructed version such as Habermas’ version of cosmopolitanism more with social justice cosmopolitanism, though Kant develops the concept of cosmopolitan law, and conceives a cosmopolitan republican order, and Habermas advocates a constitutionalized global order wherein violation of human rights and crimes against humanity would be prosecuted. For the same reason, Pogge identifies himself with this form of cosmopolitanism. Pogge is not only a staunch advocate and defender of human rights for all in the world, but also one of the most influential ones in our time. Since Pogge considers social justice cosmopolitanism more or less as a form of moral cosmopolitanism, he considers the emphasis on human rights in social justice cosmopolitanism to manifest what he dubs as “normative individualism”, instead of republicanism, a term which Kant or Habermas may prefer more. Meanwhile, Pogge’s cosmopolitan expansion of Rawls’s theory of justice develops with his rejection of Nagel, Blake and various others’ arguments against a possible concept of global justice.

According to Pogge, in social-justice cosmopolitanism, “injustice is primarily a property of institutional designs.” In comparison, Monistic cosmopolitanism “understands injustice as primarily a property of states of the world. This property is understood to supervene on properties of, or comparative relations among, human beings.” Accordingly, “Monistic cosmopolitanism coordinates all human agents and all humanly shapeable factors toward one unitary goal: to make the world as just as we can make it.” Like social-justice cosmopolitanism, Monistic cosmopolitanism is in essence a form of moral cosmopolitanism in the sense that the standards and criteria which it employs to coordinate all human agents and all humanly shapeable factors are moral. It differs from social-justice cosmopolitanism in focus, not in form. The similar can be said of ethical cosmopolitanism. For Pogge, ethical cosmopolitanism demands that individual or collective human agents be required to have a commitment to a cosmopolitan ethics as much as to a nationalistic or communal ethics; that in their ordinary conduct, individual or collective human agents reduce “the difference
between the concern they show for the interests of their near and dear and the concern they show for the interests of distant strangers”. In Pogge’s view, two influential representatives of ethical cosmopolitanism today are Martha Nussbaum and Jeremy Waldron. Correspondingly, Richard Rorty’s nationalistic patriotism is the opposite of ethical cosmopolitanism. Ethical cosmopolitanism is in essence a form of moral cosmopolitanism too.

Pogge indicates that all three types of moral cosmopolitanism — that is, social-justice cosmopolitanism, Monistic cosmopolitanism, and ethical cosmopolitanism — commit to follows: (1) “Normative Individualism: The ultimate units of moral concern are human beings, or persons”; as Pogge writes in World Poverty and Human rights, “The central idea of moral cosmopolitanism is that every human being has a global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern” (Pogge, 2002, 169); (2) universality or all-inclusiveness; that is, cosmopolitan moral criterion concern all and are applied to all; (3) “Impartiality or Equality: The survival and flourishing of all human beings matters equally, regardless of their native language, religion, skin color, gender, endowments, ethnicity or lifestyle”; and (4) “Generality: The special equal status of every human being has global force.” Noteworthy, Pogge’s division of cosmopolitanism among four types as described above is a revision and development of his division of cosmopolitanism between legal and moral cosmopolitanism with moral cosmopolitanism further sub-divides between institutional and interactional cosmopolitanism in World Poverty and Human rights.

X. W. Chen’s paper offers a preliminary account of cosmopolitanism by drawing a comparison between present cosmopolitanism and communism. By present cosmopolitanism, Chen refers to the type of cosmopolitanism that can be traced back to Kant and that is advocated by Habermas and various others today. The comparison between present cosmopolitanism and communism unfold around the five commitments of present cosmopolitanism: the commitments to the principle of human rights, the rule of law, democracy, inclusion, and the norm of humanity. The five commitments of present cosmopolitanism which Chen’s essay examines have affinity with the four commitments moral cosmopolitanism which Pogge discusses. That is, they emphasize cosmopolitanism based on human rights; they emphasize the principle of inclusion. That being said, Chen’s essay underscores two features of present cosmopolitanism: the idea of a cosmopolitan order as a juridical order anchored around the concept of basic human rights and the idea that cosmopolitan laws and norms are juridical; for example, the norm of human rights is juridical; so is the norm of crimes against humanity. At the end of the day, Chen’s essay illustrates the conceptual trinity of a cosmopolitan order — global justice, global humanity, and global democracy.

Josef Seifert’s essay explores the concept of cosmopolitanism from the point of view of phenomenological realism. Offering a phenomenological account, the essay first distinguishes the positive sense of cosmopolitanism from six other meanings of the term. By a positive sense of the term is meant that the “cosmopolitan” identity of a person informs him or her that he or she is not only a citizen of his or her state, but also a citizen of a global human community bound together by a common nature, fate, values, human rights and principles of peaceful coexistence. Noteworthy, as indicated
above, Pogge’s sense “cosmopolitan” focuses on one’s being a world citizen in an opening, inclusive global community. Seifert’s sense “cosmopolitan” focuses on one’s belonging to a global community of common humanity — that is, bound together by a common nature, fate, values, human rights and principles of peaceful coexistence. The phenomenological realistic qualification here is of great importance. It actually offers support for the kind of social-justice cosmopolitanism which Pogge endorses. As a form of moral cosmopolitanism, social-justice cosmopolitanism is better off with a concept of common humanity.

Seifert’s essay then addresses the question: amid cultural diversity today, is the cosmopolitan ideal an illusion? Samuel Huntington seems to suggest that the cosmopolitan ideal is indeed an illusion. According to Huntington, by some necessary historical laws civilizations in the 21st century will inevitably clash. Seifert’s essay essay rejects Huntington’s review, arguing that a) there is no necessity of a clash of civilizations and b) Huntington’s arguments for his hypothesis are wrong. The essay further indicates that a cosmopolitan spirit presupposes the recognition and consensus on some basic values and rights of humanity. In a way, Seifert’s paper and Chen’s paper have different proposals on cosmopolitanism amid cultural diversity. Seifert’s paper wants to ground the cosmopolitan ideal in the common recognition of humankind’s moral nature — that is, common humanity. Chen’s paper sets its footing on humankind’s ability to extend their life together under the rule of law.

Barbara Entl’s paper raises an important question: Can we talk about a cosmopolitan ethics without the principle of happiness? Her question leads us to see that there is a conspicuous absence in the discourse of cosmopolitanism today — the absence of the principle of happiness; a cosmopolitan ethics without the principle of happiness, a serious inadequacy! Her essay starts with exploring two important theories of cosmopolitanism today — that is, Habermas’ and Benhabib’s theory. It demonstrates that both Habermas’ and Benhabib’s theories of a cosmopolitan order are essentially Kantian; both theories advocate a cosmopolitan order for world peace on the one hand and insist only the kind of world peace on the basis of global justice and respect for basic human rights on the other hand. The essay then suggests that we should expand our concept of cosmopolitanism to include the principle of happiness as a core, operational principle in a cosmopolitan order. The acclaim point of Entl’s essay is its suggestion that both the obligation of global justice and the obligation of humanitarian morality belong in the category of cosmopolitan obligation which all citizens, governments, and nation-peoples have; a plausible concept of a cosmopolitan order must be able to accommodate the concept of different cultural centers of happiness. The stock value of Entl’s view rises in view of the fact that the principle of happiness is marginal in Kantian morality. Thus, Entl’s paper raises some important questions: Can we talk about cosmopolitan ethics without emphasizing the principle of happiness? Or should we talk about cosmopolitan ethics without emphasizing the principle of happiness? Can we talk about global inclusion and toleration without mentioning that different peoples have different centers of happiness? Noteworthy, the discipline called ethics traditionally deals with happiness and a good, worthy life.

J. Z. Ding’s paper offers a historical and comparative review of the idea of cosmopolitanism. In particular, it explores the relation between cosmopolitanism and
universalism. It indicates that cosmopolitanism has also a long tradition in Chinese philosophy since Laozi and Confucius; moreover, Chinese cosmopolitan sentiment is mingled with her universalistic sentiment. Ding’s historical and comparative account of cosmopolitanism is a good complementary to the theoretical reflection of cosmopolitanism in other papers in this volume. Ding’s paper is in line with Pogge’s paper on one important point: various forms of moral cosmopolitanism have a common universalistic commitment.

Reading the above papers together, they are devoted to expanding our concept of cosmopolitanism beyond the Kantian tradition. They emphasize a dialectical, balanced approach to the relationships between cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, republicanism and nationalism, moral solidarity and ethical pluralism, global unity and cultural diversity, and the like. Evidently, while papers in this volume focus on addressing various conceptual problems of cosmopolitanism, they also address some serious normative questions of cosmopolitanism either directly or indirectly. In sum, they serve as a good introduction to cosmopolitanism.

At the end of the day, a radically opening future stares at humankind. The glare of the promise and challenge of cosmopolitanism may make humankind dizzy. All the same, humankind should rise high with her Leonian creativity and Aquarian vision and rationality to develop a cosmopolitan order in the light of global justice, in the house of global humanity, and through the path of global democracy. That much we learn, and that much we should learn.

References