A COSMOPOLITAN ORDER: MORAL SOLIDARITY
AND ETHICAL PLURALISM

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Abstract: the purpose of this essay is to develop a concept of a cosmopolitan order that facilitates both moral solidarity and ethical pluralism in the globe. Doing so, I will explore both Jürgen Habermas’ and Seyla Benhabib’s reconstruction of the Kantian cosmopolitan project. I then discuss a concept of a cosmopolitan order that can guarantee global justice in terms of basic human rights and, simultaneously, promote human happiness and renovating nations and peoples.

THE EVOLUTION from the aspiration for international norms of justice to the aspiration for cosmopolitanism has transformed the way of how citizens should be treated and how international and global affairs should be handled in our time. World peace and human rights are among the watching words of our time and part of the spirit of our time. Notwithstanding, philosophers today engage in a heated debate on what kind of cosmopolitan order that we ought to have. This is good. Having a long tradition as it does, the ideal of cosmopolitanism itself is also historically evolving. In this essay, I first explore two important theories of cosmopolitanism today—that is, Jürgen Habermas’ and Seyla Benhabib’s view on the subject-matter. I then propose a concept of a cosmopolitan order that sets its footing not only on the norm of basic rights, but also on the principle of happiness. That is, a desirable cosmopolitan order should be a rights-centered order of global justice on the one hand and an order for promoting human happiness and renovating nations and peoples on the other hand. It should bring moral solidarity on the one hand and accommodate ethical pluralism on the other hand. It should be an order wherein those parenthetical contradictions such as cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, as well as unity and diversity would be seen from a dialectical perspective.

I do not think that it is out of style to talk about the principle of happiness as an operation principle in a cosmopolitan order in our time, though I may swim against the wave here. It is my contention that a viable cosmopolitan order is for human happiness; a desirable cosmopolitan order must be able to accommodate different centers of happiness of different cultures and peoples. That being said, I shall clarify

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at the outset that my concept of a viable cosmopolitan order is humanistic, not utilitarian. In my approach, the principle of happiness co-operates with the principle of global justice in terms of basic human rights. In my approach, the principle of happiness is also a main source of the normativity of a good cosmopolitan order. I shall also clarify that insisting the principle of happiness as an operational principle of a cosmopolitan order in our time; I have no problem with the concept that a cosmopolitan order ought to be a juridical one — that a central idea in Habermas’ cosmopolitan vision. My sole purpose is to emphasize that the principle of happiness should be an operational principle of a cosmopolitan order geared to world peace and promotion of basic human rights.

I

In the West, traditionally, the aspiration for a cosmopolitan order is always one for universal moral solidarity. This can be traced back to ancient Greek philosophy. In ancient time, the touchstone concept for such an order of universally moral solidarity is the concepts of universal good and universal ethics. In modern period, Kant retuned the ideal of cosmopolitanism in terms of basic cosmopolitan rights, e.g., the rights of universal hospitality. Kant’s ideal thus lifts up the aspiration of cosmopolitanism in which a violation of rights is considered to be universally wrong, and the norm of a cosmopolitan right is an unwritten code of constitutional and international law (Kant, 1972, 142). Near all present thinking about cosmopolitanism takes its cue from Kant.

Kant’s ideal of cosmopolitanism contains two ideas that become the touchstone of present cosmopolitanism: (1) The idea of a cosmopolitan order as an order of global justice or cosmopolitan justice; and (2) The idea of a cosmopolitan order as a kingdom of basic human rights. These two ideas epitomize modern cosmopolitanism as a philosophy of human rights and enthrone the language of basic rights as the language of a cosmopolitan order today. The wide appeal of cosmopolitanism today is due in no a small measure to these two Kantian ideas of cosmopolitanism. Against such a backdrop, noteworthy, in Kant, the consideration of happiness is not a source of moral obligation. As a result, the concept of happiness and that of human suffering are marginal in Kant’s philosophy of cosmopolitanism. Accordingly, the principle of happiness is not a guiding and operational principle of Kantian cosmopolitanism, even though Kant conceived a cosmopolitan order to safeguard perpetually world peace. In other words, Kant more or less purchased the idea of cosmopolitan rights at the cost the idea of happiness. Equally crucial, the focus in Kant's concept of a new cosmopolitan order is on cosmopolitan solidarity, though Kant emphasized the inviolability of national sovereignty — an emphasis that can be interpreted as a last defense of ethical plurality.

This leads us to Habermas. So far as the subject-matter of cosmopolitanism is concerned, Habermas is a Kantian in bone and in substance, though he is generally recognized as a philosopher of critical theory. Habermas’ most recent development of
the Kantian project inherits Kant’s insight and illusion. In *The Inclusion of the Other*, Habermas summarizes the Kantian vision of a cosmopolitan order as the following:

The republican order of a democratic state founded on human rights calls for something more than the weak regulation of belligerent international relations by international law. Rather, the legal principles implemented within single states should lead ultimately to a global legal order that unites all peoples and abolishes war (Habermas, 1998b, 165).

According to Habermas, the Kantian vision has two crucial features: (1) its objective: world peace; abolishing wars; and (2) cosmopolitan laws of justice in terms of basic human rights. In such an order, “all forms of the state are based on the idea of a constitution which is compatible with the natural rights of men, so that those who obey the law should also act as a unified body of legislators” (Ibid.). Therefore, Habermas’ reconstruction does not focus on the issue of what cosmopolitan order we ought to have, but on the issue of how to realize the Kantian ideal of a cosmopolitan order. The metaphysical question of what is a cosmopolitan order is considered to be settled by Kant in Habermas.

Noteworthy, the Kantian cosmopolitan principles are characterized as “legal principles” by Habermas. Accordingly, the Kantian cosmopolitan order is proclaimed explicitly to be a legal order in which the principle of basic human rights functions as both the guiding and the operational principle. Cosmopolitan rights and cosmopolitan law, not human happiness and morality, remain the crucial parameters for Habermas in his reconceptualization of the Kantian cosmopolitan project. For this reason, following Kant, Habermas conceives the call for world peace, which a cosmopolitan order should safeguard, to be a call from the principle of global justice grounded in the norm of basic human rights, not a call from the principle of human happiness. This Habermas’ move leads him further to develop a concept of a cosmopolitan order as one of three levels of legal order: the national, the international, and the global or super-national. Habermas firmly commits himself to search for a global order under the rule of law. More crucially, as a staunch defender of the ideal and integrity of modernity, Habermas is less sympathetic to nationalism and ideas of national values or cultural values. Correspondingly, the issue of happiness is also marginal in the concern of cosmopolitanism.

As a result of the above, for Habermas, the task to revitalize the Kantian idea of a cosmopolitan order is a procedural one; it is to locate the possibility and conditions for a political constitution of a world society; it is to define the legitimate process in which a legitimate cosmopolitan order can be built. Habermas’ central question of a cosmopolitan order is more or less reformed Kantian one: How is a juridical cosmopolitan order without a world state possible? This question leads some further sub-division questions: How are laws of global justice possible? How is a global constitution possible? How is a legitimate world constitution defining a legitimate cosmopolitan order possible? Accordingly, Habermas’ interest focuses more or less exclusively on how to develop a legitimate world constitution and building a constitutionalized global order without a world government. In Habermas’ view, a
political constitution is the totality of basic laws of a cosmopolitan order. It is the foundation for all laws of global justice.

Now, for Habermas, a legitimate constitution of a cosmopolitan order must meet two conditions: (1) it is democratically established; and (2) universally justifiable. How to develop such a constitution possible? In his 2007 essay “A Political Constitution for the Pluralist World Society” and elsewhere, Habermas offers a three-dimensional transformation of state-centered international laws into cosmopolitan laws without a world state: (1) The federalist notion of “divided sovereignty” and a “multi-level system”; (2) “The distinction between two types of constitution that might be combined in a new way in the constitution of a world society without world government”; (3) “The temporal pattern of incremental advances in the constitutionalization process, initiated and backed by governments rather than by citizens” (Habermas, 2007, 333). Here, Habermas’ reconceptualization of the Kantian project of a cosmopolitan order addresses directly these two questions: (1) How is a constitutionalized cosmopolitan order without a world state possible?; (2) How is a cosmopolitan constitution or a constitution of the world society possible without a world state?

Along this line, in Europe: the Faltering Project, Habermas argues for further three conceptual renovation — that of statehood, of democratic constitution, and of civic solidarity (Habermas, 2009, 112–118). Though his focus falls on how to realize the Kantian ideal, not to reconstruct the substantial content of the Kantian ideal, Habermas does move beyond Kantian in some aspects. Most importantly, Habermas rejects Kant’s unconditional recognition of the sovereignty of a state in a cosmopolitan order in both the Inclusion of Other and the Divided West. For him, cosmopolitan laws of global justice as giving due to human rights should also be binding on individual governments and their officials, negating related sovereignty of nation-states. By this token, in front of cosmopolitan laws of justice in terms of basic human rights, national sovereignty is not inviolable. Noteworthy, doing so, unfortunately, Habermas also rejects the concept that each nation or people has its own center of happiness and value in a new cosmopolitan order. This is exhibited in his two emphases in the Inclusion of the Other: (1) the overriding power of the global human rights politics over national sovereignty; and (2) his view on the relation between group rights and individual rights in the matter of inclusion and the primacy of the latter over the former. In both emphases, he is profoundly correct in emphasizing global human rights politics with law as its necessary mediation. Responding to this, my concern here is the question about what is the relation between the idea of national good or the communal good of a nation-people and global human rights politics. As I shall see it, the concept of national good and happiness should not simply vanish or be marginalized. The same can be said of the relation between group rights and individual rights. Habermas’ may be correct in insisting the primacy of the latter over the former. Still, the concept of communal good and happiness should not simply vanish or be marginalized. At least, we are much better off with having the concept of communal good and happiness in a further cosmopolitan ethics.
In light of the above, I would like to press some concerns here. Above all, in addition to the principle of basic human rights, are there other guiding and operational principles of a cosmopolitan order? Here, at issue is not merely that the application of cosmopolitan laws of justice should take into consideration of cultural values. It is that in reality, the principle of human happiness should also be a guiding and operational principle of a cosmopolitan order so that a cosmopolitan order is in principle not only geared for universal moral solidarity, but also ethical pluralism, just as the Europe project is not merely geared to develop the moral and legal solidarity of European nations, but also to develop the European identity and value. Buddhism may be incorrect in suggesting that happiness should be the only guiding principle of universal ethics. That being said, learning from Buddhism and other oriental philosophies, we should recognize that to talk about a global order without emphasizing human happiness is a serious inadequacy. Here, the principle of human happiness may suggest that a cosmopolitan order be grounded in both global justice and humanitarian morality, not in either alone. Notwithstanding, a justified cosmopolitan order enables, not eliminates, ethical pluralism; that is, a justified cosmopolitan order enables also different peoples to pursue diverse courses of happiness.

A cosmopolitan order, like any other political orders, is justified and called for not only because it is right, but also because it promotes and safeguards human happiness and reduces human suffering. Safeguarding world peace is an important way to promote human happiness in the globe. This amounts to saying that happiness is the purpose, world peace is the instrument. A cosmopolitan order is called for also because it is good and it is a call of the prudential reason. A cosmopolitan order cannot be good if it does not allow different people to pursue diversely happiness, including diverse kinds of happiness and good. Therefore, cosmopolitanism presupposes its opposite, multi-culturalism, as we are taught by traditional Chinese yin-yang dialectics. More crucial, a good cosmopolitan order itself is a combination of opposites and an order of unity with diversity. A cosmopolitan order should be normatively justifiable. A justified cosmopolitan order is not only much cognitively and morally acceptable, but also ethically prudential.

As a result, I would like to propose follows. First, a legal-political constitution of a new global order must enable us to deal with cultural diversity and cultural values and aspirations more democratically and competently. Second, a legal-political constitution of a new global order should bring about not only normalization of practice and institutions in the globe, but also a new ethical toleration of humankind amid the diversity of humankind. Third, a legal-political constitution of a new global order should bring about not only a global, legal order, but also universal human values and standards of happiness, of which toleration of cultural diversity itself is a value. In short, a legal-political constitution of a new global order should be a constitution that both brings about unity and tolerates diversity. The task that we face to reconstruct the Kantian-Habermasian ideal of a cosmopolitan order is not merely a procedural one, but al substantial one — that is, it not merely how to realize the Kantian-Habermsian ideal, but also to reconstruct the substantial content of the ideal itself.
By this token, the task to locate the “mid-wife” of a cosmopolitan order as emphasized by Habermas is important. That being said, the question of what “baby” the “mid-wife” should help to deliver is equally crucial. In other words, the task to locate the mother and father of a cosmopolitan order is equally crucial, if not more important. In this context, Habermas’ rejection of what he calls “human right fundamentalism” both is illuminating and leaves something to be desired (Habermas, 1998b, 200-201). It is illuminating in the sense that human right fundamentalism betrays the ideal of cosmopolitanism and global justice, not strives for it and that global human rights politics should be mediated by global laws of justice. It leaves something to be desired in the sense that perhaps, the problem is not merely a political use of the concept of human rights; in the international arena, the problem can be that illegitimate violation of a nation/people’ sovereignty and cultural way may be unreflectively done under the cover of protecting universal human rights. I am not for extreme multiculturalism or what Habermas calls “militant multiculturalism” here. I am for cultural inclusion which recognizes different legitimate centers of happiness in different cultures and nation-peoples.

In sum, my critical response to Habermas is that we need to reconstruct the substantial content of Kant’s concept of a cosmopolitan order, not merely to find a way to enact the Kantian project. Kant conceives the cosmopolitan order merely in terms of a set of cosmopolitan rights. Habermas has not expanded this concept of a cosmopolitan order. Essentially, Habermas’ new version of a cosmopolitan order is still one co-extensive with that of global justice as Kant’s is. We shall turn to Seyla Benhabib at this point.

II

Benhabib’s view on cosmopolitanism is also within the Kantian tradition. She recognizes that Kantian cosmopolitanism is anchored around the concept of cosmopolitan rights. She thus calls Kant’s version of cosmopolitanism and its various contemporary versions, including hers, “another version of cosmopolitanism”, underscoring their differences from Grecian or Stoic cosmopolitanism. Drawing from Kant’s cosmopolitanism, Benhabib’s version of cosmopolitanism also “imagines a global order which the idea of human rights is an operative principle of justice, with mechanisms of global governance established especially for their protection” (Fine, 2009, 8). In it, cosmopolitan norms are norms of global justice geared to honor, protect, and maintain human rights. Benhabib climbs to a higher point on Kant's shoulder. Benhabib makes no bone of that. In “The Philosophical Foundations of Cosmopolitan Norms,” the first of her own two essays, she recalls Kant and the Kantian legacy particularly. Benhabib brings in the historical progress since World War II in recognizing universal human rights to rekindle the Kantian ideal. In particular, “since the UN Declaration of Human rights in 1948, we have entered a phrase in the evolution of global civil society, which is characterized by a transition from international to cosmopolitan norms of justice” (Benhabib, 2006, 15-16). Thus, the norm of human rights in Benhabib is more substantial than the Kantian one whose paradigmatic example is the universal right of hospitality.
In light of the above, Benhabib's version of cosmopolitanism is another version in three senses. In one sense, it is grounded particularly in the concept of basic human rights, which demarcates it from other versions of cosmopolitan ethics or moral philosophy, e.g., Grecian cosmopolitanism or Stoic cosmopolitanism. Noteworthy, in its departure to Grecian cosmopolitanism, Benhabib's cosmopolitanism also marginalize the principle of happiness. In another sense, contrasted to various interpretations of cosmopolitanism today, Benhabib advocates the concept of cosmopolitanism as “a normative philosophy for carrying the universalistic norms of discourse beyond the confines of nation-state” (Ibid.18). In a further another sense, her version of cosmopolitanism conceives a cosmopolitan order to be not only moral, but also legal, an order that not only gives rise to advices, but also imposes legal obligation. More crucial, such a global order is one based on basic human rights. In her own words, Benhabib follows “the Kantian tradition in thinking of cosmopolitanism as the emergence of norms that ought to govern relations among individuals in a global civil society” (Ibid., 20).

As a result, no wonder, Benhabib's question is how to have a cosmopolitan order as a legal order, not merely a moral order. Also, Benhabib wants to purchase a cosmopolitan order with the price of multi-culturalism, though she explicitly emphasizes on global democracy. Like Kant and Habermas, the concept of happiness is marginal in her version of a new cosmopolitan order. Benhabib highlights her version of cosmopolitanism with addressing three interrelated questions, as they arise in the Arendt-Jaspers exchange: (1) “What is the ontological status of cosmopolitan norms in a post-metaphysical universe?”; (2) “What is the authority of norms that are not backed by a sovereign with the power of enforcement?”; and (3) “How can we reconcile cosmopolitan norms with the fact of a divided mankind?” (Ibid., 70).

Following Kant’s footsteps, Benhabib also thinks of “cosmopolitanism as the emergence of norms that ought to govern relations among individuals in a global civic society. These norms are neither merely moral nor just legal. They may be best characterized as framing the ‘morality of law,’ but in global rather than a domestic context” (Benhabib, 2006, 20). Benhabib’s conceptual renovation is to reconceptualize Kant’s concept of “cosmopolitan right, which concerns relations among civil persons to each other as well as to organized political entities in a global society” and therefore to reconceptualize the ideal of a cosmopolitan order centered on the idea of individual persons’ cosmopolitan rights (Ibid., 21). By this token, the values of a nation or people, the national pathos of happiness, and individual pathos of individual persons’ happiness do not constitute a class of consideration in a project of building a cosmopolitan order. Noteworthy also, like Habermas, Benhabib also takes for granted that the concern of world peace and the concern of global justice are more or less identical. For this reason, the concern of world peace, which is pivotal in Kant, is pushed back to the background so deep to be no ascertainable.

Unlike Habermas, Benhabib does not see much conceptual limitation in Kant’s centralist concept of a world republic modeled after the French Republic nor does she see any necessity to renovate Kant’s concept of constitution amid the absence of a world government. Her question is simply how to recapture the Kantian concept of a cosmopolitan republic as a human-rights regime in the world today, moving the
regime from a moral one to a legal one as well. In connection with this, her question is also in what sense cosmopolitan norms such as basic rights are not merely moral, but also juridical. Her project of cosmopolitanism is devoted to “carrying out the universalistic norms of justice of discourse ethics beyond the confine of the nation-state” (Ibid., 18).

Correspondingly, Benhabib’s signature contribution to the discourse of cosmopolitanism today is in answering the question of how to realize the Kantian ideal of cosmopolitanism. According to her, the road to a cosmopolitan order is what she calls a “democratic iteration”, “through which cosmopolitan norms come to acquire positive legal status” (Post, 2006, 4). By democratic iteration, Benhabib does not mean either some kind of formal procedure of legislature or informal customization of what are considered to be cosmopolitan norms. Rather, she means a process wherein citizens can “reiterate these principles and incorporate them into democratic will-formation process through argumentation, contestation, revision and rejection” (Ibid.) In other words, democratic iteration is a comprehensive cultural, institutional process in which cosmopolitan norms are conceived, spread, and institutionalized globally as well as locally. “Democratic iterations are complex ways of mediating the will-and opinion-formation of democratic majorities and cosmopolitan norms” (Benhabib, 2006, 45). And the objects of the global will and opinion that must be formed through democratic iteration are the contents of global justice and the contents and range of basic human rights.

Noteworthy here, Benhabib holds that democratic iteration as described above can translate morally cosmopolitan norms into legal or positive laws. Thus, Benhabib in effect follows Kant to subordinate law to morality and does not buy Habermas’ view that “legal norms stems from the decisions of a historical legislature” (Habermas, 1998a, 124). That being said, Benhabib also replaces the Kantian mid-wife as some revolutionary events with the mid-wife as a democratic process. Also for Benhabib, such a process is not merely procedural, but also moral and substantial, and is one of global will-opinion formation process. In comparison to Habermas who focuses more on developing kind of a legitimate but formal world constitution, Benhabibs focuses more on embodying what are considered to be cosmopolitan norms of justice in basic social institutions of nations and peoples in the globe. Thus, for example, Habermas is obsessed with the concern of reconstruction of United Nation as a governing body. Benhabib is preoccupied more with “iteration” of public discourse on universal human rights.

Though Benhabib correctly insists that a cosmopolitan order should be understood both in the moral sense and in the legal sense, her vision of a cosmopolitan order has also some shortcomings. First, in content, her version of a cosmopolitan order is exclusively one of basic human rights. Cosmopolitan obligation arises exclusively from respecting a person’s basic rights. By this token, the foundation for global solidarity is exclusively the norm of basic rights. Second, her version of a cosmopolitan order is exclusively one of global justice. Third, accordingly, for Benhabib, as it is for Kant, consideration of happiness is marginal in cosmopolitanism. Fourth, like Habermas, Benhabib sets aside the concept of happiness in her project of cosmopolitanism. To talk about a cosmopolitan order for
world peace without the concept of happiness is a serious inadequacy. Therefore, though Benhabib conceives cosmopolitan norms to constitute the morality of laws, her concept of cosmopolitan morality and ethics is essentially Kantian.

That being said, unlike Habermas, Benhabib recognizes the problem of multiculturalism. The author of *The Claim of Culture* and a distinguished feminist thinker herself, Benhabib may not advocate multiculturalism in her vision of cosmopolitanism. Still, she recognizes that “the tension between universal human rights claim and particularistic cultural and national identities is constitutive of democratic legitimacy. Modern democracies act in the name of universal principles, which are then circumscribed within a particular civic community” (Benhabib, 2006, 32). Thus, unlike Habermas’ single-mindedly talk about cosmopolitan norms, the concept of value is not totally absent in Bahabib’s vision of a cosmopolitan order. Therefore, democratic iteration is also intended as a bridge mediating “moral universalism with ethical particularism”.

In spite of the above, Benhabib’s insightful view needs some remedies. We still need to ask the question of what cosmopolitan order we ought to develop today. As I shall understand it, a cosmopolitan order should have not only normative requirements of cosmopolitan justice giving due to cosmopolitan rights, but also normative requirements of humanity giving due to aspirations for happiness and particular values. It is not only an order of solidarity, but also one of inclusion. Inclusion presupposes of diversity and is of course inclusion and toleration of differences. In short, a cosmopolitan order is not merely a regime of cosmopolitan rights, but also a republic of human happiness and human goods. Also, along this line of approach, we should recognize that from time to time, the interests of peace and that of justice may differ. The situations in Middle East, Africa, and other parts of the world today should remind us of this.

Furthermore, with regard to the question of how to translate cosmopolitan moral norms into cosmopolitan legal norms, in my opinion, we would be unjustified to assume a natural transition from cosmopolitan morality to cosmopolitan jurisprudence here. Anything else, law has what Habermas calls “facticity” that morality has no. Two further points are also worth being stressed. First, Habermas’ distinction between acceptability and acceptance finds its accrued value here. Just as acceptance itself does not presuppose acceptability, acceptability itself does not presuppose acceptance. Thus, the acceptability of cosmopolitan norms alone still does not make them globally juridical norms. There must be acceptance of them and institutions to enforce them in the globe. Second, as Habermas points out, moral norms and legal norms differ in at least three areas: cognitive, motivational, and organizational (*Ibid.*, 114—115). Thus, for example, the development of cosmopolitan juridical norms involves a transition from the cognitive indeterminacy of cosmopolitan moral norms to cognitive determinacy of cosmopolitan laws. The transformation presupposes an overcome of the organizational deficiency of cosmopolitan moral norms. “The law presents itself as a system of rights only as long as we consider it in terms of its specific function of stabilizing behavioral expectation. These rights can take effect and be enforced only by organizations that make collectively binding decisions” (*Ibid.*, 130).
Benhabib says rightly that cosmopolitan norms of justice frame “the morality of laws” and “signal the eventual legalization and juridification of the rights claims of human beings” on the earth (Benhabib, 2006, 20). I would not spend time worrying here that given that moral norms and legal norms are not identical, “the morality of law” cannot replace legal norms and principles of law themselves; that equally crucial, while the transformation of cosmopolitan moral norms into legal norms involve global democracy, not only individual persons participate in such a democracy as both cosmopolitan and national citizens, but also nation-states have important role to play. My question here is whether in addressing those world problems such as war and peace, hunger, environment, we need the principle of human happiness as an operational cosmopolitan norm, in addition to the norms of human rights. My question here is also that given participation of nation-states and nation-peoples in turn inevitably brings in multiculturalism, how best to address the matter of cultural inclusion and toleration and in such a context, whether the principle of happiness should be an operational cosmopolitan principle.

In light of the above, we need a broader concept of a cosmopolitan order both of global justice and of human happiness. Kant envisioned a cosmopolitan order as a global legal order. The ongoing globalization increases the stock value and credential of the concept of a global legal order, especially, the development of regional, international, and global institutions (e.g., laws, treaties, and organizations) is a key benchmark of the progress of juridical globalization. That being said, we must not lose a perspective of the fact that cultural diversity is a permanent reality; we are better off by envisioning a cosmopolitan order that not only emphasizes global solidarity, but also entertains ethical-cultural pluralism.

III

We are in a position to develop a broad concept of a cosmopolitan order. In a broader concept, a cosmopolitan order is one geared for not only global justice, but also global human happiness; cosmopolitan norms of obligation include not only norms of global justice, but also norms of happiness. As the principle of human happiness is in play, a cosmopolitan order which I would like to argue for here emphasizes the global human bond among all human beings, peace and cooperation among peoples as a core value, universal compassion for human suffering as one of the basic human sentiments, and toleration and inclusion of cultural values as an important norm.

What we should build is not only a new world order, but also a new one in which human happiness is promoted. If peoples and nations are not happy in a new world order, what is the point of building a new world order? If individual persons are not happier in a new world order than they were in the old world order, what is the point to talk about a new global order? By this token, a cosmopolitan order which I argue for here implies follows: (1) Norms and standards of action are geared to promote happiness; they are to safeguard world peace; (2) Our practical identity which is indispensable for our sense of happiness is a practical reason for action and a source of all reasons and value; (3) concerns about values that are crucial to happiness will impose a specific class of ethical obligations in global human affairs, for example,
cultural toleration and inclusion; cosmopolitan laws should be conceived in terms of promoting happiness and eliminating suffering. The ethics of happiness insists on "tolerance in other people’s ways of thought" (Brown, 1987, 65). Cosmopolitanism and multi-culturalism are not incompatible.

I would like to make an even stronger claim: the purpose of world peace is human happiness. In other words, world peace is important because it is an indispensable condition for endurable human happiness. But world peace itself is not the purpose, at least the highest purpose of human endeavor. Therefore, if we follow Kant’s idea that a cosmopolitan order should safeguard world peace, we should go beyond Kant’s vision to see that a cosmopolitan order should safeguard world peace in order to realize human happiness. We should follow Aristotle to see that happiness is the highest good. A cosmopolitan ethics without the principle of happiness is poor both in letter and spirit. The principle of happiness and the norm of basic rights are akin to yin-yang forces in Chinese philosophy, inseparable and mutually enhancing.

That being said, global justice is still the main operating principle of a new cosmopolitan order and the norm of basic rights is still the touchstone principle of a cosmopolitan order. Meanwhile, the norm of happiness brings about a distinctive class of cosmopolitan human obligations that intersected with from obligation of justices, but not reducible to the latters. This can be seen in some situations of global affairs in which peace and the ends of some conflicts that produce speechless human suffering are not always achieved in manners that justice is served, but often in manners in which justice may be compromised momentarily. All the same, one class of cosmopolitan obligations should be understood as obligations that arise from concerns of human welfare from the point of view of happiness than in terms of giving due to cosmopolitan rights. This class of cosmopolitan obligations is in line with Kant’s requirement of treating human beings as the purpose. They engrave and insert concerns of human suffering and happiness and the welfare of a person in the moral consideration and motivation.

Recent works of Brian Berry, Thomas W. Pogge, and others have emphasized the human obligation to eliminate poverty in the globe. I find Pogge’s concept of our cosmopolitan obligation to eliminate world poverty particularly inspiring. However, Berry, Pogge and others all frame such a kind of cosmopolitan obligation in the language of global justice as giving due to basic human rights. For example, Pogge frames our cosmopolitan obligation to eliminate world poverty as obligation in terms of basic economic rights. In my opinion, it makes more sense to talk obligations of this category as obligations in terms of happiness. Indeed, in my opinion, what Berry, Pogge, and others have emphasized, in terms of economic rights, are obligations of human happiness. From them, we learn two things. First, the concerns of happiness and suffering are, and ought to be, crucial ones among core concerns of a cosmopolitan order. The concern of human suffering is the core of traditional humanitarian morality. Second, in a justified global order, there is such a thing called the legitimate interest and welfare of a nation-state or a people as a whole. Therefore, we do better in emphasizing directly and explicitly that the norm of happiness imposes a distinctive class of cosmopolitan obligations on humankind for humankind. In my opinion, we do better by recovering the Confucian insight that if we lose a
sense of commiseration for human suffering, we lose part of our human nature. In my opinion, the key is to understand that the global obligation to eliminate global poverty belong in the category of a class of obligations of humanitarian ethics, which is centered on the concept of happiness. It is a class of obligations of human values and human happiness, not a class of obligation of global justice as giving due to basic rights.

A further point is this. In a world full of cultural conflicts, world peace calls for not only global justice, but also sensitivity to human values and human happiness. In this context, the consideration of human values must do justice to different cultural values which different peoples hold dearly, and the consideration of human happiness must recognize that different peoples may have different centers of happiness and gravity of happiness. Here, it is helpful to recall Vaclav Havel. At his acceptance speech to the award of the Liberty Medal at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on the 4th of July, 1994, the 218th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, Havel said:

The single planetary civilization to which we all belong confronts us with global challenges. We stand helpless before them because our civilization has essentially globalized only the surface of our lives. But our inner self continues to have a life of its own … Because of this, individual cultures, increasingly lumped together by contemporary civilization, are realizing with new urgency their own inner autonomy and the inner differences of others. Cultural conflicts are increasing and are understandably more dangerous today than at any other time in history … The abyss between the rational and the spiritual … the universal and the unique constantly grows deeper (www.theosociety.org/pasadena/sunrise/44-94-5/fiss-hav1).

As Havel noted, multiculturalism is an inherent reality of our time wherein various cultural selves each has a life of their own and cultural values and centers of happiness do matter. This amounts to saying that a viable version of cosmopolitanism must be able to accommodate such a reality; a plausible version of cosmopolitanism should not “treat nationalism, religion and at least strong version of ethnicity as the ‘bad other’ to cosmopolitanism” and not neglect “social solidarity” (Habermas, 2007, 287). Only a concept of cosmopolitanism that takes the principle of happiness and peace as a core operational principle and value in its own right can accommodate the reality of multiculturalism most adequately.

The principle of happiness says at least follows. On the one hand, as a cosmopolitan citizen, each of us has an obligation to contribute to build world peace. As part of the global human community, each nation and people has an obligation to commit to world peace. On the one hand, the claim of the obligation to world peace is a distinct, independent claim in its own rights. While it may be intertwined with the claim of global justice, it is not reducible to the latter. The principle of world peace has more to do with human happiness than with other norms. Therefore, a class of cosmopolitan norms of humanitarian obligation arises from the norm of happiness and world. They issue: (a) negative commandment: If one is committed to world peace and human happiness, one ought not to do X; (b) positive commandment: if one
is committed to world peace and human happiness, one ought to do Y. All the same, there is such a claim that “this is something we human beings do not do because we are human beings” — a claim that imposes normative obligation on us. There is also such a claim that “this is something that we human beings must do for the sake of world peace and human happiness” — a claim also imposes a normative obligation on us.

In sum, in my opinion, we are better off by having a humanistic concept of a cosmopolitan order that is broader than either a legal concept or a moral concept or a merely combination of the legal and the moral. We are better off to have a broader concept of a cosmopolitan order whose norms of cosmopolitan obligation can put into at least three categories: (1) giving due to human rights; (2) giving due to human values, including cultural values; (3) giving due to human happiness, including recognition that different peoples have different centers and gravity of happiness.

IV

In conclusion, we need to revise our concept of cosmopolitan norms. On the one hand, in terms of content and scope, we should conceive cosmopolitan norms to include both the norms of justice as giving due to basic rights and norms of happiness as giving due to basic human values and human nature. In terms of nature, we should see that cosmopolitan norms are not only norms of normalizing human conducts, practices, and institutions in the globe, but also norms of promoting human happiness and welfare; cosmopolitan norms are not only norms of integration with sanctioning force, but also norms as standards of nurturing human nature and transforming humankind for better.

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