THE RECEPTIVE TRANSCENDENCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE "FOURTH COGITO": TOWARDS A CONTENT-FULL NOTION OF "EARLY PHENOMENOLOGY"

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Abstract: There is a purely historical notion of "Early Phenomenology" (from the late 19th century to 1939), a period during which Husserl's move towards transcendental phenomenology (1905 and 1913) has occurred that led to the break between him and almost the entire Göttingen and Munich circle of early phenomenologists. Evidence about the essence of knowledge, especially of a priori knowledge of essences and states of affairs grounded in them, but also of the phenomenological fourth cogito-argument (after Augustine's, Descartes' and Husserl's) shows that the act of cognition is characterized by a transcendent receptive grasp of beings, essences, principles of ontology and logic, and other data that are autonomously existing "in themselves" and yet clearly given in intentional cognitive acts as being irreducible to noemata and purely intentional and constituted objects of conscious acts. The transcendence of the act of knowledge rejected by Husserl from his Beilagen to "The Idea of Phenomenology" (1905) on, and its strong defense by some phenomenologists, leads to a contentful concept of "early phenomenology" as an objectivist and realist phenomenology. Such a "phenomenology of cognitive transcendence" was ably defended in the Prolegomena of Husserl's Logical investigations, various works of Scheler, Reinach , Hildebrand, and others, leading to a deep break within the phenomenological movement and to the birth of a phenomenological realism very much akin to Platonic, Augustinian, and medieval , Aristotle-inspired philosophy. Moreover, it will be argued that, far from constituting a "naïve realism," a relapse to a Bilderbuchphänomenologie, and Weltanschauungsphilosophie opposed to rigorously "scientific phenomenology," a phenomenology based on the discovery of the transcendence of man in knowledge constitutes the only properly critical phenomenology faithful to things themselves as given to the mind, and free of inner contradictions, and did not end in 1939 but continues to exist until today.

Some authors use a purely historical notion of "Early phenomenology" extending from the late 19th century to 1905 or to 1913, i.e. to the moment when Husserl's

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move towards transcendental phenomenology has occurred[1] that led to a more or less sharp philosophical break between him and almost the entire Göttingen and Munich circles of early phenomenologists. [2] Other authors let "early phenomenology" end only in 1939, an artificial date meant to designate the point in time when realist and "early phenomenologists" had died or ceased to write in the mode of early pre-transcendental phenomenology. However, this date is obviously incorrect because many early phenomenologists (such as Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Dietrich von Hildebrand, or Roman Ingarden) wrote until the 1960ies and 1970ies in the same realist way and published some of their epistemological main works or critiques of Husserl during this period. Moreover, many realist phenomenologists are continuing to think in ways similar to those of "early phenomenologists" until today.

I would like to suggest that the essential point that identifies the so-called "early" Munich and Göttingen phenomenology and distinguishes it from Husserl's later phenomenology cannot be identified in a purely historical periodization but concerns an essential philosophical content: namely the realism and above all the understanding of the transcendence of phenomenological knowledge and of knowledge as such, and the consequent critique of Husserl's "cognitive immanentism" which emerges for the first time in his 1905 lectures *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*[3], in which Husserl expresses most clearly the same kind of "phenomenological immanentism" that characterizes his *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* as well as his *Ideas* and *Cartesian Meditations*.[4]

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[1]Edmund Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), originally written in 1905; and Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, I, *Husserliana* Bd. 3, ed. H. L. Van Breda, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, 1950); originally written in 1913.

[2] See Adolf Reinach, «Über Phänomenologie», in: Adolf Reinach, *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Ausgabe mit Kommentar*, Bd. I: *Die Werke*, Teil I: Kritische Neuausgabe (1905-1914), Teil II: Nachgelassene Texte (1906-1917), S. 531-550; Roman Ingarden, *On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism,* translated by Arnór Hannibalsson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975); Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Der Sinn philosophischen Fragens und Erkennens,* (Bonn: Peter Hanstein,. 1950); the same author, *Che cos'è la filosofia?/What Is Philosophy?,* English-Italian (Milano: Bompiani Testi a fronte, 2001).

[3]Edmund Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), *Beilagen.* The Emglish translation: *The Idea of Phenomenology,* transl. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964) does not contain these decisive texts.

[4]See Edmund Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, in: Edmund Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge* (1911-1921), Hrsg. Thomas Nenon und Hans Rainer Sepp, *Husserliana* Bd. XXV (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: M. Nijhoff, 1987), S. 3-62; see also *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, I, *Husserliana* Bd. 3, ed. H.L. Van Breda, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, 1950), und Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, hrsg. u. eingel. von S. Strasser, in: *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke E. Husserls,* auf Grund des Nachlasses veröffentlicht vom Husserl-Archiv (Louvain) unter der Leitung von H. L. van Breda. (Den Haag, Nijhoff 1950 – 1962), Bd. 1, 1950. See also Josef Seifert, „Phänomenologie und Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft. Zur Grundlegung einer realistischen phänomenologischen Methode – in kritischem Dialog mit Edmund Husserls Ideen über die Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," in: *Filosofie, Pravda, Nesmrtlenost. Tòi praúskå pòednáóky/Philosophie,*

I. Husserl's Rejection of the "Transcendence of Man in Knowledge"

In his five lectures entitled *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl writes:

> Cognition in all of its manifestations is a psychic act; it is the cognition of a cognizing subject. The objects cognized stand over and against the cognition. But how can we be certain of the correspondence between cognition and the object cognized? How can knowledge transcend itself and reach its object reliably? The unproblematic manner in which the object of cognition is given to natural thought now becomes an enigma.[5]

It is quite clear from the further text that "because our lack of clarity about cognition implies that we cannot understand what it could mean for something *to be known in itself* yet *in the context of cognition*,"[6] Husserl arrives at a negation, amply testified to by the passages quoted below, of any real transcendence of knowledge to the *"Ding an sich'* (in itself) of 'things in themselves." It is highly surprising to find such a denial of knowledge transcending towards 'things in themselves' in a thinker who had so strongly insisted in his *Logical Investigations* and in subsequent works that most forms of consciousness are 'intentional acts,' and thereby achieve some 'transcendence' in that each act of perception or knowledge is directed towards an object which is not a real part of our conscious experience itself. Even when the object of consciousness is merely fictional, Husserl asserts, it stands clearly over and against the stream of our conscious life.

Wahrheit, Unsterblichkeit. Drei Prager Vorlesungen/ Philosophy, Truth, Immortality. Three Prague Lectures (tschechisch-deutsch), pòeklad, úvod a bibliografi Martin Cajthaml, (Prague: Vydala Kòestanská akademie Òim, svacek, edice Studium, 1998), S. 14-50; "La filosofia come scienza rigorosa. La fondazione di un metodo fenomenologico realista in dialogo critico con le idee sulla *filosofia come scienza rigorosa* di Edmund Husserl", Saggio integrativo, in: Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Che cos'è la filosofia?/What Is Philosophy?,* Englisch-Italienisch (Milano: Bompiani Testi a fronte, 2001), 535-568; «философия как строгая наука» (Philosophy as a Rigorous Science. Towards the Foundations of a Realist Phenomenological Method – in Critical Dialogue with Edmund Husserl's Ideas about Philosophy as a Rigorous Science), (Russian), *Logos4* 9 (1997), 54-76.

[5]Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. W. P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 15. See also the original text in E. Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), p. 20: "In allen ihren Ausgestaltungen ist die Erkenntnis ein psychisches Erlebnis: Erkenntnis des erkennenden Subjekts. Ihr stehen die erkannten Objekte gegenüber. Wie kann nun aber die Erkenntnis ihrer Übereinstimmung mit den erkannten Objekten gewiß werden, wie kann sie über sich hinaus und ihre Objekte zuverlässig treffen? Die dem natürlichen Denken selbstverständliche Gegebenheit der Erkenntnisobjekte in der Erkenntnis wird zum Rätsel."
[6]Die Idee der Phänomenologie, II, 23-3: weil die erkenntnistheoretische Unklarheit es mit sich bringt, daß wir nicht verstehen, welchen Sinn ein Sein haben kann, das an sich und doch in der Erkenntnis erkannt sei. *The Idea of Phenomenology,* 2nd lecture, p. 29.

Zeus, or a house which we perceive in a dream, are not part of our conscious life; we will never find their properties as properties of our own conscious acts. Our conscious life does not have windows, doors, or colour - as does the house we dream about; nor are Zeus and his lightning and thunderbolts immanent parts of our consciousness.[7] From this important insight into the intentional character of consciousness, which always achieves a 'transcendence' towards intentional objects that are not parts of the real stream of consciousness, it would seem that Husserl should not have experienced special difficulty in answering the problem of the 'transcendence of knowledge' in the sense of reaching being and essences that – while existing wholly autonomously with respect to our consciousness – still show themselves to our conscious cognitive acts.[8]

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[7]See also the expression of the same idea in Adolf Reinach, "Über Phänomenologie", in: Adolf Reinach, Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Ausgabe mit Kommentar, Bd. I: Die Werke, Teil I: Kritische Neuausgabe (1905-1914), Teil II: Nachgelassene Texte (1906-1917), S. 531-550, and the English translation: Adolf Reinach, 'Concerning Phenomenology,' transl. from the German ("Über Phänomenologie") by Dallas Willard, *The Personalist* 50 (Spring 1969), pp. 194-221. Reprinted in *Perspectives in Philosophy*, ed. Robert N. Beck (New York: Holt, Reinhart, & Winston, 1961 and 1969).

[8]I am aware of many philosophers and interpreters of Husserl who, like Dallas Willard and Robert Sokolowski, seek to interpret Husserl as a thinker who does not see any real or important distinction between idealism and realism (Sokolowski), or who is a firm realist (Willard). See Robert Sokolowski's still authoritative work, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution.* Phaenomenologica 18 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), in which he gives to the terms "constitution" primarily a harmless meaning that a realist philosopher just as an idealist one could accept: that through a variety and series of conscious acts objects show themselves and become present to the human subject and in this sense "constitute themselves" *as objects of knowledge and consciousness,* through or to the subject by means of passive or active syntheses. In his more recent works, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), and his "Husserl on First Philosophy". *Phaenomenologica* 200, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010) , 3–23, Sokolowski presents similar inerpretations of "constitution in Husserl, which undoubtedly capture well this universsally accepted and accceptable sese of the term, but do not even touch the onviously entirely different ontological sense of constitution Husserl has in mind in his *Beilagen* and in his *Cartesian Meditations.* Willard claims, without any reason or quote that would demonstrate that I hold such an opposite view of my own position, that my own position in *Back to Things in themselves* and critique of Husserl   is "quintessentially idealist" and at the same time "naively realist," which would amount to a well-nigh idiotic position, fitting in well with the generally rather sneering and insulting terms inn which describes my work (Thus Willard writes: "The only sustained piece of philosophical argument occurs on pp. 303-317, where Seifert purports to prove an inner contradiction in any idealist position." Willard claims without any further argument, that I hold the opposite of what I do in fact hold: "in any case, the `being in itself' which the author purports to prove is itself of quintessentially idealist type." And later, referring to phenomenological realism, adds: "In this regard he remains faithful to that naivity for which Husserl criticizes his own early followers.") See Dallas Willard, "Seifert, Josef, *Back to Things in Themselves: A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism,"* *Canadian Philosophical Review*, IX, #2 1989, 66-69; http://www.dwillard .org-/articles/artview.asp?artID=55. I believe that interpreters of Husserl such as Sokolowski and Willard, with all their brilliant expertise in Husserl, do not attend to the very basic later Husserlian position that our conscious acts can never reach any being that would not be

However, made aware by Nicolai Hartmann of the fact that this 'transcendence' of each intentional act, as such, does not imply anything except 'immanent transcendence,' Husserl came to see the problem of how knowledge can achieve 'transcendent transcendence,' in which, as he put it in the *Prolegomena* to the *Logical Investigations,* "angels and gods would recognize the same (eternal) truths," as insoluble: Could not an omnipotent . . . liar-spirit have created my soul in such a way and given it such contents of consciousness, that of all the objects which it intends, insofar as they are (claim to be) in extra-mental reality, nothing would exist? Perhaps there are things apart from me, but none of those which I take for real. And perhaps there is nothing at all outside of myself . . . . Does   perception possess any *evidence* for this achievement of transcendence? But any evidence, what else is it except a certain psychic character. . . something transcendent is not implied in the immanent. . . . The transcendent . . . can in principle not be experienced.[9]

Consider also this impressive text:

> The relatedness of knowledge to something transcendent is unclear. When would we have clarity about it, and where? Well, when and where the essence of such a relatedness would be given to us, so that we could *intuit* it *(sie schauen),* we would comprehend the possibility of knowledge (for the respective type of knowledge in which it would be achieved). Obviously this condition [i.e., the evidence about transcendent cognitive contact with being in itself, J.S.] seems to be a priori unfulfillable and thus transcendent knowledge impossible.[10]

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dependent on and constituted by the ego and that knowledge of any being as it exists independently of human consciousness and that knowing *things in themselves* is impossible and absurd. I have dealt with this position, with all necessary texts and passages to substantiate the claim of interpreting the later Husserl as a more radical transcendental idealist than Kant, in a paper Willard does not seem to know, "Kritik am Relativismus und Immanentismus in E. Husserls Cartesianischen Meditationen. Die Aequivokationen im Ausdruck 'transzendentales Ego' an der Basis jedes transzendentalen Idealismus." *Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie XIV*, 1970.) Se also my "The Significance of Husserl's Logical Investigations for Realist Phenomenology and a Critique of Several 'Husserlian Theses' on Phenomenology. In Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of the Publication of Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations (1901/01-2001/2)", in: Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile en Santiago, *Seminarios de Filosofía*, Vols. 17-18, (Santiago de Chile: Instituto de Filosofía, 2004-2005), pp. 133-190.

[9] Die Idee der Phänomenologie, Beilage II, ibid., pp. 81-2: Könnte nicht ein allmächtiger...Lügengeist meine Seele so geschaffen und so mit Bewußtseinsinhalten versorgt haben, daß von all den in ihr vermeinten Gegenständlichkeiten, soweit sie irgend ein Außerseelisches sind, nichts existierte?. Vielleicht sind Dinge außer mir, aber kein einziges von denen, die ich für wirklich halte. Und vielleicht sind überhaupt keine Dinge außer mir... Haftet der Wahrnehmung eine Evidenz an für diese Leistung der Transzendenz? Aber eine Evidenz, was ist sie anderes als ein gewisser psychischer Charakter...Transzendentes ist nicht in Immanentem impliziert . . . Das Transzendente ist…prinzipiell nicht erfahrbar. (Translation mine; this text is not contained in the English edition.)

[10]*Ibid.,* Beilage III, p. 83 (translation mine): Unklar ist die Beziehung der Erkenntnis auf Transzendentes. Wann hätten wir Klarheit und wo hätten wir sie? Nun, wenn und wo uns das Wesen dieser Beziehung gegeben wäre, daß wir sie schauen könnten, dann würden wir

Husserl's thesis is clearly this: "How immanence can be known is understandable, how transcendence, unintelligible'."[11] It is equally clear that one of the decisive reasons for Husserl's turn towards transcendental subjectivism and for its radical interpretation of *epoché* lies here. In fact, *epoché* receives an even more radical meaning here than the fourth sense of this term distinguished elsewhere.[12] It comes to mean a radical doubt of *all transcendence* of knowledge in the sense perhaps, of there being *absolutely nothing* outside of cogitation and *cogitate*.[13] But why did Husserl accept it as clear that the 'immanent transcendence' of the intentional objects as well as the 'immanent' being of consciousness can be grasped and explained, whereas any 'going beyond the act of knowledge' toward the 'things in themselves' in their 'real transcendence' is taken by him to be inexplicable and impossible?[14] And more importantly: Is the rejection of really transcendent knowledge in rigorous scientific philosophy justified?

II. Critique of Husserl's Rejection of Cognitive Transcendence and Defense of the Latter through the "fourth cogito" of Realist Phenomenology

This step in Husserl's reasoning toward transcendental idealism is entirely unwarranted, as can be shown in the following ways which will only be sketched here and have been treated more extensively elsewhere.[15] I wish to start the sharp critique of this Husserlian thesis with the expression of an important shared conviction: that the ultimate foundation of philosophy and of epistemology calls for certain knowledge, and even for an indubitable certainty of knowledge.[16]

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die Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis (für die betreffende Erkenntnisartung, wo sie geleistet wäre) verstehen. Freilich erscheint diese Forderung eben von vornherein für alle transzendente Erkenntnis unerfüllbar und damit auch transzendente Erkenntnis unmöglich zu sein.

[11]Ibid., p. 84: "Wie Immanenz erkannt werden kann, ist verständlich, wie Transzendenz, unverständlich" (translation mine).

[12]See Josef Seifert, Back to Things in Themselves. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism (London: Routledge, 1987; electronic edition 2013), ch. 2.

[13]"Although the *epoché,* which the critique of cognition must employ, begins with the doubt of all cognition, its own included, it cannot remain in such doubt. . . If it must presuppose nothing as *already given,* then it must begin with some cognition which it does not take unexamined from elsewhere but rather gives to itself, which it itself posits as primal. This primal cognition *must contain nothing of the unclarity and the doubt which otherwise give cognition the character of the enigmatic and problematic . . .* (emphasis mine - J. S.). See German text, *ibid.,* p. 39.

[14]On the many motives that led Husserl to espouse transcendental phenomenology se the excellent work of Roman Ingarden: *On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism,* translated by Arnór Hannibalsson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), and my *Things in Themselves*, cit., ch. 4.

[15]Josef Seifert, Back to Things in Themselves. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism (London: Routledge, 1987; electronic re-edition, 2013).

[16]Sharing this assumption does in no way signal agreement with Husserl's claim that all knowledge less than apodictically certain that includes elements of belief or faith such as sense perception or the perception of real animals and persons (Weltglauben), should be excluded from philosophy and, instead of being defended in its rationality by it, be

Husserl's characterization of phenomenological realism as an unscientific philosophy of world-view that leaves the sphere of evident knowledge and is based only on some kind of "belief" in transcendence, in no way captures correctly phenomenological realism, so as if the latter were merely to espouse beliefs (knowledge in a wider sense) and only transcendental phenomenology were based on rigorously evident knowledge in the narrower sense. It is clear that the difference between knowledge in a wider sense and knowledge in a strict and narrow sense of the term is linked to the problem of certainty and of philosophy as a rigorous science. For it is precisely to the extent alone to which a knowledge-claim is justified by rigorous evidence and is thus certain, that I can really say that I know in the proper sense of the term.

The connection between knowledge and certainty can also be gathered from this: When referring to a lack of certainty, I may say, "I believe this to be true" or "I am convinced that this is true, but I do not know it." This way of speaking even of our well-founded opinions and this our contrasting them with knowledge strictly speaking shows that some kind of identification between knowledge and certain knowledge occurs in the related modes of expressing ourselves, and this is not by chance but follows from the nature of knowledge. *He ontoos epistéme*, knowledge in the true sense, and surely philosophy as a rigorous science, is given only when knowledge is certain. On this, phenomenological realists agree entirely with Husserl, without absolutizing this ideal such that *only* indubitably evident knowledge should be held in esteem or used in philosophy.[17] Unlike evident

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debunked by it as belonging to a naïve belief in the world and to unphilosophical sciences. The recognition and elaboration of the real (transcendent) transcendence of the act of knowledge rejected by Husserl from his Beilagen to "The Idea of Phenomenology" (1905) on, and its strong defense by most of the early phenomenologists in Munich and Göttingen, leads to a content-full concept of "early phenomenology" as an objectivist and realist phenomenology. Such a "phenomenology of cognitive transcendence" was ably defended in the Prolegomena of Husserl's Logical investigations, various works of Scheler, Reinach, Hildebrand, and others, leading – upon Husserl's "transcendental turn" – to a deep break within the phenomenological movement and to the birth of a phenomenological realism very much akin to Platonic, Augustinian, and medieval, Aristotle- or Augustine-inspired philosophy. Far from constituting a "naïve realism," a relapse to a Bilderbuchphänomenologie, or to a pure "dogmatism" and Weltanschauungsphilosophie opposed by Husserl to a rigorously "scientific phenomenology," a phenomenology based on the discovery of the transcendence of man in knowledge, constitutes the only properly critical phenomenology faithful to things themselves as given to the mind, and free of inner contradictions, and did not end in 1913 or in 1939, but continues to exist until today.

[17]See my *Discours des Méthodes. The Methods of Philosophy and Realist Phenomenology,* (Frankfurt / Paris / Ebikon / Lancaster / New Brunswick: Ontos-Verlag, 2009). Nonetheless, forms of uncertain knowledge partake in the nature of knowledge insufficiently and only indubitably evident knowledge is archetypical and, being certain, ulfills the ratio of knowledge in the authentic sense. Hence only certain knowledge is *epistéme ontoos ousa* and can both rightfully claim the title of *knowledge* and justify fully claims about philosophy being a rigorous science. Thus it alone can teach us fully what *knowledge* is. For it is a general principle of philosophical method that we should first begin with examples in which the true essence of something is clearly and unambiguously given so that we might not confuse the datum under consideration with something which it is not. If we say we opine that something is such and such, we tacitly admit that we do not

knowledge in the strict sense merely more or less strongly substantiated opinions which are not fully supported by cognitive evidence cannot dispel in a definitive way skepticism, for example the skepticism expressed in the above quotes from Husserl.[18]

I wish to defend here the conviction that within phenomenological realism a way was found, in what I call the "fourth cogito," that can dispel skepticism in a definitive way and achieve this by a truly *receptive transcendence* of knowledge in the grasp of things *in themselves*. The historically speaking first prominent Cogito-Argument that freed Augustine from skepticism and led him to recognize indubitable truths about the really existing world and about an infinity of necessary essences is closest to the fourth cogito of phenomenological realism, which differs in several respects sharply from Descartes' (second) cogito that attempts in vain to sever the evidence that "I exist" from the knowledge of universal and necessary truths (denying their equal evidence and suggesting that the latter could be changed by God). For it is entirely impossible to be certain about "I exist," without knowing with equal certainty the truth of the principle of contradiction.[19] The fourth cogito of realist phenomenology, however, contrasts even more sharply from the Cogito of Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* which attributes to the *cogito* a world- constituting role that makes human subjectivity the source of the whole world and can scarcely be reconciled with the rejection of solipsism attempted by Husserl in the fifth *Cartesian Meditation.* When Willard claims that this "fourth phenomenological realist cogito" simply constitutes a "re-run" of the Cartesian and Augustinian *Cogito,* he overlooks entirely the sharp difference between the second and the fourth cogito and the strong critique of the grave deficiencies of the Cartesian cogito by the authors of the fourth cogito. He likewise fails to see the very new development of the many *eidetic* intuitions in necessary essences and the development of this kind of indubitable knowledge as method of philosophy, which distinguishes the cogito of phenomenological

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know it. Thus knowledge in the strict and narrow sense of the term implies that we know that we know and thus implies certainty. An *orthé dóxa* or correct opinion, on the other hand, may rightly be termed knowledge in a wider sense of the term and allow us to say that there exists a high probability, for example, that the towering mountains indicated on our map of Nepal are actually there. Yet to „know that they are there" is not knowledge in the narrow and strict sense of the term. As Socrates puts it in the *Theaitetos*, knowledge differs from correct opinion. It is not the same thing as an opinion which happens to be true, even if such an opinion is not blind but if we find some cognitive grasp of things at its root. Sharing this assumption does in no way signal agreement with Husserl's claim that all knowledge less than apodictically certain that includes elements of belief or faith such as sense perception or the perception of real animals and persons (*Weltglauben),* should be excluded from philosophy and, instead of being defended in its rationality by it, be debunked by it as belonging to a naïve belief in the world and to unphilosophical sciences.

[18]See on this distinction Josef Seifert, *Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit. Die Transzendenz des Menschen in der Erkenntnis,* 2nd ed. (Salzburg: A. Pustet, 1976), Part I, ch. 3.

[19]See René Descartes, *Discours de la Methode*, in: *Oeuvres de Descartes*, hrsg. v. Charles Adam & Paul Tannery, VI, 1-78 ; see also Jean-Luc Marion, *Sur l'ontologie grise de* Descartes. Savoir aristotélicien et science cartésienne dans les Regulae (Paris: J. Vrin, 1975, 2nd ed. 1981); the same author, *Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981).

realists and phenomenological realism in general (also in authors who do not develop thoughts on the cogito) from the Augustinian *cogito*.[20]

What I call the realist phenomenological fourth cogito-argument (after Augustine's, Descartes' and Husserl's) provides the reasons and insights which show that the act of cognition is characterized by a transcendent receptive grasp of beings, essences, principles of ontology and logic, and other data that are autonomously existing "in themselves" and yet clearly given in intentional cognitive acts as being irreducible to noemata and purely intentional and constituted objects of conscious acts.[21]

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[20]See the first development of the fourth cogito in Dietrich von Hildebrand, „Das Cogito und die Erkenntnis der realen Welt", Teilveröffentlichung der Salzburger Vorlesungen Hildebrands: 'Wesen und Wert menschlicher Erkenntnis'", *Aletheia* 6/1993-1994 (1994), 2- 27, and the most extensive published development of it in Josef Seifert, *Back to Things in* Themselves. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism (London: Routledge, 1987, *re-published as e-book* and in print in August 2013). See also Dietrich von Hildebrand's analysis of the realist phenomenological method in *What is Philosophy?,* 3rd edn, with a New Introductory Essay by Josef Seifert (London: Routledge, 1991); *Che cos'è la filosofia?/What Is Philosophy?,* English-Italian (Milano: Bompiani Testi a fronte, 2001), especially ch. IV, and J Seifert, Discours des Méthodes. The Methods of Philosophy and *Realist Phenomenology,* (Frankfurt / Paris / Ebikon / Lancaster / New Brunswick: Ontos-Verlag, 2008). Willard fails entirely to recognize this fourth cogito and the development of cognitive transcendence in it when he writes about my *Back to Things Themselves:* "He simply re-runs the Augustinian/Cartesian arguments, and proceeds to deduce (or at least suggest) the general world view of classical realism therefrom." Willard, *ibid.*

[21]In De Trinitate (X, X, 14) St Augustine formulates, with great precision, the manner in which the human mind, even when it finds itself threatened by the most radical skeptical doubt, can reach an indubitable certainty of knowledge which is immune to any possible skeptical objection because it reaches that which is both evident in itself and which is presupposed by any skeptical doubt. He writes:Vivere se tamen et meminisse, et intelligere, et velle, et cogitare, et scire, et judicare quis dubitet? Quandoquidem etiam si dubitat, vivit; si dubitat, unde dubitet, meminit; si dubitat, dubitare se intelligit; si dubitat, certus esse vult; si dubitat, cogitat; si dubitat, scit se nescire; si dubitat, judicat non se temere consentire oportere. Quisquis igitur aliunde dubitat, de his omnibus dubitare non debet: quae si non essent, de ulla re dubitare non posset. On the other hand who would doubt that he lives, remembers, understands, wills, thinks, knows, and judges? For even if he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, he remembers why he doubts; if he doubts, he understands that he doubts; if he doubts, he wants to be certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows that he does not know; if he doubts, he judges that he ought not to consent rashly. Whoever then doubts about anything else ought never to doubt about all of these; for if they were not, he would be unable to doubt about anything at all. (St Augustine, *The Trinity,* translated by Stephen McKenna, Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1970.) In this and in many other formulations, Augustine takes his sole starting point in doubt, more radically even than Descartes, and he overcomes this radical doubt in a more grandiose fashion than Descartes, by showing that the reality of doubt itself necessarily presupposes what will turn out to be two types of indubitable knowledge. On the one hand, I gain the certain knowledge that I myself am, and that thus at least one being and person really exists (who knows vivere se). On the other hand, inseparably linked to this knowledge, we also gain insight into the necessary essence of doubt and of all those acts (of cognition, knowing, willing, and others) which are necessarily entailed by doubt.

The starting point for this most fundamental philosophical knowledge (that we can know with certainty) is nothing more than - the doubt about everything. How is it possible that the most negative destructive thought, the radical skeptical doubt of all knowledge, should lead to indubitable certainty? In what follows we shall use the text quoted and other texts of Augustine, Descartes, and Leibniz as guides to our own discovery that indubitable knowledge of truth is indeed the condition of the possibility of radical doubt. Even if I doubt the reality of everything, in this act I still discover with absolute certainty that I live and that I am conscious as subject. This Augustinian discovery of the indubitable knowledge of my own being was also made anew by Descartes and expressed most forcefully in Meditations II (3), starting, too, from the most radical doubt:

> But I was persuaded that there was nothing in all the world, that there was no heaven, no earth, that there were no minds, nor any bodies: was I not then likewise persuaded that I did not exist? Not at all; of a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of something [or: merely because I thought of something]. But there is some deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning, who ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let him deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something. So that after having reflected well and carefully examined all things, we must come to the definite conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive of it. (René Descartes, Meditations II, 3, translated by Haldane and Ross, Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 150.)

At first, we have to marvel at the datum of the immediate experience of myself as knowing and existing subject which is an experience of such an original structure that it is entirely irreducible to anything else. To begin with, this knowledge of myself is in no way arrived at by mediation of other premises, but it is immediate and not the conclusion of a logical argument. Descartes has put this well: When someone says, *'cogito ergo sum sive existo,'* he does not deduce existence from thinking by means of a syllogism, but he knows something known through itself *(per se notum)* through a simple intuition of the mind *(mentis intuitu) . . .* otherwise he would have to know first 'everything that thinks exists." But it is not so: For it is the nature of our mind that it derives the general propositions from the knowledge of the particular. (René Descartes, Reply to Second Objections to *Meditations,* 189. (My translation - J.S.)

Leibniz formulated the immediacy of this knowledge still more clearly: "On peut tousjours dire que cette Proposition: j'existe, est de la dernière evidence, estant une proposition, qui ne sauroit estre prouvée par aucune autre, ou bien une verité immediate. Et de dire: je pense, donc je suis, ce n'est pas prouver proprement l'existence par la pensée, puisque penser et estre pensant est la même chose; et dire: je suis pensant, est déja dire: je suis . . . c'est une proposition de fait, fondée sur une experience immediate. " (G.W. Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, IV, vii; Die philosophischen Schriften, V, cd. C.J. Gerhardt, Hildesheim, 1965. pp. 391-2.) One can always say that this proposition: I *exist,* is of ultimate evidence, being a proposition which could not be proven by any other one, or an *immediate* truth. And to say: I *think, therefore I am,* does not properly mean to prove existence by means of thinking, for to think and to be thinking is the same thing; and to say: I *am thinking* already implies: I *am. . .* (this) is a proposition of fact which is founded on an immediate experience. (My translation - J.S.)

But it is not enough to characterize the inescapable givenness of my own being in indubitable knowledge by referring to the immediacy of the cognition of my being. We have to add that our own being is accessible to us in an entirely interior fashion - by being

consciously lived from within. There is no more immediate and interior givenness of a being than this self-awareness of the person. It is decisive to see with Augustine that my being is not given here like an object over against me of which I would be conscious, as this occurs in explicit reflective self-knowledge (se cogitare). I know myself already prior to any such objectifying as it occurs in conscious reflection - in which my being becomes an object of which I gain consciousness and to which I return - in what Plotinus and Thomas Aquinas called a reditio perfecta mentis in seipsam. Augustine distinguishes the immediate self-awareness of my concrete individual being which I constantly possess and identifies it as nosse se. He contrasts it in another famous passage with the cogitare (cognoscere) se, saying that only in such a cogitatio can a full thematic cognition of the mind itself happen:

> Tanta est tamen cogitationis vis, ut nec mens quodam modo se in conspectu suo ponat, nisi quando se cogitat: ac per hoc ita nihil in conspectu mentis est, nisi unde cogitatur, ut nec ipsa mens, qua cogitatur quidquid cogitatur, aliter possit esse in conspectu suo, nisi seipsam cogitando. Quomodo autem, quando se non cogitat, in conspectu suo non sit, cum sine se ipsam numquam esse possit, quasi alia sit ipsa, aliud conspectus eius, invenire non possum. Hoc quippe de oculo corporis non absurde dicitur: ipse quippe oculus loco suo fixus est in corpore, aspectus autem eius in ea quae extra sunt tenditur, et usque ad sidera extenditur. Nec est oculus in conspectu suo; quandoquidem non conspicit seipsum, nisi speculo objecto, unde jam locuti sumus: quod non fit utique quando se mens in suo conspectu sui cogitatione constituit. Numquid ergo alia sua parte aliam partem suam vidit, cum se conspicit, sicut aliis membris nostris, qui sunt oculi, alia membra nostra conspicimus, quae in nostro possunt esse conspectu? Quid dici absurdius vel dici potest? Unde igitur aufertur mens, nisi a seipsa? Et ubi ponitur in conspectum suum nisi ante seipsam? Num non ergo ibi erit ubi erat, quando in conspectu suo non erat; quia hic posita, inde ablata est. Sed si conspicienda migravit, conspectura ubi manebit? An quasi geminatur, ut et illic sit et hic, id est, et ubi conspicere, et tibi conspici possit; ut in se ipsa sit conspiciens, ante se conspicua?

> Nihil horum nobis veritas consulta respondet: quoniam quando isto modo cogitamus, nonnisi corporum fictas imagines cogitamus, quod mentem non esse paucis certissimum est mentibus, a quibus potest de hac re veritas consuli. Proinde restat ut aliquid pertinens ad ejus naturam sit conspectus ejus, et in eam, quando se cogitat, non quasi per loci spatium, sed incorporea conversione revocetur: cum vero non se cogitat, non sit quidem in conspectu suo, nec de illa suus formetur obtutus, sed tamen noverit se tanquam ipsa sit sibi memoria sui.

But so great is the power of thought that not even the mind itself may place itself, so to speak, in its own sight, except when it thinks of itself. And consequently nothing is so in the sight of the mind, except when it thinks of it, that not even the mind itself, by which is thought whatever is thought, can he in its own sight in any other way than by thinking of itself. But how it is not in its own sight when it does not think of itself, since it can never be without itself, just as though itself were one thing and its sight another thing, I am unable to discover. For it is not absurd to speak thus of the eye of the body, since the eye itself is fixed in its own proper place in the body, but its sight is directed to those things that are without, and reaches even to the stars. Nor is the eye in its own sight, for it does not see itself, except when a mirror is placed before it . . . ; and certainly this is not done when the mind places itself in its own sight by thinking of itself. Or does the mind, then, but one part of itself see another part of itself when it sees itself by thinking, as with some of our

members, the eyes, we see other members which can be in our sight? What can be said or thought that is more absurd than this? For by what, therefore, is the mind removed except by itself and where is it placed in its own sight except before itself? Hence, it will not be there where it was when it was not in its own sight, because it is put down in one place after it is withdrawn from another place. But if it has wandered away in order to be seen, here will it remain in order to see? Or is it, as it were, doubled, so that it is both there and here, that is, both where it can see and where it can be seen: in itself in order that it may see, and before itself in order that it may be seen? When the truth is consulted, it does not give any of these answers, since when we think thus, we think only through the feigned images of bodies, and that the mind is not such is absolutely certain to the few minds that can be consulted for the truth about this matter.

It remains, therefore, that its sight is something belonging to its nature, and the mind is recalled to it when it thinks of itself, not as it were by a movement in space, but by an incorporeal conversion; on the other hand, when it does not think of itself, it is indeed not in its own sight, nor is its gaze formed from it; but yet it knows itself, as if it were a remembrance of itself to itself. (Augustine. *The Trinity,* XIV, vi, 8) Here we see that the vivere se, our own conscious being, life, and acts, are known to us more immediately than by reflective thought: in the very performance of consciousness itself. We are our own conscious being and live it, and, in living it, it is given to us in a most interior fashion prior to any objectivizing reflection in which we think of ourselves (cogitare se). Moreover, our actions, so we may interpret Augustine's philosophy of consciousness in the light of important contributions of Karol Wojtyla, are reflected by our consciousness, even after they have passed, in a memoria which is again prior to any explicit act of reflection. As it appears clearly in moral conscience, we remember ourselves prior to thinking about ourselves, as occurs in explicit reflection and self-knowledge. In fact, as Augustine puts it audaciously in the text quoted above, it is 'as if we were the memory of ourselves.' Our acts are reflected, illumined, and judged in some fashion prior to their becoming explicit objects of reflection. Nevertheless, this immediate, pre-objectivizing acquaintance with our own being, in spite of its indubitable immediacy, is not yet what occurs in the cogitatio sui ipsius. For only when we make our being an object of acts of reflection and thought, can it be known fully by us. Tanta est tamen cogitations vis - for so great is the power of thought (of the intentional act of knowledge) that even the mind, which knows itself most immediately and by which we know everything else, can know itself only when it places itself, as it were, in front of his own thought. While on the level of such an intentional subject-object-relation, of cognition, judgment, and thought about our being and life many errors and distortions, which do not exist on the two more immediate forms of self-acquaintance mentioned before, can occur, the philosophical knowledge of our own life (of the se vivere) is no less evident and is absolutely indubitable. It is indubitably certain because it makes the evident and immediate cognitive contact with our own being the starting-point of the knowledge: sum. The philosophical cogitatio sui ipsius grasps the concrete fact of our own being with indubitable certainty.

It might be objected that this is a merely subjective knowledge that we (I) exist, and does not refer to the objective reality of the material world explored by science, the object of our sense-perception and social relations. We reply: far from establishing any merely 'subjective' knowledge, the thrust of Augustine's insight is precisely that not only is the I just as objective a reality as all the trees out there, and all the stars, and the entire material world, but the mind is also far more wonderful than all the mountains, trees, and material beings. Thus in our own being we touch one objective and real being, and one which is far more important and real than the whole material universe. Therefore we can interpret Augustine with Hildebrand and say that the point of the cogito really is: 'I am; therefore one objective entity is; therefore being itself is.' Cogito; (ergo) sum; (ergo) esse est. In this indubitable knowledge of real facts I not only grasp that I as subject exist, but also that I

doubt, that I do not know, etc. Hence, each and every act of mine is given to me with a certainty similar to the one in which I grasp the reality of the sum in self-knowledge in the strictest sense. And in knowing the vivere me as well as the existence of all the acts in me I grasp also the truth, the truth that I am, and that I think, doubt, lack certainty, judge, and so forth. This indubitable discovery of truth in the Cogito is explicated by Augustine in another important passage:

> Deinde regulam ipsam quam vides concipe hoc modo: Omnis qui se dubitantem intelligit, verum intelligit, et de hac re quam intelligit certus est. Omnis igitur qui utrum sit veritas dubitat, in se ipso habet verum unde non dubitet; nec ullum verum sine veritate verum est. Non itaque oportet eum de veritate dubitare qui potuit undecumque dubitare. Ubi videntur haec, ibi est lumen sine spatio locorum et temporum et sine ullo spatiorum talium phantasmate. Numquid ista ex aliqua parte corrumpi possunt, etiamsi omnis ratiocinator intereat aut apud carnales inferos veterescat? Non enim ratiocinator talia facit, sed invenit. Ergo antequam inveniantur, in se manent, et cum inveniuntur, nos innovant. (Augustine, De Vera Religione, XXXIX, 73, 205-7)

Then conceive the rule itself which you see, in the following way. Everyone who knows that he is in doubt about something, knows a truth, and in regard to this that he knows he is certain. Therefore he is certain about a truth. Consequently everyone who doubts if there be a truth, has in himself a true thing of which he does not doubt; nor is there any true thing *(verum)* which is not true by truth. Consequently whoever for whatever reason can doubt, ought not to doubt that there is truth. Where this is seen, there is a light without the spaces of place and time, and without the deceiving imagery associated with such spaces. Can these truths in any way corrupt, even if every thinker were to die or would long be in the grave? *For the thinker does not make such (truths) but he finds them.* Therefore also before he finds them, they remain in themselves; but when they are found, they renew us. (My translation - J.S.) The truth of these facts, the truth of the proposition that I exist, and that I doubt, is likewise discovered in the indubitably known fact that I exist. So we find in the Cogito countless positive and evident cognitions about really existing facts: "about the fact that we exist and live." On this see also Antonio Rosmini, *Certainty*, transl. from *Nuovo Saggio sull Origine delle Idee* (Durham: Rosmini House, 1991), p. 107, the text from: " 'Myself'' to „...is alive." It is indeed strange that such an evident fact found so many thinkers to object to it: From Hume's assertion that he found within himself all kinds of impressions but no impression of the self, to Kant and to modern psychological schools of thought, many objections against this insight of Augustinus and Descartes were raised. Certainly the I is not given like impressions or perceptions but clearly it is given, and given in quite another way: as subject, with quite different predicates. The very language of Hume shows that he, too, presupposes a knowledge the self, for example when he says: 'betwixt my impressions...'' More common objections against the givenness of the subject I have treated elsewhere. See See Josef Seifert, *Leib und Seele*, pp. 53-60. sine ulla phantasiarum vel phantasmatum imaginatione ludificatoria mihi esse me idque nosse et amare certissimum est. Nulla in his veris Academicorum argumenta formido dicentium: Quid si falleris? Si enim fallor, sum. Nam qui non est, utique nec falli potest; ac per hoc sum, si fallor. Quia ergo sum, si fallor, quo modo esse me fallor, quando certum est me esse, si fallor? Quia igitur essem, si fallerer, etiamsi fallerer, procul dubio in eo, quod me novi nosse, non fallor. Consequens est autem, ut etiam in eo, quod me novi nosse, non fallar. Sicut enim novi esse me, ita etiam hoc ipsum, nosse me. Eaque duo cum amo, eundem quoque quiddam tertium nec imparis aestimationis eis quas novo rebus adiungo. Neque enim fallor amare me, cum in his quae amo, non fallar; quamquam et si illa falsa essent, falsa me amare verum esset. Nam quo pacto recte reprehenderer et recte prohiberer

ab amore falsorum, si me illa amare falsum esset? Cum vero illa vera atque certa sint, quis dubitet, quod eorum, cum amantur, et ipse amor vere et certus est? Tam porro nemo est qui esse se nolit, quam nemo est, qui non esse beatus velit. Quomodo enim potest beatus esse, si non sit? (St Augustine, De Civitate Dei XI, xxvi). But, without any delusive representation of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am, and that I know and delight in this. In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians, who say, What if you are deceived? For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived as to my existence? For it is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since therefore I, the person deceived, would be, even if I were deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. And, consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For as I know that I am, I know this also, that I know. And when I love these two things, I add to them a third thing, namely my love, which is of equal moment. For neither am I deceived in this, that I love, since in those things which I love I am not deceived; though even if these were false, it would still be true that I loved false things. For how could I justly be blamed and prohibited from loving false things, if it were false that I loved them? But, since they are true and real, who doubts that when they are loved, the love of them is itself true and real? Further, as there is no one who does not wish to be happy, so there is no one who does not want to be. For how can he be happy if he is nothing? (Translated by M. Dods, Basic Writings of Augustine, vol. II, New York, 1948)

My own being and my acts can never be only an irreal object of conscious acts, without really being in themselves. Noémata of the form of seeming and appearance have no other being except the 'thin' existence which they possess as pure object of our consciousness. Augustine's and Descartes' insight is precisely that it is impossible that our own being and acts only appear to be. They are real existing beings and part of my real being. Any possible deception, any error in which we are duped by seeming facts that are not, presupposes this absolute Archimedean point of the real being of the subject who is deceived and who therefore cannot be deceived in the cognition that he exists. Any form of theory which interprets the being of the subject as a merely constituted object of some transcendental consciousness (which would also constitute itself) falls into the same untenable contradiction pointed out by Augustine, and denies the eternal truth which Augustine uncovers: that any possible object of thought and constitution presupposes the non-constituted reality of the subject, and therefore of one real being. Yet, with equally indubitable evidence, I find, says Augustine, that I cannot doubt without remembering what I am doubting about. Again, this state of affairs is not just found in myself as the individual fact of my own doubt discussed above. Rather, I grasp from the very essence of doubt that no man, no thinking subject in any possible world, could doubt without having some awareness and cognition of the object of his doubt. This intentional structure of doubt as necessarily going beyond an immanent state of consciousness towards something which is doubted, is disclosed as belonging to the very essence of doubt itself. Moreover, we can see that this object of doubt must possess a certain structure, that is, it cannot be simply a man, a rose, etc. which I doubt. Rather, only a 'state of affairs,' the 'being-b of an A,' can be the object of doubt: only that something exists, or that something has or does not have a certain predicate can be the object of doubt.

I doubt not simply the one state of affairs but I doubt whether or not it obtains. This 'whether or not' which characterizes the complex object of doubt reveals another essentially necessary fact about the object of doubt. In doubt we always regard at least two contradictorily opposed states of affairs (Sachverhalte): that something is or is not X. Thus the radical doubt of all truth implies that it is not certain whether or not there is truth. I doubt all truth, that is, I am uncertain of whether or not it is.

But if this is the case, Augustine explains in an earlier version of his cogito, I grasp at the foundation of doubt also the universal principle which Aristotle calls the 'first and most certain of all principles,' namely the principle of contradiction. For if it were not impossible that one and the same thing, A, possesses and does not possess existence, or a predicate b, then the meaning of doubt would be entirely undermined. Doubt, in order to be meaningful at all, presupposes the absolute validity of the principle of contradiction. I grasp that either there is truth or there is no truth, but both cannot occur at the same time and in the same sense. If they could both be, A and its contradictory opposite, then doubt would not make sense any more. In Contra Academicos, the early dialogue of Augustine which is the first purely philosophical writing of a Christian and which presents a critique of skepticism, a view, Augustine himself had once adopted, he shows that again infinitely many true disjunctive propositions follow from the truth of the principle, of contradiction:

> Count, if you can how many there are: . . . if there is one sun (only), there are not two: one and the same soul cannot die and still be immortal, man cannot at the same time be happy and unhappy; . . . we are now either awake or asleep: either there is a body which I seem to see or there is not a body. Through dialectic I have learned that these and many other things which it would take too long to mention are true; no matter in what condition our senses may be, these things are true of themselves. It has taught me that, if the antecedent of any of those statements which I just placed before you in logical connection were assumed, it would be necessary to deduce that which was connected with it. . . . (St Augustine, *Contra Academicos,* II, xiii, 29.)

Hence the most radical skeptic sees that a thing cannot be and not be in the same sense and at the same time. The unfolding of this knowledge would make us understand how many additional evidences it implies, and how all the things Husserl's Logical Investigations and Pfänder's Logik unfold about the essence of the principle of contradiction, about the distinction between its ontological and its logical sense, about the difference between the principle of contradiction and a mere psychological law, about the immediate knowledge in which it is given, about the difference between its evident objective truth and its mere presupposedness by thinking, and so on are contained within and are implicity recognized in the most radical doubt. They form part of the nucleus of indubitable truth without which the person cannot live and perform any conscious act at all, including doubting. Moreover, everybody who doubts also understands (intelligit) that he doubts. This implies the truth that no apersonal unconscious being could ever doubt. Doubt presupposes not only the directedness towards an intentional object of doubt but also the self-awareness and self-consciousness which permits the unique act of reflection, the intellectio that I think and doubt. A being which would be totally absorbed in objects and which could not take the step back involved in reflection, a being which could not bend back over itself in what Augustine calls an entirely immaterial conversion over itself and in what Thomas Aquinas called the reditio mentis completa super seipsam, also could not doubt. This fascinating act, in which the subject is both subject and object of reflection, is again necessarily implied - at least as a possibility - by doubt. The type of consciousness which suffices for feeling physical pain, which animals undoubtedly have, would not suffice for doubt, because doubt presupposes a higher mode of personal consciousness that permits the intelligere se dubitantem. Moreover, not only do I understand that I doubt but I also know that I do not know. This scit se nescire refers again to the absolutely universal fact that in order to doubt I have to know that I do not know. First of all, when I doubt, at least in the sincere doubt which is not just a pretext and a rejection of knowledge, I actually do not know the fact of which I am doubting. For it is impossible for me to doubt the indubitable truths which I have just discovered. I can only doubt if my knowledge is uncertain in virtue of some

The "Fourth Cogito" of Phenomenological Realism can be shown to gain access to the real existence of our own person and to eternal truths as well as to other persons and the absolute personal being. Only philosophy, and only a philosophy which proceeds systematically and is founded on ultimate evident truth, can give an account of the existence of indubitable evidence and I will argue that phenomenological realism has, though this is hardly recognized by the wider philosophical community, wholly refuted the claim that certainty of self-transcending knowledge about things in themselves is impossible.[22] How so? I can only give the outline of an answer:

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deficiency, and if there is, for this reason, some dubitability in my conviction about a state of affairs (Sachverhalt). But the mere lack of (certain) knowledge is not sufficient for doubt. Rather, I also have to know that I do not know, in order to doubt. This is another reason why doubt necessarily presupposes a subject that is capable of the act of reflection and of grasping the absence or limits of knowledge.

Thus, not only do I understand that I doubt but I also know that I do not know. This *scit se nescire* again refers not only to the fact that I know in myself and you in yourself that we do not know something when we doubt, namely that we do not possess the knowledge concerning that which we doubt. More than this empirical fact, we discover also a strictly necessary and universal Sachverhalt or even a host of such states of affairs: that I do not know, at least not know with certainty, the fact which I doubt about. If I said I doubt what I know with indubitable certainty, I would lie. It is intrinsically impossible to doubt that which I know with indubitable certainty and therefore I understand that an omniscient being who knows perfectly cannot doubt anything. Even for a man it is impossible, except in the insincere form of a masked rejection of the truth, to doubt the indubitable facts about the essence of doubt once he has discovered them. I can only doubt if my knowledge is uncertain in virtue of some deficiency, and if there is, for this reason, at least some minimal dubitability in my convictions concerning that which I doubt. But the mere fact of my not knowing is not enough for me to doubt. It is again of the intelligible and necessary essence of doubt that I have to possess some awareness that I do not know in order to doubt, I have to know that I do not know. This step involves again various elements. One of them is reflection. I have to be able to bend back over my own acts and to notice there presence or absence, I have to be aware of my own acts and understand: yes, I know, or yes, I believe. I have also to be able to question my knowledge, to ask myself whether I know or whether I do not know. Only after such a questioning of my knowledge do I come to the understanding that I do not know. If I never had any question about whether I know or do not know, I would not doubt. Of course, someone can also be shaken into such a question by an external reason. He can be so clearly aware that he was in error by being victim of a Fata Morgana that he is almost forced to call his knowledge into question and thereby also to ask himself whether his senses are mistaken or not. Nevertheless, without any such question he would not come to know that he does not know.

[22]On the essence of certainty and knowledge see especially the following works: Plato, *Gorgias*; Aristotle;, *Metaphysics*, IV (Gamma); Aristoteles, *Posterior Analytics*; Thomas von Aquin;, Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, esp. X ff., St. Bonaventure, Quaestiones Disputate de Scientia Christi, IV, in: Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera omnia, edita studio et cura PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura;, ad Claras Aquas (Quarracchi) ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventura, 10 volumina (1882-1902), V; Adolf Reinach, „Über Phänomenologie", in: Adolf Reinach, *Sämtliche Werke.* Texktritische Ausgabe in zwei Bänden, Bd. I: Die Werke, Teil I: Kritische Neuausgabe (1905-1914), Teil II: Nachgelassene Texte (1906-1917); hrsg.v. Barry Smith und Karl Schuhmann (München und Wien: Philosophia Verlag, 1989), pp. 531-550; 'Concerning Phenomenology,' transl.

(1) Husserl's above quoted thesis that cognitive transcendence and certainty about things and states of affairs in themselves is excluded, clearly implies a self-contradiction because even knowledge of the most mind-dependent fictitious object, for example of a purely fictitious intentional object such as the house in a dream, necessarily *presupposes* not only the "immanent transcendence" Husserl attributes to it, but likewise knowledge of truly 'transcendent facts,' such as the knowledge of my actually perceiving such objects (albeit in the dream), that the house which appears in the dream has five rather than four windows, and so on. If it were not 'really so' that I am dreaming, and 'really so' that I dreamt of a house with five windows instead of one with only four, then the fiction could not be constituted. Thus the knowledge of facts which are truly transcendent to my mind and exist in themselves, not merely as *noemata* of my noeses, is the condition of the possibility of any knowledge of merely 'immanently transcendent' objects of the sort Husserl has in mind. Hence his rejection of the possibility of such a truly transcendent knowledge, while at the same time retaining the assertion of a knowledge of immanently transcendent objects, is absurd; and such absurdity does not at all attach to the assertion of a truly transcendent knowledge, as Husserl believes, but to its negation.

This point is no less evident than the one Husserl himself made so clearly, namely, that any image-theory of knowledge presupposes precisely what it denies: a knowledge which grasps not only a subjective image of reality but the reality itself in the light of which alone the image could be recognised as image. This case is objectively quite different from ours because transcendent knowledge is in no way a mere subjective character or image the coincidence of which with the transcendent reality would have to be known. Nevertheless, Husserl rejects the claim of transcendent knowledge by likening it to some sort of 'intentional image' (as Hartmann earlier suggested in his critique of Husserl's critique of the image-theory of knowledge),[23] the correspondence of which with reality could never be known. But this conception of knowledge is no less inadequate than the image-theory as characterisation of the intentionality of consciousness, and can be refuted with arguments very similar to those which Husserl had employed in *Logical Investigations* against the more primitive image-theory that distorts the structure of intentionality. *For any knowledge of 'immanently transcendent' intentional objects to be possible at all, presupposes the knowledge of*

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by Dallas Willard, *The Personalist* 50 (Spring 1969), pp. 194-221. Reprinted in *Perspectives in Philosophy*, ed. Robert N. Beck (New York: Holt, Reinhart, & Winston, 1961 and 1969); also translated as "What is Phenomenology?", by David Kelly, *Philosophical Forum*, 1, pp. 231-256. Vgl. dazu Dietrich von Hildebrand, *What is Philosophy?,* 3rd edn, with a New Introductory Essay by Josef Seifert (London: Routledge, 1991), bes. S. xii ff., and Kap. iv. Back to Things in Themselves. A Phenomenological *Foundation for Classical Realism* (London: Routledge, 1987), Antonio Rosmini, *Certainty*, transl. from *Nuovo Saggio sull' Origine delle Idee* (Durham: Rosmini House, 1991); *Die Philosophie und ihre Methode* (Salzburg: A. Pustet, 1976). Josef Seifert, *Erkenntnis* objektiver Wahrheit. Die Transzendenz des Menschen in der Erkenntnis (Salzburg: A. Pustet, 1976), "Theory of the Three Facts" in: Max Scheler, *Selected Philosophical Essays*, transl. by David R. Lachterman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
[23] Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* (4. Auflage). Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co 1949.

'transcendently (truly) transcendent' objects. And knowledge of transcendent objects is not only a precondition for the formation of the very concept of 'immanent transcendence,' but is also presupposed in any concrete case of knowing an immanent intentional object. Without knowledge of things or facts which are truly 'transcendent' and not dependent on pure consciousness, no 'immanent intentional object' could ever be known. For example, without knowing the transcendent objective fact, the absolutely existing state of affairs that I see an object and live, I could never know the purely immanent object of a dream.[24] It is astonishing that a man of Husserl's genius, who had brilliantly shown very similar absurdities of any relativism and of the image-theory of knowledge in *Logical Investigations,* came to overlook such an evident fact that excludes also the "transcendental relativism" of denying "transcendently transcendent" knowledge of things in themselves.[25]

(2) Husserl's denial of the real transcendence of the act of knowledge and his claim of its a priori impossibility is built on an equivocation and confusion of two entirely different things: a) the evident truth that of course we can know absolutely nothing if the object of knowledge does not become the intentional object of our intentional act of knowing it and if it does not "constitute itself as *object of our consciousness* (noema) before our mind"; b) the wholly unfounded and contradictory claim that things that exist in themselves can never become present to our consciousness *in their not just being intentional objects of consciousness.* This idea that all intentional objects of consciousness could just be *nothing but* intentional objects of consciousness and that autonomous being as such – really existing beings, for example persons, and essential necessities existing in themselves – cannot become object of intentional cognitive acts, but only be objects of some *Weltglauben,* is a false and contradictory assumption that has nothing to do with the former true one. Also Millán-Puelles has, in masterful phenomenological analyses, shown this with overwhelming clarity.[26]

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[24]See also Gerold Prauss, in: W. Marx (Hg.), *Philosophie und Psychologie* (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), 201.

[25]A very litttle known character trait of Husserl described in Hildebrand's *Memoirs* and in his Selbstdarstellung, in: Philosophie in Selbstdarstellungen, Bd. II., hrsg. von Ludwig J. Pongratz (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1975), pp. 77-127, can provide a partial explanation of this riddle. There Hildebrand reports on conversations which he had with Husserl, in which the latter showed himself deeply worried and almost "anxious" in the face of philosophical critics, particularly Neo-Kantians, who charged the *Logical Investigations* with a "naïve realism and dogmatism." On an earlier remarkable critique of transcendental phenomenology and of transcendental Thomism as a kind of "transcendental relativism" see Walter Hoeres, Kritik der transzendentalphilosophischen Erkenntnistheorie (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969); ders., "Critique of the Transcendental Metaphysics of Knowing, Phenomenology and Neo-Scholastic Transcendental Philosophy." *Aletheia* (1978) I,1, 353-69.

[26] Antonio Millán-Puelles has very well pointed out this false and contradictory equivocation in his *Teoría del objeto puro*, Colecciónes Cuestiones Fundamentales (Madrid: Ediciones RIALP, 1990). Ins Englische übersetzt von Jorge García-Gómez: *The Theory of the Pure Object*, hrsg. v. Josef Seifert in der Reihe „Philosophie und Realistische Phänomenologie. Studien der Internationalen Akademie für Philosophie im Fürstentum Liechtenstein" (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1995), Bd. 2.

(3) What was said in the context of uncovering the self-contradiction implied in any denial of really transcendent knowledge already implied one fact and one being which is known by us and which could never be just constituted by our consciousness or be a mere object of our consciousness: namely, our own conscious life. Husserl admits this, but interprets this 'I' as identical not with the empirical and *really* existent ego, but with a transcendental ego which is no "little corner of a really existing world". Whether this ego and consciousness are declared transcendental or empirical, however, the fact that I know their existence and that no possible doubt can be thrown upon it cannot meaningfully be denied. But, if this is so, it is here that I touch upon a 'really transcendent' being, my own objective reality. I know: *cogito, sum* (Descartes); *si enim fallor, sum* (Augustine); *si cogito, etsi fallor, sum; ergo esse est.*[27] There is no good reason offered by Husserl for rejecting the real transcendence of this knowledge which attains a being that cannot be constituted by my consciousness or coincide with a mere *noema* nor with a purely ideal object that is not a real part of the really existing world. Also the intrinsically transcendent fact so sharply stressed by Max Scheler as "first evidence": that there is (truly) something and not nothing cannot be just a noema of my noesis.[28] I know that there is truly something and not nothing. Since truly transcendent knowledge, which Husserl calls into question, is therefore both real and possible as self-given and as the condition of the possibility of any knowledge of immanently transcendent intentional objects, the rejection of a knowing grasp of being *as it truly is in itself* shows itself as not only self-contradictory, but as running counter to the evidence of transcendent knowledge, an evidence which is even *part of* the evidence of the absolutely evident and "immanently transcendent" cognition admitted by Husserl: the cognition of purely intentional objects and phenomena.

(4) Moreover, any instance of our knowledge of necessary essences and *Wesensgesetze* disproves the claim that we only know immanent intentional objects and can never attain certainty about objects which are truly 'transcendent' to human consciousness or existent in themselves.[29] For, in the knowledge of

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[27]Cf. the development of what I term here "the fourth cogito" in Dietrich von Hildebrand, "Das Cogito und die Erkenntnis der realen Welt," Teilveröffentlichung der Salzburger orlesungen Hildebrands: "Wesen und Wert menschlicher Erkenntnis", *Aletheia* 6/1993-1994 (1994), 2- 27.

[28]Max Scheler, "Vom Wesen der Philosophie. Der philosophische Aufschwung und die moralischen Vorbedingungen," in Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen* (Erkenntnislehre und Metaphysik), Schriften aus dem Nachlass Band II, herausgegeben mit einem Anhang von Manfred S. Frings (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1979), S. 61-99. See likewise the same author, "Theory of the Three Facts" in: Max Scheler, *Selected Philosophical Essays*, transl. by David R. Lachterman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

[29]On this point I have a profound disagreement with Millán-Puelles' phenomenological masterwork, who interprets such "essential necessities" as "pure objects." See Josef Seifert, "Preface" to Antonio Millàn-Puelles, *Teoría del objeto puro*. 977 pp. Colecciónes Cuestiones Fundamentales (Madrid: Ediciones RIALP, 1990); *The Theory of the Pure Object,* English translation by Jorge García-Gómez (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996), pp. 1-12; and "El papel de las irrealidades para los principios de contradicción y de razón sufficiente", Ibáñez-Martín, J.A. (coord.), *Realidad e irrealidad.*

necessary truths we grasp something of which it is precisely evident that it is *absolutely* necessary and not necessary only relative to our minds. We grasp that 'in itself' no person who is subject of error can be deceived as to his existence or his free will,[30] that in itself and in any possible world guilt cannot exist without freedom of the will, rights cannot inhere in a material being, the quality of the colour orange lies between yellow and red, nothing can be willed that is not first conceived in thought or knowledge, and so on *ad infinitum*. But in truly grasping the *absolute* necessity of such states of affairs grounded in necessary essences, we understand, by the same token, that these essential laws apply to all possible and real beings of a certain kind and that our knowledge here grasps the truly 'transcendent' structures of 'things in themselves,' i.e., states of affairs and laws that are *in themselves* and provide the eternal laws for all real and possible worlds *in themselves*.

(5) Certainly, this capacity for knowledge of something really transcendent to our consciousness is 'astonishing,' as Husserl calls it, and worthy of being marvelled at. But this does not mean that it is impossible. On the contrary, it discloses itself to be both given and possible. The philosophical wonder at the arch-datum of the receptive transcendence of man in knowledge, a datum which is so fundamental that it is necessarily presupposed by any attempt to deny it, is no argument against the datum. It is likewise false to hold that this amazing character is found only with regard to truly transcendent knowledge and that the knowledge of 'immanent' objects does not entail this marvel of transcendent knowledge, therefore raising none of the problems the knowledge of 'transcendent' beings and states of affairs does raise. No, both are clearly possible, and the knowledge of "immanent objects" of consciousness such as fictions admitted by Husserl necessarily implies, as we have seen, the knowledge of states of affairs transcendent to the intentional cognitive acts in which they are given: knowledge of some real being and of some ideal and necessary states of affairs which *absolutely cannot just be objects of consciousness* and are *themselves given in their transcendent reality*. And both are 'astonishing' data, the (immanent) transcendence of each intentional act to its object that, however fictitious, is never part of the stream of consciousness (neither Don Quixote nor Sancho Panza are part of the stream of my consciousness) and the full transcendence of knowledge of states of affairs which are really real or intrinsically necessary.

(6) With reference to the problem of bringing the *Leistung* (achievement) of transcendence itself (of a relating of the act of knowledge to the transcendent) to evidence, it is likewise not true to say with Husserl that the achievement of transcendence defies a priori its being brought to evidence. For not only do we perform transcending cognizing acts, but the fundamental feature of 'transcendence' can itself be known with indubitable certainty and is itself given due to the peculiar reflective structure of cognition which the Scholastics (Thomas Aquinas and others) emphasised so much, following the lead of ancient philosophy (particularly of Plotinus) and early medieval thought (especially

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Estudios en homenaje al Profesor Antonio Millán-Puelles, (Madrid: RIALP, 2001), S. 119-152.

[30]Cf. Josef Seifert, "In Defense of Free Will: A Critique of Benjamin Libet," *Review of Metaphysics*, Volume LXV, Nr. 2, December 2011.

Augustine). Wherever an act is both knowledge and accompanied by evidence,[31] the knowing subject does not merely 'go' and 'look' out of himself at a being or essential law which he understands to be independent of his consciousness. He also returns, to speak figuratively, from the object known to himself and becomes aware *of* the achievement of transcendence. Thus, this knowledge of the transcendence (which is *part* of the evidence of transcending knowledge), too, answers Husserl's difficulty. It implies the self-givenness of the transcendence of knowledge. In performing authentic knowledge (always transcendent knowledge in the narrower sense) we become laterally aware of its existence and nature which is mirrored also in the 'reflective dimension' of consciousness,[32] a phenomenon very similar to what has been called Vollzugsbewußtsein.[33] It can then be made the object of explicit reflection and, above all, of knowledge of the universal *essence of* transcendent knowledge. The instances of indubitably certain knowledge of which we have spoken, make it clear both that such transcendence in knowledge is in principle possible and what its essence is, as well as that it is

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[31]This cognition has been termed 'knowledge in the narrower sense' by the present author in an earlier work. See Josef Seifert, *Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit,* Part I, Chapter 3. Apart from the passages on the transcendence of man in knowledge from Augustine's work quoted there, see Ludger Hölscher, The Reality of the Mind. Saint Augustine's Philosophical Arguments for the Human Soul as Spiritual Substance, Boston, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986.

[32]See Karol Wojtyìa, *The Acting Person,* See also Josef Seifert, 'Karol Wojtyìa (Pope John Paul II) as Philosopher and the Cracow/Lublin School of Philosophy,' *Aletheia II* (1982).

[33]See on this notion of *Vollzugsbewußtsein* Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung,* 2. Auflage (unveränderter reprographischer Nachdruck, zusammen mit der Habilitationsschrift "Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis" - Darmstadt: Wissen schaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969), S. 1-126, pp. 8 ff.; Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Moralia*. Nachgelassenes Werk. Gesammelte Werke Band V. (Regensburg: Josef Habbel, 1980), pp. 208 ff.; Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Ästhetik*. 1. Teil. Gesammelte Werke, Band V (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1977), pp. 32-40, 49-57; Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Ethik,* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, Stuttgart o. J., 1971?), pp. 202 ff., 212, 242; Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Ethics*, 2nd edn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978), pp. 191 ff.; Dietrich von Hildebrand, "Das Cogito und die Erkenntnis der realen Welt. Teilveröffentlichung der Salzburger Vorlesungen Hildebrands (Salzburg, Herbst 1964): 'Wesen und Wert menschlicher Erkenntnis'" : (7. und 8. Vorlesung), *Aletheia* 6/1993-1994 (1994), pp. 2- 27; Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Transformation in Christ. Our Path to Holiness.* Reprint of 1948 (New Hampshire: Sophia Institute Press. 1989), ch. 4; *Die Umgestaltung in Christus*. Über christliche Grundhaltung, 5. Auflage in den Gesammelten Werken Band X, (Regensburg: Habbel, 1971), Kap. 4. See also the first part of Karol Wojtyìa, *The Acting Person (*Boston: Reidel, 1979); first part. cf. also the corrected text, authorized by the author (unpublished), Library of the International Academy of Philosophy in the Principality Liechtenstein, Schaan. See also Josef Seifert, "Karol Cardinal Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II) as Philosopher and the Cracow/Lublin School of Philosophy" in *Aletheia* II (1981); the same author, *Back to Things in Themselves. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism* (London: Routledge, 1987)., 144 ff., 176 ff., 181-198, 249 ff., 286 ff., see also the passages indicated in the Index of Josef Seifert, *Back to Things in Themselves*, under consciousness, and constitution. See likewise Josef Seifert, *Leib und Seele. Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen Anthropologie* (Salzburg: A. Pustet, 1973), pp. 45 ff.; Josef Seifert, *Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit. Die Transzendenz des Menschen in der Erkenntnis* (Salzburg: A. Pustet, [2nd ed.] 1976), 59 ff., 65 ff., 118 ff., 212 ff., 233 ff., 150 ff., 161 ff., 203 ff.

actually achieved in a particular instance (e.g., in the *si enim fallor, sum* which grasps both our own being and innumerable universal truths).[34]

III. Conclusion: Summarizing the Recognition of the Transcendence of Knowledge in Early and Contemporary "Realist Phenomenology" and the Fourth Cogito

The fact that we find here not only the transcendence of knowledge itself, but also the evident givenness of it as a transcendent grasp of 'being in itself,' makes the knowledge of our own being and the knowledge of necessary essential facts two Archimedean points for human knowledge. In these Archimedean points we touch upon the foundation of ultimate certainty of knowledge.

We may conclude summarizing the key elements of the fourth cogito of phenomenological realism and at the same time phenomenological realism as such:

1. Its link to the first of all ontological evidences that there is something rather than nothing (Scheler) and its reading the *cogito* as*: Cogito*; *sum; ergo esse est* (Hildebrand).

2. The receptive, self-transcendent structure of the knowledge of my own real being in the cogito which does not lock me in a Cartesian "isolated I" or lead to subjectivism or Kantian idealism, as many realists and idealists alike believe, but frees me from any subjectivism, relativism, and immanentism.[35]

3. The discovery of equally evident universal truths, metaphysical and logical principles, and essences or "ideas" in the Platonic sense; and the recognition of their absolute, mind-transcendent necessity and other marks which

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[34]See on this Josef Seifert, *Back to Things in Themselves. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism* (London: Routledge, 1987, *re-published as e-book* and in print in August 2013), ch. 5. This text does not coincide with the second revised and augmented edition published on the (old) IAP-Homepage nor with a third and definitive (but not yet published) edition of the work. The new Hungarian edition of this work, *Vissza a magánvaló dolgokhoz*, (Budapest: Kairosz Kiadó, 2013), translated and introduced by Mátyás Szalay, represents the most definitive and considerably enlarged edition of the work. Especially the section on the realist phenomenological *cogito* is further elaborated and enlarged by a detailed analysis and critique of Kant's charge that the *Cogiito* argument is built on an equivocation of the *ego cogitans* as object and subject of consciousness. See also the masterful doctoral work of Raquel Vera González, *Crítica a la ontología y gnoseología del yo en Paul Natorp desde la perspectiva de la fenomenología realista*, published electrónically on http://eprints.ucm.es/10062/1/T31456.pdf.

[35]See Dietrich von Hildebrand, *What is Philosophy?,* 3rd edn, with a New Introductory Essay by Josef Seifert (London: Routledge, 1991) ; Adolf Reinach, 'Concerning Phenomenology,' transl. from the German ("Über Phänomenologie") by Dallas Willard, *The Personalist* 50 (Spring 1969), pp. 194-221. Reprinted in *Perspectives in Philosophy*, ed. Robert N. Beck (New York: Holt, Reinhart, & Winston, 1961 and 1969); Josef Seifert, *Back to Things in Themselves. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism* (London: Routledge, 1987; electronic re-edition, 2013); the same author, *Discours des Méthodes. The Methods of Philosophy and Realist Phenomenology,* (Frankfurt / Paris / Ebikon / Lancaster / New Brunswick: Ontos-Verlag, 2009).

make them an *objective a priori* instead of subjective a priori forms of perception and thought and which makes their knowledge a "receptively transcendent act" of grasping "things in themselves".[36]

4. The evidence of the contingency of the *ego cogitans* and the ascent from it to what Scheler called the second most evident knowledge: that of an absolute being; this step, if taken from the cogito-experience, bears important similarities to Descartes' cogito of the Third and Fifth *Meditation,* as well as to Anselm of Canterbury (Aosta)'s ontological argument for the existence of God but elaborates more the self-transcendence of the cognitive act and the intrinsic transcendence of the necessary divine essence than both previous thinkers and elucidates a central thesis of Husserl in *Logical Investigations*.[37]

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[36]See Dietrich von Hildebrand, *What is Philosophy?,* 3rd edn, with a New Introductory Essay by Josef Seifert (London: Routledge, 1991), ch. 4. See also Josef Seifert, *Ritornare a Platone. Im Anhang eine unveröffentlichte Schrift Adolf Reinachs,* hrsg., Vorwort und übers. Von Giuseppe Girgenti. Collana Temi metafisici e problemi del pensiero antico. Studi e testi, vol. 81, (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2000); and "The Idea of the Good as the Sum-total of Pure Perfections. A New Personalistic Reading of Republic VI and VII", in: Giovanni Reale and Samuel Scolnikov (Ed.), *New Images of Plato. Dialogues on the Idea of the Good*, (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2002), S. 407-424.

[37]See Alexandre Koyré, *L'idée de Dieu dans la philosophie de St. Anselme* (Paris: Editions Ernest Leroux, 1923); (Reprise, Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1984). See likewise Edith Stein, *Endliches und Ewiges Sein. Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinne des Seins*, in: Edith Steins Werke, Bd. II, Hrsg. L. Gerber, 2. Aufl. (Wien, 1962); 3. unver. Aufl. (Freiburg: Herder, 1986); see also Josef Seifert, *Gott als Gottesbeweis. Eine phänomenologische Neubegründung des ontologischen Arguments*, (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996), 2. Aufl. 2000; the same author, *Erkenntnis des Vollkommenen. Wege der Vernunft zu Gott*, (Bonn: Lepanto Verlag, 2010); the same author, "Der vergessene Protophänomenologe Anselm: Anselm von Canterburys' Ontologisches Argument" und die Methode der realistischen Phänomenologie von Edmund Husserl bis zur Gegenwart, *The Paideia Project* (20ieth World Congress of Philosophy in Boston August 10-15, 1998); See E. Coreth, *Metaphysik* (Innsbruck3 1980), pp. 82 ff. E. Coreth chooses this very question as the starting point for philosophy, arguing also from the even more fundamental question about the right method. No doubt the question, as long as its implications are not discarded, can indeed be a starting point of philosophy.

Another essentially necessary fact which is presupposed by any act of doubt is the will to be certain and to avoid error. Any genuine doubt, which is not merely a skeptical revolt against truth, presupposes the desire for knowledge. This implies again a whole world of related facts. In seeking to know, the one who doubts also understands what knowledge is, and that only a receptive-discovering contact with being, in which that which is the case manifests itself to the spirit, is knowledge, not any mere assuming, narrative or positing of something that does not coincide with that which is.

Thus, the nature of truth is also discovered in doubt, the nature of truth as a unique sort of conformity between judgments and the states of affairs posited in them. Along with the nature of truth which I wish to attain, the essence of the error which I wish to avoid in doubt is also known. For I could not doubt if I did not wish to avoid error. Then it would make no sense to doubt. And error is understood to be a false opinion or conviction, the falsity of which I do not know and which presupposes a certain semblance of truth, without which I would not err, and contains some truths without recognition of which I would never have come to err. Thus knowledge, conviction, judgment, truth, error, certainty, uncertainty - all of these are given in the act of doubt, and countless further essentially

necessary facts about each of their natures can be brought to evidence simply by carefully attending to the act of doubt. Insofar as doubt contains the question about truth, one could also unfold the necessary essence of the question both as act and as thought, and show that the latter cannot be true or false, and so on.

Insofar as nobody doubts who does not prefer knowledge to error and to doubt, I also perceive that some axiological knowledge is gained in doubt. The value of knowledge and truth when compared to falsity and error, the superior value of knowledge when compared to doubt, are known in doubt. Likewise, the difference between the purely intellectual disvalue of error as opposed to the moral disvalue of the person who does not even seek truth or who lightly claims its possession, can be known by delving into the nature of sincere doubt. One can also see that, apart from their intrinsic value as a positive importance which they possess in themselves, knowledge and the desire and love of truth are goods for the person who possesses them and error is an evil for him. In order that genuine doubt be possible, also hierarchical gradations of values and goods for the person must be known. The doubting subject must understand that it is a greater evil to err than to doubt, for, otherwise, he would have no motive to doubt rather than putting forth blind claims. He must understand that his doubt differs from a cynical rejection of truth as well as from an untrue hypocritical claim to certainty where it is lacking.

Finally, everyone who doubts judges that he ought not to assent rashly. In this, again the doubting subject has to make at least two judgments: that he does not possess sufficient knowledge to give his assent to a proposition, and that he ought to abstain from judging if he possesses insufficient knowledge to warrant the judging assent. The doubt is then recognized as the response due to this situation and as preferable to the blind assent of the one who judges lightly. The existence and essence of time - in the transition from the moment in which I doubt to that in which I gain certainty, and in the impossibility of doubting and being certain about the same thing and in the same sense - can also be known by grasping the essence of doubt. At this point we see, however, a new fact: what we discover as the condition of doubt is not restricted to the knowledge of the existence of our own acts and of ourselves as subjects, on the one hand, and to the insights into universal essences of personal acts, on the other. Our starting point in the cogito37 shall not restrict us to knowing the objective nature of the most important being in the universe, the person and his acts. Rather we shall gain access, too, from this same starting point, to similarly indubitable facts in the sphere of universal ontological and logical principles which Aristotle investigates in book IV of the Metaphysics or in his Organon. We gain knowledge about being, truth, reason, logical consistency and countless other things - all hidden even in the most radical doubt and only waiting to be opened to the searching mind. In fact, nothing forbids to recognize that perhaps in the evidence of the cogito and with the evidence of our own being, nay in a certain way prior to it, we gain knowledge of such universal essences as that of being as such, which Aristotle and Avicenna, and with them many other philosophers regarded as the first and most evident fact, is known by us, or the first principles of being, that of identity, of contradiction, and others such as that of the excluded middle. For indeed, we could not know that we exist, and even not doubt, as it shall turn out, without knowing already such essentially necessary principles of being. Why do we then not start with their knowledge as the first beginning of philosophy? Why with the subject and the cogito? Why with doubt? The starting point for epistemology and philosophy as such in the reflection on the most radical doubt does not imply, that we ought to start or have to start with doubt. No, there is no single starting point for philosophy and epistemology. We could very well start with us having sense-perceptions and proceed from there to those evidences which we can attain from the evidence of the senses. We could start also with our knowing that something is rather than nothing (Scheler),37 with the judgment (Lotz) or the question (Coreth),37 or with being and the

5. The undeniable existence and empathetic knowledge of other real persons and of the world co-given in the human conscious experience of the world, an experience that is particularly entailed in the experience of social acts directed by their essence to real other persons and in love (Edith Stein, Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Paola Premoli de Marchi, Gian Paolo Terravecchia) and overcomes solipsism in a real and not again immanent sense, as in Husserl's Fifth *Cartesian Meditation*.[38]

While it is of course impossible in a short lecture to show all of this with sufficient clarity, this paper may be sufficient to convince the listener or reader that the recognition of the transcendence of knowledge and its receptive openness towards beings and states of affairs as they are in themselves that distinguishes realist phenomenology is the fruit of careful and critical phenomenological and philosophical research and distinctions, and in no way constitutes a naïve and ingenuous realism. It is the fruit of a strenuous "seventh voyage" and in no way a

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principle of contradiction (Aristotle) or that of identity (Leibniz) as an even more fundamental ontological principle.

Yet all these evidences are also to be found in the cogito, as we shall see. And while they are included in the evidence of the cogito, with its link to the really existing world as well as to that of many pure Wesenheiten, these other evidences do not clearly and specifically point to the existence of ourselves and to the evidence of the cogito. In fact, they do not contain any direct reference to the order of existence and thus lack one of the two sides of the evidence of the cogito. Moreover, without the evidence to be unfolded in the cogito, no other evidence is possible because nobody can be certain about anything if he can doubt that he himself exists, because certainty always involves a moment of reflection: of knowing that I know. Precisely for this reason alone the other starting points which offer themselves to the philosopher are more restricted and, I believe, inferior to those contained in the cogito. The last remarks lead us to recognize a further point: the starting point in doubt or in the cogito has the great advantage that it spells out a general structure of all certain knowledge, which remains unspoken if we use other evidences as starting point. This silent presupposition and condition of all other evidences consists in that certain knowledge can never be about anything at all without also involving the certainty about the knowing subject. For certainty is always linked to a moment of reflection that I am certain of X. A completely self-forgetting evidence in which no evidence of the knowing subject would be contained, is impossible. On this see especially Antonio Rosmini, Certainty, transl. from Nuovo Saggio sull' Origine delle Idee (Durham: Rosmini House, 1991), pp. 107 ff.

[38] See Edith Stein, *Zum Problem der Einfühlung*, (Halle a.d.S.: Buchdruckerei des Waisenhauses, 1917), Reprint (München: Kaffke, 1980). See also Adolf Reinach, „Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes", in: Reinach, Adolf, *Sämtliche Werke. Texkritische Ausgabe in zwei Bänden,* Bd. I: *Die Werke*, Teil I: Kritische Neuausgabe (1905-1914), Teil II: Nachgelassene Texte (1905-1917); hrsg.v. Karl Schuhmann Barry Smith (München und Wien: Philosophia Verlag, 1989), 141-278; see Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft. Untersuchungen über Wesen und Wert der Gemeinschaft,* 3., vom Verf. durchgesehene Aufl., Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Gesammelte Werke* IV (Regensburg: J. Habbel, 1975). See also Paola Premoli De Marchi, *Uomo e relazione. L'antropologia filosofica di Dietrich von Hildebrand* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1998). Se likewise Gian Paolo Terravecchia, *Fenomenologia delle relazioni interpersonali. Il contributo di Reinach e von Hildebrand alla filosofia sociale*. Internazionale Akademie für Philosophie im Fürstentum Liechtenstein. Diss. 1998; *Filosofia sociale. Il contributo di Dietrich von Hildebrand.* Pref. Josef Seifert (Milano: Diade, 2004).

mere return to the past or to "the early times of the phenomenological movement." It is thus both essential to early phenomenology and to eternal truth, to *philosophia perennis*.[39]

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[39]On the notion of the „seventh navigation" see Balduin Schwarz, *Wahrheit, Irrtum und Verirrungen. Die sechs großen Krisen und sieben Ausfahrten der abendländischen Philosophie*, hrsg, v. Paula Premoli/Josef Seifert (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1996), and the Preface oft he editors; see also Josef Seifert, "Die 'Siebte Ausfahrt' als Aufgabe der Internationalen Akademie für Philosophie im Fürstentum Liechtenstein (1986-1996). Rede zur 10-Jahres-Jubiläumsfeier der Internationalen Akademie für Philosophie im Fürstentum Liechtenstein am 26. Oktober 1996," in: Mariano Crespo (Hrsg.), *Menschenwürde: Metaphysik und Ethik* (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1998), pp. 19-55; and Josef Seifert, "The Seventh Voyage of Philosophy," *Journal for Interdisciplinary Studies*, XI 1999: 83-104, and the Preface oft he editors to Balduin Schwarz, *Der Irrtum in der Philosophie*, 2. Auflage, ed. by Stefan Schwarz, Josef Seifert, and Wolfram Schrems, (Frankfurt a.M.: *Ontosverlag/Gruyterverlag*, 2013).

REALITY: A STATEMENT ABOUT IT AS INTELLIGIBLE-BEING

Devendra Nath Tiwari[*]

Abstract: No reality can get the value of being reality if it is beyond knowledge. It cannot be life and part of practice and cannot serve for the welfare if it is not revealed determinately. It is trivial to say that my reality is beyond my knowledge, separate from me. Misguided approach causes failure to determinate cognition of reality that leads to it as indescribable. In such a paradoxical situation, epistemological proving of Reality gets only a subordinated import. Reality independently from thought and thought isolated from language cannot be the object of philosophical reflections. Metaphysicians construct their systems of reality because of reason and fortify them by the rationale of reason comprising epistemic proofs, arguments, justifications, beliefs, instances and evidences. Do they drive reason in its proper direction? Epistemology is a natural urge of metaphysics; there is no other way to convince about the reasonability and justifiability of the systems. Even in some cases, they accept imagination also as a proof. Some may produce justifications and grounds of justifications of reality while others may find fault with it; to some it may perhaps give incentive to mystification and to some other to skepticism. Reality becomes the problem of philosophical investigation and discussion only when it figures in cognition and then, it is not a thing- in- itself or ontic reality but the intelligible reality expressed by language. It may be an individual or universal, may be beyond or inexpressible, may have a name or unnamable, but that can be known determinately thus only because language presents it so.

I

How does the question of reality arise in most natural way? When we think about reality, we find ourselves in the duality of 'I', the conscious being who knows that is subject and the external things before me to which I know, that is, objects. A third thing also falls in the compass and that is the sources by which we claim to know the reality. All the three are realities for the realists but they concentrate basically only on the former two as reality. Some of the realists provide with equal status to both sorts of realities but they have no defense against the subordination of the later on former in an activity of knowing in which the things are dependent on the mind who knows them. On the contrary idealists give importance to the consciousness to the extent that they assume even the external reality as the manifestation, appearance or as the hypostatization of the consciousness. The reality is consciousness which is the reality of things we know by sources of knowledge also. I have concluded that idealists added an edge over realists but the question is: is consciousness –it-self the object we know as reality in a philosophical activity? So far the use of reason is concerned both the realists and the idealists try to justify their metaphysical constructions in a way that keep

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them away from object of doing proper philosophy. Metaphysicians construct their systems of reality because of reason and fortify them by the rationale of reason comprising arguments, justifications, beliefs, instances and evidences. Do they drive reason in its proper direction? Is philosophy simply a game of reason? Is a philosopher's concern with reality not confined to analysis and reflection on cognition as it figures in or flashes forth in the mind? These questions form the subject matter of the discussion in this paper.

<center>II</center>

Epistemological thinking in East and West is popularly developed as offshoot of a metaphysical system whose purpose is to show that assumptions of metaphysical entities are well supported by measures of knowledge that is, they are based on true knowledge of the reality, proved by arguments and demonstrated by logical justifications and evidences. Such attempts in the field of epistemology are centered mainly on two different views-i- "reality is dependent on knowledge" that paves ways for a noetic dependence epistemology and ii- 'knowledge is dependent on reality' that served as the basis of ontic dependence epistemology. In Indian philosophical systems the aforementioned views form the controversy of "*mānadhīnā meyasiddhiḥ*[1]" and '*meyadhīnā mānasiddhiḥ*[2]'. Indian philosophical systems have held fast either to the former or to the latter of these two positions in a way that they frame arguments for refuting each other as their opponents.

There are three popular attitudes about knowledge that have played central role in determining the direction of epistemological thinking in Indian Philosophical systems.

i. Had all knowledge been true there would have been no need of epistemology. Epistemology is required for determining the nature of knowledge, truth and falsity of knowledge and the conditions involved therewith. Mīmānsā school of Indian Philosophy is an exception to this ideology. It accepts all knowledge true and then develops a theory of knowledge that merits maximum number of epistemological proofs.

ii. Contrary to the former, there is a view that there is the need of epistemology because the truth and falsity of knowledge cannot be worked out without an epistemology. Epistemology is developed in our attempt of knowing the truth of knowledge of reality. Reality comprises not only the thing existents (*bhūta vastu*) but those that can be brought into existence (*bhāvya bastu*) also. Accordingly, two sorts of epistemology –descriptive and prescriptive came into light. Out of the two the former is only popular in the theories of knowledge. With the contemporary Western efforts especially in the field of moral and religious language the latter is also developing as theories of knowledge and justification.

iii. All knowledge is true therefore there is possibility of logic and theories of knowledge. The knowledge expressed beforehand serves as the foundation of not only different theorizations of it but also of proving its truthfulness or falsity on the basis of

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[1]Tattvapradīpikā, verse 18 p. 356, according to it, the existence, non-existence truth falsity, etc. of the objects are relative to the epistemological proofs.
[2]This definition is accepted by some Buddhists for whom things are endowed with all powers and the truth and falsity, validity and invalidity of the proofs and justification depend on their agreeability with the powers of things.

epistemological measures and logic based on availability or absence of the corresponding things. This view gives importance to the verity of knowledge. All knowledge is determinate and veridical. Validity and invalidity, truth and falsity, cohering and non-cohering, consistency and inconsistency of the verity are logical measures through them the verity is logically testified[3]. Here in the present discussion, I am concerned with the view for which the knowledge expressed by language is veridical and the measures of knowledge, theorization of knowledge are possible only if it serves as the cognitive ground of epistemological and logical activities.

Had metaphysician not been giving high importance to epistemological scheme of proving, I would have not been prompted to write the present paper on reality? Metaphysics cannot survive without epistemology and both of them taken together form a system. Epistemology is a natural urge of a metaphysics which have no other way to convince about the reasonability and justifiability of their systems. They construct a number of entities and produce a number of epistemic proofs and justification to justify them. Some of the entities they claim to known by perception and others by inference, resemblance, presumption, authority, implication, non-apprehension, practice, unseen power and several other means of knowledge. If they do not find any popular proof to prove a certain reality they give evidences and logical justification to convince about the veritable myth of their assumptions. Even in some cases they accept imagination also as a proof. I shall discuss the point in section IV. Epistemological proving schemes based on metaphysics or on a theory about something –in-itself which is beyond the grasp of reason, falls short in checking metaphysical construction either by contradiction or by their incapacity of encountering reality. Epistemolygy may realize its limitation and may leave such things as beyond for religious meditation. Either they do not succeed in proving the reality they intend to prove or in proving that which not the object they intended to prove was; they mislead to an unwarranted conclusion. Such proving is based on creating confusion between the object they intend to prove, the object reached by their arguments of proving and the object beyond the limit of the arguments. More clearly they intend to prove the object of knowledge which they grasp and their arguments prove the object which they do not grasp that is beyond the grasp. Such amalgamation has caused great harm to philosophy. What is the object that needs proving and what object the epistemic proofs prove? I shall shift on the issue after a few steps. Here I want to point out the metaphysician's undertaking of the reality with specific instances from Indian philosophical systems.

Metaphysics is taken as a theory that involves in determining the real or ultimate nature of things, world preoccupied with the concept of existence and reality. The term 'metaphysics' now a day is taken in so many senses. It includes questions about the reality of external things, their kinds, modes and epistemology based on proving them. Modern thinkers take the term for the study of things separate from and transcendental to the world of things but having more intrinsic reality and value than the things. More precisely, I take the term 'metaphysics' in

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[3]A precise discussion on the issue by the same author can be seen in D. N. Tiwari's *The Central Problems of Bhartṛhari's Philosophy* published by ICPR, New Delhi, pp. 40-42, 2008.

the sense of a mode of thinking in which the thought and the reality or the essence of thing – empirical or transcendental- are considered independent and exterior to language that refers to or represents them. However, in both of the senses metaphysical things-transcendental or empirical – are not only independent from but also are beyond the grasp of thoughts and language. Both the empirical and transcendental are in a sense transcendental- one is transcendental to the sensory data we acquire from contact or experience and the other to the data and world of things we sense as well.

Metaphysicians discuss reality as the reality of the world of experience and as the absolute as well with an unsteady and illegitimate difference of empirical and transcendental. The former out of them are the things existing independently of knowledge but are taken popularly as the objects we perceive by senses and the later as existence beyond the grasp of human reason. We very often use the words thing, object, being, interchangeably. I perceive these concepts differently and find that interchangeable use of them may cause confusion. By the term 'thing' I always mean the thing –in-itself in Kantian jargon. A thing is an object when it is sensed or it concerns with knowledge or a theory of it. Some metaphysicians accept that, ultimate reality/absolute reality/Brahman is not the object of our senses; it does not fall in the category of things; it is the object of direct knowledge; it may be the knowledge itself as Sānkara Vedāntins[4] accept; but that is not the object of senses; it is immediacy. Let us proceed to examine critically as to how Sānkara Vedantins define and what problems are caused by their interpretations of reality. At the very outset I want to clarify that my critique of the dialectic of Buddhists' against metaphysical objects and epistemic proofs, and Sankara's approach to immediacy through subletting worldly existences, and showing the insufficiency of different epistemological proofs like perception, inference, etc, is not to lower the religious importance of these systems. Indeed I would point out that they use those devices to cultivate the mind towards a religious experience of the transcendental reality via the grasp of speech, thought and a whole construction of the mind. It is thus to show they give importance to philosophical reflection only as a device for moving towards a religious experience. Their aim is not to achieve philosophical excellence but to excel their religious design by philosophical thinking. They admit that reality is beyond the grasp of reason, and for that reason these systems are respected.

<center>III</center>

Śankara Advaita defines reality in two ways- first as that which is not sublated in all the three parts of time (*trikālābādhitvam hi sat*). For this view nothing in this world is real because everything even the world itself is subject to time, change and sublation; they are born, exist and lastly destroyed in future. Śankara himself accepts that which is subject to sublation is false (*bādhitvāt mithyā*[5]). To say something real is not similar to say that other things are false and vice-versa. To accept different criterion for two different sorts of reality is to split reality into

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[4]Knowledge is Existence and vice versa. *Śārīrakabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra* 3/2/21.
[5]Reality is that which is not sublated in all the three divisions of time and that which is sublated is false *ādhyasmānatvāt Mithyā- Śārīrakabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra* 3/2/4.

reality as such and it as false. To say that falsity implies the practical reality different from the reality in definition is not only to confuse the logic of reality but to mislead the philosophical conclusions regarding it.

Secondly, Advaita Vedantins take reality as the reality of the realities (*satyasya satyam*).[6] In view of this definition the reality of this world (*Vyavahārika sattā*) and the reality of appearance (*pratibhāsika sattā*) get place in the realm of existences in which ultimate reality (*Pārmārthika sattā*) inheres (this inherence may be false). This definition entails that reality is universal that inheres in individuals, universals and universal of universal. This implies that Reality is the object of knowledge, we know it different from individuals or infer it as that which inheres in individuals. Moreover, universe is the object of awareness or consciousness and not an externally eternal object. Śāṅkara Vedantins can not equate the object with consciousness that is not an object but simply the knower of the object. They do not equate thoughts with consciousness, which in their philosophy is the substratum of the former.[7]

To get rid of the logical flaw of the idea of reality of realities they adopt a method of transcendence in which reality is transcendental to the world of individuals and universals.[8] The transcendence can get shelter ultimately in silence where language and logic do not hold meaning. Metaphysician's construction of transcendental reality different from the reality of our approach through means of knowledge gives place to a different sort of means of knowing which they name intuition. The Reality is always something more or left untouched by those epistemic proofs based on our senses and reasoning and that is why they provide with an epistemological support to their assumption of reality by taking immediacy a source of knowledge different from other sources. Is immediacy the same as intuition? Immediacy is involved in subjective reflection while intuition flashes directly all of a sudden in the mind. The object of intuition is not the soul which in immediacy thesis is a knowing by becoming. Intuition is fallible source of knowledge but the same is not the case with Advaitin's immediacy. Advaitin's argument for the transcendence is immediacy that may have religious importance but that cannot add any object for philosophical reflections; that ultimately leads to cessation of philosophical reflections which are confined to the objects of awareness and the self-conscious activity on them. Why should all philosophical reflections center to a trans-philosophical ontic reality? The immediacy argument in contrast to mediacy argument for which objects of senses are objects of reflection is based on consciousness as the object of reflecting awareness that is consciousness turns to itself as an object of that immediate awareness; but Vedantins will never accept consciousness as an object. Consciousness flashes but the two- the consciousness and its flashes cannot flash simultaneously and are not the same; the subject and the object both at the same time in the same awareness do not flash, each flashing is new but is not so with

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[6]*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6/8/7.
[7]A Dialogue between a Wife and a Husband, Issue-8 (May 2011), Empowerment, Cover Story by Devendranath Tiwari., pp. 1-7, www.visit-the.indian.subcontinent.org.content.
[8]According to Madhyamikas appearance are void of reality and reality is void of plurality (*prapancaśūnya*).

the consciousness. Transcendence from the object world to shift to the subject may be a good move. But can a subject be an object in a cognition? If yes, all arguments and reflections on subject may be directed in the same objective mode as they move in objective reflection. It is not, and therefore Vedantins accept subjective mode of reflection on the subject. They try to differentiate the mode of thinking on the object and subject by introducing immediacy as a mode of knowledge. Immediacy cannot be different from flash of consciousness. They place consciousness as the object of meditation and not of philosophical reflection. The question is: is not the subject become an object in a subjective reflection? How should immediacy, a flash be taken as the consciousness itself? It will lead to a fallacy of taking an action of a thing as the thing itself. Vedantins feel proud of accepting two different modes of reflecting on two different sorts of realities-objective mode for the objects of empirical world we know by sources of knowledge and the subjective mode for the subject we know by immediacy that is transcendental to the former and hence beyond the grasp of the former mode of reflecting on. By that way unconsciously they commit the same mistake of taking the soul as an object in the subjective mode of reflections. This contradicts with their basic assumption that the subject (soul) is never an object; it is always consciousness. *Prakāśānanda* in *Vedāntasiddhānta Muktāvali* has sincerely considered the problem of subject-object dichotomy, and that is why he has tried to solve the problem by assuming that the same reality is dividedly perceived as both the subject and the object.

The uniqueness of metaphysicians lies in their belief in a transcended reality, which they assume as the reality of the physical world also. In Advaita Vedanta the reality is not only immanence but transcendence as well and thus they involve in search of the reality of realities. For fulfilling that aim they apply the logic of abstraction and implication. But the question is: how can the abstraction be non-different in character from that (thing) which is abstracted? The abstracted may be different but it will be altogether a different reality; it is not to say the abstracted one as the reality of the realities which in Advaita Vedanta is conscious light, the reality of the abstractions also. Abstraction depends on the thing abstracted and on the mind as the abstracting agency, but Śankara's 'Absolute' is neither of the two. In case of reality as abstraction the question arises as to which one out of the thing abstracted and the abstraction of the thing is real? The abstraction being last would not and the thing abstracted, being logically false in the Śankara's logic of Advaita, could not be real.

In the history of Indian philosophy Buddhists gave utmost importance to a discussion on the concept of reality. Their concern with the discussion is more interesting than any other metaphysician who speculates into reality. They put all possible arguments regarding different sorts of reality that is ontic, epistemic, logical, etc. and make it clear that they are not concerned with reality as it is but with examining the soundness of the arguments given for accepting some or the other sort of reality. They by analyzing and examining those arguments demonstrate that those arguments are not steady. On close analysis they fail to establish what they intend to establish and thus they are meaningless for proving or disproving the reality as such. 'Reality beyond all sorts of expressions or

expressibility' and 'it as fit for all possible sorts of expressions' signify the same meaning that is reality as such is not known determinately; it is by nature (*svabhāvaśūnya*[9]) and definition (*catuṣkotivinirmukta*[10]) both in case of the former, that is in Buddhism and by definition (*anantadharmātkamvastu*[11]) in case of the latter that is Jainism, that reality is not known determinately.

<p style="text-align:center">IV</p>

Arguments furnished for proving the reality or which claim to reveal reality indicate only to indescribability of reality which is transcendental to its knowledge. Realizing their limitation or incapability of arguments and proofs some theorists turn their thoughts to skepticism. In the process of exhausting all epistemological options, metaphysicians when they fail to prove the reality of realities   germinate mysticism. Śankara's arguments take to a third position, that is, the reality cannot be denied because of it being the denier itself (*ya eva hi nirākartā tadevatasya svarūpam*[12]). Is the denier an ontic being (soul) inferred on the basis of the activities of denying? If it is yes, then the question: is it the same soul, the ultimate reality of Advaita Vedanta? The function and qualities of the reality is not the same what the reality is. Śankara himself accepts a difference between the individual self and the soul. The inference of individual self on the basis of denying activity does in no way prove the soul. What is the object of immediacy? Is it soul or self? If it is self that is known by immediacy, will it not lead to subjectivism? If it is then the problem of knowledge of other mind stands strongly before them and their any attempt to it may culminates in solipsism. Does a philosopher analyze and reflect on the reality separate from knowledge and not on knowledge of that (reality)? While doing so do we not go beyond limit of knowledge? Epistemic   proofs indicate a static reality void of any possibility of change or alteration that is a thing- in -itself which, in fact, is beyond reasoning. If things in the world are svabhāvasunya, they cannot be proved by epistemological proofs which are implied to prove only the svabhāva and if the reality as svabhāva is accepted then there is no need for epistemic proofs. If it is not so there must be unanimity in metaphysicians but none of the two agrees on the nature of object they prove. In such a position, in the affair of reality we are left with only alternative to follow them as the wise treat them (*laukikomārgoanusartavyaḥ*[13]) without doubting and putting a question as to why the black is black or why such thing has such a svabhāva.

    Different theorists talk about different sorts of reality; they claim to perceive physical, ontological metaphysical, logical, epistemological, aesthetical and other kinds of it. Now the question is: is reality different in nature or is it the same reality which is theorized differently by theorists as per adherence and allegiance

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[9]According to Buddhists the Reality is Indescribable, beyond category of statements or language.
[10]*Anyayogavyavahārachedikā*, p. 22.
[11]Śārīrakabhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* 2/3/7.
[12]*Laukiko mārgo'nusartavyaḥ-Tattvopapllavasinhaḥ* by Jayarasi
Bhatta, *Granthaprakaraṇa pratijñā*, p. 1.
[13]See, "The Life Divine" by Sri Aurobindo, Pondicherry Ashram.

to their own construction of a system? I am well aware of the fact that no two theorists agree on the sameness argument of reality. Why is it so? Is the nature (svabhāva) of a thing such that it changes from person to person? Not only do they criticize and refute each other's arguments of reality and think that their construction is the only consistent and comprehensive truth, but they position their system to a place of meditation outside philosophical reflection. If this is the case then no agreement is possible. Those who adhere with the opposite view think that no variation in reality is possible and that it is the theorists who for their own purpose perceive it differently. Even if this view is accepted, we find no two theorists agree on the nature of that one reality. For instance there are a number of absolutists, non-dualists who describe the nature of reality differently. All of the theorists construct some epistemology; give some arguments, instances and justification for showing their conception of reality as objectively true. How can they avoid privatism, subjectivism and solipsism in constructing the metaphysics of their own allegiance?

Some contemporary thinkers like Sri Aurobindo (Raju, 1985, 409) and P. T. Raju (Hick, 1985, 28-36) furnish the logic of infinite, transcendental logic for the transcendental reality which is spiritual or divine. According to them, the reality is infinite in existence and function operative in the universe. This logic, for them, is inherent into the deep structure of human life. All conflicts, opposition and tensions are at level of infra rational and rational thinking on reality but there is no possibility of them at spiritual level of reality which is all positive and negative. Reality and non-reality, existence and non-existence are two poles or forms of the same reality. Immanuel Kant wisely propounded that our mind can know only the things as they appear and not the noumena. He honestly accepted that when the mind tries to grasp the noumena, it is fenced in the antinomies of reason.

Here I refer to Anselm's (Ibid. 37-52) and Aquinas'[14] ontological argument for the existence of God that is, for them, truth also. God is greater than something which we can conceive of as not existing. Therefore, Anselm claims that we would have impossible contradiction if we accept that than which a greater cannot be conceived could be conceived not to exist. It cannot be understood not to exist or even cannot be understood to be capable of not being. Thomas Aquinas believes that truth about God is not an article of faith, but is preambles to the article; it can be known by natural reason. The finite mind can think of such a truth but can neither prove nor disprove. If finite mind contradicts itself by thinking of the denial of the greatest, how can it think of its existence? Any assertion or denial of finite mind is impossible according to their own logic of the greatest. So far the logic of natural reason is concerned, I can say that there are natural reasons who do not believe in God's truth, communities who do not follow any theological orthodoxy and atheists who refute God's existence. The theologian's argument can be of a great shelter, a great article for their solace but is of no philosophical importance. In formulating such arguments and providing such proofs the theologists give importance to formulation of a logic better to say a logic of transcendent in which their existence, their mind is subordinated to their imagination of that logic. The greatest, idea of its existence, logical impossibility of denial of its existence and transcendence from both of the negative and positive

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[14]Neti neti, *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 2/3/6.

positions are all philosophically important only when their existence as thought is accepted. It becomes a matter of religious contemplation if we believe them as externally existent and independently from thought and language.

<center>V</center>

Some metaphysicians talk about reality as unknowable and *unnamable*. They realize the limit of reason and the epistemic justifications and that is why they place reality to a stage where a mystic can experience that but cannot give word to their experience of it. I cannot overlook this issue only by pushing such type of experience of reality in the realm of religion because many of the philosophers have been found to have their concern with a discussion of that conception of reality. For example, Buddhists may say that the pin pointed particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) is directly known but is not nameable and what is nameable is not reality but mental construction (*vikalpa*). Following Upaniṣadic statement Sānkara Vedantins interpret reality as "not this not this[15]". The reality is beyond the grasp of senses, mind and speech. Jain philosophers' position is altogether different. For them the reality is all the knowable and unknowable, nameable and unnamable. Reality for Jain Philosophers is one among infinite qualities of a substance. One point is very clear to us and that is – that which is known is determinately known and knowledge being determinate is not possible without language which determinates. Taking this point in view one can firmly say that that which is known is expressible or nameable. It is relevant here to refer to Naiyayikas definition of inherence (*samavāya*). Samavāya[16] according to them is unnamable, it is nirupādhika and hence indescribable. For Naiyayikas the signified (*avācya*) of the signifier (*samavāya*) is indescribable and therefore unspeakable. It cannot be indicated as this or that because of its being a *non-relata*. Now we can say against this view that 'samavāya is avācya' and 'avacya is not a signified' is a self contradictory statement. Samavāya as the signifier (vācya) of the signified 'avācya' is very much speakable. Unknowable will lose its character if it is unknowable at the time – it is cognized thus. Just as a doubtful cognition or doubt is not doubted at the same time, a signifier cannot be a signified. Logically, the 'reality is unknowable' is a contradiction and cognitively unknowable reality is the signified of the signifier "unknowable" and is speakable as well. Even silence is a thought, a concept. Had it not been so, a number of books and interpretations on Buddha's silence would have not been written. There is no reality isolated from the language. A signified, transcendental to its signifier which is unspeakable is an a-philosophical assumption.

Reality is beyond the grasp of mind and language and for that reason it is called "indescribable". Even in that case the reality is not void of language "indescribable", The idea/thoughts/flashes are secondary reality in contrast with external entities which are ordinarily taken as primary. But philosophically the

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[15]A precise discussion of on the issue by the same author can be seen in *The Central Problems of Bhartṛhari's Philosophy*, ICPR, New Delhi, pp. 389-391, 2008.
[16]Universal as the Import of words, *The Journal of The Indian Academy of Philosophy*, Kolkata, Vol. XLIII, Nos. 1&2, pp. 33-59.

latter is the only reality to which our knowledge is confined. External reality is implicated or inferred by some similarity as the ontological substratum of the reality that figures in. The moment we accept a thing –in –itself or ontic being inferred or implicated as substratum of thoughts which are only known we stop the serious thinking and destroy the interest of openness of philosophical activities; we deviate from knowing aspect and shift to assuming.

VI

Senses don't grasp thing – in – tself. They can grasp the object for which they are naturally fit; they grasp only sensations, sense-data or as the things appear to them. Epistemic proofs are needed for influencing others and not for knowing the reality. Something can be proved or disproved only when the thing is known beforehand. If, otherwise, there will be no cognitive base and, hence, no cause of incentive for directing those measures towards the object that is to be proved. I see the 'pot' and I know that I know only the sensations of 'pot' I acquired by seeing 'pot' and not the 'pot' thing as such but when somebody asks as how do you know the 'pot' I simply reply that I know it by perception. Here one can note that object of sense contact is 'pot' the thing but the object acquired by sense-data of pot which the mind construct as the knowledge of 'pot'. Senses like eyes can sense only but cannot grasp the thing-in-itself. Despite that we claim to know it by perception. It is clear that the object of perceiving ''pot'' and the object of knowledge of 'pot' are distinct.

Sense data philosophers observe that the senses can acquire only the sense data and our mind can grasp only them. Is sense data void of language? If it is yes, how can they be known determinately and distinctly so? How can the sense data of "pot" be differentiated from that of "cot"? Isolated from language no existence, no reality, no sense data and finally no knowledge of reality is possible and it is perhaps the reason sense data philosopher thought of reality as logical construct. The logical reality is a construct of mind out of sense data; they can only be represented by language; the representation which is fit to represent the facts that are logical realities. The world is totality of facts and all facts are experiences. Facts are logical realities and are related as representation – represented or as reference – and the facts they refer to. If all facts are logical units and are independent from each other, how can a fact relate or can be related with each other fact? In other words how is the fact of a representation related with the fact of the thing represented? If relation is also an experience it will be an addition to the heap of the facts and can be a relation no more. If relation is the commonness to be found in between the facts then commonness is also an experience and thus it is difficult to accept a relata as relation. The same fact cannot be the relata and the relation, expression and the expressed at the same time? Logical reality is never void of language but the question is: is it a construction of mind or of language or the language itself? Wittgenstein is not very much clear and specific to the solution of these questions.

VII

Reality is defined as Individual or substance qualified by the qualities. If reality is defined so then it must have a name, specific qualities through which it is

identified thus and   for which we use pronouns like this, that, all. Advaita Vedantins subordinate such reality having a name and qualities as appearances. Buddhists accept the individual as reality but devoid of name and qualities which are mental construction of the individual; these constructed realities are universal and the reality that is individual or pin pointed particular out of which the mind constructs universal is beyond qualities and description. Individual, as generally taken, is a whole made of parts-qualities, universal, number, gender, etc., and has a name and may be indicated by pronouns,. Individual is subject to birth and death. Brahman in Vedanta's scheme is eternal and hence cannot be an individual suffering from those changes. If it is accepted that individuals are not always changing it may be eternal or that the change may also be eternal, a number of individuals will be of a number of categories – mortal, immortal including static and change. Absolute/Brahman is neither change nor mortal. Immortal static individual is not known. Vedantins accept individual as that inhered by the universal without which the identical cognition of individual as individual will not be possible. Universal inheres in individuals because of they are known distinctly so. Advaita Vedantin's Brahman is neither individual nor universal but a transcendental signified.

According to Nagarjunian or Derridian deconstruction the reality or substance if it is a whole made up of qualities will exist no more if the qualities of it are analyzed or separated from that; separated from the qualities it will lose its existence and name as well. If we say that reality is no other than the qualities then there will be no difference between the two –the reality and the quality and that is not acceptable to metaphysicians themselves. Reality –in –itself, if an ontic being, is not an object of philosophical reflection. If they accept it transcendental to cognitive grasp, it is of no philosophical use and if it is separate from the signifier, the language it is not a signified of that signifier. To accept a signified transcendental to its signifier is not only a denial of the power and proper estimation of language but to overlook the seriousness of the problems of cognitive activities like analysis, translation, interpretation of the signified transcendental to the signifier. In case of a signified transcendental to the signifier which is only given in hand, the analysis etc., of the signifier will not be the analysis of the signified and the signified being transcendental to its signifier will always stand at a distance from its signifier. Let me clarify the limit of the sources of knowledge in knowing the individual reality with an instance of perception. Suppose somebody asks me about John's house. I make him known by sayings that see, the house on the roof of which the crow is sitting. The crow, that later on flies away, serves only as indicator; the crow is no more sitting on the John's house despite of that he reaches there. Likewise, the epistemic proofs can indicate to a reality but may not make us known the reality. Indication does in no way mean cognition or revelation of knowledge. Here the duality of indication and immediacy stands as a problem; in each reflection two sorts of knowledge belonging to two different levels in the same cognition cannot be accepted.

VIII

Is the reality Universal? Two major arguments are given against universal. First that 'doing' is performed by individuals; one cannot bring a universal 'pot' when one is asked to fetch a 'pot'. One can fetch only an individual 'pot'. Secondly

identical cognition of an individual is possible only on the basis of individuals and that universals are also known by inference or by implication as inhering in individuals. Here I want to remark that identical cognition of individual cannot be caused by individual itself because individuals vary from one another; they all are independent discrete. Even the instant individual differs in the next moment in an atomic theory. Identical cognition of individuals by resemblance, similarity and group require more than one individual out of which the commonness or resemblance is taken as the cause of identical cognition. There is no possibility of perception and statement of commonness or similarity in case it is either discrete particulars or is non-dual. Even if we accept some commonness or resemblance for logic sake the question arises: how are they different from universal? The individual cannot be the cause of identical cognition of universal because the position will destroy the identity and difference of individual and universal. If there is a reality transcendental or beyond our knowledge, that may be important for a religious purpose but is of no philosophical use. Universal is admitted as the cause of identical cognition by the word individual and exclusion also because of which they are identified thus[20]. Does universal exist independently of thought and language?

IX

It is clear from the analysis, observation and discussion of the metaphysician's epistemic position made earlier that the reality they speculate is beyond the grasp and the realization of the reality which they claim as the goal of their philosophies is an indescribable stage. They admit themselves that the Reality independent and transcendental to individuals and universals is beyond the limit of proving and argumentation. Buddhists accept that whatever our mind can know is universal, and that they are construction of mind and therefore not real. The Real is not a construction and hence beyond our knowing. I do not understand as to why we should accept the reality beyond what we know. To deny or even to subordinate the reality of what is directly known to us is self-suicidal.

In such a circumstance why should we not concentrate on analyzing cognition of Reality which figure determinately in and by language? That which figures in the mind figures so by language. Our knowledge, philosophical reflections and investigations are not only based on to the intelligible beings but are confined to them also. I shall discuss the issue in following paragraphs but before that I want to point out that intelligible beings are those expressed by language and they are only beings to whom our mind can know determinately. Reality defined as thing-in-itself separate or isolated from language and thought cannot be a philosophical Reality which is always the object of cognition and philosophical reflection. Reality becomes the problem of philosophical discussion only when it figures in the mind and that which figures in the mind is not a thing in itself or ontic reality; it is not individual existing independently from its knowledge. Isolated from language no thought can determinately figure in the mind. Can you have a thought or even think of a reality isolated from language? Even the word 'reality' ceases to have any signification isolated from language. The reality as the language presents it may be an individual or universal, may have a name or unnamed but that can be known thus because they are presented so by language.

How can an unconditioned reality be accepted at all as the object of philosophical reflection? It is peculiarity of human mind that it thinks determinately even about those beyond its grasp. As all thinking is thinking in language, the unconditioned is thought of as conditioned by language and is communicated accordingly as of this or that form, one, many, diversity, changing, unchanging, etc. it is relative to language that they flash as many relatively to one and likewise. What then is a reality we know in a cognitive enterprise? The reality which is the object of our knowledge and philosophical reflection is confined to intelligible reality. Our doing is based on external things, but our knowing is confined only to the intelligible reality. Any amalgamation of the two is a-philosophical. External things cannot be grasped; it does not become the object of knowledge. Reality ceases to be so if isolated from thought and isolated from language no thought is possible. All thoughts are intelligible beings, beings expressed so by language. The term 'being' is used for the existences belonging to past, present and future because they are existences flashed forth by language. The being here is neither the thing–in–itself nor abstraction of it but is revealed unit, the flashing of the given concepts that figure in different capacities and forms like being, non-being belonging to past, present and future, substantive, action, etc. Substantive can be presented as action and vice versa by the language only. For example take the substantive 'batting' as in the expression 'batting is good'. The language presents it in different capacity of 'action' as in the expression 'he is batting'. Our cognition and philosophical reflections are confined only to these beings; the term 'philosophic being' is most appropriate term and is synonymous to intelligible beings which are of the nature of awareness or cognitive units.

In Lanugage's different units – that is words, case terminations, suffixes, prefixes, particles, pre- and post-positions, letters, etc. –are concepts; they are of awareness in character; they are universals because identical cognition by them in their different occurrences and instances is accomplished; the meaning they reveal in the mind are also universal. The mind can grasp only universals, and they are realities. No reality, no thought, no language-token is possible isolated from language. Taking reality as that which figures in the differing capacities of subject and object (intelligible-being), and the unsolvable controversy of the dichotomy of substantially independent realities, then the transcendental reality, subject and object, can be removed. Reality independently from thought and thought from language can become the object of philosophical reflections only when they figure in the mind as and when presented so by language and in such a situation, epistemological proving gets a subordinated import

Flash of consciousness is universal and cannot be equated with consciousness itself. If we say that consciousness-in-itself is inferred or implicated as the ontic substratum of universals then that will be an individual. But most of the philosophers and religious thinkers will not accept the Ultimate reality as individual also. For them individuals and universals are the manifestations of the Reality. In such a position the reality is not an object of reflection; it is beyond the objects we know with which religious seekers occupy themselves.

X

It will not be a complete discussion on reality if I do not clarify my position on knowledge and truth. Knowledge is popularly defined as justified true belief. This definition of knowledge has got much popularity after Gettier. I perceive a strong difference between the knowledge and truth. A belief is not converted to knowledge if it is justified and this does not happen if it is not. If justified belief is knowledge then all philosophical attempts will dedicatedly aim and be directed to justifying beliefs and in that order there will be primacy of epistemological efforts and proving. Some may produce justifications and grounds of justifications of reality while others may find fault with them and it may perhaps give some an incentive to mystification and to some other to skepticism.   This is what has been done so far by the theorist in the name of philosophizing reality.

Knowledge is light that expresses the objects. There is difference between the knowledge and its objects. Knowledge is foundational in each of its flashings. There is no 'otherness' in knowledge. Otherness is the quality of objects of knowledge. The same object that flashes in cognition may flash in a different cognition also. For example the object of knowledge expressed by the expression 'John is hard working' is the object in a cognition revealed by the expression spoken by the same or by different person at different time. Knowledge is awareness or self awareness of the thoughts or objects flashed in knowledge.

Reality is often taken as truth. Is truth a thing-in-itself or a quality of it? Metaphysicians equate the truth with reality and reality as transcendental substance. In my view truth in not an ontic being, it is not the quality of external things. No truth is in-itself. It is always a quality of statements. If somebody asks– Is it true to say that Kalidas wrote Raghubansam? I simply reply yes, it is true. Is it true to say that Shakespeare did not write Ragubansam? I simply reply, yes, it is true. This shows that truth is the value of the statements. For correspondence theorists it is a quality of a statement; a statement is true if the object denoted by the statement has a corresponding thing in the world of experience. For coherence theorists a statement is true if it coheres with or is consistent within a set of statements. For pragmatists it is based on the utility, effects or follows up as per the statement. It is not the truth of reality independent from knowledge and language. The greatest idea of its existence, denial of its non–existence, and transcendence from both of the negative and positive positions, are philosophically important only when their existence as thought is accepted. Thought and language are infused. Truth is the quality of language and hence of thought. Truth of a reality independent from thought and language may lead to contemplation.

XI

Isolated from language the question of truth does not arise. The cognition or flash revealed in by language is always a veridical cognition because communication is accomplished by it independently of verification, falsification or any criteria of testability. The cognition revealed by language is veridical. Therefore there is the possibility of its further examination through logical measures of testability for men who seek verification, confirmation, etc., for proving the veridical cognition as valid, invalid, true, and false on the basis of availability or absence of references in the

empirical world. I am of the view that philosophy is a cognitive activity par excellence, and philosophical objects are confined to intelligible beings or to objects we know. When we go beyond or infer that which is not intelligible, we turn to metaphysical outlook or to religion and then there is a demand of inference and other epistemological proofs for convincing others. I do not deny the metaphysical way of reflections on religious assumptions. I simply want to emphasize the difference between metaphysical/religious and philosophical knowledge. Religious knowledge presupposes some metaphysical construction based on our allegiances which require epistemological justification, and that is why it turns to meditation or practice. Philosophical knowledge presupposes nothing, it is the knowledge of the objects revealed or expressed in the mind and is independent of our physiological, religious and other allegiances. When we do not find any problem for further reflection, we stop philosophical reflection either by accepting it as such or by denying it. The objects of knowledge are distinct, and different types of objects are distinctly known by the knowledge itself. Metaphysical/religious knowledge demands epistemic proofs for convincing others about it, while philosophical knowledge is confined to the analysis and interpretation of cognition for digging out the problems for clarity and conception. In brief, the philosopher's concern is not the thing-in-itself but the thoughts/concepts as they figure in the mind; is not practice but the problem which makes him self-conscious to remove it. The problems that make one self-conscious are expressed by language. Philosophical reflection is not only based on but is confined to what and how language presents this reflection to intelligible beings.

If reality is taken as externally existent, it cannot be non-existence and vice-versa at the same time. If 'pot' is taken an externally existent, it cannot be non-existent and, thus, the expressions like 'pot is non-existent (*ghaṭonāsti*)' will not be possible. The external existents can be revealed neither as existent or as non-existent nor as existent and non-existent both at a time. As intelligible being figures equally as being and as non-being by respective words. It is not true to say that the concept/idea or being figures positively and non-being do not figure or figure negatively in case of negative assertions. All concepts/ideas figure positively as idea in the mind, and so is the case with the idea of non-being because of which it is known thus.

Summing up, I can say that Realty as external entity, independently of and separate from language and thought, is all important for faith persuasion but philosophically, intelligible objects are the only reality which we know, and only they are the objects of knowledge and philosophical reflection. Reality ceases to be so isolated from language; there is no reality which is not intelligible. Our knowledge is confined to the intelligible reality, the reality that figures in the mind, infused with language. It is of awareness in nature; it can be analyzed, interpreted and justified by reason and serves as the cognitive basis of all functions of reasoning.

Language presents reality as signifier-signified, individual-universal, subject-object, substantive-action, accessory, etc., and they are known distinctly as they flash. If something is real and I do not know it – how can I say or even assume it so? Accomplishment of cognition and communication are the criterion because of which not only substantives which denote accomplished character but an action of a non-finished character is also known. No reality can get the value of being reality if it is beyond knowledge. It cannot be the part of practice and cannot serve for the welfare if it is not revealed determinately by language. It is intelligible

being, the truth void of confusion, and if it is not clear or if there is any confusion, it causes incentive for further philosophical reflections for clarity and wisdom. If it is clear it serves as the cause of incentive to our do's and don'ts. Transcendental, expressible, non-expressible, describable- indescribable, being, non-being – all are known thus because language presents them so. The being expressed in the mind by language can be presented as being and non-being as well, and that is why negative sentences exist independently of positive sentences and communication by those different sentences is made possible.

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RETHINKING EMOTIONS IN CONFUCIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract: The Confucian political philosophy is empirically grounded upon a private sphere of "emotion" in a more general sense, so "the becoming ontology" of emotion (Qing 情) stands as its footstone. As a characteristic of Confucian conception and its culture, this substantially private "emotional" experience deals with how to attain communal as well as individual harmony. In Confucian political philosophy, the initial claim is made onto the self-cultivation or moral cultivation on the part of each individual. "The becoming ontology" of emotion, which best reflects the nature of emotions, will be illustrated in four pairs of relationship: 1. Emotion vs. Shamanism (Wu 巫): from "the shamanism rationalized" to "shamanism-transformed emotion"; 2. Emotion vs. Rite (Li 禮): from "rite and Music do good to each other" to "rite comes out of emotions"; 3. Emotion vs. Human Nature (Xing 性): from "emotions arise out of human nature" to "mind unites and apprehends human nature and emotions"; 4. Emotions vs. Fact (Shi 實):"to love all equally" vs. "indiscriminate and mutual love".

The Confucian political philosophy is empirically grounded upon a private sphere of "emotion" (*Qing* 情) in a more general sense, so "the becoming ontology of emotion" stands as its footstone.[1] As a characteristic of Confucian conception and its culture, this substantially "emotional" experience deals with how to attain communal as well as individual harmony.[2] In Western political theory, the individual end is dearly cherished but held off from the communal one, because the organic process is displaced which potentially connects the private experience of harmony to the establishment of social harmony. Although both David Hume

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[1]Emotion is becoming more and more important philosophical issues today, see Robert C. Solomon ed., *What is an Emotion? Classic and Contemporary Readings*, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003; Stephen Leighton ed., *Philosophy and the Emotions*, Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview, 2003; Anthony Hatzimoysis ed., *Philosophy and the Emotions*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; Goldie, Peter, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010.
[2]But the inner meanings of emotion in Confucian contexts was neglected before the discovery of "Guodian Chu Slips", see Chad Hansen, "Qing (Emotions) in the Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thoughts", in Joel Marks and Roger T. Ames eds., *Emotions in Asian Thought*, State University of New York Press, 1994, pp. 181-212.

and Adam Smith single out "sympathy" as a forceful moral motivation, [3] Confucianism goes further and conceives the sympathy-oriented "*jen*" as the origin of emotion and life and to attribute to "*jen*" the "integrity with heaven and earth". In Confucian political philosophy, the initial claim is made onto the self-cultivation or moral cultivation on the part of each individual. And, on such a basis of personal experience, the further demand goes to the sphere of family, with an aim to secure an enduring reign, order and peace of the whole country, and ultimately the "perpetual peace or oneness of the universe". It is an internal sequence that underlies the logical construction of Confucian political philosophy.

I. Understanding "the Differential Mode of Association" (*Cha xu ge ju* 差序格局): The Metaphor of "Concentric Circles"

The hierarchical structure typical of Confucian politics is sustained in a continuum from self and family through the state to the universe, the philosophy of which can be found in the saying that "you yourself desire rank and standing; then help others to get rank and standing. You want to turn your own merits to account; then help others to turn their to account-in fact, the ability to take one's own feelings as a guide---that is the sort of thing that lies in the direction of Goodness"[4] This approach to put oneself in others' shoes, from a sociological perspective, corresponds to the "differential mode of association", one of the important conclusions Xiaotong Fei the sociologist reached in his research of the rural community of China. "Differential mode of association" can be applied to the analysis of the traditional Chinese society, for the rural community stands for the basic social unit in such an agricultural society as China.

Unlike philosophers, who are obliged to produce a clear-cut concept, Xiaotong Fei came up with a metaphor of "concentric circles" instead to describe what he meant by "differential mode of association". In his ground-breaking work *From the Soil: Foundations of Chinese Society* (1948), three points were made as follows:

(1) "The self stands at the center and his social relations spread like the ripples that move away when a stone is thrown upon the water. Rather than fellowship on equal footing, the further a ripple is from the center, the loose the relationship it represents becomes."[5]

(2) "Kinship is social relations based upon the fact of marriage and procreation. The network that is established through marriage and procreation expands in the same manner to reach an infinite number of people connected in

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[3]Some contemporary philosophers still focus on moral emotion or political emotion, see Jesse Prinz, *The Emotional Construction of Morals*, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007; Justin Oakley, *Morality and the Emotions*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1992; Janet Staiger, Ann Cvetkovich and Ann Reynolds eds., *Political Emotions*, London: Routledge, 2010; Martha C. Nussbaum, *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2013.
[4]*The Analects,* 6.28. The English translation is borrowed from Arthur Waley.
[5]Xiaotong Fei, *From the Soil: Foundations of Chinese Society* (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1998), 27.

the past, present, and even the future. Thus, the dynamics of the family relations, as the most important ties in our society, can be compared to those of the ripples that travel away from the same center."[6]

(3) "Our social structure is different from that of the West. Rather than neatly tied-up bundles of firewood, it is made up of circles of familial and social relations like radiating ripples that spread out from a center where a stone is thrown upon the water. Each person stands at the common center of circles of his social influence. How far the ripples travel determines the boundary of one's relations. And the circle(s) of relationship he turns to at a given occasion may not be the same."[7]

As seen from above, the self is for a Chinese the core of his social "concentric circles". Just as the radiating ripples become "thinner" when they travel further off the center, within the whole network of one's social relations that extend or expand from himself standing at the center, the closer a relation is, the more intimacy is suggested between himself and the person in that relation. By the same token, detachment is more predictable with regard to a remoter relation. This is how Confucians understood about social institution, for as early as in the original Confucianism it was established that the feeling of love adapts to the ever-changing interpersonal relationships. From a Confucian perspective, therefore, the conception of "indiscriminate love" by Mo Tzu was simply a stagnant pond of water. However, on the other hand, even relations at the remotest distance can be traced back to the center of a self. Thus, the self could expect himself to reach out as far as the universe through his circles of relations.

In (1), the pattern of "concentric circles" is found to be the supportive structure of the Chinese society. In (2), the relationship between the center and any of the circles at a given distance is offered for further explanation. In Xiaotong Fei's opinion, the inner circles or, in other words, the smallest concentric circle and the one immediately next to it are composed of kinfolks, related either vertically by blood (mainly through "procreation") or horizontally by marriage, eventually to give rise to a crisscross of social relations, in effect, an institutionalized Confucian philosophy.

In (3), an attempt at a comparative study is made in terms of social structure. In a comparative light, the organism of a Western society is shown to be a process of binding up firewood, in which, just like the firewood neatly fastened into separate bundles, smaller or bigger, any stick will not be mistaken for another one tied up in a different bundle. Besides strict membership, even the hierarchy of and identity with a given social group seem to be predetermined. By contrast, in Chinese society co-exit the "concentric circles" that spread out from each distinct individual, and his social relations like the circles of ripple are subject to fluidity, enlarged or shrunk, as circumstances change.

Admittedly, the metaphor is strong enough to point up the character of the static structure of the traditional Chinese society, but it fails to cast light on its dynamics of the internal relations. The first point is right about the pattern of "concentric circles", for, in terms of social structure, the self is also understood as the absolute center, the evidence of which can be found in "On this account, the

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[6]Ibid. 26.
[7]Ibid. 26.

ruler must himself be possessed of the good qualities, and then he may require them in the people. He must not have the bad qualities in himself, and then he may require that they shall not be in the people."[8] However, from a philosophical point of view, is the self a justifiable logical starting point? Historically, the mention of human nature or mind, among others, in a Confucian context, preceded that of the self. Or if put in this way, what appeals to Xiaotong Fei never goes beyond the self, the "outside-the-self", and their mutual relationship, while the "inside-the-self", an ever-present concern in Confucianism, is neglected, not to mention, in my opinion, its close relation to emotions.

The second point is also right in its identification of the inner circle(s) and particularly of marriage and procreation as two key factors that influence the major social relations such as affinity and descent in the traditional Chinese society. However, the way the concentric circles outside the inner ones keep on moving and spreading still remains in the darkness. Does the kinship apply to people not related through descent or marriage? Why does someone "seek rightness at the cost of his own life" and does so for someone else outside his kinship? How should we deal with the conflicts that arise in the real world when "a father will screen his son, and a son his father?[9]" In these cases, it seems that the family relationships do not account for much, for it is impossible to treat all the other social members the same way as to one's familial relations. Thus, a more universal "greater feeling" is expected to play an important role instead among off-the-center concentric circles. And, it becomes more powerful as it draws nearer to the more marginal ones, while the "lesser feeling", bound up with the relations by blood or marriage, becomes a less appealing power.

The problem with the comparative study in the third point is that the individual person of "differential mode of association", when placed at the center of concentric circles, was attributed a Chinese-styled egoism, a plausible parallel to the individual atomism of the Western society. However, "When a Chinese shifts his personal concern back to himself; the focus is not so much upon his ego as upon the self, i.e., the micro milieu outside his body. A better description might be the ism of outside-the-self."[10] In this connection, even the conception of "each one for himself" by Yang Zhu, an extremist expression of the ism of outside-the-self in the history of Chinese thoughts, is far from a celebration of subjectivity oriented to lift man up to the measurement of the universe. This is a correct observation on the differences in the understanding of individualism in a Chinese or Western context, while the "humanism" and "individuality" attributable to Chinese culture are no more than the expressions Western sinologists as well as domestic scholars borrowed from the Western discourse in their interpretation of Chinese thoughts.[11] Here, I want to raise a further question: what on earth tells the self situated at the center of "concentric circles" apart from the "individual" that

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[8]*Great Learning* IX: 4. The English translation is borrowed from James Legge.
[9]Analects, 13.18.
[10]Tingyang Zhao. "Self vs. Outside-the-self: A Grey Area in Confucianism", in *Academic Journal of People's University*, 2007, I.
[11]Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963. Chapter Ⅱ. Wing-tsit Chan is the prominent one among those who identify the essence of Confucianism as humanism.

belongs to a traditional Western society? Since the self as an individual is concerned both about the inner circle of his kinship and about his relations to the more marginal "concentric circles" in terms of emotion, emotion is believed to play a more important role as a crucial part of the inside-the-self of a traditional Chinese.

In sum, "differential mode of association" is more powerful in its illustration of "hierarchy" and "sequence", but less so about the "harmony" of the structure of the traditional Chinese society. In my opinion, the key to sustain the harmonious whole of differences is emotions, the much-neglected emotions man finds himself endowed with.

II. From "Inside-the-Self" to "Outside-the-Self": Will Emotions Reach Far?

The biggest problem with the metaphor of "concentric circles" is the absence of the mechanism "to extend kin-directed love", which is also one of the most important issues addressed by Confucianism---will the kinship-centered emotions find their way to the further ends away from the center? The efforts to find an answer began as early as Mencius, when he developed the concept of "humane nature" to anchor "extension of love" into a solid theoretic foundation. Furthermore, Mencius drew on what he designated "the good end" (or good-in-nature) as a psychological starting point or source, which activates the process of "carrying out goodness", voluntarily from the center of the "concentric circles" to the distant margins.

The criticism it readily invited aims at the possibility to "extend" the emotions, which yield to the changes in the social relations where emotions get embedded. Is "love" extended only within the inner circles, unable to be carried out further or not at all? Similar skeptical voices have already been heard. "The 'extension of love' is above all the key to Confucianism. Intimacy between relatives is self-evident (as a matter of fact), but it promises no universal ethics in its own right unless it reaches out to the remote relations or even the unrelated. … To extend the relative-to-relative intimacy, outwardly from the center in a sequential manner to the unrelated mass, is supposed to give rise to an ethic system Xiaotong Fei described as 'concentric circles'. The difficulty lies in the fact that, on the way out, the mutual emotional commitment already dies down before "love" reaches far, and eventually dissolves into the remotest relationships. It fails to go further, so it fails to reach out. On the other hand, the pattern of interpersonal conflict is found also surviving between any two families of the numerous ones at large. So, the model of relative-to-relative intimacy is not a sufficient ethical foundation to support the whole society, nor a factor of decisive significance in the resolution of social conflicts. From the family ethics derives no social ethics, nor derives the love of "the other" from the love of one's kin. This is a fatal blow to the vitality of Confucianism. "[12]

The above argument is based on two assumptions. One is the fiction of "a stranger", i.e., anyone outside one's network of connections. Accordingly none but the "stranger" is identified as a typical "the other" in philosophical terms.

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[12] Tingyang Zhao, "The ethical reorientation in Confucian politics", in *Chinese Social Sciences*, 2007, IV.

Then, will the marginalized other (the stranger out of relation) be affected by more "personal" feelings? Furthermore, in the traditional Chinese society, whose network of connections is based on corporate bodies of blood relation or local community, will "love" find its way to the stranger coming from outside the corporate bodies? The assumption of "a stranger" is challengeable, because it missed factual interpersonal dynamics between strangers. Take the earthquake that afflicted Wenchuan in China in 2008. Why did so many volunteers (including foreigners) devote themselves to the rescue efforts out of their sympathy? Why did their sympathetic feelings reach for the strangers thousands of miles away? Should the fictional "stranger" exist, most Chinese would have remained apathetic in the face of the catastrophic damage the earthquake caused. However, the fact is quite the opposite. The Ethics of Care also support this point in some meaning: "The ethics of care advocates care as a value for society as well as household. In this there are some resemblances to the Confucian view of public morality as an extension of private morality."[13]

The other assumption is the more implicit Confucian claim of "restraint of emotions", which is believed responsible for the failure to extend emotions further to reach the unrelated "stranger". On one hand, Confucianism accepts emotions both as natural endowment and instinctual need, saying "joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, aversion, and desire are not what man learns to feel" in reply to the question about "what human emotion is."[14] On the other hand, it also emphasizes the "containment of seven types of emotion,"[15] as the commentator Kong Yingda said, "…the seven types of emotion are volatile, precariously poised between the good and the bad. Thus, containment must be imposed." The single word "containment" adds to the claim of "restraint of emotion" with a political implication. It is widely held that the dominant claim by Confucianism of emotions is "restraint by principle", undoubtedly under the sway of Neo-Confucianism, which predominated since Song and Ming dynasties and later even went to the rationalist extreme in calling for the "smothering of emotions and desires".

However, as early as in pre-Qin era, emotions were once highly encouraged in the original Confucianism, the evidence of which has been found in "Guodian Chu Slips" of Jingmen (Hubei Province) unearthed in 1993. Then, why did the claim of restraint of emotions begin to prevail in the later periods of Chinese history? The answer may possibly have something to do with the assumption of emotions as identical with desires and the consequent restrain and control of emotions. In this respect, the Confucian claim to control "mind" through "rites" is intended to restrain emotions to an extent Confucius asserted in "what I desired no longer overstepped the boundaries of right".[16] "Emotion", one of the "soft" kernels of Confucian political philosophy, fortifies the philosophy with an empirical foundation. The emotion-centered political philosophy is put to practice through the following approaches:

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[13]Virginia Held, *The Ethics of Care*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.21.
[14]"Evolution of Rites" in *Records of Rites*.
[15]Ibid.
[16]Analects, 2.4.

First, the personal sphere of Confucianism covers primarily the self-cultivation of each individual, out of which he is to attain the inner harmony. Then, by virtue of the sympathy "to feel others in oneself", the private experience of self-cultivation is indeed put in a larger perspective of "inter-subjectivity" for mutual empathy. From the individual located at the center to strangers at different levels of relation, the inner driving force is to extend emotions, though admittedly the "quantity" of emotions in the process varies accordingly. By contrast, the concept of "common sense"[17] in Kant's ethics and aesthetics is closer to the assertion that "man is endowed with the same heart; the heart with the same principle", an idealistic orientation obviously different from the aestheticism in Chinese "celebration of emotion".

Second, art, or the aesthetic education of emotion, is also responsible for the practice of Confucian political philosophy. What Confucius demonstrates through the "distraction in the arts" and "perfection by Music" is intended to bring out the unity of aesthetic refinement with moral exaltation in its equal emphasis of the two. Either in the case of poetry, which strengthens the fraternity of any social population, or in Music, which enables personal equanimity and promotes social peace,[18] "emotion" is invariably registered to have played a role in the process of one's character-building. This insight of Music as a powerful political instrument is quite rare in other cultures of the world, except some similarity found in the "city-state" civilizations of the ancient Greek.

Third, by virtue of the "common sense", the "miniature institution" of Confucian ethics is to be realized in the domain of family, the value of which is of high importance to guarantee harmony, for, without a harmonious family system, the harmony of a macro-institution would find nowhere to be grounded upon. According to Shuming Liang, "For a Chinese, the family life is the first level of his social life, while his relationship with relatives, friends, or neighbors the second level. At the two levels, where the social and moral obligations and laws can be found, what he asks for can be observed while the boundary of his social interactions is also defined."[19] All of this is different from the Western family system based on atomism.

Last, the transcendence the empirical Confucian political philosophy hopes to attain points to a "quasi-religious" morality, that is, rather a "private sphere" morality for inward transcendence than a "social morality" that governs the public sphere. And, the tri-dimensional process of inner surpassing, as illustrated in the legend of "Zeng Tzu's metaphor" (*Zeng dian zhi xue* 曾点之学) or "Confucius and Yan Hui's delight" (*Kong yan le chu* 孔颜乐处), points to the unity of the religious, the moral, and the aesthetic, which Youlan Feng described as "Heaven-Earth State" and Zehou Li as "Aesthetic State".

In sum, "emotion" not only finds its way through the "concentric circles" of traditional Chinese society but also underlies the Confucian philosophy of politics as its empirical cornerstone. Thus, we may call it "ontology of emotion" or attach

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[17]Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Hackett Publishing Co., 1987), 89.
[18]Xun Tzu. *On Music.*
[19]Shuming Liang. *The Essence of Chinese Culture* (Shanghai: Xuelin Publishing House, 1987), 12.

to it "the becoming" if "ontology" itself suggests too strong the implications of "being" understood in the context of European philosophy. "The becoming ontology of emotion"[20,] which best reflects the nature emotions, will be illustrated in four pairs of relationship.

III. Emotion v. Shamanism (*Wu* 巫): From "the Shamanism Rationalized" (*Wu shi chuan tong* 巫史傳統) to "Shamanism-Transformed Emotion"

In terms of origin, the conception of "emotion" derives from what the ancient Chinese once understood about the nature of mankind. On the other hand, as far as the unique structure of the cultural psychology of Chinese is concerned, "emotion" is closely related to the "shamanism" or in other words, it derives indirectly from the unique tradition of shamanism.

The so-called "shamanism rationalized" is a new interpretation by Li Zehou of the source of Chinese thoughts in his discussions of the rite of shamanism in "Rethinking Confucius" (1980)[21], "Dialogues on the History of Shamanism" and "Supplement to Dialogues on the History of Shamanism." According to him, the characteristics of Chinese culture and its philosophy arise out of the rationalization of the activities by shamans. At the heart of the rationalization takes place the transformation from shamanism to rite, while the transformation from shamanism to history, the union of shaman with king, and the chief shaman-king appear as the contributory factors in the process.[22] That's how "Shamanism rationalized" was adopted in Li Zehou's own translation as the traditions of shamanism.[23] As the translation suggests, the emphasis was put not so much upon the "aesthetic" as the "rational" aspect, although Li Zehou accepted "emotion" as one of the basic characteristics of shamanism as well. "In the 'rite of shamanism', the emotional element is of great importance. The activity of shamanism is an ecstatic experience that engages the shaman or all of the participants. It is an exhibition and exposure of irrational or unconscious passion."[24]

Although Li Zehou introduced the important role of emotion, his attention still focused on the rationalization of "shamanism" to "history" for a direct transition to the humanistic "rite" and "*jen*". Recessive as they might be, the "emotions" still survive in the unconsciousness of ancient Chinese culture, particularly in the early Confucianism and its culture. In my opinion, the constructive role of "the history of shamanism", in the shaping of the structure of Chinese cultural psychology, not only lies in the rational transition to rite, but also in the aesthetic process of "emotion" (which I call "the shamanism- transformed

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[20]In this respect, Alfred Whitehead's process philosophy and John Dewey's philosophy on experience are indeed closer to Chinese thoughts. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, New York: Macmillan Company, 1929；John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 1934.

[21]Zehou Li, "Rethinking Confucius", in *Chinese Social Sciences* II (1980). This article was reprinted in Zehou Li's *Ancient Chinese Thoughts* (Beijing: People's Press, 1985).

[22]Zehou Li, "Supplement to Dialogues on the History of Shamanism", in *Historical Ontology* (Beijing: Sanlian Press, 2006), 373.

[23]Ibid. C. f. "Dialogues on the History of Shamanism", 57.

[24]Ibid. 165.

emotions") as well. Thus, the Confucianism-influenced experience becomes a process of "quasi-religious" feelings, with their origin deeply rooted in the shamanism; the Confucian ethics accordingly becomes "quasi-religious" morality. That Confucianism is not a religion is largely due to the surviving "traditions of shamanism" and the nature of "emotion" itself.

IV. Emotion vs. Rite (*Li* 禮): From "Rite and Music Do Good to Each Other" to "Rite Comes Out of Emotions" (*Li zuo yu qing* 禮作於情)

In view of the ancient shamanism, emotion, the passionate engagement, is never separable from rite, the rationalized shaman performance. Since emotion is expressed mostly through Music, the age-old conception of the "mutual benefit between rite and music" or "the oneness of emotion and rite" began as early as in the times of the Duke of Zhou.

Confucius believed that he was witnessing an increasingly deteriorating role of Music and the collapse of rite. The tradition that "rite and Music do good to each other" was broken up. Music, being astray from the institution and laws of rite, was reduced to merely sensual forms to cater to the kings in their pursuit of extravagance; rite, unable to play its role in ritual performances and moral transformation, rose to abstract ideas. Confronted with this historical predicament, Confucius suggested a return to the traditional harmony of rite and Music and proposed the idea of "perfect beauty" and "perfect goodness" as the unity of goodness and beauty.[25] Rite and Music, redefined in terms of the unity of beauty and goodness, are expected to play a double role as the "guide of joy" and "guide of morality". "Music is joy; it is a feeling man cannot get away from."[26] This feeling is an aesthetic pleasure out of human emotions, and therefore beauty and goodness are located in pan-aesthetic relationships, with the communication and coordination of emotions going throughout. Thus, rite and Music becomes intertwined in Confucian political philosophy, as it is said that to examine the Music is to learn the politics and the knowledge of Music is approximate to that of the rite.[27] In Music is the access to emotions; the sensibility for things precedes the stirred emotions. "Things come up and hold sway over man"; "the ancient Kings set down rite and created Music… to teach the commoners good from bad and to restore the humanity."[28] Only through the cultivation and refinement of emotions, do "the kin love each other and live by *jen*." In sum, "in Music is the access to ethics."[29]

As circumstances changed, Music was witnessed to be suffering a lower status and an increasing detachment from rite, and even its special importance to the Confucian political philosophy was particularly downplayed. However, since the tradition of rite-and-Music went downhill, rite was reestablished on rational grounds of various forms, while Music was even retarded instead of simultaneously strengthened, only to give rise to the separation and alienation of

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[25]*Analects,* 3.25.
[26]"Records of Music" in *Records of Rites.*
[27]Ibid.
[28]Ibid.
[29]Ibid.

rite from Music. Besides, freed from the institution of court, music in later times found its way into the circle of literati and folk culture. Further reasons can be found in the Confucian practice of education. Music, one of the Six Classics of the Confucian canon, was said to have been lost in the burning of books in Qin dynasty.[30] The problem with this speculation is why only Music was lost? Some even goes so far as to reject Music as the canon, asserting that it is an appendix of score to the *Book of Poetry* and affiliation with the rite. "The origin of Music is in the three hundred pieces of the Book of Poetry; the use of Music in the seventeen pieces of the Records of Rites."[31] This may be a more valid speculation, for it shows the reasons why the practice of Music stopped short. On one hand, the instrumental, vocal, and recital performances of Music did not carry on; one the other hand, Music went along with the rite not so much in practice as in text. Here, facts of history count for much. The Six Classics was mentioned in the writings of pre-Qin era, say "The Evolution of Heaven" in Zhuang Tzu,[32] but in the Han dynasty, only five of them appeared in such account as "the later sages set out Five Classics,"[33] with only Music left unmentioned. Confucius embarked upon a multi-disciplined educational project that centered on "poetry, documents, rites, and music"; while undoubtedly the musical education was believed to play a more important role in "cultivating a broad-minded and kind-hearted man."[34] Together with the *Book of Poetry*, Music resorted to emotions in order to facilitate the spread of Confucian ideas. "Rite and Music are the common keys in any Confucian argument about family and politics. Therefore, the compliers of *Analects* placed the chapter on rite-and-music right after the first two chapters respectively on learning and governing."[35] Obviously, such arrangement of the first three chapters is quite symptomatic of a given political philosophy.

Thanks to the direct relationship between family and politics, two important subjects in Confucianism, the public sphere for conducting political affairs has to be understood in terms of the private sphere for regulating a family. This is of course different from the rigid demarcation of public sphere from the private one in the West.[36] Or, in other words, for Confucians, the understanding and elucidating of political issues depend on the metaphor of family, and the implicit "emotions" as an important factor to sustain a family must be taken into account. In "Guodian Chu Slips" (an unverified version of the lost documents of the "the School of Tzu Ssu"), there appeared such key notions as "rites are performed out of human emotion,"[37] "emotions come from human nature, rite from emotions, and reverence from rite,"[38] and "rite comes from emotions and gets

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[30]"The Record of Music" in *Book of Sung*.
[31]Yichen Shao, *General Introduction to the "Records of Rites."*
[32]"Evolution of Heaven" in *Zhuang Tzu.*
[33]Jia Lu, "*Dao Ji*" in *New Analects.*
[34]"The Commentary of Canon" in *The Records of Rites*.
[35]C. f. Mu Qian, "Reading of Chapter III", in *A New Reading of Analects*, (I), (Hong Kong: New Asia Research Center, 1963.
[36]C. f. Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1996).
[37]Guo Dian Chu Slips.
[38]Ibid.

encouraged."[39] In either case, emotions (joy, anger, sorrow) were recognized as the root of rite.

For Confucius himself, emotions were acted upon more often than not in poetry and Music. "Let a man be first incited by the Songs, then given a firm footing by the study of ritual, and finally perfected by Music."[40] Evidently, the incitement by poetry was placed as an antecedent of the sequence, while rite or *jen* was supposed to be performed or perfected through Music. "Music and rite were held equally important, but Music was placed above the rite, because only Music was considered the embodiment of his attainment of personality. This is the cornerstone where Confucius builds up his educational system."[41] Realizing the "self-awareness of the art of the highest order", Confucius said "Set your heart upon the Way, support yourself by its power, lean upon Goodness, seek distraction in the Arts."[42] Here, in contrast to the heteronomy by the Way, virtue and *jen*, as the expression "set upon" or "support by" or "lean upon" suggests, only "seek distraction in the art" is supposed to reflect the autonomy in the aesthetic freedom. Thus, for the Confucians, the highest artistic ideal is rather the disinterested and bounds-free transcendence than simply the "goodness-anchored beauty." Seen from Confucius' perspective, it is more than "rite comes from emotions", emphasizing that the performance of rite is completed in the aesthetic emotion or feeling.

V. Emotions vs. Human Nature (*Xing* 性): From "Emotions Arise out of Human Nature" (*Qing chu yu xing* 情出于性) to "Mind Unites and Apprehends Human Nature and Emotions" (*Xin tong xing qing* 心統性情)

In ancient Chinese philosophy, "human nature" and "emotions" were often mentioned together like a compound. For example, "if everybody remains true to his human nature-emotions, will Rite and Music serve any function?"[43] However, there exist subtle differences between the two.

In the discovery of "Guodian Chu Slips", an emotion-themed piece of writing entitled "Human Nature Derives from Mandate" draws wider attention. Its emphasis upon emotions (mentioned more than 20 times) highlights as well as confirms the exceptional Confucian commitment to emotions. There, the best-known formula concerning emotions is "human nature derives from the Mandate; the Mandate comes from the heaven; the Way starts with emotions; emotions arise out of human nature."[44] In this cosmic model emerge a schema of genesis and logic of evolution---"heaven-mandate-human nature-emotions-the Way". However, "emotions", which serves as the link between "human nature" and "the

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[39]Ibid.

[40]*Analects,* 8.8. The translation is borrowed from Arthur Waley.

[41]Fuguan Xu, *The Spirit of Chinese Art*, (Shenyang: Chunfeng Wenyi Press, 1987), 4.

[42]*Analects,* 7.6.

[43]"Horses' Hoofs" in *Zhuang Tzu.*

[44]"Human Nature Derives from Mandate" in "Guo Dian Chu Slips "

Way", is often interpreted as "real conditions or states", since that is how emotions was understood in pre-Qin era.[45]

As to the relationship between human nature and emotions, a more important statement is found at the same time, which asserts "truthfulness is the direction of emotions. Emotions arise out of human nature."[46] Of course, "human nature" and "emotions" are still very close concepts. For example, in *Daide Anthology of Records of Rites*, it is recorded that "human nature" referred to "joy, anger, desire, fear, and anxiety".[47] Even Li Ao of the Tang Dynasty also said "what bewilders man about human nature is emotions. Joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, aversion, and desire are all stirrings of emotions. When emotions fall in the darkness, human nature will be hidden away."[48] After all, human nature is distinct from emotions. When "human nature" is intended to designate the common attributes found in all humanity, "emotions" is applied to the same ordinary feelings out of human nature, with a mixture of both true and affected expressions. In addition, it is said that "so long as one is sincere, his mistakes are not evil; so long as one is insincere, even his painstaking efforts will not be appreciated; with sincerity, man does nothing to win trust."[49] In these contexts, emotions are demonstrated as indicative of human nature only if they are sincere. More often than not, "emotions" is used to refer to the so-called "seven types of feeling and six types of desire", as we find in such idioms as "desire arises out of human nature", "evil arises out of human nature", and "joyfulness arises out of human nature."[50] In pre-Qin era, "emotions" was hardly independent from "desires", with "desires" included as a more underlying element. However, later Confucians seemed more inclined to narrow down the concept of "emotions" to that of "desires", thus paving the way to various theories of "restraint of emotions".

Historically, due to the predominance of rationalism and particularly Neo-Confucianism, the theme of extolment of emotions as well as various theories about human nature and emotions survived as a latent force in the depth of Chinese culture and thoughts. The conception that "mind commands both human nature and emotions", which first appeared in Chang Tsai's writings, was picked up by Chu Hsi for further explication and development. In Chu Hsi's philosophy of mind, "*jen*, rightness, riteness, and intelligence belong to human nature; sympathy, shame, repulsion, courtesy, and sense of right and wrong belong to emotions; to love with *jen*, to hate with rightness, to be courteous with rite, and to learn with intelligence are what the mind is capable of; human nature is the principle in the mind, emotions the instrumentality of the mind, and mind the control and command of human nature and emotions."[51] Obviously, the human

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[45]Graham the sinologist had made this point quite early. A. C. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China*, (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1989), 98. A. C. Graham, *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 59-65.
[46]Cf. "Human Nature Derives from Mandate".
[47]*Daide Anthology of Records of Rites*.
[48]Li Ao, *Recovery of the Nature*.
[49]C. f. "Human Nature Derives from Mandate".
[50]C. f. "Anthology" (II), in Guodian Chu Slips.
[51]Chu Hsi, "*Yuan Heng Li Zhen Shuo*", in *ChuWen-kungwen-chi*, Vol.67.

nature was understood as moral nature, the Heavenly principle within, while, for that matter, "emotions" were reserved for ethic relationships-engaged ones. More importantly, it naturally followed from the above quotations that the mind commands human nature and emotions and for this reason embraces the both.[52] When Chu Hsi declared that "since the mind commands human nature and emotions, it includes them both"[53,] he actually attributed to the "mind" a role as a master of moral consciousness. During the predominance of Neo-Confucianism and even after, history witnessed the subjugation in the mainstream Confucianism of both "emotions" and "human nature", with the distortion of the role of emotions leading to an extremist attitude that called for rooting out emotions and desires. However, the theoretical suppression can never drive them out of real life, and in the social practice of Confucianism, the roles of "emotions" can never be replaced or displaced.

VI. Emotion vs. Fact (*Shi* 實): "To Love All Equally" (*Fan ai zhong* 泛愛眾) vs. "Indiscriminate and Mutual Love" (*Jian xiang ai* 兼相愛)

Mo Tzu's political philosophy is the next of kin to modern thinking, because it addresses the political matters out of utilitarian and realistic considerations. Though Mo Tzu followed Confucius in the latter's reverence of the sage hood of the Three Dynasties, the two thinkers indeed made different choices. Confucius followed Zhou Dynasty's tradition of rite and Music as an access to moral education and transformation, while Mo Tzu picked out Yu (Yu is the mythical founder of the Xia Dynasty, called Yu the Great) as the model of pragmatism. Rather than taking adaptable measures as Confucius did for the restoration of rite and Music, Mo Tzu went to the opposite extreme of "the condemnation of wasteful musical activities as the leverage in maintaining the peace of the state and universe"[54,] although he was right in pointing out the fact that "the more ostentatious the ritual Music is, the less effective the government becomes."[55] This led to his conclusion that "sages do not perform Music." The implied "non-music" claim is all of a piece with elimination of emotions. Of course, when it comes to emotions, Mo Tzu deviated again from Confucius' "love one's kin", and produced "non-discrimination of love",[56] fiercely attacked upon by Mencius for its being "indiscriminate".[57] The universally shared love is not love at all; the equally shared emotions are an overflow of emotions. "Mo Tzu's principle is--- to love all equally, which does not acknowledge the peculiar affection due to a father." [58]

Thanks to the discrimination of degree in what Confucius suggested even as he said that "to have kindly feelings towards everyone"; the concentric structure can be sustained by circles of different radii. By contrast, the notion of

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[52]Chu Hsi, *Chu TzuYǔ-Lei*, Vol. 20.
[53]Chu Hsi, *Chu TzuYǔ-Lei*, Vol.98.
[54]Mo Tzu, "*San Bian*" in *Mo Tzu.*
[55]Ibid.
[56]Mo Tzu, "*Da Qu*", in *Mo Tzu.*
[57]*Mencius*, IIIA.
[58]*Mencius*. IIIB. The English translation is borrowed from James Legge.

"indiscriminate love" can be rendered only in a single circle, with any point along the circumference standing at the same distance from the center. This can be found in the notions like "indiscriminate and mutual love", "love others the way one loves himself", "regard others as one regards himself", "respect others' house as one respects his own", "respect others' family as one respect his own", and "respect other countries as one respects his own." In comparison with the Confucian continuum mentioned in the first part, the ultimate "universe" is absent in the sequence, while the "house" is inserted as a link between self and family. These changes are very telling evidence to confirm the shifted attention on the part of Mo Tzu from the family ties to the practical aspects of a household. Besides, either in his criticism of the Confucians as "supernumerary ornaments, rite and Music" [59] or his observation that "clothes are not expressions of conduct"[60], his rejection of the formalism of rite is seen to have prevented him from a look into the content and have led him to relocate himself on a more practical ground of activism.

The attack by the Confucians at the Mo Tzu's school (and the Legalist as well), in addition to differences between these schools of thought, can provide modern political philosophy a new point of view. Take the Legalists, who addressed problems exclusively from a utilitarian perspective. They called on "doing anything to strengthen the country, regardless of the established rules; doing anything to benefit the common people, regardless of the ritual prescriptions."[61] No residue of emotions is found in such an extremist's prejudice. The Qin dynasty, the first unified empire ever in the history of China, strengthened its state under this principle. However, it did not survive the second generation, because to rule a country does not simply mean to strengthen it.

VII. The "Emotions" between the Individual and the Corporate Body: Rethinking Neo-Liberalism and the Communitarianism

The value of Confucianism has an irreplaceable role in the contemporary debates among political philosophies, with a very unique perspective to offer particularly in the debate between neo-liberalism and communitarianism. Then, how does the Confucian political philosophy, emotions-oriented, closer to and yet different from communitarianism, find its way into the contemporary political theories and practice?

At first sight, the Confucian political philosophy stands just opposite to the neo-liberalism, [62] which is a derivation from the "atomism" and relies on an abstract universal principle appealing to rational individuals. By contrast, the "self" in Confucianism is an individual inseparable from the corporate body he finds himself in, or the self situated at the center of the "concentric circles".

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[59]"Fei Ru" in *Mo Tzu.*
[60]Mo Tzu, "Gong Meng" in *Mo Tzu.*
[61]"Geng Fa" in *Shang Jun Shu*.
[62]Erin Cline argued that "a comparison with early Confucian views can serve as a resource for developing Rawls account in order address some of communitarian and feminist critics, such as the claim that Rawls neglected areas such as the family", see Erin Cline, *Confucius, Rawls, and the Sense of Justice*, Fordham University Press, 2012, p. 5.

Apparently, at least in this respect, Confucianism seems quite close to the communitarianism. However, the true Confucian political thoughts are far from a parallel to communitarianism, which has become theoretically drained because it fails to take emotions into account. In this respect, Confucianism and communitarianism never meet.

Both neo-liberalism and communitarianism are based on the dichotomy that divides individual from the society and from the corporate body. On the contrary, from a Confucian political perspective, which allows a mutual transformation between private sphere and public sphere, the private is by nature inseparable from the public. Therefore, the rigid displacement of the private from the public (or vice versa) will not work out the fluid dynamics between the two.

For Michael R. Martin, it is not enough for the Western scholars to approach Confucius' thoughts from the concept of "wholism", because Confucius himself never attempted a separation of the individual rigidly apart from the society like two polar extremes. Instead, the society was understood as the process of interpersonal dynamics, so conflicts take place rather between individuals than between the individual and the society.[63] This argument is not strengthened by its resource to individualism, in the sense that the self in Confucian political philosophy is a socialized person and the society as a corporate body accordingly is a derivation of each distinct person.

Michael Martin is right when he approached the relationship between the individual and society from the perspective of mobilism, because the polarity of the two is rejected in the true Confucianism. However, Michael R. Martin did not recognize the presence of emotions in the interpersonal dynamics. Therefore, the return to "emotions" as the defining character of man's interactions is the key to the understanding of the cream of crop of Confucian political philosophy and of the loopholes in neo-liberalism and communitarianism. In this regard, the importance of "aesthetic order" Roger Ames emphasized in a Confucian community unveils the role of a mediator emotions play between the liberalism and collectivism.[64]

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[63] Michael R. Martin, "Individualism and Confucian Moral Theory", in the History Department of Fudan University ed., *Confucian thoughts and Future Society,* (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1991).

[64] David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *The Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China* (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), chapter 8.

"CONSORTING WITH THE BASE ARABIAN"; *THE TRAGEDIE OF MARIAM, FAIRE QUEENE OF JEWRY* (1613), FROM DISCURSIVE AMBIVALENCE TO ORIENTALIST BENEVOLENCE

Nizar F. Hermes[*]

Abstract: Through discussing issues related to the play's subgenre(s) and especially alterity, I will present what I see as the ambivalent discourses at work in The Tragedy of Mariam which make it almost impossible to come up with a conclusive verdict on the subversiveness or conservatism of the text which, by and large, has dominated its critical reception. This stands in stark opposition to what some would call, not without truth, as the play's orientalist discourse. The latter can be traced in several textual instances, but notably in the stereotypical representation of the Arabian Silleus, the exotic and erotic lover/seducer of the play's anti-heroine Salome, which, I will argue, does not only reminisce of medieval anti-Saracen rhetoric, but equally it coalesces early modern literary and non-literary demonization of the Moors. I propose it is always legitimate to question the applicability of Edward Said's theory to the medieval and early modern encounters between the Islamic Orient and the West. This is especially true when it is a fact that, and in great part the Orient was conquering not conquered, Said's strong argument that the West, in its search for self-definition, has constructed Arabs/Muslims as the ultimate Other par excellence–exotic, lustful, carnal, cruel, cunning, irrational, and emotional-- is still valid for those interested in exploring what they strongly see as medieval and early modern discourses of Orientalism. The Tragedy of Mariam, I will argue, is not an exception

"*He loves, I love; what then can be the cause, Keeps me [from] being the Arabian's wife?*" (*The Tragedy of Mariam*, I.4.37-38, 61)

In the last two decades, there has been growing interest in Elizabeth Cary's *The Tragedie of Mariam, Faire Queene of Jewry* (1613) [hereafter *The Tragedy of Mariam*.] This exciting attention has somehow been compromised by the polarizing controversy over the "cultural work," to borrow Jane Tompkins' phrase (25), of the first (known) play to be published by an English woman. In the example of the pioneering work of Betty S. Travitsky, Barbara K. Lewalski, Margaret W. Ferguson, Elaine Beilin and others, the bulk of scholarship on *The Tragedy of Mariam,* and to quote William Hamlin, has "concentrated on the play's explorations of women's "public voice," female resistance to patriarchal tyranny,

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and contradictions within prevailing gender and political discourses" (3). [1] Essentially, two conflicting readings have circulated leading almost to a critical debate nothing short of an intellectual *cul-de-sac*. The first has highlighted the radicalism of the play, applauding its subversive resistance to patriarchy and monarchy, whereas, the second has stressed the play's conservatism, adducing Cary's consolidation of female submissiveness both as conjugal and political subject.[2]

By most accounts, it is not an exaggeration to state that few have gone beyond the gender/politics debate in their 'materialist' investigation of Cary's historically and culturally rich text. Many would agree, however, that there is much more in *The Tragedy of Mariam* than gender and politics. Not only is this the case when it comes to the relatively neglected issues of genre, but also, and mainly, the largely unstudied themes and motifs of orientalist alterity.

Through discussing issues related to the play's subgenre (s) and especially alterity, I will try to argue that what I see as the ambivalent discourses that are at work in *The Tragedy of Mariam* make it almost impossible to come up with a conclusive verdict on the subversiveness or conservatism of the text which, by far and large, has dominated its critical reception. This stands in stark opposition to what some would call, not without truth, as the play's orientalist discourse. The latter can be traced in several textual instances, but notably in the stereotypical representation of the Arabian Silleus, the exotic and erotic lover/seducer of the play's anti-heroine Salome, which, I will argue, does not only reminisce of medieval anti-Saracen rhetoric, but equally it coalesces early modern literary and non-literary demonization of the Moors.

As aptly demonstrated by Reina Green and others, the score of critics who have explored the issue of genre and its ideological function in Cary's *The Tragedy of Mariam,* have focused on political themes and gender motifs related to the closet drama and the Senecean revenge motifs in particular without giving much, if any, attention to the Aristotelian imprints of the drama (462).[3] The latter,

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[1] Prominent among the first group of critics who reads *The Tragedy of Mariam* as a radically subversive text, one can cite Margaret W. Ferguson and Barbara Kiefer Lewalski. As for the second group, one has in mind Louise Schleiner and Betty S. Travitsky.

[2] See, for examples, Shannon, Laurie J. "The Tragedie of Mariam: Cary's Critique of the Terms of Founding Social Discourse."(*English Literary Renaissance,* 24 (1994):135-53), Boyd M. Berry, "Feminine Construction of Patriarchy; Or What's Comic in *The Tragedy of Mariam*." (*Medieval and Renaissance Drama in England,* 7 (1995): 257-274), Karen L. Raber, "Gender and the Political Subject in *Tragedy of Mariam*. (*Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900,* 2 (1995): 321-343), Alexandra G Bennett, "Female Performativity in *The Tragedy of Mariam*." *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900,* 2 (2000): 293-309, Heather E. Ostman, "Backbiters, Flatterers, and Monarchs: Domestic Politics in *The Tragedy of Mariam*," (*Images of Matter: Essays on British Literature of the Middle Ages and Renaissance.* U of Delaware P, 2005: 183-205), Danielle Clarke, "*The Tragedy of Mariam* and the Politics of Marriage." (*Early Modern English Drama: A Critical Companion.* Oxford UP, 2006, 248-259), and Nandra Perry, "The Sound of Silence: Elizabeth Cary and the Christian Hero." (*English Literary Renaissance*, 1(2008): 106 – 141).

[3] See, Nancy A. Gutierrez, "Valuing Mariam: Genre Study and Feminist Analysis." (*Tulsa Studies in Women's Literature*, 2(1991): 233 – 251), Carol Mejia LaPerle, "Access and

in my view, can be of much help when it comes to unveiling the discursive ambivalence of the play. Related to this is one's conviction of the paramount importance of Aristotle's *Poetics* to the Renaissance concept of genre. As noted by Rosalie L. Collie, "Aristotle's *Poetics*, together with Horace's long-known *Ars Poetica,* the epistle to *The Pisos*, has established Renaissance genre"(4). If read as a classical Aristotelian tragedy—as I see it— *The Tragedy of Mariam* can expose its inherently and ultimately ambivalent handling of gender and politics.

By definition and tradition, tragedy is conceived as one the most patriarchal and 'masculinist' genres. A reality that could have hindered Cary in her possible effort at coming up with a radically eloquent "public voice." One should not, however, turn blind to Cary's discursive manipulation of the genre. Tragedy, in some significant ways, cannot be appreciated outside the Western patriarchal literary history. Likewise, tragedy in its Aristotelian paradigm defines and confines the tragic within the boundaries of the masculine. "The heroes who remain lie between all these. They are not servant," Aristotle affirms in his magisterial *Poetics b*efore asserting that the tragic heroes' sufferings "are caused less by innate wickedness than because of *hamartia* (error). *Hamartia,* it is to be added, is the failing in understanding or moral character, which leads the tragic hero to a disastrous choice of action (*Poetics,* 17).

By referring to the Aristotelian definition of the tragic hero and *hamartia*, I want to suggest that if we assume that Mariam is a tragic heroine—which she really appears to be, at least since she seems to embody Aristotle's characterization of the hero's "high degree and reputation" (17) — her death must be the result of a *hamartia*, or a failure in understanding and/or judgment. "Mariam," as noted by Ina Habermann in her insightful study *Staging Slander and Gender in Early Modern England* (2003), "[is] beset by difficulties and implicated into a conflict about loyalty and honour worthy of a Hamlet" (143). Indeed, the single most tragic *hamartia* committed by Mariam is her unprecedented challenge of Herod, who is both her husband and her king. In other words, it is her refusal to meet him in a conventional wifely manner when he returned from Rome. Habermann is worth quoting again:

> Carey explores the moral dilemma women experience in trying to live up to the complex and conflicting requirement of society [....] Additionally, they must not only respect their husband's ill and belief but must embrace it for themselves. Mariam's *hamartia*, her tragic error, consists in privileging "human" over female honour, which must necessarily result in a clash with the social framework-- "if guiltily eternal be my death." (150).

This can be clearly seen from the messages of the play's choruses, which according to Aristotle, "should be treated as one of the actors and incorporated in the plot" (22), a thing Cary appears to 'religiously' implement. The choruses, as many have suggested, are critical of Mariam's transgression of her wifely duties.

It is clear, then, that Cary fashioned the transgression to fit the concept of *hamartia*. Furthermore, errors as depicted by the choruses are of a corruptive and destructive nature because they are enemies to innocent people (Mariam) whose innocence is obliterated when they commit those errors (Mariam is no longer innocent):

> To hear a tale with ears prejudicate
> It spoils the judgment, and corrupts the sense.
> That human error given to every state,
> Is greater enemy to innocence?
> It makes us foolish, heady, rash, and unjust
> It makes us never try before we trust. (II. 118-23, 84)

This particular chorus is important in several respects, not least because it hints at Mariam as being transformed into a foolish, stubborn, hasty, and unwise person. The error she has made has moved her from the realm of innocence and sanity to the realm of culpability and insanity. Therefore, the tragic *hamartia* invokes our indictment of Mariam. It is an error to challenge husbands and kings even the like of Herod. The above and other choruses, as demonstrated by Kimiko Yoshida, are not only reflective of ancient Jewish society, but equally of early modern England (35).

Aside from the concept of *hamartia*, which encodes wifely submission, the play's implementation of Aristotelian of unity, linearity, and causality can be said to hinder the articulation of the discourse of subversion stressed by many. Cary's failure in initiating a subversive discourse can be seen as her failure in producing a discourse of an "*l'écriture féminine,*" to quote French Feminist Hélène Cixous. Tragedy, according to Aristotle, is "the imitation of an action which is whole, completed and substantial. By whole, I mean that it has a beginning, middle, and an end" (11). This unity, linearity, and causality are very conspicuous in *The Tragedy of Mariam*, a fact that contradicts the feminist discourse of writing through internalizing the female body and *jouissance*, as a strategy of celebrating the feminine. Accordingly, one may posit that part of the failure of *The Tragedy of Mariam* in adopting an overt subversive discourse can be attributed to the reliance on the 'phallogocentric' discourse of linearity, unity and causality. By most accounts, Miranda Garno Nesler seems to go too far when she writes:

> Cary demonstrates how gendered narratives complicate the literary territory of closet drama. She presents female writing as effective when partially covert the way that closet drama itself is constructed. Yet, in writing, she unmasks that covert effort and makes it public. Writing is both a performance of public speaking and, simultaneously, privatized feminine behavior. Such an activity critiques the tension between those two opposing positions in which women exist; the juxtaposition of public and private, or of performance and reading, reveals that women's writing, silence, and peaking are encouraged as performance by the very texts that attempt to limit them (379).

To a certain extent, *The Tragedy of Mariam* can be read as the victim of its own genre. Its subversive discourse is predictably contained by the very virtue of being a tragedy: a genre that has always articulated the masculine and the established. Cary's capitulation to the exegeses of the tragic has undoubtedly impeded any

possible feminist discourse. Mariam's apparent subversion ends up a consolidation of the *status quo*. In this, *The Tragedy of Mariam* echoes perfectly Stephen Greenblatt's take on the ultimate ideological function of literature. "Thus the subversiveness, which is genuine and radical, sufficiently disturbing so that to be suspected of such beliefs," Greenblatt eloquently phrases it, "could lead to imprisonment and torture, is at the same time contained by the power it would appear to threaten. Indeed the subversiveness is the very product of that power and furthers its ends" (26). If seen under the lenses of Greenblatt, *The Tragedy of Mariam*, therefore, can be read as a text that subverts the patriarchal and tyrannical discourses of Renaissance England. This subversion is, however, subtly contained by the generic qualities of tragedy, among which *hamartia* has been very effective in the case of Mariam, not least because it leads to her tragic death, which in turn, can be politically interpreted as her ultimate containment and the consolidation of the *status quo*.

Approached from another perspective, however, the tragedy as a genre gives Mariam an experimental space for subversion and negotiation of patriarchal and tyrannical culture. As pointed out earlier, tragedy is seen as the 'masculinist' genre that has always confined the tragic to male heroes. Cary`s subversion of this Aristotelian doctrine augurs well for her subversive motifs behind writing this tragedy from the perspective of Mariam. It is a female manipulation of Aristotle's and a challenge to the historical confinement of the tragic to male heroes. According to Aristotle, although a woman and a slave might be "good", they cannot be tragic heroes since as he tells us "Females are inferior and slaves are beneath consideration" (*Poetics* 20).

Being the first (known) English woman writer to publish a play, Cary, one may postulate, was positioned to write 'against the grain'. By dramatizing Mariam as a tragic heroine who, against the tradition, fully embodies the definition of Aristotle's tragic hero, Cary can be said to challenge the generic confinement of the 'high' tragic to males even if we recall heroines such as Antigone, Electra, and Medea. Cary appears to subtly celebrate the capability of a woman in being a tragic heroine competing dramatically and historically with such a tragic figure as Herod the Great. Not only may we perceive in Mariam's challenge of Herod a metafictional stance which subverts the male literary and generic establishment, but also an early modern female cultural resistance that puts Cary ahead of her time in adopting a feminist strategy of challenging patriarchy, known later as 'self-ownership.' Mariam, by refusing to capitulate to Herod, is declaring her self-ownership and refusing being owned by a husband and a king. "Self-Ownership," Margit Stange asserts, "signified a wife's right to refuse marital sex— a right feminists were demanding as the key to female autonomy" (22). Cary's dramatization of a woman who used her body as a strategy of challenge and negotiation of power is a proof of the subversiveness of the play. It perhaps in this context that Lewalski's following quotation, however radical it may sound, might be justified:

> Mariam is the last published in a series of Senecean closet dramas concerned with forms of tyranny, and should be seen perhaps as the first series of tragedies(1610-14) that focus on female resistance to tyrants in the domestic sphere—women who seek to control their own sexual choices, challenging the orthodox ideal of submission[...] Mariam's challenge to the patriarchal control within the institution of marriage is revolutionary, as the heroine claims a

> wife's right to her own speech—public and private as well as the integrity of
> her emotional life and her own self-definition. (210)

Yet, it is particularly through another generic quality that one can radicalize *The Tragedy of Mariam*. This quality is the concept of *mimesis,* or as Aristotle defines it "the imitation of reality," which is "the chief purpose of all composition" (3). Far from locating the reality of *The Tragedy of Mariam* in its Jewish factual and mythical narratives, one may argue that its ideological history or historiography is intrinsically related to Renaissance England. The figure of Herod transcends its mythological iconography to display mimetic patriarchy and monarchy. Herod can be projected through his authoritative double identity as patriarch and monarch in the very historical reality of the play. His patriarchy is a social reality that Cary injects from her personal experience. His tyranny is a political reality that she constructs through playing on the interrelation between the concept of history as a past and history as reality. The mimetic in *The Tragedy of Mariam* does transcend the historical and the mythical to dwell on the real.

Mimesis puts us in the actual and the historical, and its effect is actual and historical. The fear that Herod generates in us, displays our unconscious fear of tyranny and injustice, or, as Lewalski puts it: "In Cary's *Mariam* political and domestic tyranny are feared in Herod the Great" (194). The love and sympathy we feel for Mariam is the culmination of a historical identification with the victims of injustice. *Mimesis* is the royal path to the cathartic, which in turn, makes us ponder on the likeliness that what happened to the tragic heroine could happen to us. The cathartic is the ultimate *telos* of the tragic. Through its focus on the didactic and the moral, catharsis can help us in locating the ideology of a given tragedy since it is through catharsis that the readers and audiences receive the message of the play. *Catharsis*, as such sets a link between the plight of the tragic hero and us. Not only do we pity a tragic hero like Hamlet, but we also become aware of the circumstances that led to his downfall. Our intellectual investigation of the power games taking place in the court of the play ends up, most of the times, with a historical investigation of the courts of our real play.

This is likely what most of us have experienced after reading *The Tragedy of Mariam*. Mariam's downfall stimulates both our emotional and political *catharsis*. We identify with her, we pity her, and we fear that what happened to her can equally happen to us. The locus of our fear is Herod, both as a cruel husband and a ruthless monarch. It is through *catharsis* that *The Tragedy of Mariam* injects in us its socio-political message. It is through the cathartic that we may conjure up what Frederic Jameson has dubbed as the *foci* of the literary text, which is "the political unconscious". The latter, as explained by Jameson, historicizes the literary text and transforms it into "a socially symbolic act" (20). *The Tragedy of Mariam's* unconscious is Cary's sublimation of her repressed "public voice" into a political silence to which the discerning political readers will give a voice.

Interestingly enough, if revisited from the perspective of the late Edward Said, one might argue that *The Tragedy of Mariam* can be read as an Orientalist text. By an Orientalist text, and as he argued in hugely influential *Orientalism: Western Concepts of the Orient*(1978) and, to a lesser degree, *Culture and Imperialism* (1993)*,* Said has in mind, any western literary text that discursively constructs—wholly or partly, overtly or covertly—the Orientals(i.e., Muslims) as the West's irreconcilably antagonistic Other. Among other things, Said defines

Orientalism, as a "collection of dreams, images, and vocabularies available to anyone who has tried to talk about what lies east of the dividing line."(73). Said locates this constructed Orient in what was interchangeably known during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance as the lands of the Saracens, Moors, and Turks. In Said's own words, "the term *Orient,*" is *"*most rigorously understood as applying to the Islamic Orient" (95). This concept or rather metaphor of the 'Orient', and since ancient times, has been fashioned and refashioned by western authors as *the land* of exoticism, materialism, tyranny, immorality, licentiousness, irrationality, misogynism and cruelty.

Although it is always legitimate to question the applicability of Said's theory to the medieval and early modern encounters between the Islamic Orient and the West, especially when it is a fact that, and in great part the Orient was conquering not conquered, Said's strong argument that the West, in its search for self-definition, have constructed Muslims as the ultimate Other *par excellence*–exotic, lustful, carnal, cruel, cunning, irrational, and emotional–is still valid with those interested in exploring what they consider as medieval and early modern discourses of Orientalism. *The Tragedy of Mariam*, I will argue, is not an exception.

It is common place that *The Tragedy of Mariam* based on the account of the Queen Mariam by her husband King Herod chronicled by Josephus' *Antiquities of the Jews* and *The Wars of the Jews*. Set in the very heart of the Orient, that is Palestine, the play, geographically and ideologically, transports us to the single most contested "contact zone,"(6) to use Mary Louise Pratt's influential phrase, between the Christian West and the Islamic East. "There is good reason, then," Dympna Callaghan notes, "not to dismiss the Palestine of Cary's *Mariam* as a mere backdrop, as a matter of incidental local codes. Rather Palestine is the locus of complex racial and religious coordinates, at once the displaced center of Christianity and the home of the infidel" (168).

In order to fully grasp the discourses of alterity in *The Tragedy of Mariam,* it is essential to go beyond the overtly racialized focus on the Edomites (Herod/Salome) and settle on the covertly orientalist depiction of the Arabian Silleus.

We all know that the play presents Herod as an Idumean or Edomite. Edomites are a group of 'Oriental' people who used to live south of the Kingdom of Judea and who converted to Judaism. History mentions that despite their conversion, they were looked down by 'pure' Jews. This is nearly dramatized in *The Tragedy of Mariam* in the following lines by Alexandra, Mariam's mother:

> What means these tears? My Mariam doth mistake.
> The news we heard did tell the tyrant's end:
> What weep'st thou for thy brother's murd'rer's sake?
> Will ever wight a tear for Herod spend?
> My curse pursue his breathless trunk and spirit,
> Base Edomite, the damnèd Esau's heir.
> Must he ere Jacob's child the crown inherit?
> Must he, vile wretch, be set in David's chair?
> No, David's soul, within the bosom placed
> Of our forefather Abram, was ashamed
> To see his seat with such a toad disgraced,
> That seat that hath by Judah's race been famed.

> Thou fatal enemy to royal blood. (I.2. 1-12, 53-54)

Like her mother, Mariam is fully aware of her racial 'superiority'. In a racially charged exchange with her sister-in-law Salome, she has this to say:

> Scorn those that are for thy companions held.
> Though I thy brother's face had never seen,
> My birth thy baser birth so far excelled,
> I had to both of you the princess been.
> Thou parti-Jew, and parti-Edomite,
> Thou mongrel: issued from rejected race,
> Thy ancestors against the Heavens did fight,
> And thou like them wilt heavenly birth disgrace. (I.3. 25-32, 59)

As noted by Barry Weller, for early modern English readers, the ethnically Edomite and religiously Jew Herod, is the epitome of villainy (19). The fear he must have engendered is related not only to his tyranny, cruel, and 'impure' race, but also from the doubt surrounding his real commitment to the Jewish faith. "Although Herod usually observed Jewish law in public," Weller maintains, "many observers clearly regarded him as a monster, as suggested by an Augustan epigram: "It was better to be Herod's swine than a son of Herod" (19). Perhaps one is not going too far to suggest that there is something of a Saracen/Moorish connection in this oriental monster!

This can be corroborated by bringing the attention to the fact that in medieval literature, Herod was sometimes referred to as pseudo-Muslim. This is clearly dramatized, for instance, in two famous medieval *Corpus Christi* plays. The first one is *Herod the Great,* where Herod is depicted as a "hynd king -by the grace of Mahowne- of Jury" (*Medieval Drama,* 438) and who swears often by "Mahowne," one of the numerous medieval misspellings of Muhammad. The second is *The Death of Herod*, where again Herod is depicted as a pseudo-Muslim ruthless tyrant who invokes usually "the gracious Mahound" (*Medieval Drama,* 457), yet another medieval misspelling of Muhammad.[4]

Tellingly, even in some modern western accounts, Herod is presented as an Arab. This is the case in numerous Internet sites where, among other things, Herod is described as "[although] a practicing Jew, of Arab origin on both sides." Some films are not an exception. In fact, as mentioned by Jack G. Shaheen in his

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[4]As shown by a number of scholars, if one surveys much of the literature of the Middle Ages and Renaissance, one might easily discern the abundant presence of the Saracens, Moors, Turks, and Mohammedans in European literature. The Muslim Other, as Dorothee Metlitzki once phrased it, became "a crucial public theme," that permeated the religious, political, military and social life of Christian Europe, as well as its literary and cultural products (116). For more on this, see, among many others, Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: the Making of an Image* (1960), *The Arabs and Medieval Europe* (1975), Richard Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* (1962), Marie-Therese d'Alverny, *La connaissance de l'Islam dans l'Occident médiéval* (1994), Michael Frassetto and David R. Blanks, *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (1999), John V. Tolan's *Saracens; Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (2002), Emily C. Bartels, *Speaking of the Moor: From Alcazar to Othello* (2008), and Adam Galamaga, *Representations of Islam in Travel Literature in Early Modern England* (2011).

Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People (2009), movies such as "The King of Kings" (1961), and to quote Shaheen, "the narrator (Orson Welles) falsely states the Roman- appointed leader who slaughters the movies Jews, Herod the Great, was an "Arab."(303).

Aside from what might be seen as a possible racial and religious transfiguration of Herod, the textual references to the Arabian Silleus can be a rich site for revisiting the play's orientalist discourse. It is surprising that little, if nothing, has been said about the racialized representation of Silleus in *The Tragedy of Mariam* in most studies that have discussed race in the writings of early modern women in general and Cary's play in particular. To give some examples, in Kim F. Hall's "Beauty and the Beast of Whiteness: Teaching Race and Gender"-- which explores the teaching of *The Tragedy of Mariam*, *Othello*, and *Oronooko-- a*nd Dympna Callaghan's foundational study " Re-Reading Elizabeth Cary's *The Tragedie of Mariam*, *Fair Queene of Jewry*", Silleus is not referred to even in passing. This holds true even, although to a lesser degree, for Kimberly Woolsey Poitevin's, "'Counterfeit Colour': Making Up Race in Elizabeth Cary's *The Tragedy of Mariam*.", where despite some references to the Moors in medieval and Early modern western literature and the legality of divorce in Islamic law, her entire focus falls on the racial and religious juxtaposition of Mariam and Salome especially in what relates to the dominant debate of (Christian) whiteness versus (Jewish) blackness. The fact is that Silleus is mentioned only once-- as Salome's lover-- in her entire article.[5]

It is an inescapable fact that Silleus is another figure of those "horryble Peple," to *Morte D`Arthur*, (117) and another "erring barbarian," *Ohello*, (3.3.206-7) who literally and symbolically populate western literature of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. *The Tragedy of Mariam*, one might say, provides us with another 'horrible and 'erring' Arabian among those 'base' *gente* who populate the "Orient." Constabarus' infuriation at his wife does not seem to emanate solely from his excruciating feeling of matrimonial betrayal. It is predominantly racial and he has no secret about the fact that he is most and foremost concerned by the fact that his wife's eyes have fallen on a 'base' Arabian:

> Oh Salome, how much you wrong your name
> Your race, your country, and your husband most.
> A stranger's private conference is shame
> I blush for you that have your blushing lost
> Oft have I found, and found you to my grief
> Consorted with this base Arabian here.
> Heaven knows that you have been my comfort chief,
> Then do not now my greater plague appear. (I.6.1-6, 64-65)

Constabarus, as a Jewish husband is undoubtedly concerned about his conjugal honor. Yet, his "greater plague" is caused by the fact that his wife has given him up, he who is a pure Jew, for the sake of an Arabian, the '*gentile'* par excellence.

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[5]The same is even true of Ferguson, *Dido's Daughters: Literacy, Gender, and Empire in Early Modern England and France* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), where she mentions Silleus a couple of times as being Salome's lover without exploring his racialized representation.

What is significant here is that Constabarus' stereotyping of Silleus does not solely capture Jewish views of Ismaelites (Saracens), but it also, and perhaps more importantly, it betrays images and discourses amounting to Renaissance Jewish Orientalism. By degrading a fellow Semite and Oriental, Constabarus is indirectly degrading himself. While this goes beyond the scope of the current article, it would be particularly interesting to approach *The Tragedy of Mariam* from the perspective of works such as *Orientalism And The Jews* (2005)*,* not the least in relation to Suzane Conklin Akbari's claim that the medieval and early modern western representation of Saracens/Moors were largely, if not wholly, modeled on accounts of Biblical Jews (33).

To go back to our text, there is no reason not to believe that the Arabian Silleus is the primary target of the play's racial stereotypes. Silleus' seductiveness, for example, is depicted through a sensual diction full of images of fire which, as attested below, conjure up conventional temptation scenes of morality drama:

> My coals of love to quench: for through they smother
> The flames awhile, yet will they out at last.
> Oh! Blessed Arabia, in best climate placed.
> I by The fruit will censure of the tree.
> Tis not in vain, thou happy name thou hast
> If all Arabians like Silleus be.
> Had not my fate been too, too contrary,
> When I on Constabarus first did gaze.
> Silleus had been object to mine eye,
> whose looks and personage must all eyes amaze. (I.4.7-16, 60)

By most accounts, the figure of Silleus as an exotic male seducer brings to one's mind Jill Dubisch's fascinating investigation of Sex and Orientalism in her essay "Lovers in the Field: Sex, Dominance and the Female Anthropologist," notably her theory of the inherent correlation between the exotic and erotic in western Orientalist writing (33). As a rare early modern female text *The Tragedy of Mariam* does equally, and perhaps most importantly, corroborate Dubisch's insightful following comment:

> Less frequently portrayed or examined, however, is the sexual [oriental] male
> Other. When he is portrayed, such portrayal often reveals the threatening
> dimension of erotic sexuality which Said mentions—for example this insatiable
> and in-exhaustible Oriental potentate with his harem of wives and concubines
> (33).

It seems that Silleus is an early modern personification of this "insatiable and in-exhaustible Oriental potentate" and one can always imagine Salome among his *harem of wives and concubines!*

On another note, it does not take much effort to discern the near equation of Silleus to Othello. With   his "foul charms" (*Othello*, 1.2.73), he has mesmerized Salome and he allured with all material promises. Literally and figuratively, when Silleus is given a voice, his is one full of Oriental excess:

> Arabia, joy, prepare thy earth with green,
> Thou never happy wert indeed till now:
> Now shall thy ground be trod by beauty's queen,

Her foot is destined to depress thy brow.
Thou shalt, fair Salome, command as much
As if the royal ornament were thine. (I.5.34-39, 63)

Again, like Desdemona who was enchanted by Othello's exotic language and
sexuality—black magic in Iago's eyes—Salome seems to be the prey of the
Arabian flattening words:

Well found, fair Salome, Judea's pride!
Hath they innated wisdom found the way
To make Silleus deem him deified,
By gaining thee, a more than precious prey? (I.5. 1-5, 63)

Salome, who is both looked down by her sister-in-law and her husband—
emotionally and sexually—has found all "allowances" in Silleus. The latter's
allowances are impliedly both emotional and sexual. Here is the enchanting
language of Silleus:

Thinks Salome, Silleus hath a tongue
To censure her fair actions? Let my blood
Bedash my proper brow, for such a wrong,
The being yours, can make even vices good. (I.5. 17-20, 63)

Concomitantly, Arabia, land of heat and lust, while at least impliedly, a pure hell
for Mariam and her likes, in her foil's scopophilic eyes looms as an earthly
paradise. In her "task" of pursuing of her own desires, Salome is ready to
everything immoral and evil to get what she wants. There is perhaps no more
egregious example of this than when she satanically urge her brother Pheroras to
help her plot the execution of her husband:

Tis not so hard a task. It is no more
But tell the King that Constabarus hid
The sons of Babas, done to death before;
And 'tis no more than Constabarus did.
And tell him more, that we, for Herod's sake,
Not able to endure our brother's foe,
Did with a bill out separation make,
Though loath from Constabarus else to go. (III.2.37-44, 88)

Be this as it may, it is understood that Palestine is not the place for a promiscuous
woman like Salome. Holy Palestine is the place for Mariam, the very
embodiment of morality, chastity and purity. Salome can gratify her "coals of
love," only in an 'unholy' *loci* that befits her. A "blessed Arabia," which,
according to Salome, is in "best climate placed". Arabia, one of the hottest
countries in the world seems to climatically and morally fit Salome, dubbed by
Catherine Belsey as "a wicked woman, spiritual sister of Vittoria and Lady
Macbeth" (174). [6] One has to remember here the 'noble' motivations that

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[6]I am indebted to Kimiko Yoshida for this pertinent quotation.

encouraged Mariam to question her relationship with her husband and compare them to those behind Salome's revolt against Constabarus. In other words, if the evil Salome figures as the imperfect foil of the good Mariam, Silleus is her perfect match!

The juxtaposition of Palestine and Arabia echoes Medieval and Renaissance orientalist discourses in as much as the denigration of the Arabian in *The Tragedy of Mariam* translates the racial hierarchy of Renaissance England. Written by a stalwart Christian—as evidenced from the hagiography written by her daughter—the text internalizes the religious manipulation of race. In this hierarchy, we might infer the supremacy of Mariam, who is unconsciously represented not only as the pure white queen, but also as a metaphor of a Christian heroine. The question that enforces itself here is the following: how could such a young Christian stalwar*t*-, which Cary really was, - write about Mariam (Mary in Hebrew and Arabic) without injecting her veneration to Mary, without injecting her prejudices against both Jews-the presumed oppressors of Jesus- and the Arabs- the "infidels" and the conquerors of the Holy Land? As a religiously knowing subject, Cary unconsciously injects her religious knowledge and subjectivity in her play.

One may argue that in early modern England, both Jews and Arabs are both "others", *but some others as more others than others*. Due to mostly biblical narratives, Jews are ultimately more acceptable than Arabs/Muslims. In fact, in *The Tragedy of Mariam* one can easily trace racial/religious hierarchy, not least because of the literal and figurative placing of the Arabian Silleus at the very bottom. Silleus is depicted as the ultimate source of moral decadence. His appearance entices Salome to rebel against the Jewish laws of marriage and sexuality. In several respects, and if Salome is a "base woman", in Mariam's eyes, in the minds of early modern readers the Arabian Silleus would be 'the base of the bases!'

To sum up, at least when it comes to its "cultural work," *The Tragedy of Mariam, The Fair Queene of Jewry,* defies an ultimate evaluation. On one hand, it can certainly be read as a subversive text that targets Renaissance patriarchy and monarchy. Conversely, its racialized representation of the Other(s) and the Arabians in particular can be read as an overt/covert consolidation of (dominant) early modern discourses of Orientalism, which in turn, testifies to the fact that the first (known) play to be published by an English woman should be approached as discursively very complex, if not ambivalent.

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JYOTIBA PHULE: GLOBAL PHILOSOPHER AND MAKER OF MODERN INDIA

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Abstract: Jyotiba Phule (1827-1890) initiated social change in nineteenth century India especially in Maharashtra through his philosophy. The nineteenth century was an era of social criticism and transformation that focused on nationalism, caste and gender. All major questions taken up by the reformers were connected with women's issues such as female infanticide, child marriage, ban on women's education, Sati, tonsuring of widows, ban on widow remarriage etc. At the same time, reformers concentrated more on reforming the social institutions of family & marriage with special emphasis on the status & rights of women. Jyotiba took up the issue of gender and caste. He revolted against the unjust caste-system under which millions of people had suffered for centuries. His revolt against the caste system integrated social and religious reform with equality. He emerged as the unchanged leader of the depressed classes in Maharashtra and was recognized as a leader of downtrodden class in allover India. He was influenced by American thinker Thomas Paine's ideas of Rights of Man.

This paper is an attempt to discuss Jyotiba Phule as global philosopher in 19th century. He raised the problem of women's oppression and his thoughts on resolving women's oppression through their own efforts and autonomy makes him join the company of other nineteenth century Western Philosophers and male feminists like J.S. Mill and F. Engels. In this small work I would like to focus on philosophical aspect of his thought will conclude with remark on contemporary relevance of Jyotiba Phule's philosophy.

Jyotiba Phule (1827-1890) one of the "*Mahatmas*' (Great Soul) of India, occupies a unique position among social reformers of Maharashtra in the nineteenth century India. He was first teacher of oppressed, critic of orthodoxy in the social system after Buddha and a revolutionary. The task of bringing concerning socio-religious reform in nineteenth century was not so simple. Social reformers had made tremendous effort for social and religious change in Indian society during this period. Phule played a remarkable role in this area. In order to remedy the problems of gender and caste oppression, he contributed with a constructive suggestion. This was by way of a new image of religion which was known as universal religion. He started reflecting critically about the ground realities of the huge majority of rural masses. He read broadly on American Democracy, the French revolution and was stuck by the logical way of thinking in Thomas Paine's "Rights of Man". Influenced by Thomas Paine's book on "Rights of Man", (1791), Phule developed a keen sense of social justice, becoming passionately critical of handicap caste system. Besides being a leader and

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organizer of the underprivileged class movement, Phule was a philosopher in his own right with several books and articles to his credit. Throughout his life, Jyotiba Phule fought for the emancipation of the downtrodden people and the struggle which he launched at a young age ended only when he died on 28th November 1890. He was a pioneer in many fields and among his contemporaries he stands out as one who never hesitated in his mission for truth and Justice.

Exploitation of women and underprivileged class and protection of human rights all these issues and their rational humanist treatment was the agenda of the philosophy of Phule.

I. Jyotiba Phule: A Contemporary Indian Philosopher

Jyotiba Phule was one of the makers of modern India. He was the philosopher, leader and organizer of the oppressed castes. He always practiced what he preached. He fought for the rights of the untouchables and women and work for their emancipation. He identified and theorized the most important questions of his time. These include religion, the *Varna* system, ritualism, British rule, mythology, and the gender question, the condition of production in agriculture and the lot of the peasantry. In 1848 Jyotiba began his work as a social reformer interested in education of lower caste boys and girls. He encouraged his young wife Savitribai to read and write. At home he began educating his wife Savitribai and opened a first girl's school on 15th May, 1848 in Pune. No female teacher was available to teach in the school. As not teacher dared to work in school in which untouchables were admitted as students Jyotiba asked his wife to teach in the school. The orthodox opponents of Jyotiba were furious and they started a vicious campaign against him. They refused to give up their noble endeavor and choose the interest of the larger society over their personal comfort. He also took keen interest in establishing a network of institution through which it would be possible to educate the masses. He opened two more schools for girls in 1851, he was honored by the Board of Education for the work he did for girl's education in 1852. By 1858, he gradually retired from the management of these schools and entered into a broader field of social reform. He turned his attention to other social evils.

Jyotiba's activities were extended beyond the field of education. The drinking water tank in his house was thrown open to untouchables. This would be considered a brave act even today. In 1868, it was revolutionary. He believed that revolutionary thought has to be backed by revolutionary praxis.[1] He analyzed the structure of Indian society and identified the *Sudra-atishudra* as the leading agency of social revolution. According to him, the *Sudra-atishudra* will lead the revolution on behalf of the whole society, to liberate the entire people from restricts of Hindu tradition. Thus, Phule's ideas and work had relevance for all Indians. As cognition of his great work for the lower castes, he was felicitated with title "*Mahatma'* (Great Soul) by the people of the erstwhile Bombay in 1888. He belongs to the first generation of social reformers in the 19th century. Dhananjay Keer, his biographer, rightly described him as 'the father of Indian social revolution.'

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[1]Deshpande, "Selected Writing of Jotirao Phule", p. no. 9

Phule can be called as Modern Indian Philosopher as Descartes. Rene Descartes (1596-1650) was a French Philosopher, has been called as 'the father of Modern Philosophy', and is often regarded as the first thinker emphasizes the use of reason to develop the natural sciences. For him the philosophy was a thinking system that embodied all knowledge. He employs the method called metaphysical doubt or methodological skepticism. He rejects the ideas that can be doubted and then reestablishes them in order to acquire a firm foundation for genuine knowledge. So like Descartes Phule can be known as 'Modern Philosopher'. Descartes spirit of questioning traditional claims to authority can be discerned in Phule. Like Descartes, Phule exercised his capacity from freedom for thinking freely to question obscure and violent social customs. The Cartesian spirit was extended by Phule from natural science to social science.

II. Practical Aspect of Jyotiba Phule's Philosophy

Jyotiba Phule can be interpreted as an Indian philosopher who transformed traditional philosophy by turning to the practical and social problems of inequality and oppression. One can read him as a thinker who separated himself from the metaphysical roots of Indian systems of philosophy like Yoga, Vedanta and Buddhist Philosophy to give these systems social meaning from the point of view of the ordinary person.

Yoga philosophy has a practical emphasis where it believes that mental-concentration and control leads to individual transformation of the mind and body. Although Jyotiba's philosophy would not agree with some of the metaphysical assumptions in Yoga such as the satva, rajas and tamas, his philosophy has some similarities with Yoga. For Jyotiba mental concentration is replaced by social concentration on problems that distract society from its democratic ideals. He recommends the practice of values like *Samata, Badhutava,* and *Svatantrya* to transform the whole social structure. In yoga philosophy transformation is individual but in Jyotiba philosophy transformation is not for individual but for all.

Vedantic philosophy makes a distinction between *maya* and reality. Once again Jyotiba would reject its Brahminical otherworldly roots and outlook. However, there is a way in which he has transformed Vedanta as well. According to him *Maya or illusion* does not apply to the empirical social world. Rather in social relations there is the *maya* of caste and superstition that causes *avidya* or ignorance about social reality should remove from the mind of every individual. Once this *avidya* is replaced by true knowledge there will be *ananda* or pleasure of egalitarian social relations.

As Buddha said 'suffering *(Dukha)* is ultimate truth and the cause of sufferings is ignorance about the reality, reality of our-self (I or ego). Once this ignorance remove through true knowledge person will get freedom from their sufferings, he or she will enjoy ultimate state of mind / peaceful state of mind or *Nibana*. Similarly Jyotiba also believed that suffering is the central problem, however this suffering is not a historical. It is due to the social structure of Indian society. Demolishing this structure will lead to liberation and an affirmation of values such as freedom, equality and solidarity.

Religion in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries faced two differences of opinions. One was the notion of God, Soul, Hell and Heaven, Vice and Virtue.

These notions were all important in the building of a religious edifice, and yet, none of these could be proved to exist at the level of reasons. The meaning and purpose of life, the meaning of death are explained by most religions in terms of an omnipotent and omniscient God, whose will is the source and justification of human existence.[2]

The other difference of opinion that religion faced, was the existence of a multiplicity of faiths, a plurality of Gods, of concepts of virtue and vice, of what awaited man when he died. The path of the religious and dutiful man was carted differently by different religions, when they came to an analysis of the details of daily life, thought they might agree on some fundamentals. They differed in what they considered the appropriate Book to read in matters of religion, the appropriate prayers to say, the appropriate food to eat and the laws of personal morality to observe.[3]

Many years Jyotiba Phule spoke on religious and practical issues. Through debate he has removed illusions from the people's minds. He has written books and dedicated them to the people. He has discussed and continues to discuss these issues in newspapers. He has instructed the public through many poetic compositions. He has inculcated in people the habit of inquiring into the veracity and cause and effect of religious matters. He has demonstrated what is right and what is wrong with respect to particular customs. He has disapproved the practice of idol worship and upholder monotheism. He has refuted beliefs that would cause harassment to people in matters of religion, duty and everyday activities. A false religion, idol worship and the caste system have together created destruction in India; this has been well described in his book *Sarvajanik Satya Dharma.*

Gail Omvedt mentions in her book "Culture Revolt in a Colonial Society", that Phule's thought represented the fulfillment of the renaissance desire for social transformation along revolutionary lines. In sociological terms it makes good sense that he, rather than later and more widely known elite thinkers, should be seen as the primary renaissance figure. Any culture, after than later and more widely known elite thinkers should be seen as the primary renaissance figure. Any culture after all, rests upon the class society and the dominance of a particular class. Hence the total transformation of culture requires the destruction of this dominance. In terms of India, Hindu culture and the caste system rested upon Brahmanism. Hence Phule, who aimed for the complete destruction of caste, superstition and inequality, linked thought with a movement of opposition to the Brahmin elite. Non-Brahmanism in India, therefore, represents not simply communalism or a result of British divide and rule policies; it traces its origin to the Indian renaissance and represents the first expression of social revolution in India.[4] The life of Jyotiba Phule has become a new source of learning and a new source of inspiration for modern generation. His life provided an example and an inspiration to the oppressed masses of humanity, supreme courage, sincerity, selfless sacrifice.

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[2]M.S. Gore, Vitthal Ramji Shide, Biography, p. 74.
[3]Ibid, p. 75.
[4]Gail Omvedit, "Culture Revolt in a Colonial Society", P. no.100.

III. Phule's Social Reform Movement

The history of nineteenth century is the story of the impetus for social reform in which the introduction and spread of modern education was an important element. Schools which taught English language were opened not so much to educate the masses but to groom Indian people to run the British government. Christian missionaries opened a Marathi school in Pune for the public. During this transitional phase, even though education was open to masses, the common person was not aware of its importance. Jyotiba has worked for the masses and made them aware of education as a vehicle for social change.

19th Century was a period of social problems like *Varnasystem*, mythology, caste-system, ignorance about human rights etc. In oppressed castes great-grandparents and grand-parents did their community work which involved hard menial labour. They were not permitted social mobility other permissible for them. They were not even aware of their rights; illiteracy was very high in the society. Jyotiba shows the light of hope, to free from these problems of society. He revolted against the unjust caste-system and upheld the cause of education of women and lower castes. He started primary education and higher education and fought for their rights. Thus, he ushered in primary education as a tool in perceiving the work of the oppressed castes as dignified labour that was exploited by society.

In 20th Century people belongs to oppressed castes their parents had opportunity to get undergraduate education which they could also impart to their children. This was a period when oppressed castes struggled to enter institutions and make their presence visible in the context of nation-building. It was also a period when they had an understanding of their rights and responsibilities.

In the late 20th century and the beginning of 21st Century oppressed castes to an extent have entered into institutions of higher learning and have started producing knowledge that questions inequality and reconstructs identity from the theoretical point of view. They are ready to face the challenges of their time. We can see the growth of education from 19th to 21st century India. 19th century the focus on primary to higher education, then in 20th century system focused on Undergraduate level education, and now in 21st centry high level research on social sciences is available for the generation. The present position is better because of education which has given them self respect, made them aware of their rights, organizations to voice their feelings.

IV. Phule's Feminist Thought Comparable to J.S. Mill and F. Engels

Jyotiba was global philosopher in 19th century; he raised the problem of women's oppression. Jyotiba did not spell out a theory of patriarchy or a fundamentally inequality between man-woman like John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)[5] or Friedrich Engels (1820 –1895)[6]. But his thoughts on resolving women's oppression through their own efforts and autonomy makes him join the company of other nineteen

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[5]John Stuart Mill, "The Subjection of Women". 1869.
[6]F. Engels, "The origin of the Family, Private Property and the state", New York, 1972.

century male feminists like Mill and Engels. Phule differed from other Indian male reformers who were his contemporaries in that he did not see women's oppression as an excuse to objectify them under the control of male norms. Rather, he believed that women have to, through their own struggles, evolve ways of living with dignity. In this, education played a very big role for Phule.

It is worth comparing Phule's perspective on gender and modernity with that of Mill, the British philosopher, economist, moral and political theorist, and administrator. Mill was one the most influential English-speaking philosopher of the nineteenth century in Maharashtra. Several thinkers like Ranade, Agarkar and Ambedkar have been influenced by his philosophy. Mill's views reflect the need for reforming the socio-political body from the liberal political view of society and culture. The overall aim of his philosophy is to develop a positive view of the universe and the place of humans in it, one which contributes to the progress of human knowledge, individual freedom and human well-being. It is in this context that he suggests the need to reform the condition of women through their education in which rationality plays a central role. Phule similarly believed that society has to adopt a liberal philosophy, in which orthodox customs are abolished. Like Mill he maintained that women have a crucial role to play in the creation of such a society through the development of their rational faculties through education.

However, Phule's normative ground for social criticism differed from Mill. He critiqued caste-based and gender based oppression on the basis of his commitment to equality and freedom. Thus Phule did not advocate Mill Utility principle – of greatest happiness for greatest number -as kea foundation of social reform. Rather Phule was committed to the equal worth and freedom of all human peoples. Hence, for Phule differences that come from hierarchic of caste and gender should be rooted out.

Since Friedrich Engels, German social scientist and political philosopher, published his work on women's oppression *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* in 1884, it is worthwhile to compare his position with that of Phule.[7] This work systematically set out to provide a social explanation for the emergence of women's oppression with the development of the social institutions of the patriarchal family and private property at a particular historic period. Such an explanation stood as a direct challenge to the dominant religious view that women's inferior status rested on God-ordained biological, physical, intellectual and moral inferiority. Even as science and scientific methodology gained credibility as the basis for the pursuit of knowledge during the 19th century, the explanation for gender difference and the inequality of women shifted from being based on religious to a very similar explanation that such inequality was based on natural difference. Nature, not God, determined this difference and this provided the rationale for inequality. Engels disputed this type of explanation, arguing that such views determined women's oppression as timeless and unchangeable, something they refuted with their materialist analysis of the rise of exploitation and the development of class society and with it, the emergence of systematic oppression of women. Liberation from gender oppression, like liberation from

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[7]Engels wrote *The Origin* after Marx's death, but it was a joint collaboration, as he used Marx's detailed notes along with his own.

class oppression, was possible for Engels by transcending the material inequalities of society. Like Engels, Phule understood women's oppression as a material problem that is linked to caste (for Engel's it is related to class). He related some aspects of women's position to the Brahmanical social order. Though he did not say so explicitly, he seemed to imply that the end of Brahmanical domination of would end the exploitation of women. According to Phule, Brahmin woman was much *shudra* as a *shudra* woman. In this sense, he was remarkably modern, and femininity view, which saw gender itself, and not *Varna,* as the basis for the oppression that women faced.

In the modern age, hierarchy between men and women has been explicitly questioned with rise of women's freedom movements all over the world. As a result women are quite confident of their ability to achieve their goals in this life. Today we find that women have proved to be quite otherwise and are holding highest positions in every field of life. Jyotiba and his wife Savitribai amidst the women's reform movement of the nineteenth century Maharashtra. Vitthal Ramji Shinde, Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar were the real successors of the feminist movement of Jyotiba's thought, which they developed further in the twentieth century.

V. Contemporary Relevance of Phule's Philosophy

According to William A. Haviland, "Although India's national constitution of 1950 sought to abolish cast discrimination and the practice of untouchability, the caste system remains deeply entrenched in Hindu culture and is still widespread throughout southern Asia, especially in rural India. In what has been called India's "hidden apartheid", entire villages in many Indian states remain completely segregated by caste. Representing about 15 percent of India's population—or some 160 million people—the widely scattered Dalits endure near complete social isolation, humiliation, and discrimination based exclusively on their birth status. Even a Dalit's shadow is believed to pollute the upper classes. They may not cross the line dividing their part of the village from that occupied by higher castes, drink water from public wells, or visit the same temples as the higher castes. Dalit children are still often made to sit in the back of classrooms[8].

Whereas the world has entered in the third millennium and is progressing towards accomplishing the goals and liberty and equality and fraternity still India has failed to eradicate untouchability and caste and descent-based discrimination. Sincerely believe that the caste problem is not the problem of Dalit one but also the problem of entire nation and without the annihilation of caste and the elimination of other primordial identities, India will not truly progress. Today dalits have positive identity. Some Dalits reaching higher levels in professions, business and politics, some are economically well off. But some Dalits still suffer from social stigma and reactionary political discrimination. Discriminations against Dalits typically manifest itself in the private sector with respect to employments and social mobility. Dalit and prejudices against dalits are

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[8]William A. Haviland, *Anthropology: The Human Challenge*, 10th edition, Thomson Wadsworth, 2005, p. 575.

reinforced by casteist views. These have been known to obvious themselves in caste-related violence. Dalits are often denied the basic rights of education, housing property rights, freedom of religion, choice of employment and equal treatments in many parts of country. Till today caste-mind set exist in our country. This kind of mind set should be removed from the society. Internal change can be made by women, through education. Charles Fourier, "Social advances and changes of periods are brought about by virtue of the progress of women towards liberty, and the decadences of the social order are brought about by virtue of the decrease of liberty of women… the extension of privileges to women is the general principle of all social progress."[9] Every woman should be educated in society then only our society will progress. This important of education and freedom Jyotiba saw and he did work for that. We have to make our mind to spread knowledge of Mahatma Phule as a philosopher of emancipation to all the oppressed anywhere in the world, and to fulfill the assurance.

Savitribai was the first biographer of Jyotiba Phule Savitribai internalized the vision and philosophy of Jyotiba and a devoted supporter of his work. In her literature she has repeated the distress, aspirations, and feelings of modern, liberated woman of India. Her composition also reflected to anger of the new emerging woman of India who wanted to be treated as a human being and not just as an object of male-lust. One of her composition she described the good man. According to her, "one who looks after his family with care and responsibility, one who is always industrious and inquisitive, who has quest for knowledge, one who is worship of freedom, one who is compassionate towards family, one who is caring, sacrificing and dedicated is truly a good man". In Savitribai's thought Jyotiba was good human and husband and he precisely passed the mission of humanism.

Jyotiba Phule's social thoughts are based on humanism. It is based on the values like equality, Justice and tranquility. He spread value based system through his work and thought. Our country is independent still independent values are not there in our society. Reason is Varna and caste system is still follow in some part of our country. Jyotiba's humanism is true and modern. In modern civilization every individual should follow his humanism.

Today education has been reduced to transmitting information. There is a fear of examination because of bookish education. Little bit we have to be practical in system, we have to brought life-oriented education. In this context, Phule's education system is still very relevant. For him knowledge was not just information. It involves questioning, understanding critiquing knowledge. Interpretation, critique and values all three are central to Phule who way back in the 19th century gave an alternative to the information approach to knowledge. For him, "Education is the power to think clearly, the power to act well in the world's work, and the power to appreciate life". For Phule knowledge matters because it can question, change and transform the individual and society. Thus for Phule, like John Dewey education can empower and make society more democratic. It can help in reconstructing, rethinking, interpreting tradition. This aspect of Phule is extremely relevant in the paradoxical context of caste in contemporary India-where despite constitutional provisions, caste discrimination is widespread.

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[9]Selected Writings of Charles Fourier, Design for Utopia, 1971.

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REPRESSION, SILENCE, AND CINEMATIC LANGUAGE: EASTERN SENSIBILITY IN VISUALIZING *BROKEBACK MOUNTAIN*

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Abstract: From Brokeback Mountain to Life of Pi, the Taiwan-born film director, Ang Lee, has won two Oscars for the Best Director. Both films are set in cultural contexts where Lee did not grow up, and yet both have drawn global audiences and received unanimous praise from critics. This article examines Ang Lee's cinematic technique communicated with his Eastern sensibilities in Brokeback Mountain. In applying his cinematic language, he not only shows loyalty to the mood and content of the original short story, but also re-creates much visual detail. His visual additions serve to redeem what in writing is not replicable in film, such as psychological description, and to enrich the story to fill the range of a full-length feature film.

So much has been written about Ang Lee's *Brokeback Mountain*. The film has received unanimous acclamation from global audiences, film critics and LGBT communities. It was also one of the biggest winners at the 78th Academy Awards, crowning Lee the Best Director. It has been regarded as an "issue film that invites nothing but pure escapism" (Herring, 2007, 94), as well as "a love story about two guys who happen to be gay" (McBride, 2007, 96). The financial success of the film is equally remarkable. Grundmann has noted, "Made and marketed for $14 million (not a single one of which, as Variety has noted, went to TV advertising), its initial badge was strictly art house. But when the opening weekend yielded a conspicuous eighth best per-screen average in history, even seasoned industry analysts were taken by surprise " (2006, 50-52). The success is obvious, and yet not so much scholarship has been done to examine the immense success of this film. Some critic ascribes the financial success of the film to the "sacrifice of countercultural subversiveness" to achieve the inoffensiveness of the subject matter (Osterweil, 2007, 42). In my view, the success lies in the Eastern sensibilities in Ang Lee's cinematic language entailed to highlight the universality of a cowboy love story.

We will first look at what makes a good film and what is the definition of a good film. Arguably, despite individual differences of taste and inter-subjective reception of a particular film within an audience, the universality of world's most

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acclaimed films is always characterized by the nature of a good story well told. Story-telling demands a great deal of technique, and it is even more demanding to tell a story in film that can be fully understood by audiences regardless of their cultural identities and the language barrier. It is noticeable that Ang Lee's directorial work is well received both in the West and Asia, no matter if it is situated in American West (*Brokeback Mountain*) or China's Qing dynasty (*Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*). In brief, his use of the nuanced visual composition, constructed on a sense of the commonality of human nature, draws a universal attitude towards it. To achieve the universality, his cinematic language transcends not only geographical differences, but also sexuality differences. As D. A. Miller has suggested, Ang Lee's cinematic technique creates a "celluloid closet," drawing mainstream audiences to the universality of love while allowing them to forget the sexual politics and the homosexual content of the romance between two men (2007, 52).

The immense success of *Brokeback Mountain* has, therefore, reinforced my interest in examining Ang Lee's cinematic language. I have particularly examined reviews and critiques on Ang Lee's family background and his directorial style in an attempt to find out if I have any consensus of opinions with other critics. It is also intriguing that *Brokeback Mountain* is perceived as both authentically American Western and yet different from most other Westerns, having incorporated Chinese melodramatic elements (Berry, 2007, 32-37). Furthermore, even though *Brokeback Mountain* has been called by some a "gay cowboy movie," or "a gay watershed" (Burr, 2006, 69), it is also widely acknowledged by the mainstream, non-homosexual audiences. In my view, the fact that *Brokeback Mountain* has transcended cultural, geographical, gender and sexuality boundaries is evidence that Ang Lee's work has earned a global reception in a "real" sense, not through the influx of international capital, or assembling international cast in consideration of transnational box office income, or switching between locations in various countries as often seen in a time-travel film. His celebrated global reception is due to his well-schemed cinematic language that links the audience with the characters on the large screen, making clear a theme that otherwise would be lost to cultural and language barriers. It is a language that does not need subtitles, or to be dubbed, but a language that is shared and received by all audiences. Ang Lee's multicultural background has contributed to the achievement of that goal. It is hard to identify Ang Lee as a film director geographically. He himself is also confused by his identity, as he remarks, "I have always had identity problems. People like me, second-generation mainlanders from Taiwan, are a rare breed. They last only about two generations and account for a very small proportion of people among Chinese…And in Taiwan there are all kinds of local groups who have different cultural affiliations…and many of us came from Taiwan to the States, where we are foreigners. So all our lives we have identity problems" (332, Berry). Born in Taiwan to parents who migrated from Mainland China, he has spent most of his adult life in the U.S., where he not only

received his degree in film production, but conceived ideas and fragments for his early films on East-and-West interaction and conflicts and family dynamics such as *Pushing Hands* (1992), *The Wedding Banquet* (1993) and *Eat Drink Man Women* (1994). He says, "For me, all of my first three movies…are actually a trilogy about my father…and the need for the releasing of the Chinese tradition, so to speak…The thing that used to be [the backbone of Chinese society] and provide us security is now drifting away" (Dilley, 2007, 64). Since *The Wedding Banquet*, he has walked in long strides in his film career, gradually becoming an internationally acclaimed director, by directing one British and two Hollywood masterpieces: *Sense of Sensibility* (1995), *The Ice Storm* (1997), *Ride with the Devil* (1999). Following three contracted film projects, in 2000, he returned to the Chinese subject matter, directing *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*, which won the Academy Award for the Best Foreign Language Film and was nominated for Best Director. It was *Brokeback Mountain* in 2005 that finally brought him the Academy Award for Best Director. From family melodrama, to Jane Austen, to the Qing dynasty of China, and the American West, his transformation is underlined by a notable negotiation between audiences and a remarkable ability in handling such diversity of subject matters with thought and artifice. He is the epitome of globalization with a globalized audience, with his work facilitating our perception of globalization on film and globalization in the larger life.

From *The Wedding Banquet* (1993) to *Brokeback Mountain* (2005) and to *Lust, Caution* (2007), Ang Lee's work is consistent if they are viewed in a sequence. As a "queer" film, *The Wedding Banquet*, revolving around family ethics featuring a father figure, has stereotypical portrayal of gay people that reflects the early stage of Ang Lee's reading of the complexity of homosexuality. *Brokeback Mountain*, however, has been regarded as a mainstream classic as above mentioned even though it has a homosexual subject matter, nevertheless allowing Ang Lee to become an internationally acclaimed film director. In critiquing *The Wedding Banquet* and some of Lee's other Chinese themed films, Dennis Lo argues, "[T]he underlying themes and stylistic tropes that extend through his works are emphatically 'Asian American'" (2008). During the 12 years' time span between *The Wedding Banquet* and *Brokeback Mountain*, Ang Lee seems to have made a great leap forward in working his favorite film genre and the subject matter. He has proved that he cannot only deal with Chinese-ness in his film, but also a Western subject matter with his invisible Chinese-ness. In brief, he embodies his Chinese sensibilities deeply rooted in his hybrid identities in *Brokeback Mountain*.

Ang Lee says to Hong Kong media, "Everyone has Brokeback Mountain in mind" (2006). In my view, the Brokeback Mountain in his mind is symbolic of a transgressive potential, a deviant tendency against social norms and sexual taboos, and a desire to depart from conformity to mainstream society in pursuit of transgressive pleasures. By the time he shot *Brokeback Mountain*, Ang Lee seems to have developed a deepened understanding of the complexity of sexualities.

Brokeback Mountain represents Ang Lee's new path in exploring the "Brokeback Mountain" in everyone's mind. Two years later, his *Lust, Caution*, a Chinese espionage thriller film also adapted from a short story, earned him new awards or nominations at such prestigious international film festivals as Venice International Film Festival and Golden Global Awards. *Brokeback Mountain* and *Lust, Caution* are described by Ang Lee himself as visions of "heaven and hell," albeit both depicting a forbidden love, *Brokeback Mountain* serves as heaven for two cowboys and bears witness of their eternal love, *Lust, Caution* traps the woman with an assassination mission into a momentary lustful love that leads her to hell. A significant similarity between these two masterpieces is marked by his exquisite use of cinematic technique and his keen sensibilities.

Although *The Wedding Banquet*, *Brokeback Mountain* and *Lust, Caution*, as Ang Lee's self-oriented directorial work, have never been officially announced as Ang Lee's trilogy, there appears to be a consistence if they are viewed in a sequence, only the cinematic skill being matured and consummated. Overall, it is his invisible Asianness (Lo, 2008) that constitutes the consistency.

The nature of the story of *Brokeback Mountain* sets the reticent tone that perfectly needs Ang Lee's exquisite cinematic language. Ang Lee himself is a quiet man, whose humility and reticence in personal life have been noted by media (Anthony, 2003). He states that his father was "a man of few words," too (2003), and the father figure that shaped his own character has been presented consistently in his early films with Chinese concerns. As "emotional repression" is one common theme in Lee's work, the fact that Lee has been raised in his traditional Chinese family "tense with unexpressed thoughts and feelings" makes him "an expert on the subject" (2003). Silence has played an important role in shaping his mentality. In *Articulate Silences*, the quiet Asians are seen as "inscrutable," and the quietness is "associated with the feminine" (Cheung, 1993, 2). Silence may also be caused by prohibition (3), and also "carries other functions and meanings" (3). It may be added that silence has contributed to Ang Lee's sensibilities in creating his cinematic language. Notably, the emotional repression in Ang Lee has reached to its peak in filming *Brokeback Mountain*, as well as the later *Lust, Caution*, unfolding more of his potential of using his masterly cinematic language set with a silent tone.

The story takes place in Signal, Wyoming, where Ennis Del Mar (Heath Ledger) and Jack Twist (Jake Gyllenhaal) meet each other when getting summer jobs as sheepherders on Brokeback Mountain. Jack is extroverted, loquacious and outgoing, while Ennis is introverted, quiet and reserved. Life in the mountains is dull, with barely other human beings but the two of them and their sheep. Who knows what is going to happen between them if they constitute each other's only company? One night, Ennis sleeps by the campfire at the campsite while Jack sleeps in the tent. Seeing Ennis trembling in the freezing cold, Jack invites him to sleep in the tent. When one's body snuggles and nestles against the heat of the other's, the physical closeness ignites cardinal sparks between the two young

men. Even though they do not talk about it the next morning, they cannot stop doing it. While continuing to have sex here and there, their love also deepens, though neither of them identifies himself as queer. When the summer jobs are done, they part. Ennis marries long-time girlfriend Alma while Jack marries Lureen, a Texas cowgirl from a wealthy family.

Four years have passed now. Jack visits Ennis, their passion exploding again. While Jack wishes to make a life with Ennis, Ennis feels fearful about the risk. They end up getting together once in a while on the Brokeback Mountain, lying to their wives that they are going on fishing trips. One day, upon hearing Ennis's divorce, Jack is exhilarated, driving to see Ennis in hopes to be together for the rest of their life, but again, his proposal is turned down by Ennis. On Brokeback Mountain, they have an argument: while Jack blames Ennis for the frustration at seeing him infrequently, Ennis blames Jack for causing his emotional conflicts.

Some more time has passed by. Ennis receives a returned postcard that he had sent to Jack, stamped "Deceased." He phones Lureen. She tells him that Jack died of a tire explosion. Lureen also tells Ennis that Jack wanted to have his ashes scattered on Brokeback Mountain, but she doesn't know where it is. Ennis visits Jack's parents, offering to take Jack's ashes but is refused by Jack's father. In Jack's childhood bedroom, Ennis finds his lost shirt inside of Jack's, hanging in the closet. Jack's mother allows him to keep the shirts.

Annie Proulx, the author of the original story, reportedly showed satisfaction for Ang Lee's adaptation after watching the film. Fundamentally, in the film Ang Lee does not seem to have changed much, except that the two actors, Heath Ledger and Jake Gyllenhaal, are apparently more physically attractive than what Annie Proulx describes in the original short story. Ang Lee keeps the codes coined by Proulx, including the names of the two protagonists. Twist, meaning not straight, implies that Jack Twist is more on the homosexual side. Ennis in Irish is an island, while del mar means "of the sea," so the name of Ennis Del Mar, meaning "island of the sea," may indicate his loneliness, isolation and inarticulateness.

Ang Lee's subtle cinematic language serves three categories in the film. Firstly, it authentically visualizes the landscape as described in the original story. The difference is that Anne Proulx uses description in words conflated with personal commentary while Ang Lee uses a cinematic language based on shots that he gives a meaning to. In doing so, he reproduces beautiful color-and-texture compositions of the wilderness and emptiness of the Brokeback Mountain as described in the original short story, the visuals of the sheep, the campsite, the fire, the blue sky and clouds, and the snow and hailstones. The first shot in the film is a long shot of a pick-up truck running along a road in Wyoming, headlights on in the predawn dark, with no other vehicles running on the road, creating a feel of loneliness and bleakness. And yet the colors are beautifully composed in the long, fluid shot: Underneath a ribbon of dim orange on top pervading the dawning sky are shades of lush greens. The truck, driven by Jack

Twist, is running from left to right in a gigantic field, like a bright dot, with the headlights on, floating in the endless dark. The slow guitar music contributes to the desolate tone. It is not even music; it rather sounds like random plucking of strings, and the emptiness in between the notes seems like a helpless sign. All in all, the opening shot establishes the mood of the entire film, foreshadowing the tragic, frustrating and unfulfilling ending of the story. This fine-tuned poetic melancholy is also typical in his *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*, a representative feature of the Chinese humanistic spirit, which appeals to Western audiences as well.

Secondly, Ang Lee masterly uses well-designed cinematic language to mouth the untold, the inarticulate, and the silent dynamics of and between the characters. In the introductory scene where the two protagonists appear and meet each other while waiting for Joe Aguirre to look for work, Ang Lee gives a close up shot to Jack Twist, who observes Ennis in the rear window of the truck. Ennis, head down, silent and motionless, does not seem to have noticed Jack's presence. The shot of Jack's gaze lasts for quite a few seconds, not only indicating that the story will be taking place between them but also establishes the relational dynamics between the two protagonists. This is even more evident in the next scene where after leaving Joe Aguirre's office, in a wide shot of the ghost town of Signal, Jack walks with long strides, ahead of Ennis, head up, while Ennis follows, head down. This shot conveys that Jack is the one that takes the initiative in their interaction, as contrasted with Ennis's passive and subdued nature. The reticent tone set in meticulous shots is evident that Ang Lee's sensibilities often seen in his Chinese-themed films also work well in an American Western.

The ghost town of Signal now has been replaced by the sheepherding scene in the lush mountains where the blue sky, rolling clouds, shades of greens, and the vast mobile picture of thousands of wriggling sheep, create a feel of liveliness and colorfulness. The guitar music cheers up, while Jack and Ennis seem to be more relaxed and comfortable with each other, riding their horses, following the sheep through forest and across streams, as presented in a fluid and naturally transitioned montage. From the stagnant, deadly Signal to the Brokeback Mountain, Ang Lee is accentuating to the audience the significance of the Brokeback Mountain, where the two protagonists find their escape from reality and enjoy a forbidden love in their own Eden. It is a place that does not need the spoken language; it articulates everything in the visual language, a language of subtleties, fluidity and honesty, as it conceals nothing to the audience.

The Eden of Brokeback Mountain is constituted with the public and private spheres. The mountains may be perceived as the public sphere, where the two sheepherders pass time looking after the sheep without confronting each other with fear of intimacy, but at nights their campsite becomes their private sphere that renders their proximity inevitable, and, once the potential sparks are fueled, a homoerotic libido will erupt.

The day after Jack and Ennis had sex in the tent, they don't talk about what has happened between them. The feelings are intricately entangled and any word is extra. For this extended wordless part of the story, Ang Lee particularly constructs a visual composition of Jack and Ennis on a hillside looking into the tranquil distance, where Ennis stands first, while Jack casually lies on the grass, creating a meaningful right angle that reveals the state of mind of each person: One seems stiff, inhibited and discomfort about the situation and the other more relaxed, more uninhibited and more comfortable.

Another two scenes featuring Jack and Ennis on the Brokeback Mountain that consists of well designed shots are the scenes of their return to the Brokeback Mountain for their fishing trips, one right after their reunion after four years of no contact, and the other perhaps the last retreat prior to Jack's death. Unlike what we most likely see in a scene similar to this in other films using a master shot, a medium two shot, an over-shoulder shot favoring A and an over-shoulder shot favoring B, Ang Lee uses meticulous multiple shots and camera angles to shoot the camp fire scene where Jack and Ennis discuss the possibility of starting a life together, with Jack expressing his frustration at the infrequence of their get-together and Ennis recalling his childhood memory of a man who died of gay bash. We see a full moon in the sky overlooking the two of them, a master shot of them sitting by the camp fire and the stream to locate the scene geographically, and then at least a few medium close up shots and close up shots of each person, dirty shots favoring one while part of the other in soft focus, along with a medium two shot showing the proximity of them. Again, we see Ang Lee's masterly grasp of Chinese poetic melancholy. There is also Ennis's memory scene inserted in the middle. Multiple camera set-ups are also used as we see in different frames the switch from Jack's profile to his front and back and forth, and switch from Ennis left profile to his right. Ang Lee's effort in shooting this scene with so much detail and consideration signifies the importance of this scene positioned in the whole story as it is the beat of the plot that links the heavenly reunion with the purgatory of despair, frustration and continued loneliness and isolation. The last Brokeback Mountain retreat scene, albeit as romantic as before, ends up with an argument between Jack and Ennis over Ennis's inability to make a committed life together. If Jack is still hopeful in the first Brokeback Mountain retreat scene, this time he is in despair, mouthing, "I wish I knew how to quit you." Alongside a panoramic view of a tranquil lake with Jack standing in front of it, Ang Lee even uses a dolly shot shooting the two of them, with Jack in soft focus in the forefront with his back towards Ennis and Ennis in the background, trying to defend himself. It is an interesting way of blocking and the shot works well. The camera moves slowly and steadily from Jack's right side to his left side. While mobilizing Jack's upper body in the frame, the shot keeps Ennis still in the frame, showcasing the contrasted two different inner worlds and the psychological struggles in each.

Thirdly, as above-mentioned, Ang Lee has also added a great number of visuals that are not in the original short story, but they work fairly well in the film.

One example is the tent scene after Jack and Ennis had crossed their line. In the scene, first of all, we see Jack lying in the tent, his upper body naked, and then Ennis walks into it slowly from the campfire. Jack sits up, leans forward, trying to kiss Ennis. Ennis resists it, shifts away from it, but keeps on having sex, with Jack's encouraging response. He seems to feel guilty, and yet cannot stop it. This re-created visual detail makes a great deal of sense: For a deeply homophobic and masculine man like Ennis, especially in that pre-Stonewall era in America's Middle West, kissing is perhaps a more intimate act than penetrative sex, for kissing involves much emotional investment but sex may just be for emergency purposes, a "one-shot thing" as Jack puts it. Further, kissing between men literally threatens a man's masculinity, while penetrative sex does not as it is a form of conquest and dominance. In fact, neither Jack nor Ennis is effeminate or falls into the stereotypical imagery of homosexual men. Ang Lee's addition particularly exemplifies a deepened understanding of the sexualities in relation to one's homoerotic desires and one's gendered mannerism. It subverts the traditional binary sexuality mode by manifesting the flexibility, complexity and fluidity of one's sexuality. It also interrogates the stereotypically effeminate mannerism of those who practice homosexual acts. This scene along with the entire film conveys the secret where Jack and Ennis can be positioned in the spectrum of sexualities: While obviously Jack is more on the homosexual side whose sexuality is more fixed and consistent than Ennis, Ennis seems to be simply heteroflexible. This spectrum challenges Western black or white ideological mode and distinct classification of sexualities. Like Ennis himself claims in the original short story, he loves having sex with women and has dated a woman since divorce, but only doing it with Jack is most gratifying. He even masturbates thinking about him. Apparently, he loves Jack more for who he is than for him being a man, and love for him has transcended gender, social and cultural norms.

About their passionate indulgence in homoeroticism while refusing to identify as queer, Anne Proulx writes in the original short story as such:

> As it did go. They never talked about the sex, let it happen, at first only in the tent at night, then in the full daylight with the hot sun striking down, and at evening in the fire glow, quick, rough, laughing and snorting, no lack of noises, but saying not a goddam word except once Ennis said, "I'm not no queer," and Jack jumped in with "Me neither. A one-shot thing. Nobody's business but ours" (Proulx, 1997).

To reproduce this part of description, Ang Lee does not use montage that normally would combine a series of shots of Jack and Ennis having sex at different times of the day or in different places, which may undermine the weight and profundity of the theme. Instead, he re-creates a scene where in a wide shot Jack and Ennis play naughtily with each other, both semi-naked, and end up rolling on the ground, kissing and making love. This, however, has been caught by Joe Aguirre from afar through a telescope. Although Anne Proulx writes that

Joe Aguirre watches them having sex through a telescope, Ang Lee has added a meaningful visual detail, which is Ennis takes the initiative by kissing Jack in the playful scene. This indicates that Ennis has overcome his sense of guilt to some extent and come to fully enjoy a secret love on the Brokeback Mountain.

Among other visual additions that Ang Lee has created, the throw-and-miscatch of the keys between Jack and his father-in-law reveals to the audience a communicational dysfunction between them, which is even upgraded in the later Thanksgiving scene, where Jack is enraged at his father-in-law over turning on or off the TV set for Jack's son. Besides, the shirts in the final trailer scene are given more thought than the original short story to generate a powerful moment. We may remember the scene where Ennis visits Jack's parents after Jack's death. Jack's mother lets him come into Jack's childhood bedroom, where Ennis finds out two shirts hanging in the closet, with Ennis's shirt tucked inside of Jack's. This is exactly written in the original short story:

> The shirt seemed heavy until he saw there was another shirt inside it, the sleeves carefully worked down inside Jack's sleeves. It was his own plaid shirt, lost, he'd thought, long ago in some damn laundry, his dirty shirt, the pocket ripped, buttons missing, stolen by Jack and hidden here inside Jack's own shirt, the pair like two skins, one inside the other, two in one. He pressed his face into the fabric and breathed in slowly through his mouth and nose, hoping for the faintest smoke and mountain sage and salty sweet stink of Jack, but there was no real scent, only the memory of it, the imagined power of Brokeback Mountain of which nothing was left but what he held in his hands (281).

This is a powerful image that has articulated what is concealed underneath in a forbidden love, a love that is not allowed to manifest in a mainstream, normative manner. Two shirts, Ennis's inside of Jack's, as if skin to skin and "two in one," symbolize the unity of two souls, inseparable and eternal, as well as conveys a secret yearning in Jack to cherish Ennis forever deep inside of him. In the film, Ang Lee does not only visualize the descriptive scene loyally, but also re-creates a scene featuring the two shirts that is fairly different from the original short story. The original short story ends up with Ennis searching for a Brokeback Mountain postcard in a gift shop. The postcard arrives, he nails it in his trailer, hangs the two shirts right below, watching them, and murmuring, "Jack, I swear." In the film, towards the end the 19-year-old Alma Jr. (Kate Mara) comes to her father Ennis's trailer, inviting him to her wedding. Ennis asks her if her fiancé loves her, and she says yes. After Alma leaves, Ennis turns to his closet. On the back of the closet door we see two shirts hanging on a nail, with a postcard of Brokeback Mountain above them. It is Jack's shirt inside of Ennis's now, reminding us that in the earlier scene Ennis's shirt inside of Jack's. Fastening the top button of Jack's shirt, Ennis utters, his eyes being wet by tears, "Jack, I swear…" He also straightens the Brokeback Mountain postcard, and then closes the closet door and walks away. This scene not only echoes the earlier scene where Ennis finds out

the two shirts in Jack's childhood bedroom, but once again strengthens our belief in their long cherished love for each other, a love that is linked with the Brokeback Mountain and now hidden deep in a closet, and a love where now the living cherishes and protects the dead, still skin to skin and "two in one." Hence, the Brokeback Mountain has become a remote memory that will never fade away; a surreal place where the lovers once made their home, open and yet private, spatial and yet liminal, while now Ennis is left alone in his tiny and drab trailer, spending the rest of his life finding solace in the postcard and the shirts below. Ennis Del Mar, island of the sea, seems to have been destined to be lonely, isolated and alienated. This subtle, indirect way of showing lasting love and prolonged frustration in film is uncommon in American Westerns, but has been a common technique in classical Chinese literature and films. In general, Chinese sensibilities stem from the introverted nature of the people and the sophistication of their culture and historical heritage, while there is a lack of subtlety and nuances in "Western interpretative tools" (Hall and Ames, 1995, 2). The rationale given by Hall and Ames is that the dominant features of Western culture, "expressed in the form of broad doctrinal traditions which contextualize the most important meanings…exist alongside an inexhaustibly complex set of alternative ideas and practices the attenuation of which is, though partly the result of limitations of creativity and imagination, largely a function of the rise to dominance of an objectivist bias which leads us, above all, to search out the 'truth of the matter'" (2). The truth-seeking, especially in post-Enlightenment era, characterizes Western mentality, while there is always a blurring line between the truth and non-truth in Eastern mentality. Therefore, in East Asian cultures, exists an inexhaustibly complex of subtleties, nuance and meta-message, for which "anticipating" is needed.

Ang Lee's Chinese sensibilities fit into the story of a reticent forbidden love. He employs the subtle and nuanced visuals to empower the theme, speaking louder than any words, and articulating inaudibly yet without attenuating any message. Indeed, there are numerous wordless scenes in *Brokeback Mountain*, and Ang Lee's silent and yet rich cinematic language works well. Silence has been associated with sensibilities in East Asian cultures. As J. Vernon Jensen has put it, quoted in *Articulate Silences*, "Silence can communicate scorn, hostility, coldness, defiance, sternness, and hate; but it can also communicate respect, kindness, and acceptance" (Cheung, 2). Silence has split people into "Orientals and Westerners" (16). Silence has inspired Ang Lee's creativity in speaking out his diverse cinematic language as described above. Significantly, the fact that Ang Lee underplays the gayness but reinforces the universality of love using his "silent" cinematic technique allows spectators from all backgrounds to relate to it.

In conclusion, Ang Lee's successful film adaptation of *Brokeback Mountain* has appealed to a globalized audience largely due to his masterly cinematic language. In applying his cinematic language, he not only shows the reproductional loyalty to the mood and content of the original short story, but also

re-creates much visual detail with his Eastern sensibilities. His visual additions not only redeem what in writing is not replicable in film, such as psychological description, but also enrich the story to fill the range of a full-length feature film. The visuality of the film accounts for the worldwide reception. Although *Brokeback Mountain* has been labeled as "a gay cowboy movie," "American Western," "a bisexual movie" (Andre, 2006), or critiqued as being "Chinese" as above-mentioned, above all these labels, *Brokeback Mountain* is a universal love story, set in America's Midwest and told in a cinematic language with Eastern sensibilities.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Chinua Achebe, *There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra*. Penguin Books, 2013. 352pp, ISBN-10: 014312403X

There once was a country called the Republic of Biafra. Its brief existence, from May 1967 to January 1970, was an affront to the leaders of Nigeria, from which Biafra, occupying the nation's southeast corner, had seceded. Nigeria, which had gained independence from Britain just seven years prior, took military action to suppress Biafra's bid for sovereignty. In a brutal civil war that lasted thirty months, perhaps as many as 2 million Biafrans perished -- directly from the violence or from the starvation and disease resulting from a blockade imposed by Nigerian forces. The Biafran War was, according to the most famous Biafran, the writer Chinua Achebe, "a cataclysmic experience that changed the history of Africa." Before the humanitarian disasters in Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and elsewhere, it was one of the first dirty wars to run its course on the world's TV screens.

One of the authors of the Ahiara Declaration, proclaiming the new nation's liberal founding principles, Achebe also served Biafra as a diplomatic envoy. His absorbing new memoir, There Was a Country, recounts the doleful history of Biafra from the perspective of a disappointed partisan and within the context of the author's life through 1970. Although Achebe has been living in the United States -- currently resident at Brown University -- for more than twenty years, this is a book about Africa and its author's experiences there. He begins by recalling his childhood at the crossroads of traditions, in the town of Ogidi, where he was open to the influences of his father, a Christian teacher and evangelist, as well as to the ambient Igbo culture. He praises the British colonial system, in particular an educational infrastructure that celebrated hard work and high achievement. Achebe, who earned the nickname "Dictionary," excelled within this meritocracy, as a student and then as an employee of the Nigerian Broadcasting Service. In 1958, he outdid Amos Tutuola and Cyprian Ekwensi, the only Nigerian novelists to have gained significant recognition, by publishing Things Fall Apart, the most influential novel ever to come out of Africa.

The memoir's account of Achebe's early life is perfunctory, lacking the rich textures that vivify his fiction. Recalling University College, Ibadan, he notes that his brother Augustine provided him with funds "so that I could pay the university tuition and continue my studies, which I did, very pleasantly." No details explain what made the studies pleasant. Achebe does offer an anecdote about how the manuscript of Things Fall Apart was almost lost when he mailed it off to be typed by a shady outfit in England, but it only whets one's appetite for further insights into the writer's life.

However, the focus of this book is Biafra, as refracted through Achebe's experiences and beliefs. Though he clearly favors the secessionist cause, he attempts to present the complexities of national identity in Nigeria, a construct of colonialism that encompasses more than 250 ethnic groups. Of these, the largest are the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. Achebe praises the Igbo, his own people, for their industriousness, individualism, and respect for learning; he lays much of the blame for Nigeria's woes on resentment of Igbo achievements. He admits that Igbos led what he calls "the naively idealistic coup of January 15, 1966." That bid

for power triggered a violent counter-coup that was accompanied by anti-Igbo pogroms. Biafra, where Igbos constituted about 65 percent of the population, was a refuge against genocide. Achebe views the ensuing war as a personality clash between two rival graduates of Sandhurst -- General Emeka Ojukwu, the son of wealth and privilege who led Biafra, and General Yakubu Gowon, the opportunist who took control of Nigeria. In his own family's close calls with death, Achebe reflects the ordeals of millions.

Now eighty-one, Achebe has been a public figure for most of his life, called on for fifty years to make pronouncements about his native land. Much of There Was a Country consists of recycled riffs on set subjects. The book's 377 footnotes acknowledge not only that Achebe draws on outside sources but that much of the text is a verbatim sampling of what he has already said in essays and interviews. The name of a prominent figure often generates two or three sentences of canned description. Awkwardly interpolated, one too-tidy paragraph sums up Achebe's crucial founding of the African Writers Series. What might have been a vivid record of a literary artist's personal experiences instead too often reads like a compendium of well-rehearsed position statements.

One in four Africans lives in Nigeria, whose population may well exceed 1 billion by century's end. Achebe, who defines himself as "a protest writer, with restraint," concludes his anguished memoir by denouncing the "decadence, corruption, and debauchery" that continued to worsen after 1970. Things fell apart, perhaps irreparably, in the carnage of Biafra.

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P. Robbins and M. Aydede (ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 532pp. ISBN: 9780521848329

THIS VOLIME is the most recent work that creatively articulates the idea of situated cognition and systematically presents a wide range of research projects guided by that idea. It begins with three essays that introduce the basic concept of situated cognition, its scientific backgrounds, and its philosophical roots, attempting to show that cognition explicated in terms of situatedness or situativity is well grounded in science and philosophy and that it takes lead in the new trend associated with embodiment, embedment, enaction, and extendedness in cognitive science. These introductory essays are followed by twenty three articles that cover almost all the important topics in the studies of cognition, attempting to make it the case that situated cognition constitutes a genuine alternative to the traditional or mainstream cognitive science whose defining characteristics are solipsism and formalism. These features make this volume an introduction to frontier issues in cognitive science and philosophy of mind, a resource for understanding updated research on situated cognition, and a thought provoking text for a graduate seminar in philosophy and cognitive science.

Historically, the study of situated cognition was situated in a larger intellectual context. No sooner than cognitive science established its identity as computational modeling of cognitive processes in 1980s did the demand for its revision begin. This demand quickly grew into an intellectual movement consisting of three currents: *returning to the brain*—the ideas of neural architecture and network processing, *returning to the body*—the ideas of embodied cognition embracing the idea of enacted cognition, and *returning to the environment*—the ideas of environmentalized cognition embracing the ideas of embedded and extended cognition. *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition* is edited with the intent to aggregate these trends into a unified intellectual movement. As the editors of this volume claim in their introductory essay, at the heart of research projects focused on situated cognition is the picture of the mind that a cognitive activity or process depends on the situation or context in which it occurs, whether that situation or context is the brain, the body, or the environment. In this sense this volume provides an indispensible guide to the available theories and controversial issues concerning the new trends in cognitive science.

This volume attempts to present situated cognition as a holistic conception of cognition, which focuses on the contextual, dynamic, systemic, open, nonlinear, and nonlocalized aspects of the mind. Contributing articles are arranged in two parts, "Conceptual Foundations" and "Empirical Developments." Philosophical readers will enjoy interesting and inspiring discussions on the debate about

extending traditionally dominated intracranial model of studying cognition and mind to transcranial levels, on the issues about transcending the traditional notion of human knowledge as merely an internal property of individuals, and on the topic that cognitive processes in particular and mental processes in general may be dynamically expandable. The readers may also be provoked to entertain the idea that cognitive systems in particular and mental systems in general may be decentralized, the thought experiment on reforming the notion of cognizer that blurs the subject-object distinction and detaches from the idea of the self, and the hypothesis that unifies cognition with action in the way that cognition would no longer be viewed as something that goes on in the mind and then directs behavior that goes in the world. Cognitive scientists will enjoy a variety of overviews written by foremost scientists on sensation, perception, spatial cognition, concept, memory, representation, rationality, learning, language processing, semantics, problem solving, rational decision, consciousness, emotion, and social and cultural cognition.

The reader will find multiple notions of and approaches to situated cognition in this volume, almost a different one in each of the articles. The multiplicity of notions and approaches signifies that the theory of situated cognition is far from mature or unified. At the current state of the relevant researches, a theory of situated cognition is at the best a significant extension of, rather than a radical *alternative* to, traditional computational model of cognitive science that construes cognition as starting with sensory inputs at skin and culminating in representations. Let's call the proponents of situated cognition the situationist, whether they are scientists or philosophers. Situationist claims about the extension take two forms: the weak or scientific form and the strong or philosophical form. The researches in the weak form are attempts to extend the traditional parameters of cognition to incorporate what are traditionally considered as contextual variables that link intracranial processes and states with aspects of the physical and social environment, for examples, bodily states of sensorimotor, adaptive drives of action, functional properties of tools and equipments that are indispensable for accomplishing a cognitive task. The scientific researches exhibited in this volume seem to have followed this line of thinking. For their claims don't go beyond the conviction that cognition is context-dependent and in this sense, situated.

Philosophical studies of situated cognition, on the other hand, tend to take stronger a stance in extending the traditional computational model of cognitive science, viewing situated cognition as a cognitive extension of the mind into brain, body, and the world. Here by cognitive extension they mean that both cognitive *processes* and cognitive *systems* are extended. It has been argued that a computational theory of the mind be expanded to accommodate the idea that cognitive processes can be extended beyond the skull in the sense that intracranial computational processes can be extended to include the processes of sensorimotors, embodied actions, and physical devices. Carrying this argument

one step further, a system whose operations play part in the function of computing is an integral part of the whole system that accomplishes the relevant cognitive task and in that senses it is an integral part of the cognitive system. The situationist argument may also go in the reverse way. For example, it has been argued that if the intracranial system is compelled to be coupled with bodily and environmental systems in order to accomplish a cognitive task and if such a coupling is harnessed, then the cognitive processes are extended.

Is the mind thereby extended when both cognitive process and cognitive system are extended? The philosophical situationist seems to suggest that a system that possesses both intracranial properties and transcranial properties would mean an expanded mind. On this reformed notion, the mind is so dynamic that it is expansible and contractible, that is to say, the mind may expand to aggregate transcranial systems that are indispensible for accomplishing a cognitive task as in the case of perceptual cognition and it may contract back into intracranial systems as in the case of self-reflection. This is a radical move. However, the situationist has not gone far enough to address the issue about what is traditionally assumed the center of consciousness or the cognitive self or simply the cognizer. Here the computation analogy lost much of its thrust. An extended computational process does not necessarily entail an enlarged central processor. Does the cognitive system consisting of both intracranial and transcranial systems have a center that operates cognitive processes? What is it that observes, inspects, determines, and exploits transcranial resources and that recognizes and utilizes the computing results? These seem to be hard questions for the situationist who attempts to embrace the notion of extended cognition. *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition* does sharpen the issue though it does not offer a focused discussion on this issue.

As it is quite obvious that the notion of situated cognition presented in this volume relies heavily on the ideas of cognition as embodied, enacted, embedded, distributed, and extended operations, those readers interested in the philosophy of cognitive science may be intrigued to see how these new trends in cognitive science are related. It should be noted that the situated cognition movement initially emerged as a cognitive science variant of contextualism, a response to traditional theories of cognition which tend to ignore the context of fulfilling cognitive tasks. The concept of situatedness and that of the embeddedness used to be so much alike that they were once treated the same in literature, for example, in *The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences*. However, *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition* goes much further than demanding contextual validity of cognitive studies. Its main concern is not merely whether contextual parameters should be appreciated by cognitive sciences; but rather whether the dualism of being and the world, organism and the environment, cognition and action, etc. as a scientific paradigm, and the solipsism as a research strategy, should be abandoned. Consider that some cognitive tasks (calculation, memory, etc.) can be off-loaded onto the environment. The cognitive process seems to be

distributed among intracranial and transcranial systems. Here sensorimotor activities and processes play a pivotal role. Thus, the brain, the body, and the environment are not merely situations or contexts. This scenario shows that the notion of situatedness must work with those of embodiment, enactedness and extendedness in order to overcome dualism and solipsism. But it does not mean that situatedness generalizes the other concepts.

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