The nature of color and other qualities.
“Phenomenal Externalism’s Explanatory Power,” forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (argues in favor of phenomenal externalism along with a version of physicalism about color).
“What the Mind-Independence of Colour Requires,” forthcoming in How Colours Matter to Philosophy, ed. Marcos Silva. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG (argues that the mind-independence of color does not require that color is a primary quality, and develops an alternative requirement for the mind-independence of color).
"Fitting Color into the Physical World"
Philosophical Psychology, 23, 5 (October 2010): 575-599 (motivates and defends a version of physicalism about color).
"The Appearance and Nature of Color" The Southern Journal of Philosophy, XXXVII, 2 (Summer 1999): 227-252 (a paper related to "Fitting Color into the the Physical World" which primarily argues against a claim called Revelation).
"Perceived Colors and Perceived Locations: A Problem for Color Subjectivism" American Philosophical Quarterly, 49, 2 (April 2012): 125-138 (argues that subjectivism about color has no plausible account of color perception).
“Primary and Secondary Qualities,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, editor Mohan Matthen, Oxford University Press, 2015, 405-421.
The distinction amongst the senses and the nature of perceptual states.
"Common Sense about Qualities
and Senses" Philosophical Studies, 138, 3 (April 2008): 299-316 (argues that perceptual states
have qualitative properties but that qualitative properties need
not be characterized as qualia).
and the Senses" The Philosophical Quarterly, 51, 205 (October 2001): 495-511 (argues that our intuitive distinctions among perceptual modalities
don't require that perceptual states have qualia).
Review of The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Fiona Macpherson, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2011.08.24 (August 2011).
“Spectrum Inversion,” forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, edited by
Derek Brown and Fiona Macpherson.
Science and Spectrum Inversion: A Reply to Nida-Rumelin"
Consciousness and Cognition, 8, 4 (December 1999): 566-570 (argues against Nida-Rumelin's use of what's called pseudonormal vision to support the existence of actual cases of spectrum inversion). Continuing discussion with Nida-Rumelin in the same issue of Consciousness and Cognition: "Intrinsic Phenomenal Properties in Color Vision Science:
A Reply to Peter Ross"; "Color Science and Spectrum Inversion: Further Thoughts"
The distinction between philosophical and scientific existence problems.
"Existence Problems in Philosophy and Science", Synthese, 190, 18 (December 2013): 4239-4259. Written with Dale Turner (uses inference to the best explanation to draw a distinction between philosophical and scientific existence problems in epistemological terms).
The problem of free will.
Constraints on the Problem of Free Will" in Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? eds. Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, and Shaun Gallagher, MIT Press, 2006, 125-144 (considers how empirical research
can provide constraints for the philosophical debate about free will).
The nature of moral judgment.
Theory and Conservative Complacency" Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 86, 4 (December 2005): 544-555, written with Dale Turner, and "Explaining Motivated Desires" Topoi, 21, 1-2 (2002): 199-207 (these papers focus on the question of whether moral judgments are desires of a particular sort or hybrids of beliefs and desires called besires).
Links to Courses Fall 2018:
Phl 2180, Logic and Computing
Phl 3500, Philosophy of Mind
STS 4610, STS Capstone Seminar
Phl 201, Introduction to Philosophy (Fall 2011)
Phl 290, Philosophy Proseminar (Winter 2017)
Phl 453, Cognitive Science (Spring 2018)
Phl 460, Metaphysics (Fall 2017)
Phl 483, Philosophy of Science (Winter 2018)
Phl 489, Seminar in M&E: Perception and Consciousness (Winter 2018)
STS 201, Introduction to STS (Fall 2016)