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A Social Psychological Approach to Enduring Rivalries

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The recent scholarly work on the concept of enduring rivalries offers a promising way to examine strategic interaction among dyads of states over extended periods of time. A focus on rivalry, and on the mechanisms that provide for such interaction, may offer a way to bridge existing theories of international relations that rely exclusively on structure or process. Unfortunately, the potential for theory-building has not been fully realized because research into rivalry has tended to be inductive. This paper seeks to rectify that problem by situating the rivalry concept within a social psychological approach to international relations. The rivalry concept is appropriately located in a theoretical approach that views the international system as a social system where actors are conditioned by mechanisms of competition and socialization.

KEY WORDS: enduring rivalry; socialization; dissonance; social proof; mechanisms; international system.

The recent scholarly work surrounding the concept of enduring rivalries offers a promising way to examine strategic interaction among dyads of states over extended periods of time. The notion of an enduring rivalry requires us to examine interstate behavior as a time-dependent process, rather than as a series of discrete events. A focus on rivalry, and on the mechanisms that provide for such interaction, may offer a way to unite existing theories of international relations that rely exclusively on structure or process. The rivalry concept thus offers considerable potential for theory-building in international relations.

Unfortunately, that potential has not been fully realized because of the way that this literature has developed. The major hindrance to theory development in the rivalry literature has been the inductive nature of its birth. Enduring rivalries were first noticed as empirical phenomena associated with the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set. Goertz and Diehl (1992) launched this literature when they emphasized that certain state dyads were more
war prone than others. Indeed, such rivalrous dyads appear to have engendered more than half of all interstate wars. Goertz and Diehl were correct to note that this phenomenon deserved greater scholarly attention. However, until recently, most of this research involved refinements in the data-driven operationalization of rivalries, with scant attention paid to theoretical explanations for this phenomenon.

This paper situates the rivalry concept within a social psychological approach to international relations. I argue that the current conceptual focus on competition among states is but one structural feature conditioning the emergence, maintenance, and termination of rivalries. Socialization is another, equally important, structural feature of the international system that adds a vertical dimension of politics to the conventional horizontal dimension accounted for by competition. Incorporating socialization into the rivalry literature offers new hypotheses to test against dyads that had been inductively identified as rivalries. The rivalry concept is appropriately located in a theoretical approach that views the international system as a social system where actors are conditioned by both competition and socialization.

**The Conceptualization and Operationalization of Enduring Rivalries**

Goertz and Diehl (1992, p. 153; 1993, pp. 154–155) suggested that enduring rivalries have three conceptual components: competitiveness, time, and spatial consistency. Competition over an intangible good (e.g., prestige, influence) or over a tangible good (e.g., territory, resources) underlies the conflict in a rivalry. A rivalry cannot be “enduring” unless it persists for an extended period of time. Finally, rivalries must include a consistent set of states in their spatial domain, normally defined as dyadic in nature, although Goertz and Diehl (1993, p. 155; 1997) and Diehl (2000, pp. 241–262) suggested that rivalries might involve linkages among multiple states. A prominent example of a multi-state rivalry is the triangle formed by the United States, U.S.S.R., and China (Goldstein & Freeman, 1990).

Goertz and Diehl (1992, pp. 155–156) operationalized enduring rivalries according to the following components: a minimum number of militarized interstate disputes or MIDs (Gochman & Maoz, 1984), a minimum time frame for dispute occurrence, and a rule that determines termination of the rivalry after a minimum passage of time in the absence of a dispute. Enduring rivalries are conflicts between the same two states that involve at least five MIDs within 20 years. The rivalry terminates if 10 years pass without a MID between the two states. This operationalization produced a list of 59 enduring rivalries. The authors also adopted a threshold criterion to indicate isolated conflict (one MID with no dispute in the following 10 years) and proto-rivalries (two to four MIDs with no more than 10 years between disputes). Their empirical results indicate that the frequency of MIDs is twice as great in enduring rivalries as it is in
isolation. Additionally, more than half of all interstate wars take place in enduring rivalries. Finally, a dispute in an enduring rivalry is almost twice as likely to lead to war as one in isolation. These results, despite the lack of theoretical specification, suggest that rivalries are indeed an important subject of scholarly attention.

Unfortunately, because of the lack of a priori theoretical specification of the rivalry concept, much of the literature has yielded different lists of rivalries generated by different operational definitions. This battle of operational definitions has led to the tendency for rivalry lists to be used as case selection devices to study a number of other phenomena in the conflict literature (e.g., Geller, 1993; Huth, Gelpi, & Bennett, 1993; Huth & Russett, 1993; Sorokin, 1994). The result is that little theoretical work has been done on the rivalry concept itself. As Diehl (1998) admitted, “Because little work has been done on the beginning and end of enduring rivalries, there is a notable gap on what happens in rivalries between these endpoints” (p. 15).

This statement suggests three general aspects of rivalries that remain unexplained by the inductive approach. First, how exactly are these series of conflicts linked together? What intangible or tangible goods provide the basis for rivalrous interaction? Could something other than competition account for the linkage between conflicts? The inductive approach to rivalry is able to incorporate these linkages into its definition only by assumption. Second, how are rivalries initiated and terminated? The inductive approach can only make such determinations ex post facto. The inductive approach adopts a wait-and-see approach to determine whether a rivalry has commenced or expired. Third, why does the level of intensity vary during the course of a rivalry’s life cycle? According to the inductive approach with its adoption of the MID framework, the occurrence of varying levels of conflict (including war) throughout a rivalry is again assumed, not explained.

**Toward Theory: Competition**

The first problem, that of accounting for the linkage in rivalrous interaction, has received some attention in the rivalry literature. Vasquez (1996) defined a rivalry as “a relationship characterized by extreme competition, and usually psychological hostility, in which the issue positions of contenders are governed primarily by their attitude toward each other rather than by the stakes at hand” (p. 532). Rivalries are thus marked by the adoption of an actor dimension to issues, rather than a stake dimension. An actor dimension is adopted when issues are defined in terms of what they mean for the other actor, as opposed to a stake dimension, which defines issues in terms of their intrinsic value (Mansbach &

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1 These results are somewhat tempered by the fact that dispute frequency is also a component of the definition of an enduring rivalry.
Vasquez, 1981, p. 60). Vasquez’s (1996) definition thus encompasses three dimensions: issues, competition (over the issues), and psychological hostility. His general argument is that one of the main factors leading to war among equals is the occurrence of territorial disputes, especially where contiguous territory is at issue. In his analysis, territorial contiguity is used as an indirect measure of territorial disputes, which is itself the operationalization of a “contentious issue.” Essentially, what promised to be a conception of rivalry that incorporated competition over issues and psychological hostility is reduced to territorial contiguity.

Bennett (1996, 1997) similarly incorporated issues into his definition of rivalry. Bennett (1996) defined an interstate rivalry as

a dyad in which two states disagree over the resolution of some issue(s) between them for an extended period of time, leading them to commit substantial resources (military, economic, or diplomatic) toward opposing each other, and in which relatively frequent diplomatic or military challenges to the disputed status quo are made by one or both of the states.

(p. 160)

The issues at stake in rivalries could include territory, external political policies (e.g., promotion of a religion or ideology), or internal political policies with international effects (e.g., the treatment of ethnic minorities). Bennett’s (1996) operationalization of interstate rivalries requires that the issues at stake in the dyad must be connected over the life of the rivalry. The first MID between two states marks the onset of the rivalry, the issue is identified by the demand or claim made by one state against the other, and the rivalry continues until the issue(s) at stake are settled. In 25 of the 34 interstate rivalries his operationalization produces, both states were concerned with the issue of control over contiguous or homeland territory. Bennett (1997, p. 231) further argued that territorial issues are the key to understanding international conflict generally, and because conflict is the key to identifying rivalries, we should expect territorial issues to be crucial to identifying interstate rivalries.

The focus on competition over issues in the work of Vasquez (1996) and Bennett (1996, 1997) is a good start at conceptualizing rivalries. But as we have seen, most of the “issues” collapse into the issue of territory, or more specifically territorial contiguity. It would seem that the study of rivalries has a built-in bias toward territorial contiguity, as it assumes a central position in these and other scholars’ research on rivalry (e.g., Diehl, 1985; Hensel, 1994, 1996; Huth, 1996). This may be an artifact of the MID data: At least half of the 14 types of military acts that are drawn upon to code a MID include an explicit reference to the threat or actual use of force on or against the territory of another state (Gochman & Maoz, 1984, pp. 587–589).

Thompson (1995) clearly distinguished rivalries that concern territory from those that concern position in the international system. This distinction between spatial and positional rivalries is useful for several reasons. First, it highlights the
different motives and goals behind rivalrous interaction. Second, it helps sort out the relationships of minor and major powers in rivalries. Third, it helps us understand the different roles played by competition and socialization in the international system. According to Thompson (1995, p. 204), spatial rivalries usually involve minor powers that lack the resources and/or the independence from major powers to fully resolve their territorial disputes. Such disputes tend to flare up for brief periods of time, as a result of resource constraints, and then die down until one of the rivals has the resources to resolve the issue to its favor. Spatial rivalries tend to be more common and less deadly than positional rivalries. They are generally found where there is power symmetry between the two states. They also should occur in the states’ immediate geographic area (Diehl, 1985, pp. 1204–1205).

Positional rivalries also require some rough symmetry of capability, especially at the major power level. Positional rivalries involve conflicts about relative position at or near the apex of the international system. These rivalries tend to be less frequent and much more deadly than spatial rivalries, as states near the apex of the system generally do not prefer to share the lead position (Thompson, 1995, p. 205). Vasquez (1996, p. 553) found empirical support for Thompson’s distinction between spatial and positional rivalries. Because Thompson hypothesized that spatial rivalries will be the primary domain of minor powers, it is likely that previous research on the “issue” of territory will need to be refined. If Thompson is correct in his categorization of some rivalries as positional, territory may often be the proximate cause of conflict between states, but is not necessarily what is being fought for in a larger sense. But if minor powers are competing over territory, and major powers are competing over position, then what explains rivalries between major and minor powers?

Vasquez (1996, p. 533) argued that relative equality is a prerequisite of rivalry, because the behavior of major power—minor power dyads is fundamentally different from that of major power—major power or minor power—minor power dyads. Vasquez pointed to questionable dyads in Goertz and Diehl’s (1993) list of rivalries, such as U.S.—Haiti and India—Nepal. Thompson (1995) also questioned these and 14 additional rivalries from Goertz and Diehl (1993) as dubious in terms of face validity. Goertz and Diehl (1993) and Diehl (2000, p. 25) suggested that the inclusion of major power—minor power dyads as rivals is simply an empirical question. However, it is also an important theoretical question because this behavior must be explained.

In the search for a conceptualization of rivalry that seeks to avoid the inductive trap of dispute frequency, I concur with Thompson (1995) in recognizing that rivalries require a certain level of identification and recognition by both members of a rival dyad to distinguish them from mere competition. This type of recognition takes us beyond a mechanistic system of impersonal competition toward a social

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3 Thompson (1995, p. 203) stated that positional rivalries can be dyadic, regional, global, or regional–global in nature.
system where the identities of actors are important. Such an understanding is found in Keunne (1989):

Rivalry is distinguished from competition among agents by its non-anonymity. In rivalrous interaction, each agent knows that his or her autonomous actions will affect the welfare of every other rival non-negligibly and that those rivals will react self-protectively. . . . In competitive environments, the external welfare consequences of actors’ decisions are dispersed so widely over other interested parties that their initiatives cannot be identified and reactions need not be contemplated. (p. 555)

The non-anonymity condition moves the rivalry concept beyond Goertz and Diehl’s (1992, 1993) inductive approach that emphasizes perfect competition. Indeed, their approach must emphasize perfect competition, as all possible combinations of states are considered potential rival dyads. The non-negligible condition requires that states in a dyad are aware that their behavior will affect each other.

Non-anonymous, non-negligible competition is analogous to oligopolistic competition among firms in a market. Oligopolistic competition involves a small number of firms dominating a market. Such firms are aware of their competitors and the impact that their decisions have upon them. This is quite different from perfect competition, in which firms’ decisions affect others in the abstract, because no single firm has enough market power to affect the livelihood of any single competitor. The great powers are clearly states with “market power” in the international system. The type of oligopolistic competition described by Keunne is characteristic of great-power rivalries. However, oligopolistic competition may also be found in regional subsystems. Neighbors within a particular region are very aware of who their competitors are, and how their decisions affect them. If neighbors have enough capabilities to affect each other, then competition may also explain rivalries between minor powers within particular regions.

Competition cannot explain rivalries that are unbalanced in terms of power capabilities. Thompson’s and Vasquez’s concerns about major power—minor power rivalries are valid. The long-lived conflictual interaction between the United States and Haiti, or that between India and Nepal, is not properly explained by competition. Major differences in capabilities among states introduce a status dimension to international politics. It may be competition that spurs the development of those capabilities, but once a status is attained, its maintenance enters the realm of socialization. Waltz’s (1979) structural theory of international politics views competition as one of the two mechanisms through which structure works its effects on units. For Waltz, competition is a situation within which units find themselves. The structural condition of anarchy means that no higher authority exists to regulate the actions of states other than the states themselves. Thus, all units conditioned by anarchy must potentially interact with others for power, prestige, and security. The situation of competition pushes all units to adopt a
similar form and internal organization—whatever appears to be most efficient at securing power, prestige, and security. Competition as a situation does not say how the units will go about securing these things in the system. How they go about these tasks will largely be the result of socialization.

I expect that two mechanisms can account for competition among states—organizational competency and rational imitation.4 Waltz is clear that competition should encourage the sameness effect among the units. Stinchcombe (1998) argued that states have developed certain organizational competencies that enable them to appropriate benefits from certain legitimate activities, such as trade, and to be free of liability for whatever damage is caused in the legitimate pursuit of those benefits. The flow of benefits that the state monopolizes is used to maintain its status or rank in the system. Such rank or status is precarious because one’s own appropriation may be inhibited by the appropriation activities of others who are also not liable for damages. This argument is quite similar to that of Spruyt (1994), who also argued that the sovereign territorial state was better able at organizing itself to take advantage of trade and commerce than its competitors, including city-states and city-leagues. Thus, organizational developments that might reap competitive advantage are quickly adopted by other states in order to maintain their rank in the system.

Sameness in function, or functional undifferentiation, refers to the fact that all states face similar tasks, including raising revenue, establishing internal order, and defending themselves from other states. Hedstrom (1998) proposed a mechanism of rational imitation that can account for this type of sameness. Rational imitation does not arise from any notion of the need to adhere to social conformity. Rather, imitation is seen as a useful strategy for arriving at better decisions in the pursuit of resources or position. Imitation is also seen as a strategy for organizations to achieve legitimacy. When organizations imitate already existing and accepted models, they reduce the risk of being called into question by individuals and institutional actors and thereby increase their chance of survival. This mechanism of rational imitation seems to be what Waltz believed to be operating in the system. But who will they imitate? It seems reasonable that states with similar status will imitate each other—some avenues of state behavior, such as the projection of global force, are simply unavailable to states without similar capabilities.

Rivalries conditioned by competition are likely to occur among great powers, or between great powers and major powers. These two groups of states are more likely to have the organizational competency to allow them to make the fullest use of their capabilities. This kind of competition is exactly what the power transition literature describes (Organski & Kugler, 1980). To the extent that great powers and major powers imitate, they will imitate each other. Competition among small states and emerging states is likely to take the form of rational imitation. These states simply do not have the capabilities (or the organizational competency to exploit

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4 For more on mechanisms, see Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998).
the capabilities they possess) to compete with major or great powers; rather, they will imitate the internal organization and external form of their peers. In general, rivalrous competition should occur between states with similarly matched capabilities.

**Socialization and Enduring Rivalries**

Waltz (1979) considered socialization the other primary mechanism through which structure conditions the units of the system. Again, he was rather elusive about how he expected socialization to operate, but it is clear that he expected it to also produce the “sameness” effect. Undoubtedly, Waltz expected that units will conform to the dictates of the international system, or they will fail to survive. The inclusion of socialization into Waltz’s otherwise static theory of international politics offers a way to think about both structure and process in the international system. Competition is an environment or situation within which actors find themselves. Socialization, on the other hand, is an ongoing process. Rivalries are ongoing dyadic processes that occur within a competitive environment. Rivalries are thus an ideal way to bring out the latent dynamic features of neorealism and to bridge the theoretical gap between structure and process.5

Previous discussions of socialization provide little guidance for incorporating this concept into the study of international relations. Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) discussed socialization within the confines of a hegemonic system, whereas my intent here is to demonstrate its importance to the anarchic system that is generally assumed by rivalry researchers to form the backdrop of international relations. Schimmelfennig (2000) offered an account of socialization that emphasizes the self-interested actions of post-communist states operating within the context of the highly institutionalized environment of the European Union. Again, however, most states are generally not operating in such an environment. Both Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) and Schimmelfennig (2000) have run into the problem of incorporating what is normally considered a social psychological concept into international relations theory driven primarily by economic analogy. Their solution was to select cases in which the environment is highly institutionalized, such as under hegemony, or in an exceptional case of regional institutionalization. Neither choice is particularly helpful to the task at hand—incorporating socialization into the generally accepted anarchic view of the international system.

Resende-Santos’s (1996) attempt to incorporate socialization into an explanation of the emulation of military systems obscured the concept of socialization even further. He argued that “emulation is more directly a product of socialization” than

5 Of course, by drawing out the logical implications of socialization, neorealism as understood by its practitioners may be undermined. Socialization offers a way to think about replication and transformation of the international system, or, as Wendt (1992) so succinctly put it, “anarchy is what states make of it.”
it is of competition (p. 208), even though he discussed both emulation and innovation as features of competition. Waltz (1979, p. 127) gave an example of the emulation of the Prussian military staff system to describe the effects of competition, thus directly contradicting Resende-Santos’s analysis, which tends to conflate competition and socialization. Theoretically, we should expect that emulation and innovation are features of both socialization and competition as expressed through the operation of different mechanisms. Wendt (1999) also argued that socialization, in addition to competition, should play an important part in the explanation of behavior in the international social system, but he failed to produce a framework that could offer general predictions or explanations of the operation of either one of these structural features. The framework that I propose for understanding the impact of these mechanisms should illuminate not only the study of rivalries, but the study of international relations more generally.

What then is meant by socialization? According to Wentworth (1980), “socialization is the activity that confronts and lends structure to the entry of nonmembers into an already existing world or a sector of that world” (p. 85). Socializing activity establishes a tension between the “member” and the “novice.” This tension has several implications. First, there are relative differences in power, status, and prestige between the member and the novice. Second, the novice is within the sphere of influence of the member. Third, a variety of “others” may intervene in the socialization of the novice. Fourth, there is a varying degree of asymmetry between the member’s and the novice’s view of reality. Fifth, an ongoing historical institution, consisting of structure and roles, precedes a new generation of potential members.

The tension between members and novices in the international system requires additional explanation. Who are the members? The members are those states that are established in their roles in a given system. Who are the novices? The novices are states that emerge during a period in which the system is stable. What happens when the system changes? In a new system, all states are novices in a sense. However, because of the peculiarities of the international system, some states—namely great powers—are always “members.” Great powers, because of their greater capabilities, retain their status and primary role(s) from system to system. The great powers will be the dominant socializers in any international system. However, small states should be considered “novices” when the system changes, just as emerging states are also considered “novices” at whatever point in history they enter the system.

The relative differences in power, status, and prestige between members and novices supports my contention that socialization may provide explanatory power for rivalries consisting of states with differential capabilities. Great powers have traditionally held sway over states within their spheres of interest. The great power that dominates a particular sphere of influence will socialize the novice states of that region; if a great power no longer holds sway, then a regional power will assume the role of member vis-à-vis the novice. The regional power itself may be
a novice vis-à-vis a great-power member of the international system. Thus, a novice may be subject to socialization pressure from both a great power and a regional power. However, “others” such as local peer states may also intervene in the socialization process.

The asymmetry between a member’s and a novice’s view of reality is crucial to the socialization process. The member largely structures the reality within which the novice must operate. The member determines the roles, norms, and principles that are appropriate guides for behavioral interaction in the system. The socialization process operates on behalf of the member, with the purpose of bringing novices in line with the member’s normative expectations. However, entry into the system is a process of mutual accommodation and negotiation. Disagreements between novices and members over appropriate roles and norms may persist, thus giving rise to rivalries. Further, novice states, and particularly emerging novice states, are in the process of constructing their identity. Identity formation is partially the result of internal processes that may reject outside imposition of roles and norms, but is also conditioned by interaction with the “other,” according to social identity theory and identity theory. Thus, socialization is crucial to the construction of identity in the international system.

Finally, the ongoing historical institution that we discuss in the context of international relations is the existence of an international system. The deep structure (anarchy) that forms the base of all systems is regarded as constant by Waltz (1979). The surface-level component of structure—the distribution of capabilities—changes to give rise to a new system. Certain roles are also part of the ongoing historical institution. Waltz (1979) acknowledged the special role that great powers play in the international system. This should not preclude the existence of other roles in the system. Members (largely great powers) must socialize emerging states and resocialize existing states to the new reality. Even Waltz (1979, pp. 194–210) emphasized the system maintenance functions performed by the great powers. Thus, the main elements of continuity in the international system are the deep structure and the socializing role of the great powers.

During the socialization process the novice undergoes assimilation, which makes the novice more similar to the members. However, the novice also exerts influence on the members, thus necessitating accommodation on the part of members (Moreland, 1985, p. 1174). This process fits well with the neorealist conception of the international system as an environment of mutual adaptation and adjustment. The speed with which novices are socialized depends on the level of commitment of the novice to the member group and particular relationships within the group, the extent of the differences between the novice and members, and the number of novices that join the member group at any one time (Moreland, 1985, p. 1174). These factors may explain the genesis of enduring rivalries in the Middle

See Mercer (1995) for an application of social identity theory to international relations, and Wendt (1999) for an application of identity theory to international relations.
Eastern subsystem. Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria all joined this subsystem within a few years of each other—a large number of emerging novices that all formed enduring rivalries in the region. Israel, for obvious reasons, is also quite different from the rest of the Middle East and only recently has expressed any commitment to other members in the region. Thus, it has been the target of numerous socialization attempts that challenge its very existence.

Stryker and Statham (1985), Sarbin and Allen (1968), and Biddle (1986) discussed several processes identified in the literature as responsible for socialization: direct instruction, imitation or modeling, and altercasting. However, these processes can be collapsed into two general socialization processes: those that involve the direct internalization of communicated normative expectations, and those that involve the indirect assimilation of norms through a process of identification with socialization agents who exemplify the norms. Socialization should occur indirectly through imitation or modeling and directly through instruction and altercasting.

Socialization mechanisms should primarily affect the external behavior of states, with some requisite adjustments in internal organization. I postulate two mechanisms for the operation of socialization in the international system: the social proof heuristic and dissonance reduction.

The Social Proof Heuristic

The social proof heuristic (Cialdini, 1993; Hedstrom, 1998) is the socialization mechanism most likely to reinforce existing norms and roles in the system. The social proof heuristic is essentially this: When you are not sure what to do, look around to the actions of others for possible clues as to what your own behavior should be (Hedstrom, 1998, p. 314). As Cialdini (1993) suggested, “we view a behavior as more correct in a given situation to the degree that we see others performing it” (p. 116). This mechanism is essentially one of imitation or modeling, and is a pervasive feature of social as well as political life.

Cialdini (1993) argued that the principle of social proof is more frequently observed under certain conditions. First, the operation of the social proof heuristic is generally observed under conditions of uncertainty, when the situation is unclear or ambiguous (p. 129). However, the use of social proof can be problematic in uncertain situations when everyone is looking to see what everyone else is doing, but no one in the situation has a clear understanding of what is actually going on. This can lead to the phenomenon of “pluralistic ignorance,” which has been invoked to explain why groups of bystanders fail to aid victims in their time of need. Pluralistic ignorance has gained notoriety in cases such as the 1964 murder of Catherine “Kitty” Genovese in Queens, New York, because it seems to operate

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7 Altercasting refers to a member state casting a novice in a role, which entails specific normative and behavioral expectations.
best among strangers (p. 129). However, pluralistic ignorance need not always have negative consequences. In many cases, social proof is a heuristic that works to the benefit of both the individual and the group (p. 157).

A second condition that promotes the use of the social proof heuristic is when we are observing individuals who are similar to ourselves (Cialdini, 1993, p. 140). Similarity heightens the confidence that we attach to the appropriateness of behavior, especially given an uncertain situation. Finally, the social proof heuristic is most probably observed in relatively contained geographic areas. This aspect of the social proof heuristic is generally not emphasized but is nonetheless important. Copycat suicides and murders, rather unfortunate examples of social proof, occur only within those geographical areas where newspaper or television stories about them were published or broadcast (p. 147). It makes sense that imitation according to social proof will have some geographic boundaries, otherwise we would observe behaviors and attitudes spreading quickly and uniformly across countries and even throughout the globe. In some cases this may be observed, but most situations in which individuals resort to use of the social proof heuristic are probably fairly localized.

These three factors—uncertainty, similarity, and geographic concentration—combine to provide additional understanding of situations in which the social proof heuristic operates to guide state behavior. The social proof heuristic should be most evident in emerging states as they seek to understand the role of the sovereign state itself. An emerging state finds itself in an uncertain situation as a new member of a system. Any confidence about appropriate behavior or action will probably come from imitation of similar states (i.e., states with similar capabilities) in its geographical region. Other possible occasions for the operation of this mechanism include learning symmetrical roles such as that of an ally, or even that of an enemy.

In general, the social proof mechanism should operate when there is little question about the appropriateness of the state’s own role conception. The main question that the social proof mechanism helps to answer is how to properly enact a role in conformity with others’ expectations (Biddle, 1986, p. 78). To the extent that the social proof heuristic predominates, we should see a fairly stable system in which the units engage in its reproduction. The range of acceptable behaviors in the system should be fairly constrained. However, work by Schelling (1978) on “tipping points” suggests that if a rogue state were able to engage in novel behavior with impunity, and other states adopted that behavior via the social proof heuristic, then, after a certain number of states adopted the behavior, the entire system would accept that behavior as normal.

However, innovations in roles, norms, or their behavioral manifestations are usually met with skepticism by the relevant others in any social system (Stryker & Statham, 1985, p. 353). Deviance from expectations is permissible in the short-run, as actors engage in “aligning actions” to bring their behavior in line with standards, but over the long-run such behavior would be punished (Stokes & Hewitt, 1976). The only exception to this rule is that social deviance could persist in a situation
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of structural failure (Stryker & Statham, 1985, p. 365). In the case of the state system, structural failure would characterize certain regions where interaction capacity is low, such that it is difficult to even think of a system whose members could constrain agent behavior. The social proof heuristic could transmit innovative roles or norms from state to state by diffusion in such a low-interaction system only if states were actively seeking models for their own behavior and this could eventually lead to their acceptance as standard. We are unlikely to observe rivalries based on competition or socialization in areas of structural failure. For example, there are only three examples of African rivalries in a region populated by “quasi-states” (Jackson, 1990).

We should expect to see rivalries forming in part because of the social proof heuristic under several conditions. First, as mentioned above, the speed of socialization is affected by the level of commitment of the novice to the member group and particular relationships within the group. If the level of commitment between the novice and members is low, then the socialization process may be lengthy and potentially conflictual. The level of commitment relates directly to the uncertainty of the situation faced by an emerging state entering an established system. If member states act in a conflictual manner, then novices may adopt the same types of behavior in return. Second, the extent of differences between the novice and the members also affects the speed of socialization. If similarity between the novice and members is low, then an emerging state is unlikely to look toward members for guidance regarding the norms of interaction in the system, thus socialization will proceed slowly and will likely prove conflictual. Finally, the number of novices that join the member group at any one time affects the pace of socialization. The more novices entering the system in a particular geographical region, the greater the uncertainty about interaction in the system, and the less ability that member states have to control the behavior of any particular novice. Again, the result could be a slow and painful socialization process for the novice state. Any of these conditions could set the stage for the formation of an enduring rivalry between a novice and a member. On the other hand, if an emerging state enters the system under the protection of a member, or is perceived to be similar to the members, or emerges by itself, it would seem unlikely that an enduring rivalry conditioned by socialization would form, because the pace of socialization should proceed relatively quickly under these conditions.

Dissonance Reduction

The second socialization mechanism is dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957) as discussed by Jervis (1976, chapter 11), Elster (1998), and Kuran (1998). According to dissonance theory, inconsistency among cognitions causes a motivational state called dissonance (or “cognitive strain” in Sarbin & Allen, 1968, p. 541). Dissonance leads to an aversive state of arousal. The aversive state of arousal leads to attempts to reduce the arousal/discomfort and achieve consonance.

This often leads to attempts to avoid information or situations that would lead to increased levels of dissonance. Jervis (1976) discussed a number of implications for international relations derived from dissonance theory.

First, by attempting to reduce dissonance, policymakers alter their beliefs and perceptions, thus altering the premises of later deliberations that affect future perceptions and decisions (Jervis, 1976, p. 382). In combination with the normally high costs of policy change in domestic society, and the reputational costs in international society for breaking commitments, initial decisions may become “locked in,” with future dissonant information having little negative impact on the continuance of the original policy. Second, we should also observe a “spreading apart of the alternatives,” in which there is an increasing perception that the policy chosen was clearly better than the rejected alternatives (p. 388). However, some decisions may actually destroy the availability of alternative policies by radically altering the state’s environment, such as the decision to go to war (p. 389). Dissonant information about policy choices may be irrelevant once such a course of action is taken.

Third, expending resources increases dissonance and the corresponding pressure to believe that the policy is succeeding (p. 393). Therefore, states that suffer high casualties in wars are likely to believe that their sacrifice is noble and worthwhile, despite any information to the contrary. Further, the sacrifice entailed in war may lead to a perception that “winning” the fight has become more valuable, that the probability of success is higher, and that what might be considered failures by disinterested observers are actually viewed as successes by the leaders (pp. 394–396). Finally, and most troubling to Jervis (p. 399), is the “psychology of insufficient reward,” in which there exists an inverse relationship between the incentives given for an alternative course of behavior and attitude change. For our purposes, this is important because it suggests that the more other states attempt to negatively sanction a given state’s behavior, the less likely its leadership is to change their minds and adopt alternative behaviors.

Dissonance reduction may also be thought of as a social process rather than as a purely cognitive mechanism (Kuran, 1998). Agreement upon the operation of certain roles and norms is essential for any social system to remain stable. If a state challenges the roles assigned to it in a stable system, the result may be a balancing of other states against it to prevent the enactment of the nonsanctioned role. Balancing can thus be conceived of as a dissonance reduction mechanism in an interstate social system. States that are content with the current distribution of great-power roles are expected to thwart attempts by minor powers to break into the ranks of the great powers, and prevent a current great power from establishing a hegemonic role for itself. Any moves in these directions to destabilize a system will produce “dissonance” and attempts at dissonance reduction through direct instruction or altercasting. Thus, balancing and positional rivalries are not purely a function of competition, as neorealists argue, but are also conditioned by socialization.
Most rivalries conditioned by socialization will probably exhibit characteristics of dissonance reduction. Obviously, novice states or other members that enact roles or norms that are inconsistent with the expectations of other members will receive cues from those members to alter their behavior. These cues may take a benign form of socialization, such as diplomatic protests or condemnation in the United Nations. However, the offending state may choose to ignore these cues and enact its role or norm regardless of member opinion. This may lead to increased negative sanctions (e.g., economic sanctions or military action) against the state to attempt to socialize it into an appropriate role or norm. If the offending state is resolute and/or has the capabilities to resist socialization efforts, then this process could endure for an extended period of time, hence forming an enduring rivalry. In fact, dissonance theory strongly suggests according to the “psychology of insufficient reward” that rogue states will be unlikely to change their behavior, particularly as the negative sanctions increase in strength. Policy inertia and the “spreading apart of the alternatives” also decrease the chances that the offending behavior will be changed. The choice to go to war may even alter the state’s environment in such a way that no alternative policy choices remain available. The result for many socialization attempts in the international system is that rivalries become “locked in” early on, and dissonant information is ignored, or alternative courses of action are eliminated, thus producing an ongoing series of militarized disputes between socializer and socializee.

There are two variants of enduring rivalries that could stem from a socialization perspective emphasizing dissonance. First, rivalries conditioned by socialization may be situations in which efforts to socialize a state to a particular role or norm are incomplete, or fail altogether across time. Even in dyads in which the capability imbalance is enormous, it may be difficult to reduce dissonance between actual and expected behavior by enforcing conformity to norms or roles, as explained above. Waltz (1979) suggested that states that fail to adapt to the pressures of competition and socialization will be selected out of the system. Does this mean that states are eliminated? Judging from the historical record, states are not frequently eliminated. “Selection out” of the system may take on a more social tone as states are judged “pariahs” or “rogues” by other members of the system. Therefore, the list of enduring rivalries is quite likely to contain most of the states that have been considered rogues or revisionists throughout history. The ultimate failure of socialization attempts occurs when a rivalry escalates to war, especially if that rivalry continues beyond the war to a series of conflicts or wars.

The second possibility is that the norms or roles under contention in an enduring rivalry do not remain the same through time. Instead, the glue that holds

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8 Goertz and Diehl (1998) and Diehl (2000) also argued that rivalries become “locked in” relatively quickly.

9 This situation would be analogous to Bennett’s (1996) requirement that the issues at stake in a competition remain the same over the course of a rivalry.
a rivalry together is the relationship between the socializer and socializee, no matter what the norm or role under contention is at any particular time. It seems highly likely that as states endure in the system, they will adopt different roles and comply or fail to comply with different norms. This is especially the case as certain states increase their capabilities and attain a different status through time. This explanation of enduring rivalries would argue that they should persist until such a time that the difference in capabilities between the socializer and socializee erodes, such that the socializer is no longer able to structure the socializee’s reality.

The Interaction of Socialization and Competition

Socialization and competition have independent and interactive effects on state behavior. Competition is largely conditioned by capabilities. Greater capabilities make a better competitor in an anarchic world, all other things being equal. Socialization is conditioned by the instruction/learning of the appropriate roles, rules, and norms of interaction. I propose a simple taxonomy of states conditioned by the interaction of the mechanisms of competition and socialization: emerging states, minor member states, major member states, and great powers.

A state is considered a great power if the state matches Waltz’s (1979, p. 162) great-power categorization and the major-power categorization of Small and Singer (1982). Major members are those states considered by Small and Singer as major powers, yet not considered great powers by Waltz. Minor members are those states with lesser capabilities that have endured within a system for more than 10 years. Emerging states are those states that have endured 10 years or less upon their first MID with another state. These four categories by no means exhaust the types of roles that states may adopt. However, each of these categories is an ideal type that may serve as a “master status,” or a role that is salient in every situation (Stryker & Statham, 1985, p. 357).

Socialization also depends on capabilities. Usually, the actor with greater capabilities socializes the actor with lesser capabilities into a normative order that favors the continuity of the former’s status and position. However, as mentioned above, socialization is also a process of negotiation and mutual accommodation. In general, we can expect the aforementioned states to be conditioned by socialization and competition in the following ways:

Emerging states should be most circumscribed in their behavior. These states will probably engage in imitative behavior for their internal organization and their external policies. They will have a small number of well-defined roles in the system, and the roles they have are likely to be ascribed to them by member states. They may also be unfamiliar with the norms and rules of interstate interaction. Emerging states will be subject to the most intense socialization pressure of any kind of state in the system, and will be the least likely to resist such pressure because of their low or uncertain capabilities.
Minor members will have a larger number of roles, and more well-developed roles than emerging states. Minor members, having a greater sense of their capabilities and identity, will attempt to achieve roles in the system in addition to their ascribed roles. These states may still be imitating others, but their expanded role location efforts may subject them to conflict if other members disagree with their role conceptions. Minor members may be both members of an established system and novices when the system changes.

Major members, because of their greater capabilities, will have a greater array of well-developed roles, and more of these roles will be achieved than ascribed. The greater capabilities that they have are partly a function of their natural endowments, but also a function of their ability to innovate their internal organization to make the best use of those capabilities. Major members are responsible for socializing emerging states and minor member states in their geographic subsystem. However, major members cannot act with impunity, as they are still subject to socializing activities by the great powers at the level of the international system and in the regional subsystem if it is a great power's traditional sphere of influence.

Great powers, because of their overwhelming capabilities relative to the other types of states, will have the largest number of well-developed roles. These roles are likely to largely reflect the achievements of great powers on the basis of their capabilities. Great powers are still subject to socializing influence as members of a system, but they can often force the adoption of a role for themselves or disregard norms in the face of external pressure. Great powers usually maintain their status as the system changes, unless their capabilities and status are severely depreciated during the war that leads to transition. Great powers are responsible for socializing all other types of states in the system.

All states will begin their life as emerging states, as imitators and adaptors to the international system. As they successfully endure in the system, emerging states will at some point enter one of the other categories. Most states will move to the minor member category and undergo resocialization as the system changes through time. Other small states may become “members” of the system, not because of their own capabilities or intentions, but because other states tolerate them as members despite their imperfect imitation of the form and function of states (i.e., quasi-states). Finally, states with greater capabilities may become major members or great powers, with the ability to exert their influence regionally or globally, respectively.

Propositions Derived from Socialization and Competition Concerning Rivalries

Theoretically, both competition and socialization should be important factors conditioning state interaction. We can derive a number of propositions about the operation of both factors from the previous theoretical discussion. Capabilities are important determinants of both competition and socialization. Capabilities allow
states a certain status or position in the international system. The maintenance of
this status, once attained through competition, is a primary concern for socialization
efforts. Thus, socialization efforts emanate from states with greater capabilities to
those with lesser capabilities. This should not imply that states with lesser capa-
bilities will not try to resist socialization efforts. Such resistance can lead to
enduring rivalries.

I deduce the following propositions regarding rivalrous interaction from the
theoretical discussion of competition and socialization in an international social
system. These propositions are a first cut at examining the effects of socialization
and competition within rival dyads.

P-1.
  a. Great powers compete with other great powers.
  b. Great powers socialize major member states.
  c. Great powers socialize minor member states.
  d. Great powers socialize emerging states.

P-2.
  a. Major member states compete with other major member states.
  b. Major member states socialize minor member states.
  c. Major member states socialize emerging states.

P-3.
  a. Minor member states compete with other minor member states.
  b. Minor member states socialize emerging states.

P-4. Emerging states compete with and socialize other emerging states.

P-5. The majority of rivalrous interaction will be within a region.

P-6. Great powers will socialize outside of their region, as their interest
is in maintaining a global order favorable to their current status.

P-7. System changes will require resocialization of existing major and
minor members. This should result in the beginning of new rivalries and
ending of old rivalries since 1945.

What evidence is there to support these propositions? Although in-depth
analysis of each case will be necessary to document the effects of socialization and
competition, it is possible to gather some preliminary indirect evidence from the
most recent listing of rivalries from 1816 to 1992 (Bennett, 1998, pp. 1215–1216).
This list is reproduced with my coding for state status in Table I. The state status
listed in Table I corresponds to the ideal state types or master roles conditioned by
the interaction of the mechanisms of competition and socialization found in
Figure 1. The ideal types give us a rough idea of how these states will be
conditioned by competition and socialization, and should help us understand the
characteristics that led to their participation in the rivalries presented in Table I.
## Table I. Bennett’s (1998) Updated List of Enduring Rivalries, 1816–1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State 1</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>State 2</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>First MID</th>
<th>Start Year*</th>
<th>End Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Emerging</td>
<td>1869</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1915</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Emerging</td>
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<td>1859</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>U.K.</td>
<td>GP</td>
<td>1837</td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>1903</td>
</tr>
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<td>Minor</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>1898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>GP</td>
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<td>Major</td>
<td>1849</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>U.K.</td>
<td>GP</td>
<td>1826</td>
<td>1849</td>
<td>1865</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
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<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1938</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1984</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>GP</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>GP</td>
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<td>GP</td>
<td>1833</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Minor</td>
<td>Ottoman.</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>1926</td>
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<tr>
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<td>GP</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>GP</td>
<td>1914</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<td>1948</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<td>1973</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<td>S. Arabia</td>
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Table I. (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State 1</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>State 2</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>First MID</th>
<th>Start Year*</th>
<th>End Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Emerging</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>Rus./U.S.S.R.</td>
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<td>Minor</td>
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<td>Minor</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1992</td>
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</table>

*Bennett’s (1998) operationalization marks the start of a rivalry 20 years after the first MID. This contradicts Goertz and Diehl’s (1992) operationalization of rivalry initiation at the first MID. Rivalries shown as ending in 1992 may still be continuing.

Competition Mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competition Mechanisms</th>
<th>Rational Imitation</th>
<th>Organizational Competency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emerging States</td>
<td>Major Members</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Proof</td>
<td>Low/Uncertain Capabilities</td>
<td>Higher Capabilities</td>
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<td>Heuristic</td>
<td>Few Roles</td>
<td>More Roles</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ascribed Roles</td>
<td>Achieved/Ascribed Roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Socialization Pressure</td>
<td>Medium Socialization Pressure</td>
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</table>
My approach to the inclusion of socialization as a conditioning structural feature is similar to Goertz and Diehl's (1992) original assumption that all rivalrous states are engaged in competition. As discussed previously, competition cannot necessarily account for the rivalrous interaction in unbalanced dyads. I assume, pending further investigation, that socialization can account for rivalrous interaction in these dyads. The examples of rivalries conditioned by socialization should serve primarily as illustrations of the potential of this approach to explaining rivalries. Future research should focus on testing specific hypothesis about socialization and competition in the cases identified through this initial plausibility probe of previously identified rivalries.

P-1.


b. There are two cases in which great powers may be socializing major members: U.K.—U.S. and U.S.—China.

c. There are 12 cases in which great powers may be socializing minor members: U.S.—Ecuador, U.K.—Ottoman Empire/Turkey, Germany—Belgium, France—Ottoman Empire/Turkey, France—China, Italy—Ottoman Empire/Turkey, Russia—Ottoman Empire/Turkey, Russia/U.S.S.R.—China, U.S.S.R.—Norway, U.S.—Cuba, U.S.—Peru, and Russia/U.S.S.R.—Iran.

d. There are three cases in which great powers may be socializing emerging states: U.K.—Brazil, Italy—Yugoslavia, and U.S.—North Korea.

These findings about great-power interaction in rivalry are quite interesting. Almost one-third of the cases are competitions among the great powers. There are fewer cases of great powers potentially socializing emerging states than might be expected theoretically. However, it seems possible that great-power socialization of states with lesser capabilities might be accomplished rather quickly. These cases might fit into Goertz and Diehl's (1992) isolated conflict or proto-rivalry categories, in which there are not enough disputes to be classified as an enduring rivalry. Some of these cases of socialization by a great power that do attain enduring rivalry status are probably failures or incomplete attempts at socialization in which the same roles or norms are under contention. The aforementioned cases do include a number of rogue or pariah states, such as North Korea and Cuba, which may resist behavioral change according to our expectations from dissonance theory. Although the Cold War between the U.S. and Soviets is often seen solely in terms of competition, it actually involved socialization attempts by both poles to maintain the integrity and cohesion of their respective blocs. Further, both superpowers tried
to capture states from the opposing bloc. The U.S. certainly desired to socialize North Korea, Cuba, and China out of their roles as revolutionary communist states in the post-1945 era. Its failure to achieve that goal spawned enduring rivalries with these states.

The U.S.—U.K. rivalry is a case in which the roles under contention, and the status of the former participant, changed throughout the course of the rivalry. The U.K. remained the U.S.’s dominant socializer from its emergence to the point at which it became a great power. The U.S. as an emerging state attempted to adopt a neutral role for itself on several occasions by emulating members of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, which comprised small trading states such as Denmark-Norway and Sweden, and eventually the Holy Roman Empire, Prussia, Portugal, and the two Sicilies as well (Bukovansky, 1997). The emulation of similar states is exactly what would be expected of an emerging state according to the principle of social proof. Unfortunately for the U.S., this role was rejected by the U.K. several times, ultimately leading to the War of 1812 as a method of dissonance reduction using a very direct form of instruction (war).

As a minor member of the system, the U.S. attempted to adopt the role of regional leader and protector for Latin America through the issuance of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. The U.K. had previously attempted to altercast the U.S. in the role of regional collaborator in Latin America as part of a partnership between the two states. However, as a minor member conditioned by the dissonance reduction mechanism, the U.S. viewed the U.K. proposal as subservient and dissonant with its goals of expansion and preeminence in the region. The U.S. held onto its own conception of a regional leadership role despite British pressure to abandon the role. Ultimately, the U.K. grudgingly accepted the role by providing the tacit protection of the British navy in order to prevent its European enemies from reattaining a foothold in Latin America. By the time of the 1895 boundary crisis in Venezuela, the U.K. fully accepted the U.S. regional leader and protector roles for Latin America. This crisis was seen by many as the emergence of the U.S. as a great power both in terms of capabilities and social status. The U.S. then went on to socialize Spain out of its rather hollow great-power role with the Spanish-American War in 1898. The U.S.—U.K. rivalry drew to a close soon thereafter, reflecting the changed status of the U.S. vis-à-vis the U.K. As a great power enacting its roles of regional leader and protector in Latin America, in addition to its role as bloc leader during the Cold War, the U.S. intervened in the affairs of many Latin American states, including minor members Peru and Ecuador, to attempt to socialize them to the U.S. vision of the global politico-economic order.

The intervention by a series of great powers (including the U.K., France, Italy, and Russia) in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire offers an interesting window into the interaction of competition and socialization. Nationalists, supported by the various great powers, had begun to carve independent states out of the declining Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. Serbia, Greece, and Romania were established by 1870, and were joined by Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Albania before the First
Enduring Rivalries

World War. Competition among great powers explains much of the machinations of this time period. However, the competition between great powers provided a link to their separate rivalries conditioned by socialization with the Ottoman Empire. The fact that the Ottoman Empire was often formally treated as a great power, despite the lack of capabilities to back up that role, suggests that socialization may be an important factor in explaining the behavior of states involved in the Ottoman question. The Ottoman Empire had declined in power to such a precipitous state by the 19th century that it was maintained as an independent political entity primarily because the great powers of Europe could not decide how to properly divide it up without engaging in a full-scale war. The Russian rivalry with Iran also dates to this period, as the instability produced by a weak Ottoman Empire threatened the entire Middle Eastern region.

The Ottoman question that had plagued the European great powers since the 18th century was eventually settled by the First World War. Until the conclusion of the war, the Ottoman Empire emulated the behavior of a great power and certainly avoided any dissonance-producing information to the contrary, particularly the information provided by its inability to prevent the formation of independent states in its European territory during a series of Balkan wars supported by the great powers. It joined the Central Powers in the war, and was soon socialized out of its pseudo-role as a great power. War in this case, as in the War of 1812 between the U.S. and U.K., is an example of the operation of dissonance reduction as a social mechanism. The newly independent states formed before the empire’s dissolution also prove interesting to a socialization perspective on rivalries because they all emerged in the same geographic region in a relatively short time. Indeed, as illustrated in Proposition 3, Greece formed rivalries with Bulgaria and Turkey, and Serbia and Bulgaria formed a rivalry as well. These emerging states probably imitated the conflict-prone behavior exhibited by each other in their subsystem according to the social proof heuristic. Yugoslavia, formed in the aftermath of the war among the ruins of Austria-Hungary’s Balkan possessions, also formed a rivalry with Italy based on the latter’s continued interest in maintaining a sphere of influence along the Adriatic Sea.

P-2.

a. There are no cases of major members competing with each other.

b. There are two cases in which a major member may be socializing a minor member: U.K.—Iraq and the U.S.—Spain.

c. There are four cases in which major members may be socializing emerging states: U.S.—Haiti, U.S.—Mexico, China—India, and China—South Korea.

The interesting thing about Proposition 2 is that there are so few cases of rivalry that meet its standards. The absence of interactions between major members is probably because their capabilities are limited to their own regions. The case of the U.K. socializing Iraq can probably be construed as the U.K. acting as though it
were still a great power, because the Middle East was a traditional sphere of interest for the U.K. when it truly was a great power. Many observers argue that the 1956 Suez Canal crisis marked the final socialization of the U.K. out of its role as a great power by the U.S. (Waltz, 1993). The U.S.—Spain rivalry started as the U.S. began to assume the role of regional leader and protector in Latin America, leading to conflicts with Spain over Cuba. The U.S.—Spain rivalry came to a conclusion as the U.S. assumed the mantle of a great power and socialized Spain out of any remaining delusions of great-power status in 1898—a situation in which war closed alternative policy choices for Spain, and the social dissonance caused by Spain’s continued pretense at great-power status was eliminated. The four cases of major members socializing emerging states all involve regional interaction, as expected. The U.S., in particular, continued to exercise its role as regional leader and protector in its interactions (and military interventions) with Haiti and Mexico. Similarly, after China consolidated under communist rule, it attempted to socialize the newly independent states of South Korea and India into its vision of regional, if not global, communism.

P.3.

a. There are 10 cases in which minor members may be competing with other minor members: Ecuador—Peru, Bolivia—Paraguay, Chile—Argentina, Greece—Ottoman Empire/Turkey, Greece—Turkey, Iraq—Israel, Lebanon—Israel, China—Japan, Iran—Iraq, and Ethiopia—Sudan.

b. There are 12 cases in which minor members may be socializing emerging states: Somalia—Ethiopia, Egypt—Israel, Afghanistan—Pakistan, Thailand—Kampuchea, Greece—Bulgaria, Serbia—Bulgaria, Spain—Morocco, Saudi Arabia—Israel, Iraq—Kuwait, Turkey—Cyprus, Thailand—North Vietnam, and Thailand—Laos.

The remarkable thing about Proposition 3 is that one-third of all rivalries involve minor members competing with and/or socializing other minor members or emerging states. Most of the minor member—minor member dyads appear to involve competition over territory, such as Chile—Argentina, Ecuador—Peru, Bolivia—Paraguay, or Greece—Turkey after the Second World War. However, some of these cases (such as Iraq—Israel and Lebanon—Israel) do contain elements of socialization. Both Iraq and Lebanon, in addition to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have long attempted to socialize Israel out of the first role adopted by any emerging state—that of the sovereign state.\(^\text{10}\) Without intervention by the U.S. and other major members, such as France and Britain, they may have accomplished this goal. However, even in the absence of great-power intervention, our previous discussion of the social proof mechanism and the pace of socialization would expect that

\(^{10}\)See Barnett (1993) on the role of the sovereign state in the Middle Eastern subsystem.
Israel's introduction into the Middle Eastern regional subsystem would produce a long and troubled socialization process. The Iraq—Kuwait and Turkey—Cyprus rivalries are also examples of minor members challenging the adoption by emerging states of the role of the sovereign state.

It is possible that "peer" socialization may be more important than most of the social psychological literature would expect. This may make sense if minor members themselves have previously been socialized into the appropriate roles and norms of the international or regional system. The great powers or major member states have already instilled their sense of the appropriate normative order into these minor members, which then pass that information on to emerging states through socialization attempts in their localities. This may be evidence of a division of labor whereby great powers socialize major members and minor members, which in turn socialize emerging states. This may not be a very efficient method of socialization, as many of these emerging states seem able to resist the socialization efforts of minor members.

P-4. There are 10 cases in which emerging states may be competing with and/or socializing other emerging states: Jordan—Israel, Syria—Israel, India—Pakistan, North Korea—South Korea, Honduras—Nicaragua, Morocco—Algeria, Syria—Jordan, South Korea—Japan, Congo—Zaire, and Uganda—Kenya.

Rivalrous interaction among emerging states is also fairly commonplace. I would expect that these dyads have the potential for the most conflictual and longest-lived rivalries in the absence of outside intervention. If two states emerge into the system at the same time, compete over some good, and look to each other for guidance as to appropriate behavior, then they essentially socialize themselves into an ongoing cycle of conflict through the social proof heuristic. The actual source of contention no longer matters at some point, as the actors involved adopt an actor dimension (Mansbach & Vasquez, 1981, p. 60) and reduce all issues to "us versus them." The group of rivalries in the Middle East, including Jordan—Israel, Syria—Israel, and Syria—Jordan, may be examples of the operation of the social proof heuristic. Because many of these rivalries have emerged since 1945 and are ongoing, we may have to wait for some time to see how they play out. Recent efforts to end the conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors have met with continued hesitancy on the part of both sides to reduce the dissonance between the experience of the other as an enemy and the proposals that cast them as partners in peace.

P-5. As you can tell from a visual inspection of the list of rivalries, the vast majority of them occur within a geographic region. The exceptions usually involve at least one great power, as expected. Socialization and

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11 See Harris (1998) for an important exception.
competition are more likely to take place in arenas that offer greater possibilities for interaction. Regional subsystems offer such an arena.

**P-6.** As noted in P-5, great powers are found to potentially engage in socialization outside of their region when it comes to major members, minor members, and emerging states. The great powers have the greatest stake in maintaining a normative global order favorable to their current status.

**P-7.** The shift from multipolarity to bipolarity resulted in five rivalries ending in the period 1945–1955. However, 18 new rivalries began during this period. These new rivalries reflect the division of the world into two competing social spheres, with the U.S. taking an active role in attempting to bring back states from under Soviet influence. The rivalries spawned by the Cold War will have elements of socialization and competition, because the U.S.—Soviet rivalry based on competition was linked to a number of other rivalries through socialization.

In general, these findings suggest that socialization may indeed play an important role in rivalry formation. More than half (N=34) of the rivalrous dyads contain states with differential power capabilities. As I argued above, competition can only account for interaction among states with similar capabilities. Socialization is a worthwhile candidate to explain these unbalanced dyads. Further, 46% (N=29) of rivalrous dyads include at least one emerging state. Thus, just as we would expect, member states of the system (of whatever capability) may be involved in socializing novices into the system. Further investigation is needed to explain whether emerging states in these dyads are able to resist socialization efforts on particular norms or roles for extended periods of time, or whether the norms and roles under contention change through time, thus requiring ongoing socialization efforts.

The findings in this section are highly tentative. The propositions deduced from the theoretical discussion of competition and socialization demonstrate that an approach to rivalry that considers both structural features has the potential to explain some of the lingering questions about rivalries. This exploratory study should open the door to the generation of testable hypotheses and the creation of a database with information on the contents of socialization (e.g., norms and roles) as well as the contents of competition (e.g., issues). Even in its current theoretical stage, this research can illuminate additional empirical findings that puzzle those operating in the inductive approach.

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12 I use Goertz and Diehl’s (1995) method of allowing a 10-year impact window when assessing the effects of political shocks (such as a system change) on rivalry formation and termination. I also use Goertz and Diehl’s specification of the start of a rivalry as the incidence of its first MID. This approach differs from that of Bennett (1998).

13 See Goertz and Diehl (1997) and Diehl (2000, pp. 241–262) on linkages between rivalries.
Additional Findings Explained by Socialization

The second major problem with previous research, as noted above, is its failure to explain how rivalries are initiated and terminated. Goertz and Diehl (1995) argued that enduring rivalries represent a peculiar kind of stability in international relations. To break the stability of such conflictual patterns, it may be necessary to introduce a large political shock. Indeed, Goertz and Diehl argued that political shocks—defined as world wars, territorial changes, alterations in the international distribution of power, civil wars, and national independence—may account for the initiation and termination of rivalries. Further, rather than predicting the beginning or ending of a rivalry at a fixed point in time, they expected shocks to have an impact over a range of 10 years after their occurrence. They found that 87% of the 45 enduring rivalries examined in their study began during or within 10 years after any of the five political shocks. Further, more than 53% of the rivalries ended within 10 years of a political shock.

Goertz and Diehl (1995) did not flesh out the causal story that links political shocks to the initiation or termination of rivalries. A socialization perspective can provide a theoretical explanation for the finding that system shocks like world wars, large changes in the distribution of territory, and changes in the distribution of power accompany the onset and termination of rivalries. When the system changes, all states except the remaining great powers are novices and must be resocialized. This means that old rivalries based on socialization to the norms and roles of the old system should end, and new rivalries based on socialization to new norms and roles may form. Some preliminary evidence for this was found in Proposition 7.

Emerging states are particularly subject to socialization attempts. This is consistent with Goertz and Diehl’s (1995) finding that national independences are a political shock that accompanies the onset of rivalry. Some of these rivalries form as emerging states become locked in competition over their insecure territorial claims; however, others form as emerging states take time to learn the appropriate norms and roles required of them to join the “club of nations” (Maoz, 1989). Emerging states that are quickly socialized into the system (by great powers, regional powers, or their peers) may never become rivals. They may account for a number of the isolated or proto-rivalries identified by Goertz and Diehl (1992). However, others may find themselves in an ongoing relationship with a socializer that will attempt to mold and shape their behavior for an extended period of time.

The third general problem of the inductive approach, an explanation of the varying intensity of rivalries, has received some attention in the literature. Hensel (1998) developed an evolutionary approach to rivalry that demonstrates that the conflict level of a rivalry gradually increases through time. However, Goertz and Diehl (1998) found no support for such a “volcano model” of rivalry in which hostilities escalate over time into war. The little evidence on the varying intensity of rivalries is thus mixed so far. A socialization perspective would argue that the intensity level of a rivalry will vary according to how offensive each episode of
role or norm location was to the normative order the socializer was attempting to support. This might include an escalation of hostility if a state repeatedly violates a norm or attempts to enact a non-sanctioned role. This may account for ups and downs in the level of intensity in a rivalry over time, if the state violates different norms or enacts different non-sanctioned roles. Presumably, repeated offenses would elicit more intensely conflictual responses from the socializer. This turned out to be the case for the U.S., which attempted to enact a non-sanctioned neutral role twice, ultimately leading to the War of 1812 with the U.K. A socialization perspective also accounts for periods of relative calm, in which the socializee is enacting its role appropriately or conforming to established norms. The inductive approach, with its reliance on competition, has so far been unable to explain the lapses between conflictual episodes.

The inductive approach has also had some difficulty explaining Bennett’s (1998) and Cioffi-Revilla’s (1998) findings, from analyses using survival models, that rivalries exhibit positive duration dependence. Positive duration dependence means that a rivalry’s hazard rate increases over time. In other words, the longer a rivalry persists, the more likely it is to terminate. Essentially, rivalries do not become entrenched over time. Thus, truth-in-advertising requires that we drop the “enduring” appellation to rivalries. Bennett (1998, p. 1224) was puzzled by the positive duration dependence and asked what mechanism might be responsible. I suggest that socialization may account for positive duration dependence overall, and for the variance that Cioffi-Revilla found among rivalrous dyads according to their power configurations. Socialization is an ongoing process within the system. The members of the system need to be ever ready to attempt to instruct or coerce other states to support the system. Those states that resist socialization efforts and their would-be socializers are likely candidates for rivalries. States with greater capabilities, or that are not fully involved in the international system, are likely to resist socialization attempts for a greater period of time than those with lesser capabilities or a greater stake in the system.

Major power-major power dyads are the least stable (shortest-lived) rivalries, according to Cioffi-Revilla (1998, p. 86). He suggested that because the maximum amount of power is available to deal with these competitions, they are unlikely to persist over long periods of time. Major powers are not likely to be socializing each other unless a new great power enters their ranks. Thus, competition is the dominant force among the great powers, and results in the shortest-lived rivalries.

Major power-minor power dyads are more stable (longer-lived). Thompson (1995) and Vasquez (1996) have questioned the validity of including major—minor dyads in the category of rivalries. It does not necessarily make sense to think of major—minor dyads as competitors, except in the general sense that all states

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14Cioffi-Revilla (1998) referred to only two types of states: major powers and minor powers.
are theoretically competitors in an anarchic system according to Waltz (1979). However, this dyadic combination is exactly what a socialization perspective would expect. Major powers should be socializing minor powers within their sphere of influence. The fact that these dyads persist into rivalries indicates that socialization attempts may often be incomplete or fail at times, or that they may involve changes in the roles and norms under contention over time.

Minor power—minor power dyads are the most stable (longest-lived). This may reflect Thompson’s (1995) notion that these states don’t have the resources to settle their disputes once-and-for-all. Minor—minor dyads are competitors and usually neighbors. A theoretical focus on competition would predict that neighbors would be most likely to engage in competitive behaviors over time because neighbors are in the immediate field of competition (Vasquez, 1993, pp. 134–135).

A socialization perspective would also expect that peer states engage in socialization efforts. This could take three dyadic forms: emerging state—emerging state, minor member—emerging state, and minor member—minor member. Dyads of two emerging states might be particularly conflictual in the absence of a dominant regional or great-power socializer. A conflict among competitive emerging states could easily become entrenched if either of the new states believe that its survival is at stake. Once conflict is initiated, these states socialize each other into acceptable behavior according to the logic of the social proof heuristic—essentially, reciprocity based on conflict. Rajmaira’s (1997) work on the India—Pakistan rivalry appears to confirm this hypothesis. In the absence of a great-power socializer, these rivalries may become entrenched. Bennett (1998, p. 1224) similarly suggested that institutionalization may occur within a rival dyad if it is not disrupted by some outside factor, such as a great power. Minor member—emerging state rivalries may be long–lived if the minor member does not have the capabilities to force the emerging state into conformity with the appropriate roles or norms. Minor member—minor member dyads engaged in competition and socialization may similarly face a challenge of balanced capabilities that fail to enable either side to prevail. These situations also may require the intervention of a great power or major member, or the disruption of the rivalry by a political shock such as a system change.

**Conclusions**

Goertz and Diehl (1996) expressed an understanding of the implicit use of the rivalry concept in academic theory and argued that the time has come to incorporate rivalry into theory–building. The dominant theoretical explanation for rivalries is that they are competitions over territorial issues. However, as Waltz (1979) has argued, competition is but one of two structural factors conditioning state behavior in the international system. Socialization also appears to play an important role in conditioning enduring rivalries. Further, socialization, along with competition, may make explicit the role of the rivalry concept in existing research programs.
such as Modelski’s (1987) long-cycle approach and Organski and Kugler’s (1980) power transition theory, among others.

I have sought to expand on Waltz’s spare description of competition and socialization by proposing several mechanisms that may operate on their behalf, thereby producing four ideal types of states. When these types of states interact, we can make some general assumptions about their behaviors. The competitive mechanisms may account for rivalries between states with similarly matched capabilities. The socialization mechanisms may account for rivalrous interaction between states with different levels of capability. Because these mechanisms of socialization and competition are not peculiar to rivalrous interaction, they may account for all types of behavior in the international system. This research should therefore contribute to a renewal of Waltz’s structural theory by incorporating mechanisms associated with the process of socialization.

I have argued in theoretical terms for the necessity of considering socialization as a conditioning factor in rivalries between states with different levels of capability. The propositions about socialization put forward above have shed some light on a subset of rivalry cases that should be examined in greater depth. These cases may not all turn out to involve socialization, yet many of them will. The key point is that all rivalries are not equivalent. The dynamics of rivalries between major powers may indeed be similar to rivalries between minor powers, in that they are both conditioned by competition. However, the mixed dyads are a different sort and are the likely candidates for socialization effects. Because the mixed dyads make up more than half of the rivalry database, it seems logical to pursue a socialization perspective that may offer insights into their dynamics. In conjunction with work that has already been done on competition, we may yet develop a more comprehensive explanation of the peculiar feature of the international system known as enduring rivalries.

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