The author advocates a strict definition of the Truman National Historical Site. He seems unwilling to accept the notion that each competing history—regardless of politics, interests, and biases—should have an equal say. He therefore criticizes churches that demolish houses to expand their facilities and that resist the preservationist restrictions as infringements on property rights and free speech. He is also disappointed that the city council failed to support a larger district and to set strict limits on the sale or demolition of properties near the district. He is unsympathetic to those who assess preservation by its ability to increase tourism and provide economic stimulus to the city. Developers who want to replace a few old structures with new contextual ones and thus reverse the blight and out-migration of residents, institutions, and capital from the neighborhood are criticized for creating a "false sense of history," rather than recognized for revitalizing the district (p. 231). Thus, the resulting smaller Truman National Historical Site is a "missed ... opportunity" (p. 239) that reflects the failure by city leaders to formulate a comprehensive "preservation strategy" (p. 241) for the "entire cultural landscape" (p. 242). He bemoans that the district's importance has been "diminished" in the "community's consciousness" and "collective memory" (p. 243) and regrets that the "most numerous and visible historic resources, those related to Truman, have become the least visible in the community's historical consciousness" (p. 245).

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In 1957, elite panic following the launch of Russia's Sputnik changed the way scientists (especially physicists) operated politically. A cabinet-level presidential science adviser position was created. Assisting him was the President's Science Advisory Committee (psac). For the next sixteen years there existed a small panel with direct access to the president and broad advisory mandates. Presidents received relatively disinterested advice about weapons systems and space and arms races. In 1973, however, after the psac opposed an antiballistic missile (ABM) program, it and the science adviser position were abolished by Richard M. Nixon. Only partly reconstituted since, science advisory agencies have been ad hoc and decentralized under the conservative presidents Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and—especially—George W. Bush. As one result, the nation has spent $150 billion in twenty-five years on missile defense systems still not successfully tested under realistic battlefield conditions. Presidents have also dithered about addressing global warming.

Following earlier analysts including Bruce L. R. Smith and Gregg Herken, Zuoyue Wang surveys the psac to answer these questions: What shaped relationships between scientists and the state? And, what is the proper role of science in a democratic society? Eight case studies clarify these topics: the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; military missile development; the 1963 nuclear test ban; the Stanford linear accelerator; project Apollo; the psac's response to Rachel Carson's pioneering Silent Spring (1962); the Vietnam War; the ABM program; and the supersonic transport aircraft. Wang sees opportunity (in Sputnik), agreement (regarding nuclear arms control), and liberal-to-moderate consensus (regarding containing Communism) as answers to his first question on the relationship between science and the state. Toward answering his second question, he argues that psac's key role was to advise what technology would not do. Such "scientific and technological dissent" is "vital" (p. 317). Otherwise, high technology enthusiasm and gadget worship will land the country in large, avoidable troubles.

Wang's sometimes discursive survey is rich with anecdotes showing that scientists were not politically naive. Nor were they economically disinterested about federal funding for their research specialties. Relatively liberal
Technological skeptics, however, were not able to stop technologies that Wang sees as "unrealistic and undisciplined hype," such as nuclear power and human space exploration (p. 3). Nor were they able to halt arms and space races they had helped start. The PSAC slowed, rather than stopped, Cold War–based programs. Lacking statutory authority, PSAC depended on presidential regard. Accordingly, half of Wang's book concerns the more successful first six years of the PSAC's lifetime. Wang maintains well his theme of the value of technological skepticism. His discussion of "policy for science" items, such as science education and research and development funding, is cursory. Readers looking for details about the revolution in higher education after 1958 or how funding for science and technology research and development swelled to one-eighth of the federal budget by 1965 will be disappointed. Those who want to see how top scientists have tried to fight off their conservative brethren, such as Edward Teller, since the days of the H-bomb will find much to interest them. Wang's volume complements and augments earlier works and is best for libraries with strong science and society collections.

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"There are two kinds of propaganda," said the documentary filmmaker Kevin Rafferty, "propaganda when you know you're lying and propaganda when you think you're telling the truth" (p. 178). Best known for his hilarious composition of civil defense films, Atomic Cafe (1982), Rafferty understood that when it comes to propaganda it is often impossible to discern where entrenched beliefs end and deliberate distortions begin. This theme runs through Laura A. Belmonte's thoughtful analysis of American propaganda during the early Cold War. Policy makers and propagandists who sold the American way of life with almost missionary fervor self-consciously intended to manipulate foreign perceptions, but in doing so they projected their deeply held beliefs about their country's national identity.

Belmonte's study begins with two chapters that provide competent, concise overviews of how the Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower administrations approached the propaganda war. This brisk march through the controversies, ideas, and strategies that shaped the U.S. information program is a bit disconnected from the second and more significant part of the book: the remaining four chapters that analyze in rich detail the images of democracy, capitalism, gender, and race relations disseminated by U.S. propaganda agencies. Belmonte suggests that these images provide a useful lens for analyzing how Americans used culture to project power and how they constructed their own sense of self.

Propaganda experts conveyed a sanitized and idealized vision of American society. But, Belmonte reveals, they faced an intractable problem. Even in that supposed age of consensus, Americans disagreed over "what values, symbols, and people best exemplified America" (p. 9). Belmonte's study contains numerous provocative examples of domestic political controversies that arose in reaction to U.S. propaganda materials disseminated abroad. In one case, the State Department searched high and low for a "typical American family" to feature in a photo essay it intended to disseminate abroad. After settling on one "respectable and suitable" family, the department had to pull the story after a newspaper disclosed that the husband and wife had each been divorced and, even worse, that the man did not have a war record (p. 151). Such disputes dogged U.S. propaganda programs at every turn. In the age of Jim Crow, propaganda about race relations, not surprisingly, provoked especially heated debate about American values and ideals.

Propaganda studies have assumed an especially prominent place in the "new diplomatic history"—which, in addition to internationalizing the field, incorporates social and cultural history into the study of U.S. foreign relations. Belmonte's contribution is less to revise existing studies of U.S. propaganda than to synthesize, refine, and amplify that scholarship—tasks she does exceptionally well. Although