production facilities in the state of Washington.

The dual accomplishments of developing nylon and constructing the Hanford facilities made chemical engineering the most prestigious engineering field both within and outside the firm. During the 1950s, their development of additional synthetic materials, their advisory and leadership roles within the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and their construction of heavy-water and plutonium-production plants on the banks of the Savannah River in South Carolina for AEC's hydrogen bomb project further incorporated DuPont chemical engineers into the military-industrial complex and consumer society. Yet this heyday ended rapidly during the 1960s with the rise of environmentalism and growing consumer preference for natural fibers.

Ndaiye's narrative regarding the rise and fall of DuPont chemical engineering is not quite as simple as the above summary indicates. To round out his analysis, he also examines the development of chemical engineering societies and academic programs. Moreover, he describes, at length, how chemical engineering fit into the decentralized structure of DuPont and profiles key chemical personnel. While these insights do not distract from the narrative, his criticism of other scholars' approaches to the history of technology does. Moreover, his analysis of the culture created by chemical engineers at DuPont is not convincing in that he provides little substantiation for his claims, particularly in regard to their political views.

The reader who is new to the field of the history of technology will find this book tough sledding, particularly because of its historiographic references. The reader who is well versed in the field will fare much better and gain insight into the significant contributions made by chemical engineers and into the interaction between technological developments and broad social, cultural, and political changes.

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American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe.

By John Krige. (Boston: MIT Press, 2006. Pp. viii, 376. $40.00 cloth.)

If you are interested in the history of the cold war, of modern science, or of U.S.-Europe relations, this is a wonderful book to read. John Krige's American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe captures brilliantly evolving dynamics in the scientific interactions between the U.S. and continental Europe during the early cold war, providing both a lucid historical and historiographical context
and detailed, fascinating case studies. Written by one of the leading historians of modern science and technology, the book will help the reader understand both the extent and the limit of American power in the world.

At the center of the book is the story of how prominent American scientists and foundation administrators, acting as formal or informal representatives of the U.S. government, sought to revitalize science in a war-torn Europe from the late 1940s to the early 1960s. Krige uses the term "hegemony" to refer to the American influence in Europe that derived from the enormous disparity in terms of geopolitical statuses and scientific resources, especially in the immediate postwar years. Such influence was often exercised within the framework of American cold war strategy. Thus American physicist I. I. Rabi successfully pushed for the initiation of CERN, the European center for particle physics, as a step not only in strengthening European science but also in European political unification when he insisted on the inclusion of German and Italian scientists in the institution. American philanthropies, especially the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, reshaped European science through financial largess but always in close consultation with the State Department and sometimes the Central Intelligence Agency. In one of the most revealing episodes of the book, Krige describes how the Ford Foundation agreed to finance a program at the Niels Bohr Institute in Copenhagen to bring in research fellows from across the Iron Curtain, including China, as a way to gain scientific intelligence for the U.S. government.

The book is not, however, only about the one-way flow of American influence. In fact, the emphasis of Krige's nuanced analysis is that in the many cases where Americans succeeded in Europe they did so largely because they worked with the scientific elite in Europe in a collaborative spirit. Thus the American hegemony, in both science and politics in general, was very much a soft one, a "co-production" that gained acceptance for American ideas and proposals in Europe precisely because they were adapted and revised to meet local needs and conditions. There were exceptions that proved the rule, which pointed to the growing resistance to wholesale transplantation of American institutions as European science recovered its strength. For example, a proposal to build an International Institute of Technology in Europe modeled after the Massachusetts Institute of Technology met with failure in the 1960s. The sobering lesson that emerges from the book is that the U.S. should think twice and carefully before trying to export its scientific and political ideals and practices to others, even its allies.

In short, the book provides both a sure-handed, up-to-date summary of recent, exciting scholarship on cold war and modern science
and a detailed examination of a number of key events in the history of early cold war science that are important in their own right. One wishes that there could have been more comparisons with American scientific interactions in non-European regions, such as Asia and Latin America. Does the model of "co-produced hegemony" apply there as well? What about U.S.-Soviet scientific relations? One also wonders how "co-produced hegemony" worked in actual scientific practice in contrast to institutional building. But these are minor complaints that are in fact indicative of the possibilities that this well-researched, thoughtfully written study has opened.

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It is little exaggeration to argue that the cold war armed forces are one of the black holes in U.S. military history. Donna Alvah's book on overseas families is a welcome addition. Drawing from a variety of sources—archives, personal papers, magazines, official reports—she convincingly demolishes the myth that the U.S. established "Little Americas" that replicated conditions at home and segregated its personnel from the residents of the host nation. As the book's title makes clear, service wives served as unofficial ambassadors, a form of feminine "soft power" that was, in Alvah's view, vitally important in furthering U.S. diplomatic goals. Moreover, they probably had a significant role in modifying the views of Americans, both military and civilian, about their former enemies. The military families who toured war-ravaged areas, who learned new languages and customs, who formed close friendships with residents were an important aspect of reconciliation.

Alvah is a good writer, and she recognizes that her work is, above all, a history of people meeting people. There are numerous entertaining and often touching accounts that demonstrate the generosity, tolerance, and decency of military families. Perhaps they were consciously furthering the policies of their government, but those Americans who funded orphanages, helped feed the destitute, and donated their time and money to institutions like the Child Welfare