rope into the Soviet camp. In this way then, Sayle argues in one of the book’s most original interpretive contributions, from the start NATO “offered the best insurance against the dangers of democracy—a fickle electorate that, in seeking peace, might pave the way for war” (2).

A formal North Atlantic alliance, as opposed to merely a promise of U.S. assistance that could be vulnerable to shifting political currents and was thus not reliable, was deemed the sine qua non for achieving the dual aims of coopting the Federal Republic of Germany and containing the Soviet Union. If apprehension about the whims of U.S. public opinion made NATO necessary, the alliance’s increasing reliance on U.S. nuclear weapons in member countries posed others sorts of difficulties. The rub here, as Sayle explains, was the congressional insistence that U.S. troops could remain in Europe only behind a nuclear shield. If this stricture made sense as a way of protecting U.S. military personnel, it ran up against the slow but steady growth of antinuclear sentiment in Western Europe. Manifested in mounting pressure on member governments to undertake disarmament, the antinuclear movement struck the heart of NATO’s defense strategy and illustrated again the dangers that democracy posed for the organization. That member governments weathered the antinuclear challenge testified to the importance the alliance had come to assume in the pantheon of national—and continental—interests and the political risks those governments were willing to take in order to maintain it.

Member states’ efforts to direct NATO operations to suit their own national interests also threatened the organization’s very existence. Some of those efforts involved protecting colonial interests. France sought the organization’s help in suppressing nationalist revolutionaries in Algeria. Belgium expected the same sort of assistance in the Congo. And Britain and France even believed that NATO might help to resolve their differences with the United States over Suez. None of these hopes for NATO support came to fruition, largely because the United States was determined that alliance members not use the organization to advance their traditional colonial aims, aims that flew in the face of global anti-colonial sentiment. Other nationally motivated policies were disconnected to imperial pursuits. France withdrew from NATO’s military command in 1966, convinced that it no longer needed U.S. nuclear protection. Britain jockeyed for a special position in the alliance while simultaneously pursuing membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), even if that required concessions to France. Perhaps the most striking instance of a NATO member satisfying national aims was the successful coupling of German reunification with continued membership in the alliance, which satisfied both Germany and the United States while simultaneously making war on the continent less likely. That such a move also won sanction from Moscow affirmed the alliance’s continued relevance even as the Cold War was drawing to a close.

For Sayle, the key to NATO’s longevity is its adaptability. Over its seventy-year existence it has overcome a host of internal challenges and remained a priority for the governments of its member states even as they faced other national interests and priorities. No other policy initiative or organization, however, could offer what NATO did: a vehicle for preventing German adventurism, blocking Soviet expansion or subversion, and ensuring a continued U.S. commitment to Europe. By explaining NATO’s centrality for the postwar world, Enduring Alliance constitutes an indispensable addition to the literature.

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Greg Whitesides’s Science and American Foreign Relations since World War II presents a comprehensive, insightful, and timely survey on the subject that should prove valuable to historians and anyone else interested in how science, technology, and American foreign policy mixed together to shape the complex, globalized world we live in today. Filling a gap, the book successfully bridges American diplomatic history and the history of science and technology while also shedding illuminating light on other topics such as Cold War history and environmental history.

Mining an impressive range of recent scholarly studies as well as some unique—mainly digital—primary sources, Whitesides tells a fascinating story of the use of science and technology in American diplomacy that pivoted on a radical transformation that took place in the 1970s. For the period before that turning point, the book portrays a seamless transition between the deployment of science and technology for national and international security from World War II to the Cold War. Beyond familiar topics such as the roles of the Manhattan Project, Atoms for Peace (AFP), the International Geophysical Year (IGY), and the space program in U.S.-European-Soviet relations, it refreshingly also explores less-covered technical and geographical areas, such as agriculture and health in American relations with the developing world. He does so effectively through a detailed examination of the American Point Four program of foreign technical assistance starting in the late 1940s, especially in the Middle East and Latin America.

A surprising quote, from a 1946 communication from the Chinese communist official Zhou Enlai to
George C. Marshall, then serving as President Harry S. Truman’s representative in China, both illustrates the postwar international appeal of American know-how and perhaps portends the later evolution of bilateral relations: “The prosperity and peace of China could be promoted by the introduction of the American political system, science, and industrialization,” the future Chinese premier confided in Marshall, adding that this sentiment was shared by the Communist leader Mao Zedong himself (quoted on 99). While this statement may have been a diplomatic ploy designed to gain Marshall’s favor in his role as the American mediator of the Communists’ civil war with the Nationalist government, it does help Whitesides to make the interesting case that the Mao years (1949–1976) of mutual isolation represented more an aberration than the norm in modern Sino-American scientific relations. Renewed scientific and technological ties did develop after President Richard M. Nixon’s 1972 trip to Beijing and especially the reestablishment of U.S.-China diplomatic relations in 1979.

Besides U.S.-China relations reopening, other powerful forces and changes lead Whitesides to pinpoint the 1970s as the beginning of the transformation of the roles of science and technology in American diplomacy: U.S.-Soviet détente, the Vietnam fiasco, the emergence of the environment as a global concern, the replacement of the federal government by corporations as the dominant funding source of American research and development. Reflecting the shifting domestic and international landscapes, the U.S. government no longer pursued Point Four-like massive international technical aid programs but instead pushed for intellectual property protection, especially in regard to biotechnology, and export control, often causing frictions with its European allies and leading to protests in developing countries.

Finally, the book brings the narrative up to date, covering the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, charting recent controversies such as the inconsistent American and international responses to the climate change crisis, debates over genetic patenting, the rising threat of cyberattacks, and intensifying U.S.-China rivalry. It ends by observing the central importance of scientific knowledge to world affairs and calling for sensible American policies promoting international scientific cooperation in order to serve both national and global interest.

While the book is generally well written, cogently argued, and carefully documented, there are some careless errors. For example, it was not Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, who died in 1953, but his successor Nikita Khrushchev who signed a nuclear agreement with Mao in 1956 (80). Zhou was not “Chinese Foreign Minister” in 1946 when he communicated with Marshall (99); he added that title in 1949 after the establishment of the People’s Republic. By the 1970s, Khrushchev was no longer Soviet premier as stated on page 183—he had been forced out in 1964. The American physicist (and climate change denier) Frederick Seitz was once president of Rockefeller University, not the Rockefeller Foundation (205). Commendably the book uses footnotes, not endnotes, but regrettably the bibliography lists only books, making it difficult to easily identify articles when they appear in abbreviated form after the first full citation in the footnotes. Even more regrettably the index is highly erratic, listing for example only the page numbers where “China” appears in chapter 1.

One also wishes that the author could have added some discussion on both the relations and distinctions between science and technology as they appear in the historical context under study and as they are used in the book. At places the author seems to deploy them as interchangeable terms, which may or may not be justified. In this connection, the historian of science Paul Forman’s influential though controversial 2007 paper “The Primacy of Science in Modernity, of Technology in Postmodernity, and of Ideology in the History of Technology” (History and Technology 23, no. 1/2 [March/June]: 1–152) seems relevant and could form an interesting starting point for such a discussion.

These minor concerns notwithstanding, I find this broad survey of science and technology in American foreign policy, from World War II through the Cold War to the early twenty-first century, to be competent and stimulating. It represents a true scholarly achievement, would serve as an excellent text in many classes, and could be read profitably by interested readers outside academia.

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Ken I. Kersch’s Conservatives and the Constitution: Imagining Constitutional Restoration in the Heyday of American Liberalism gives an account of how an isolated American Right, struggling for identity as well as influence during the post–New Deal Era, managed to collect fractured bits of ideology from diverse sources in order to create a formidable Constitutional movement. One of Kersch’s purposes is to explain how conservatives sought to harmonize and promote their ideas so as to align them with the United States Constitution while also making them politically palatable.

This development took forty years and came to fruition only after 1980. It began largely with disillusioned anti-Progressives after World War II—an eclectic mixture of traditional conservatives, such as Wil-